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 Abstract 
 
 
Rural politics in the time of global land grabs and neoliberal agricultural de-
velopment have received much international attention. However, the proc-
esses at work in the post-socialist countryside (such as in Russia and 
Ukraine) are rarely addressed in the critical agrarian studies debates. The 
prefix ‘post-’ in post-socialist and post-Soviet studies is often associated 
with lagging behind. This doctoral study demonstrates that the analysis of 
rural politics in these settings can generate new insights about contemporary 
changes in the agrarian world. This study investigates official rural politics 
(the state politics of resource allocation and large-scale agricultural devel-
opment); politics of organised rural resistance and mobilisation; and every-
day unorganised rural practices of adaptation, compliance, resistance and 
acquiescence in contemporary Russia and Ukraine. It demonstrates that land 
grabbing and the development of large-scale industrial agriculture are often 
accepted by post-Soviet villagers, who – contrary to rural people in other 
parts of the world – do not necessarily resist, but rather struggle to be in-
corporated into large-scale agriculture. This study also shows that small-
scale subsistence farming can coexist with large-scale agriculture, due to the 
continuation of the Soviet dual agricultural system and the symbiotic rela-
tions between large and small farms. The analysis of rural resistance and 
mobilisation in post-socialist post-Soviet settings reveals that social move-
ments and activists are more effective when they cooperate with the state 
and employ official regulations, norms and rhetoric in their politics, rather 
than openly oppose the regime. Finally, the study indicates that the rights to 
culturally appropriate food and defining one’s own food system are not 
alien to the post-Soviet population. However, these ideas are not accompa-
nied by public discourses and open mobilisation, thus, representing a ‘quiet’ 
form of what can still be seen as food sovereignty. 
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Heroverweging van plattelandspolitiek in postsocialistische 
omgevingen. Plattelandsgemeenschappen, landjepik en 
agrarische transformatie in Rusland en Oekraïne 
 Samenvatting 
 
Door de neoliberale ontwikkelingen in de landbouw en wereldwijde 
landjepik heeft de plattelandspolitiek veel internationale aandacht gekregen. 
De ontwikkelingen in de postsocialistische landen (met als voorbeeld 
Rusland en Oekraïne) worden daarentegen nauwelijks behandeld in het 
agrarische academisch debat. Het voorvoegsel ‘post’ in postsocialistische en 
post-Sovjet-studies wordt vaak geassocieerd met ‘achtergesteld’. Dit 
promotieonderzoek toont aan dat de analyse van de plattelandspolitiek in de 
postsocialistische landen nieuwe inzichten over hedendaagse veranderingen 
in de agrarische wereld kan genereren. Officiële plattelandspolitiek (de staat 
die verantwoordelijk is voor de toewijzing van middelen en voor de 
grootschalige plattelandsontwikkeling); politiek, mobilisatie en verzet op het 
platteland; en alledaagse ongeorganiseerde aanpassing, naleving, verzet en 
lijdzaamheid op het platteland in het hedendaagse Rusland en Oekraïne 
staan centraal in dit onderzoek. Het onderzoek toont aan dat landjepik en 
de ontwikkeling van intensive (grootschalige industriële) landbouw vaak 
door de post-Sovjet-dorpelingen wordt geaccepteerd, ze weinig weerstand 
bieden – in tegenstelling tot mensen op het platteland in andere delen van 
de wereld – en proberen zelfs in de grootschalige landbouw geïncorporeerd 
te worden. Het onderzoek toont ook aan dat, als gevolg van de voortzetting 
van de Sovjet-duale landbouwsysteem en de symbiotische relaties tussen 
grote en kleine bedrijven, kleinschalige zelfvoorzienende landbouw kan 
samengaan met grootschalige landbouw. Uit analyse van plattelandsverzet 
en mobilisatie in postsocialistische post-Sovjet-omgevingen blijkt dat sociale 
bewegingen en activisten effectiever zijn wanneer ze samengaan met de 
nationale overheid en gebruik maken van wettelijke voorschriften, normen 
en retoriek in de politiek, in plaats van openlijk verzetten tegen het regime. 
Ten slotte blijkt uit het onderzoek dat de rechten op cultureel passend 
voedsel en het definiëren van het eigen voedselsysteem niet vreemd is voor 
de post-Sovjet-bevolking. Echter, deze ideeën gaan echter niet gepaard met 
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openbare toespraken en open mobilisatie, hetgeen neerkomt op een ‘stille’ 
vorm van wat gezien kan worden als voedselsoevereiniteit. 
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 Preface 
 
 
This doctoral dissertation is composed of seven chapters; five of them are 
published as academic articles in leading peer-reviewed journals in the field 
of rural politics and agrarian transformation (see publication information at 
the end of each chapter). The introduction (Chapter 1), two empirical chap-
ters (Chapters 4 and 5), and conclusion and discussion (Chapter 7) are writ-
ten solely by the PhD candidate. Another empirical chapter (Chapter 3) is 
co-authored with the candidate’s co-promotor, in which the candidate is the 
leading author. Two remaining empirical chapters (Chapters 2 and 6) are co-
authored with several other academics, including members of the supervi-
sory team.  
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1 
Introduction. Agrarian Capitalism and 
Rural Politics in Post-Socialist Contexts 
and Beyond  
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter presents and discusses the overall research findings of this 
doctoral study on rural politics in post-socialist settings, which was con-
ducted from 2012 to 2015 in Russia and Ukraine. It situates its analysis 
within global debates on agrarian capitalism, land grabbing, food sover-
eignty, rural resistance and mobilisation. Five key themes of the doctoral 
study are identified and discussed in this chapter, namely: 1) post-Soviet 
agrarian capitalism ‘from above’, which includes analysis of land reforms 
and the neoliberal mechanisms of ‘enclosure’ or land grabbing; 2) agrar-
ian capitalism ‘from below’ and the peasant question; 3) rural politics of 
the post-socialist state; 4) rural resistance and mobilisation; and 5) ‘eve-
ryday’ politics and adaptation practices of post-Soviet rural households. 
By bringing post-Soviet, post-socialist rural politics into the context of 
global agrarian debates, this dissertation aims to rethink some predomi-
nant assumptions in critical agrarian studies. Likewise, it challenges the 
common understanding of contemporary transformation in the post-
socialist countryside by bringing fresh insights from the agrarian studies 
literature. In addition to introducing this dissertation’s major debates and 
findings, this chapter discusses the research methodology and epistemo-
logical approach. 
1.1. The prefix ‘post-’ in critical agrarian studies on rural 
politics 
Rural politics have been of interest to many social scientists and political 
activists ever since Alexander Herzen – one of the fathers of agrarian 
populism – proclaimed ‘V narod!’ (‘To the people!’)1 as the solution to 
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the socio-economic crisis of the 1860s in Russia. Since then, academic 
and political interest in rural politics has fluctuated but never entirely dis-
appeared. The twentieth century witnessed a number of rebellions, 
revolutions and national social movements, in which peasants played an 
important role. Those historical events contributed to major debates on 
rural class struggles, mobilisation and agrarian change in the field of 
peasant studies (Scott 1976, Paige 1975, Wolf 1969, Bernstein and Byres 
2001). The contemporary globalisation of agriculture and neoliberal capi-
talist development in many parts of the world brought new challenges to 
rural communities, provoked new types of rural politics, and forced criti-
cal scholars to rethink mainstream assumptions and orthodoxies in rural 
studies (Borras 2009). Rural rebellions and peasant wars became features 
of the past; contemporary rural politics are characterised by ‘mid-range 
and micro (everyday) forms of peasant political action or forms of 
agency’ and ‘non-revolutionary but radical, unarmed but militant’ rural 
activism (JPS, Editorial note, 2009: 2).  
Rural politics is a very broad concept. It is primarily associated with 
acts and practices of poor rural communities in response to the dynamic 
changes in the agrarian world. The rural poor – including various peasant 
strata, rural labourers, and indigenous peoples – are often considered 
victims of agrarian capitalism, which is characterised by land and capital 
accumulation that leads to dispossession and marginalisation of small-
holders. Rural responses to agrarian capitalism have constituted the re-
search objective of many studies. Contemporary critical agrarian scholars 
analyse rural political reactions to industrial agriculture, land (or land 
control) grabbing, globalisation, food-for-fuel conversions and other 
challenges of neoliberalism (e.g. Schneider 2011, Alonso-Fradejas 2015, 
Moreda 2015). Whereas some rural responses involve covert unorgan-
ised practices, others take the form of open structured mobilisation. 
Thus, many covert contemporary rural politics fall into the category of 
hidden ‘everyday peasant resistance’, as conceptualised by Scott and 
Kerkvliet (Scott 1985, Scott and Kerkvliet 1986), others are rather 
within-the-system ‘rightful resistance’ as developed by O’Brien (1996, 
2013) using the example of rural China. The overt organised type of rural 
resistance and mobilisation is the primary focus of rural social move-
ments studies. Recent years have witnessed the growth and empower-
ment of many transnational and national social movements, such as La 
Via Campesina and Brazil’s Landless Workers’ Movement (MST). Those 
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agrarian justice movements advocate food sovereignty, de-globalisation, 
and the use of diverse sustainable agricultural practices through 
agroecology (Desmarais 2002, Stahler-Sholk et al. 2007, Scoones 2008, 
Newell 2008). For some critical agrarian scholars, however, rural politics 
is also an ideological struggle of indigenous peoples around the meaning 
of territory as it is associated with food, land and natural resources 
(Howitt 2001, Li 1996, Peluso 1992). Moreover, there is a growing body 
of academic research focused on rural politics of the state and state ac-
tors regarding resource allocation and rural development (Wolford et al. 
2013, Das 2009). Whereas some authors focus primarily on the role of 
the state in agrarian transformation (e.g. Corbridge et al. 2004, Lavers 
2012), others analyse state-society interactions which lead to political 
change in agrarian power and politics (Fox 2007, Evans 1997). 
In view of the complexity and variety of rural politics, Kerkvliet 
(2009) proposed the following typology. He divided all rural politics into: 
‘official politics’ (the state politics of resource allocation and promotion 
of so-called ‘good governance’ and decentralisation), ‘advocacy politics’ 
(direct and overt opposition of rural dwellers to state policies and the 
system of agrarian relations) and ‘everyday politics’ (which include peas-
ants’ complying with, modifying, and contesting the official politics in a 
quiet, mundane, unorganised manner). Taking rural politics seriously in 
agrarian studies requires consistent investigation of every type of these 
politics (Borras 2009).  
Furthermore, recent scholarship on rural politics in the neoliberal era 
contests the previous assumptions about rural dwellers’ resistance to land 
(or land control) grabbing and industrial capitalist food system. In the 
introduction to the special issue of the Journal of Peasant Studies ‘Land 
grabbing and political reactions ‘from below”, Hall et al. (2015: 468) 
wrote: ‘when land deals hit the ground, they interact with social groups 
within the state and in society that are differentiated along lines of class, 
gender, generation, ethnicity, and nationality, and that have historically 
specific expectations, aspirations and traditions of struggle’. This pro-
vokes a variety of rural responses, which range from radical resistance to 
acceptance and struggles for incorporation into large-scale agricultural 
development (White et al. 2012, Wolford et al. 2013, Hall et al. 2015).  
This study analyses the diversity of rural politics in the former Soviet 
Union (FSU), with a particular focus on contemporary processes in rural 
Russia and Ukraine. This region is largely overlooked in current critical 
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agrarian studies debates (with some notable exceptions such as Spoor 
2009, Visser and Spoor 2011, Wegren 2014, Pallot and Nefedova 2007). 
This is rather surprising given the importance of this region for develop-
ing the field of agrarian and peasant studies. The classical ‘Lenin-
Chayanov’ debate on agrarian differentiation in twentieth century Russia 
– generated by two of the most influential thinkers in agrarian studies – 
remains central to the field of agrarian change and peasant studies 
worldwide. The history of Russian peasant wars and revolutions was 
used in many iconic works on agrarian class struggles and rural resistance 
(Field 1976, Wolf 1969, Shanin 1986). Today, however, rural processes in 
the former Soviet Union have been mostly sidelined to the fields of post-
Soviet and post-socialist studies.  
Some academic attention was devoted to this region after the fall of 
the Soviet Union in 1991. The unsuccessful transition from socialist col-
lective agriculture to capitalist private farming was discussed by Wegren 
(1995, 1996, 2005), Csaki and Lerman (1997), Leonard (2000), and Ler-
man et al. (1995). A few scholars argued that land reform failed because 
of rural resistance to capitalism and the market economy (Leonard 2000). 
According to Wegren (2005a), this idea was espoused especially by re-
formers who blamed rural dwellers for the disappointing results of their 
privatisation policies. Other post-Soviet experts stated that the institu-
tional environment was hostile to private farming, therefore, rural dwell-
ers preferred to stay within the collectives, which allowed them to adapt 
and survive in the market economy (Amelina 2000, Spoor and Visser 
2004, Visser 2008). Most post-Soviet area studies focused on studying 
land reform implementation, the informal economy, and survival strate-
gies of the rural population during the transition period of the 1990s (e.g. 
O’Brien et al. 2004, Wegren 1996, Vlasenko 2008). However, as soon 
these issues were explored, academic interest in the post-Soviet rural 
politics declined significantly.  
The study by Visser and Spoor (2011) ‘Land grabbing in post-Soviet 
Eurasia: the world’s largest agricultural land reserves at stake’ was the 
first comprehensive attempt to ‘analyse the largely unnoticed, and partly 
concealed, process of land accumulation’ in the former Soviet Union 
(ibid: 306). They argued that while the attention of international society 
is devoted to land grabbing and dispossession of the rural poor in many 
developing countries, post-Soviet Eurasia constitutes a void in global 
land grab debates. Meanwhile, the region experiences widespread large-
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scale accumulation of land and associated resources by national and 
transnational investors, which leads to (re-)emergence of industrial 
monocrop production, accelerates socio-economic stratification, and ex-
acerbates the marginalisation of the rural population.  
This dissertation responds to this gap in the literature by investigating 
the socio-economic impacts of the ongoing process of land grabbing and 
industrial agricultural development in the former Soviet Union (focusing 
largely on Russia and to a lesser extent on Ukraine). The main objective 
is to understand what kind of challenges and opportunities these issues 
pose to post-Soviet rural communities, and how rural communities re-
sist, modify, or accept the process of capitalist accumulation in this re-
gion. Post-Soviet rural communities are certainly stratified, although to a 
lesser extent than in urban areas. They consist of various economic and 
political elites, civil servants, farm owners, farm labourers, pensioners 
and various marginalised groups. All of these actors have different inter-
ests, goals and responses to large-scale land accumulation. Despite its 
diversity, the majority of the rural population is impoverished, depending 
largely on small-scale household farming for their subsistence. Today, 
household farming accounts for nearly 90% of the potatoes, 80% of the 
vegetables and 50% of the milk produced in Russia and Ukraine, while 
accounting for less than 15% of the total agricultural land2. 
This dissertation explores the rural politics of various actors, with a 
particular focus on the small-scale food producers and their response 
strategies. It investigates everyday rural practices, organised resistance, 
and the activities of grassroots social movements and institutionalised 
rural organisations. It also analyses the politics of the state and large land 
investors in the countryside. Hence, it attempts to cover the full spec-
trum of rural politics, namely, ‘official’, ‘advocacy’ and ‘everyday’ politics. 
Its main research questions are formulated as follows: 
How does the process of large-scale national and transnational accu-
mulation of land and associated resources occur in the post-Soviet 
countryside? What challenges and opportunities does it bring to rural 
communities and how do rural communities respond to the related 
transformations? How do the ‘official’, ‘advocacy’ and ‘everyday’ rural 
politics constrain, modify, or facilitate (if at all) the development of 
agrarian capitalism in Russia and Ukraine?  
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Besides answering the aforementioned questions, this study aims to 
insert analysis of post-Soviet post-socialist rural politics into the interna-
tional debates on the agrarian (or peasant) question3, rural resistance and 
mobilisation, food sovereignty movements, and agrarian activism. By 
bringing evidence from post-socialist settings, it attempts to rethink 
some predominant assumptions in critical agrarian studies. At the same 
time, it challenges the common understanding of contemporary trans-
formation in the post-socialist countryside, by adding fresh insights from 
the agrarian studies literature. 
Until recently, post-socialist rural processes have been studied in a 
vacuum with virtually no reference to the global and transnational proc-
esses (Kay et al. 2012). There are several explanations for this. First, 
post-Soviet/post-socialist scholars previously assessed rural transforma-
tions in this region as a very unique and ‘specific period of change from 
above’, where rural people ‘hav[e] little of positive value to contribute to 
such transformations’ (Kay et al. 2012: 55). Second, the agrarian (or 
peasant) question has ‘disappear[ed] from the intellectual, political and 
policy agendas of rural and agricultural development shortly before the 
collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union’, and re-
mained largely ‘forgotten’ until recently (Leonard and Kaneff 2002: 2). 
Many post-socialist scholars posited that the agrarian question was 
‘solved’ and ‘[t]he laws of capitalism now apply equally, it would seem, to 
industrial and agricultural production, and class has become politically 
irrelevant in both urban and rural areas’ (Cash 2014: 164). Third, the 
post-Soviet rural population is often considered conservative, fatalistic, 
and politically passive (O’Brien and Wegren 2002). Neither overt resis-
tance nor rural social movements can easily be detected in the post-
Soviet countryside. Even the Ukrainian Euromaidan revolution of 2014, 
which provided ‘open moments’ for political contestations, did not mo-
tivate rural dwellers to address their problems openly and engage in col-
lective action (see Chapter 5). Fourth, the studies of post-socialist state 
politics and state-society relations tend to have an urban bias (Yakovlev 
and Zhuravskaya 2006, Easter 2008, Henry 2006, Chebankova 2012). 
Civil society in the former Soviet Union is considered to be underdevel-
oped or state-guided when it concerns urban moments, and considered 
as virtually inexistent in the countryside. The limited academic interest in 
state-society relations in the post-Soviet countryside was also influenced 
by the state’s withdrawal from active participation in rural politics during 
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the early post-Soviet transition period. Only some recent work aims to 
bring the state back into the discussion of agrarian transformations in 
Russia (e.g. Wegren 2007, Kay 2011). Finally, the prefix ‘post-’ is often 
associated with processes reflecting backwardness, and, therefore, post-
socialist studies are considered less likely to generate new insights on 
contemporary changes in the agrarian world (Smith and Jehlička 2013).  
This doctoral study contests the aforementioned approaches to post-
Soviet (and post-socialist) rural politics. It follows the position of Kay et 
al. (2012) and Smith and Jehlička (2013), who criticised the deconstruc-
tive academic thinking about the prefix ‘post-’, and argued that the study 
of the post-socialist countryside can reveal different trajectories of de-
velopment, which may bring new insights and generate new theories. 
The term ‘post-socialism’ is often applied to post-Soviet and Central 
European societies that experienced transformation from socialism to 
capitalism4 (Matkowski 2004, Stenning 2005a). These societies have 
much more in common than ‘actually existing socialism, [which is] un-
evenly distributed and moulded in divergent ways in different countries’ 
(Humphrey 2002b: 12). According to Humphrey (2002b), the ongoing 
capitalist development in post-socialist countries is not unidirectional: 
‘there is rather an unpredictable propensity to “turn back”, or at least 
resolute refusal to abandon values and expectations associated with so-
cialism’ (ibid: 12). Comparative analyses of post-socialist countries are 
essential for understanding the transformation processes in this region. 
Meaningful comparison, however, is problematic because of incompara-
ble differences within and between post-socialist countries: ‘there is X 
here, but not there; there is Y here but not there’ (Humphrey 2002b: 12). 
Therefore, rather than describing different situations and then totting up, 
we need to investigate broadly in order to understand a particular case. 
Put another way, ‘comparison should inform the description, not the 
other way around’ (Humphrey 2002b: 12). 
The choice of two countries for this analysis was influenced by the 
aforementioned considerations. Although the current geopolitical con-
flict between Russia and Ukraine pushed these countries far from each 
other in politico-ideological outlooks, the common Soviet legacy and 
similar trajectories of agrarian transformation provide a rich base for 
drawing some parallels regarding post-Soviet rural politics that is relevant 
elsewhere.  
Processed on: 6-9-2016
505017-L-bw-Mamanova
8 CHAPTER 1 
 
Indeed, Russia and Ukraine are often compared to each other with 
regards to their agricultural and rural development (i.e. Allina-Pisano 
2008, Pallot and Nefedova 2007). These countries are the region’s major 
agricultural producers, in which farmland is the target for national and 
international capital investments. In the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, Russia and even more so Ukraine were seen as the ‘breadbas-
ket’ of the world (Visser et al. 2014). After the fall of the Soviet Union, 
the countries underwent land reform programmes in order to distribute 
collective farmlands to the rural population. Despite the slightly different 
institutional design and the speed of land distribution in Russia and 
Ukraine, the results were very much the same: rural dwellers were unable 
to use the distributed land, collective agriculture has collapsed, and many 
fertile farmlands were lying idle. In the 2000s, this “empty land” attracted 
foreign and domestic investors, who started the process of land accumu-
lation, triggered in part by the global food price hikes5 and state support 
to large-scale agriculture (Visser and Spoor 2011, Visser 2016).  
This dissertation focuses primarily on the second phase of the post-
socialist transformation – namely from the 2000s onwards – which is 
characterised by the expansion of large-scale industrial agriculture. 
Whereas the first period, following the demise of the Soviet Union in 
1991, was characterised by economic crisis of large-scale agriculture, 
from the 2000s onwards recovery and expansion took place. The latter 
period also represents the time of the re-emergence of a strong Russian 
state, with insider oligarchic power. The dissertation investigates various 
rural politics in different settings: an agriculturally-advanced area (the so-
called ‘Black Earth’, which covers the Russian south-west and nearly the 
entire territory of Ukraine), a central suburbanised area, and hinterland in 
the non- Black Earth area (the detailed description of the fieldwork sites 
is presented in the methodological subsection). The geographical diversi-
fication of the analysed processes justifies the prevalence of Russian 
cases in the empirical analysis, as the country covers a wider range of 
geographical zones. The example of Ukraine expands the analysis be-
yond Russia, which allows to identify post-Soviet and post-socialist char-
acteristics (not particularly Russian or Ukrainian), and to provide a more 
comprehensive picture of agrarian transformation in this region.  
The present chapter addresses the five key themes of this doctoral 
study, namely: 1) post-Soviet agrarian capitalism ‘from above’, which in-
cludes a discussion on land reform implementation and the neoliberal 
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mechanisms of ‘enclosure’ or grabbing; 2) agrarian capitalism ‘from be-
low’ and the peasant question; 3) rural politics of the state; 4) rural resis-
tance and mobilisation; and 5) ‘everyday’ politics and adaptation prac-
tices of post-Soviet rural households. The analysis of these themes is 
followed by a discussion of the methodology and epistemology used in 
this study.  
1.2. Post-Soviet agrarian capitalism ‘from above’: new 
order upon old structures 
Borras and Franco (2013) have argued that unravelling rural politics re-
quires an understanding of the dynamics of agrarian change and the na-
ture of political conflict. The system of agrarian capitalism, which di-
vorces the producer from the means of production, has been discussed 
even before Marx (1867) introduced the concept of ‘primitive accumula-
tion’ in his first volume of ‘Capital’. More recent theories expanded many 
classical ideas about capitalism to address the neoliberal mechanisms of 
‘enclosure’ or grabbing (see for example Harvey’s (2003) ‘accumulation 
by dispossession’ and Levien’s (2013) ‘regimes of dispossession’). How-
ever, the main idea remains unchanged: the capitalist process of accumu-
lation creates a small privileged class of ‘super winners’ at the expense of 
‘others’, who are dispossessed of land and associated resources and pre-
vented from deriving benefits from them.  
In order to understand socio-economic changes in the post-Soviet 
countryside, we need to examine two channels through which capitalism 
penetrates the region: ‘from above’ and ‘from below’. Lenin (1964), and 
later Byres (1996, 20096) offered two possible transitions to agrarian 
capitalism: ‘from above’ (with the example of Prussia, where ‘primitive 
accumulation’ was carried out by landlords at the expense of tenants – 
resulting in their subsequent transformation into bourgeoisie and prole-
tariat), and ‘from below’ (when land and capital accumulation occurred 
within family farming communities – such as is in the case of the United 
States). For a while, these two paths to capitalism were considered as 
separate processes that were country case-based. Yan and Chen (2015: 
370) suggested that ‘capitalist dynamics exist both from below and from 
above’. They studied how capital moves into the countryside with agri-
business supported by the state’s de-peasantisation policies, and how it is 
generated locally at a peasant household level in China. The following 
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analysis builds upon the latter premise, and discusses the development of 
capitalism ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ in the post-Soviet countryside. 
1.2.1. Transition to capitalism with limited social transformation 
The transition ‘from above’ to agrarian capitalism in the FSU oc-
curred without far-reaching social transformation. This study demon-
strates that neoliberal agricultural development and land grabbing in 
Russia and Ukraine were not accompanied by the physical displacement 
of small-scale producers or their direct separation from the means of 
production. During the Soviet period, rural dwellers possessed small 
household plots used for ‘subsidiary household farming’, which provided 
a supplementary household income in addition to employment at kol-
khozy and sovkhozy (collective and state farm enterprises). After the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the new independent states, of which 
Russia and Ukraine are the focus of this analysis, initiated land reforms. 
The reforms were aimed at a ‘fundamental restructuring of the countries’ 
agricultural sectors, including price liberalisation for agricultural products 
and inputs, disappearing guaranteed markets within the Eastern Bloc, 
increased foreign competition, and the privatisation of land and capital 
assets’ (Kuemmerle et al. 2011: 1336). Farmland of kolkhozy and sovk-
hozy was distributed among rural dwellers by means of land share cer-
tificates for private farming development. Despite the slightly ‘different 
institutional design and the speed of post-socialist land reforms in Russia 
and Ukraine, the reforms affected most rural people [...] in highly similar 
ways, with virtually identical levels of apparent success and similar results 
in the actual allocation of land’ (Alina-Pisano 2008: 11).  
Rural dwellers were unable to use the distributed former collective 
and state land – it had been concentrated in the hands of local rural el-
ites, and later, in the early 2000s, domestic and foreign land investors 
accumulated it. Spoor et al. (2012) argued that the post-Soviet land re-
forms did not fundamentally change the existing land ownership: rural 
dwellers remained dependent on highly productive (semi-)subsistence 
farming on their household plots, while the former Soviet collectives 
were gradually transformed into large farm enterprises (LFEs). The term 
LFEs is commonly applied in post-soviet studies to refer to the contem-
porary large agricultural operators, which can take different organisa-
tional forms and use different sources of capital7 (see Kuns and Visser 
2016 on the typology of LFEs in Russia and Ukraine).  
Processed on: 6-9-2016
505017-L-bw-Mamanova
 Introduction 11 
Jansen (2014: 220) mentioned the ‘grabbing of public resources in the 
transition from communism to capitalism’ as a type of capitalist ‘enclo-
sure’, which occurred in the last decades. However, such capitalist accu-
mulation did not lead to drastic changes in the social order. The studies 
of post-Soviet transformation revealed that the socialist structures re-
main dominant despite the introduction of market relations and private 
property. In the book ‘Transition without transformation. Russia’s involutionary 
road to capitalism’, Burawoy argued that contrary to post-socialist Eastern 
European countries, the transition to a capitalist society and a market 
economy in the FSU was not accompanied by significant social trans-
formation. He referred to old-established Soviet social networks, which 
were ‘deployed around strategic manipulation of resources’ (Burawoy 
2002: 294). Therefore, a ‘transition without transformation’ took place8. 
In rural areas, it occurred as follows: rural dwellers, which were excluded 
from the Soviet elite networks, remained excluded, while the Party no-
menclature (i.e. former kolkhoz chairmen and top management) bene-
fited from the distributed land and capital (see Chapters 2 and 5 for a 
discussion on the implementation of land reform and its results in Russia 
and Ukraine).  
The preservation of former Soviet structures and social networks 
makes current agrarian capitalism, at least to some extent, socially ac-
cepted. Contrary to many other countries, primarily in the global South, 
where large-scale land acquisitions by foreign and domestic investors for 
industrial export-oriented agriculture faced strong civil opposition 
(White et al 2012, Borras and Franco 2013), the post-Soviet rural popula-
tion has mostly remained quiet (Visser and Spoor 2011). In the empirical 
chapters of this dissertation, it is shown that many former Soviet prac-
tices persist in the contemporary Russian and Ukrainian countryside. The 
most vivid practice is the preservation of the Soviet productive symbio-
sis, which occasionally takes the form of ‘parasitic symbiosis’, as noted 
by Spoor and Visser (2004). Rural dwellers receive farm inputs and out-
put from LFEs at lower prices, or even take some ‘for free’ without any 
permission, as was commonly practiced in the Soviet era. Furthermore, 
the current dual system of agricultural production – large-scale industrial 
agriculture versus so-called ‘people’s farming’9 – strongly resembles the 
former socialist farm structure. Just prior to the USSR’s collapse in 1990, 
rural household production contributed to 27% of the gross agricultural 
product, while kolkhozy and sovkhozy produced the rest (Rosstat 2015). 
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Today, this bifurcation has become even stronger: the share of people’s 
farming went up to 40-45% of the total output, while LFEs contribute to 
nearly 50% (commercial family farms emerged at a limited scale and 
produce only 8-10% of Russian and Ukrainian agricultural output). The 
continuity of socialist legacies manifests itself also in rural discourses. 
For example, rural dwellers still call LFEs ‘kolkhozy’ and ‘sovkhozy’ (see 
Chapter 5 for discussion about post-Soviet nostalgia).  
The transition with limited social transformation affected the ways in 
which the post-Soviet rural population sees itself in the contemporary 
system of agricultural production. Petrick et al. (2013: 164) in their analy-
sis of Kazakh agriculture argued that ‘due to the socialist tradition of in-
dustrialised farming operations, rural inhabitants regard themselves pri-
marily as workers and not as landowners, therefore, they do not long for 
independent family farming, but are willing to get wage jobs at LFEs. 
This argument is relevant in the analysis of Ukrainian rural dwellers’ in-
corporation into large-scale agribusiness as wage-workers.  
The socialist tradition of industrial farming is only one side of the 
coin. The entire socio-economic system has grown around the general-
ised Soviet belief that ‘big is beautiful’, which continues to be dominant 
in state policy and is used to justify the expansion of LFEs. Meanwhile, 
‘people’s farms have been portrayed as the official “other” of the agri-
food system’ (Pallot and Nefedova 2007: 202). Small-scale food produc-
tion is commonly discussed as ‘backward’, a ‘relic of the past’ and ‘with-
out long-term perspective’. This position is also shared by rural dwellers 
who consider their farming not as an alternative to industrial agriculture, 
but rather as a means of survival in rural areas (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
This largely reflects the former socialist discourse about “modern” and 
“progressive” collective farming (despite its factual unprofitability and 
inefficiency) and household farming as ‘subsidiary’ to it.  
The continuous character of the current agricultural system creates 
doubts as to whether any transformation has, in fact, occurred. Spoor et 
al. (2012) called the new system of large-scale agricultural operators the 
‘ultimate Soviet dream’ when the large collective and state farms were 
transformed into even larger LFEs. Nevertheless, a capitalisation of agri-
culture took place. The stabilisation of the politico-economic situation in 
Russia and Ukraine and the global financial and food price crisis in 2007-
2008 stimulated many foreign and domestic investors to acquire farm-
land and invest in this region’s agriculture. New agricultural operators 
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use economies of scale, advanced technologies, and are actively sup-
ported by national states (see Chapter 2). This large-scale agricultural de-
velopment made Russia and Ukraine the top food exporters in the world 
(Liefert et al. 2013, Visser et al 2014), while the rural population contin-
ues to be engaged in semi-subsistence farming at their household plots. 
Contrary to classical Marxist theory, which predicts separation of agricul-
tural labourers from the means of production10 (i.e. land and capital) as a 
consequence of agrarian capitalism, post-Soviet resource accumulation 
and concentration took place on the former collective land (although 
formally owned by rural dwellers) and did not entail encroachment on 
household land plots cultivated by the rural population. Thus, arguably 
due to the preservation of former Soviet structures and principles, agrar-
ian capitalism ‘from above’ was not accompanied by direct dispossession 
of smallholders from the land. 
 1.2.2. Incorporation of rural dwellers into large-scale agricultural 
development 
McMichael (2013: 13) posited that the contemporary corporate-driven 
food regime11 destroys traditional farming systems for the sake of free 
trade and agricultural development, and imposes a model of ‘agriculture 
without farmers’ across the world. Indeed, there are many cases when 
‘land is needed (for global production and corporate profit), but peoples’ 
labour is not needed to realise this production’ (Li 2011: 283). The ex-
pelled farmers may find employment in other economic sectors, how-
ever, in many cases, they join the ranks of an impoverished army of ‘rela-
tive surplus population’ (Li 2011). This dark side of the neoliberal 
agricultural model is often exposed in anti-land grab campaigns of agrar-
ian social movements and allied civil society organisations. Bernstein 
(2014: 10) criticised civil activists for ‘view[ing] capitalism only as de-
structive’ and ‘neglecting the productive possibilities created through the 
dynamism of capitalist expansion’. Recent studies suggest that capitalism 
does not necessarily lead to the exclusion of small-scale food producers 
from large-scale agricultural production. Following Li’s (2011) analysis of 
contract farming and jobs, provided by large-scale agriculture, Hall et al. 
(2015: 470) argued that there are cases – although rather exceptional – 
when investors ‘need the land and the labour’ and where ‘villagers are 
not expelled, but may be subsumed into corporate enterprises as workers 
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(perhaps even leasing land to their employer) or as contracted small-scale 
farmers’.  
The post-Soviet land reforms have made rural dwellers the main – al-
beit mostly nominal – owners of the agricultural land in Russia and the 
sole owners in Ukraine (a moratorium on farmland sales has existed in 
Ukraine since 2001). Therefore, LFEs have to engage with the rural 
population in their investment projects. Chapter 5 of this dissertation is 
devoted to the analysis of terms of incorporation of the Ukrainian popu-
lation in land deals. In that chapter, I follow McCarthy’s (2010) critique 
of the ‘simplistic dualist model’ that presumes that there is either inclu-
sion or exclusion of a rural population in agribusiness-driven agriculture. 
McCarthy argued that there are much more nuanced terms or scenarios 
in which the rural population is engaged in economic, social and political 
relations with large business, what affects agrarian transformation in the 
country. Given such assumptions, three different types of Ukrainian vil-
lagers’ incorporation in land deals were distinguished and analysed. The 
first type is ‘illusive inclusion’. Rural dwellers, many of them elderly, lease 
out their “unused” former collective land to LFEs. These land leasing 
agreements imply a very small payment (in kind) to the landowners and 
are arranged with almost no possibility to negotiate rent. Nevertheless, 
this rent is considered a significant contribution to rural households. Due 
to an inability to use the distributed land in other ways, rural dwellers 
want such inclusion. The second type is ‘subordinate inclusion’ – where 
many working-age rural dwellers lease (or lose) their land to LFEs and 
gain wage jobs often at the same LFEs. This creates the ‘post-Soviet land 
paradox’ when ‘the proletariat leases its land to the bourgeoisie’ (as refer-
enced in Chapter 5). Modern large farms apply economies of scale and 
labour saving technologies, therefore needing much fewer workers than 
their Soviet predecessors. However, due to the transition period of the 
1990s, which was characterised by the widespread bankruptcies of collec-
tive farms and rapidly increasing rural unemployment, new jobs at LFEs 
are highly appreciated by Ukrainian rural dwellers. Yet the third type is 
‘competitive exclusion’ – a situation where subsidised LFEs outcompete 
a small group of private family farmers (less than 1% of the rural popula-
tion) and expel them from the market. This often leads to the farmers’ 
impoverishment and marginalisation.  
A similar situation is observed in Russia. Although the land sales 
moratorium was lifted in 2002, massive sales of farmland occur pre-
Processed on: 6-9-2016
505017-L-bw-Mamanova
 Introduction 15 
dominantly around large cities where land was needed for rapid 
(sub)urbanisation (Mamonova and Sutherland 2015). Meanwhile, long-
term land lease agreements with local populations remain the primary 
land accumulation strategy of LFEs in agricultural regions. According to 
Lerman and Shagaida (2007), the share of leased land is about 60% of 
the total area of land used by LFEs (see Chapter 2 for more information 
on land accumulation strategies in Russia).  
These terms of incorporation and their acceptance by the rural popu-
lation are largely an outcome of the socialist legacy and preservation of 
many Soviet structures, as was mentioned in the previous section. Lease 
payments, received by rural households through ‘illusive inclusion’, are 
often perceived as a continuation of the (once interrupted) ‘social con-
tract’ with kolkhozy and sovkhozy (see Pallot and Nefedova 2003, 2007 
about the ‘social contract’ in the FSU). ‘Subordinate inclusion’ is associ-
ated with the return to the late Soviet collective agriculture system: when 
rural dwellers combine employment at kolkhozy and sovkhozy with per-
sonal farming at their household plots. Only ‘competitive exclusion’ of 
commercial family farmers is a rather new capitalist feature – a phe-
nomenon that can be categorised under ‘accumulation by dispossession’.  
The inclusion of the rural population in large-scale agricultural devel-
opment (although under adverse conditions) is not only a post-Soviet 
characteristic. There are a number of examples where the rural popula-
tion finds its way into the new system. McCarthy (2010) analysed the ad-
verse inclusion of smallholders in industrial palm oil production in Indo-
nesia based on contract agreements. He argued that the outcomes 
critically depend on the existing smallholder development schemes, state-
agribusiness coalitions, land tenure, and livelihood strategies. While un-
der some conditions, contract farming or open market competition can 
be advantageous to poor rural communities, in others it marginalises 
them. Smalley and Corbera (2012) revealed different attitudes to large-
scale land development projects among various rural groups in Kenya: 
pastoralists were against it, being afraid of eviction or losing access to 
common-pool resources, while family farmers welcomed agribusiness in 
their region hoping for agricultural development and the new jobs it 
could create. Large-scale land acquisitions influence different rural 
groups in various positive and negative ways.  
Thus, under this assumption, the 2008 World Development Report’s 
argument that ‘a strong link between agribusiness and smallholders can 
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reduce rural poverty’ (World Bank 2007: 137) is not entirely wrong, as 
many social movements suggest. The arrival of large-scale agribusiness in 
Russia and Ukraine coincided with the general recovery in agriculture 
and the reduction of rural poverty. The share of rural households with 
incomes below the subsistence level decreased from 74.2% in 2000 to 
20.3% in 2010 in Ukraine (Moroz 2010), and from 73.1% in 1999 to 
15.4% in 2006 in Russia (O’Brien et al. 2011). Policy makers and large 
agribusinesses often use this argument to justify large-scale agricultural 
development (Lapa et al. 2008). However, along with general economic 
recovery, which is indeed beneficial for the rural poor, ‘control grabs’ 
became the scourge of the post-Soviet countryside affecting sustainable 
rural development over the long term.  
1.2.3. Control grabbing and its main mechanisms 
While post-Soviet rural dwellers are not physically displaced from their 
lands, became partly incorporated into large-scale agricultural develop-
ment, and even experience a general increase in living standards with the 
arrival of agribusiness – can we conclude a ‘win-win scenario’? Accord-
ing to the World Bank, globalisation of agriculture and agribusiness 
stimulated agricultural development of the region and opened a number 
of development opportunities for the rural poor – the so-called ‘win-win 
scenario’. It was an especially strong argument in the case of post-Soviet 
countries, which are characterised by agricultural land abandonment and 
low density of the rural population (World Bank 2007). After the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, vast stretches of farmland were taken out of 
production (about 40 million hectares were abandoned in Russia during 
1990s). Chapter 2 deals with the question of the post-Soviet “empty 
land” and a possible ‘win-win scenario’. Contrary to the prevalent dis-
courses on land abandonment in Russia, it demonstrates that the unused 
land is located predominately in the North of the country (with poor 
soils, and worse climate for agriculture). Land investors, instead, are in-
terested in the well-developed fertile regions in the South, where the land 
was abandoned more recently or never abandoned. Moreover, as Mey-
froidt et al. (2012) found, only 8% of the abandoned land can be easily 
brought back into production (because of the scrubs and bushes that 
have been growing for years on this land), which increases the competi-
tion for the incessantly cultivated land.  
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In recent debates on corporate land deals and displacement of rural 
communities, White et al. (2012) followed Peluso and Lund’s (2011) ar-
gument that ‘land grabbing’ should be better termed ‘land control grab-
bing’, as it does not necessarily lead to a direct dispossession of peasants 
or smallholder farmers from their land, but implies gaining corporate 
control over the land, natural resources, results of rural labour, and agri-
cultural value chain. Therefore, the mechanisms of control (or restriction 
of access) are essential for understanding the impacts of land deals on 
rural livelihoods. Different authors revealed various practices that enable 
corporations to control production and territories. Hall et al. (2011) ar-
gued that control is exercised through four ‘powers of exclusion’: regula-
tion, force, the market, and legitimation. Peluso and Lund (2011) listed 
the following control mechanisms: enclosure, territorialisation, legalisa-
tion, force, and violence. The mechanisms proposed by Hall et al. (2011) 
and Peluso and Lund (2011) correspond to each other to some extent, 
and are relevant to this study of the post-Soviet countryside. ‘Force’ and 
‘violence’ are common control mechanisms. However, actual violence is 
rather exceptional; meanwhile the threat of violence is practiced more 
often. Chapter 3 on rural social movements in Russia provides several 
examples of hazards and dangers that rural activists experience in their 
struggles for restitution of their land rights lost during illegal/semi-legal 
land acquisitions in suburban regions. The coalitions between the mafia 
and the state, with its ‘chaotic form of sovereignty’ as described by Rigi 
(2008), are common practice in suburban central Russia, where land in-
vestment became a very profitable business, resulting in shady land deals 
and violation of rural dwellers’ property rights.  
Another control mechanism – ‘enclosure’ – implies the establishment 
of physical or institutional boundaries, which ‘are intended to secure ac-
cess for the actors in control’ (Peluso and Lund 2011: 672), and includes 
Hall et al.’s ‘market forces’ (i.e. exclusion based on the price of land and 
other resources). ‘Enclosure’, which includes a few actors, and ‘exclu-
sion’, which excludes the rest, are basically different sides of the same 
coin. This study demonstrates that LFEs control nearly 80% of Russian 
and Ukrainian farmland, monopolising many segments of domestic agri-
cultural markets and holding nearly total control over the productive 
value chain, which prevents the access of small-scale producers to them. 
Hall et al. (2015: 474) drew attention to the corporate ‘extension of 
value chains and […] control over production and territories’ as a 
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control mechanism. This is commonly practised by large agroholdings (i.e. 
vertically and horizontally integrated groups of affiliated and associated 
agroenterprises), which became the dominant characteristic of contem-
porary large-scale agricultural development in Russia and Ukraine12. 
Agroholdings ‘often combine agricultural production enterprises with 
other upstream and downstream firms in the agri-food chain, such as 
producers of concentrated fodder, elevators, processing units and whole-
salers’ (Chapter 2: 73). Furthermore, ‘enclosure’ (or exclusion) mecha-
nisms include the ‘appropriation of subsidies, bank loans using land 
permits as collateral, or to speculate on future increases in land values’ 
(McCarthy, Vel and Afiff 2012: 523). Chapter 5 indicates that 60% of the 
total state agricultural subsidies were obtained by LFEs in Ukraine in 
2012, which shows the alliance between the state and agribusiness.  
Lund and Peluso (2011: 673) argued that control is exercised ‘by claim-
ing the power to govern territorially’ [emphasis added], which they 
termed ‘territorialisation’. They saw territorialisation as a process of ‘gov-
ernance’ of people and resources, and ‘governmentality’ – the concept 
originally used by Foucault, which implies a mechanism of state control 
over its population and territories. However, Lund and Peluso (2011) did 
not connect ‘territorialisation’ to state claims only. Territorialisation is 
produced collectively through interactions between institutional and in-
dividual actors. This control mechanism is, to some extent, similar to 
‘regulation’ as coined by Hall et al. (2011), which implies institutionalisa-
tion of private property and legal restrictions on access to land and re-
lated resources. Indeed, although the post-Soviet rural population has 
legal rights to land and associated resources, their abilities to use and de-
rive benefits from this land are limited by institutional and legal frame-
work. Registering land involves time-consuming and financially cumber-
some procedures (Lerman and Shagaida 2007), while land lease 
agreements with LFEs are often unfavourable for rural dwellers (as dis-
cussed in Chapter 5). Because of their illiteracy and pressures from the 
local state and elites, rural dwellers often sign land lease agreements that 
give total control to LFEs over the given rent period. In many cases, ru-
ral dwellers are unable to terminate the lease and to withdraw the land 
for personal use. In cases where possible, LFEs usually offer land plots 
that are less appropriate for farming (the exact location of the distributed 
land is often not defined a priori), leaving rural families with a burden 
rather than a valuable asset. The ‘regulation’ control mechanism is also 
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observed in local authorities’ decision-making in favour of the 
development of LFEs. For instance, according to regional amendments 
to the land law in Russia’s Krasnodar Krai, farmers have to possess a 
land plot of at least 300 ha in order to establish a farm. This requirement 
obstructs the emergence of small and medium-scale farms (see Chapter 
2).  
‘Legitimation’ as a control mechanism, implies the justification of 
large-scale land acquisitions and the schemes under which they are car-
ried out (Hall et al. 2011). As mentioned earlier, the belief in ‘big is beau-
tiful’ is dominant in rural Russia and Ukraine due to the legacy of social-
ist collective farming. However, in comparison with the former Eastern 
Bloc countries, which share the history of collective agriculture, the rein-
forcement of the notion of ‘big is beautiful’ is primarily a FSU character-
istic. The reason is the merger between large businesses and the state 
apparatus in Russia and Ukraine (as discussed later in this chapter). The 
agricultural policy serves the interests of oligarchs and megafarms. The 
contrary would be surprising in a context where, for example, the current 
Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko, formerly known as the ‘chocolate 
king’, is the owner of the large agricultural company Agroprodinvest, 
whose land acreage tripled after Poroshenko’s inauguration (Plank 2015). 
The large business does not only lobby for its interests within the state; it 
is so strongly interwoven, that it partly is the state. Therefore, the ‘legiti-
mation’ of land deals and industrial farming occurs at a very high level. 
1.3. Agrarian capitalism ‘from below’ and the peasant 
question  
Agrarian capitalism ‘from below’ implies transformation and stratifica-
tion within rural communities, which inevitably entails the discussion of 
the agrarian or peasant question. Does the peasantry differentiate into 
the classes of bourgeoisie and proletariat under capitalism, as Marxists 
anticipated (Lenin 1964), or do peasants preserve their mode of produc-
tion and lifestyle, but differentiate based on their position in the demo-
graphic cycle and labour-consumer ratio (Chayanov 1966)? This Lenin-
Chayanov debate remains critical to contemporary agrarian studies. The 
Marxist school of thought puts forward the question of labour in this 
process and analyses how rural dwellers ‘pursue their reproduction 
through insecure and oppressive – typically scarce – wage employment 
and a range of likewise precarious small-scale and insecure ‘informal sec-
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tor’ (‘survival’) activity, including farming’ (Bernstein 2007: 6). Marxists, 
as well as neo-classical scholars, predict the demise of the peasant mode 
of production because of the competition with ‘more efficient’ large-
scale industrial farming (Bernstein 2007, Deininger et al. 2014, de Janvry 
1981). Contemporary populist scholars, however, emphasise the phe-
nomenal persistence and sustainability of the peasant mode of produc-
tion due to the moral economy, self-exploitation, and subsistence logic 
(van der Ploeg 2013, Desmarais 2002). Agrarian activists – most of them 
coming from this school of thought – argue that small-scale farming has 
the capability to ‘feed the world’ and is the best alternative to the current, 
unsustainable corporate food regime (La Via Campesina 2013). This po-
litical position has become dominant in the international food sover-
eignty movement of rural working people and their urban counterparts, 
who claim their rights to ‘healthy and culturally appropriate food pro-
duced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their 
right to define their own food and agriculture systems’ (Shattuck et al. 
2015, Alonso-Fradejas et al. 2015, Edelman et al. 2014). 
The agrarian (peasant) question gets little attention in contemporary 
post-Soviet post-socialist studies. A number of scholars have argued that 
class analysis is inappropriate for studying the post-socialist 
transformation, because social stratification cannot be adequately ex-
plained by relationship to the means of production (i.e. Burawoy 2001, 
Clark and Lipset 2001). Beck and Beck-Gersheim (2002) have even 
called class a ‘zombie category’: meaningless, and playing a small role in 
shaping post-socialist identities and politics. Stenning (2005b: 991) ex-
plains this unfavourable attitude to class-based frameworks by pointing 
to the growing recognition of factors that influence socio-economic 
stratification (ethnicity, gender, age, identity, etc.) and the process of in-
dividualisation in post-socialist societies (in which people are seen as ‘au-
thors of their biographies’, not just passive victims of class exploitation). 
New forms of social stratification are now discussed: emerging elites (or 
the ‘top 1 percent’), the lower class (or precariat), and many strata in be-
tween (Wegren et al. 2006, Stenning 2005b). However, ignorance of class 
dynamics might lead to an incorrect interpretation of rural poverty as a 
‘temporary, transitional result of the shift from plan to market’ (Stenning 
2005b: 98).  
The following section attempts to rehabilitate the agrarian (peasant) 
question for studying post-soviet agrarian capitalism ‘from below’. It en-
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gages with contemporary scholarly work on post-Soviet rural stratifica-
tion and critically discusses the disappearance and persistence of theses13 
in regards to Russian and Ukrainian rural communities..  
1.3.1. Disappearance or persistence of the peasant mode of 
production in the post-Soviet countryside 
Although the theory of social classes is not popular among post-socialist 
scholars, many studies still follow – often implicitly – the disappearance 
thesis of the agrarian (peasant) question. The academic conviction re-
garding the disappearance of the peasantry is partly the result of the so-
cialist history of collectivisation, expropriation, and forced industrialisa-
tion, which aimed at the erosion of the peasantry as a class (Dorondel 
and Șerban 2014). The elimination of the peasant mode of production is 
considered as unavoidable by those who follow the ideas on capitalist 
modernisation (Kitching 2001). Wegren (2005b) challenges the principles 
of moral economy in contemporary rural Russia. He argued that post-
Soviet rural dwellers are not ‘antimarket’ and ‘antiprivatisation’ and are 
able to adapt to capitalism. He is convinced that despite the ill-
functioning market economy, the liberalisation of land and capital mar-
kets and the removal of restrictions on incomes and trade of household 
producers caused stratification within rural communities and created the 
basis for the development of a class society (Wegren 2005b, 2011a). Pal-
lot and Nefedova (2007) have also observed the tendency in the 
smallholders sector towards commercialisation and intensification of 
production over the last 15 years. Depending on the region and method 
of estimation, from 8% to 40% of rural households’ output is sold (Pal-
lot and Nefedova 2007: 195). The various levels of market engagement 
and commercialisation became the basis for clustering the smallholders 
into different groups. Skalnaya and Burykin (2009) identified that 6.3% 
of rural Russians are engaged in individual commercial farming14, 20.3% 
of rural dwellers produce for self-consumption and for market sales, 
40.6% – for self-consumption only, which can be equalised to subsis-
tence (or semi-subsistence) farming, 20.3% are wage-workers, and 12.8% 
are jobless.  
Wegren (2014) is convinced that commercialised rural households are 
able to expand their production through land and capital accumulation, 
and could become a rural bourgeoisie, particularly if the state would cre-
ate favourable conditions and stimuli for that. Pallot and Nefedova 
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(2003, 2007: 189) are less confident about the emergence of a ‘definite 
class structure’ in the post-Soviet countryside. They argue that the com-
mercial orientation of smallholders’ farming depends on their geographi-
cal location. Thus, rural households located near large cities have more 
stimuli for agricultural intensification and commercialisation than inhabi-
tants in remote areas, who have neither economic or infrastructural re-
sources nor proximity to markets. Furthermore, households in northern 
territories are the most subsistence-oriented, much more than those in 
the central and southern regions. However, despite some levels of com-
mercialisation, ‘production for consumption equals or exceeds in impor-
tance production for the market’ for all small-scale food producers (Pal-
lot and Nefedova 2007: 202). Moreover, when smallholders sell their 
produce, the profit is used to maintain a reasonable standard of living, 
not for expansion of production (Pallot and Nefedova 2003, 2007).  
The recent MARTOR15 collection of articles on ‘The Agrarian Ques-
tion in Southeast Europe’ (2014) put forward the assumption about the 
persistence of a peasant lifestyle in the post-socialist countryside. Cash 
(2014) argued that despite the post-socialist land distribution and capital-
ist development, the moral economy of the peasantry delayed agrarian 
differentiation. Dorondel and Șerban (2014: 20) argued that the majority 
of the post-socialist rural households represent a hybrid peasant-worker 
formation, ‘having one family member earning an industrial wage and 
another one working the land is a matter of subsistence in harsh eco-
nomic times’. The investment of household income in the expansion of 
agricultural production is seen as unbeneficial as it would require a full-
time engagement of all household members in farming, what would 
negatively affect a household’s diversification strategy and, consequently, 
its resilience to economic shocks. Chapter 5 of this doctoral study simi-
larly discusses the ‘peasant-worker’ rural stratum in contemporary 
Ukraine and demonstrates that a combination of employment at LFEs 
with semi-subsistent farming leads to the lowest poverty risk and is 
therefore preferred by the rural population.  
It is argued here that the development of capitalism ‘from above’ in 
the post-Soviet countryside has hindered agrarian transformation ‘from 
below’. As mentioned previously, large agribusiness gained control over 
most of the land and associated resources, monopolised the agricultural 
value chain for staple crops and processed food, and accumulated nearly 
all state subsidies for agriculture. This control grabbing limits diversifica-
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tion within rural communities based on access to productive resources. 
The majority of rural households are unable to accumulate land and capi-
tal for commercial farming. However, they do not turn into proletarians 
due to (semi-)subsistence farming at their household plots and limited 
employment possibilities in rural areas. On one side, this study agrees 
with Wegren (2014) on the limited manifestations of the moral economy 
in the post-Soviet countryside. On the reverse side, it detects other dis-
tinct peasant features such as family labour, self-exploitation, traditional 
agriculture, and subsistence logic, which have been preserved and even 
reinforced in the post-socialist era (Chapters 5 and 6).  
Despite all the factors limiting agrarian diversification ‘from below’, 
rural communities are far from homogeneous. Chapter 5 provides an 
analysis of household response strategies to land grabbing and large-scale 
agricultural development as the drivers for differentiation. This ap-
proach, to some extent, resembles the ‘sustainable rural livelihoods’ ap-
proach developed by Scoones (1998, 2015). The sustainable rural liveli-
hoods approach focuses on analysing rural households’ material and 
social assets, access to productive resources, and the strategies employed 
by people to earn a living. I directed my attention primarily to household 
strategies for the following reasons. First, the overall impoverishment of 
the rural population after the collapse of the Soviet Union has relatively 
equalised economic assets between rural households.16 Second, the gen-
eral ageing of the rural population and its social disintegration after the 
collapse of the collectives have minimised differentiation in social assets 
(see Vinogradskiy 2013 on the decline in social capital in the post-Soviet 
countryside). Third, the exclusion of rural households from capitalist ac-
cumulation ‘from above’ has limited their access to productive resources. 
Certainly, the choice of response strategies is influenced by the different 
social and economic characteristics of rural households. However, these 
factors have less significant impact on rural stratification, than do the 
strategies people follow in resisting or adapting to the neoliberal agricul-
tural model.  
Based on the analysis of different response strategies of rural house-
holds in Ukraine, Chapter 5 concludes that the post-Soviet rural dwellers 
do not necessarily oppose capitalist agriculture. Instead, many of them 
are able to adapt and derive benefits from it. This study distinguishes five 
different rural response strategies: competition with LFEs, taking a free 
market niche, employment at LFEs, rural outmigration, and indifference. 
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More adaptive response strategies can be beneficial to their adherents, 
whereas less adaptive strategies might lead to marginalisation and relega-
tion of rural households to lower socio-economic strata. This study re-
veals that a rural group ‘odnoosibniks’17 – rural households who practice 
the adaptive ‘taking a free market niche’ strategy – are very similar to 
classic ‘middle peasants’, as they are autonomous small-scale food pro-
ducers who do not exploit the labour of others, but can meet their fami-
lies subsistence with own farming. However, can we call them ‘peasants’ 
if they do not define themselves as such? Can we consider different so-
cial groups in the post-Soviet countryside as different peasant strata? 
The answer to this question depends on how we define peasants. 
Edelman (2013) distinguished historical, social scientific, activist, and 
normative definitions of the peasantry, each of which modifies and ad-
justs this concept according to the purposes of its use. Here, I discuss 
only the social scientific formulation. Shanin’s classical definition of the 
peasantry implies the following interlinked facets: ‘the family farm as the 
basic multi-functional unit of social organisation, land husbandry and usu-
ally animal rearing as the main source of livelihood, a specific traditional 
culture closely linked with the way of life of small rural communities and 
multi-directional subjection to powerful outsiders’ (Shanin 1973: 63, em-
phasis added). This dissertation detects all four facets of the peasantry 
among the post-Soviet rural population. Chapter 5 on rural Ukraine and 
Chapter 6 on ‘quiet food sovereignty’ in Russia demonstrate that tradi-
tional ways of farming and family labour are the main characteristics of 
people’s farming. On a related note, Chapter 4 on naive monarchism and 
rural resistance in Russia discusses the submission to power as one of the 
post-Soviet rural characteristics.  
The four peasant facets, nonetheless, do not provide strong evidence 
to argue that post-socialist villagers are, indeed, peasants. First, the peas-
ant identity is weakly developed in this region due to the generalised be-
lief ‘big is beautiful’ and the legacy of the Soviet policy aimed at the 
erosion of the peasantry. Rural dwellers rarely call themselves ‘peasants’. 
Second, smallholders’ engagement with markets and diversity of income 
sources undermine the assumption about the peasantness of the post-
Soviet rural population. Thus, according to Moroz (2010), in-kind in-
come from cultivating the household plots accounted for 44.4% of the 
total rural household income in Ukraine, while wages and social transfers 
contribute to 16.3% and 13.4%, respectively (Chapter 5).  
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However, the diversification of household income does not necessar-
ily contradict the idea of the peasantry. Rather, it points towards rural 
pluriactivity and multifunctionality, which is often overlooked in agrarian 
studies (Kay 2008). Kay highlights the importance of the so-called ‘new 
rurality’ approach, which focuses on non-farm rural activities and other 
practices that have been largely neglected until recently. Hart (2014) ar-
gued that the incomes from non-farm activities make peasant farming 
more efficient and persistent under contemporary neoliberalism. The 
diversification of rural activities is not a new phenomenon. Comitas 
(1973) discussed the ‘occupational multiplicity’ of the rural poor, arguing 
in the context of rural Jamaica that peasants diversify their income 
sources through produce vending, carpentry, and various off-farm jobs. 
Abercrombie (1985) posited similar ideas in her study of ‘part-time farm-
ing’, Losch (2004) wrote about ‘multifunctionality’ of peasant farming, 
and Eikeland (1999) introduced the term ‘new rural pluriactivity’. Bern-
stein (2007: 6), however, saw rural pluriactivity as a survival strategy of 
the classes of labour, and part of a heterogeneous proletarianisation 
process in the countryside.  
Van der Ploeg (2009) did not counterpoise ‘the peasantry’ to com-
mercial farmers, but instead, looked at these categories as positions on a 
continuum. In his book ‘New Peasantries’ he argued that many Western 
farmers got locked in a vicious cycle of scale enlargement, intensification 
of production and dependency on suppliers, retailers, and banks, which 
lessens their resilience to the fluctuations in food markets. In response, 
many farmers try to reduce their dependency on external resources (in-
cluding credit), optimise the use of internally available ones, become 
closely involved in relations with ‘living nature’, and differentiate their 
activities in order to increase family labour income. These, as van der 
Ploeg argues, are the components of a peasant mode of production. If 
we look at post-Soviet rural households from van der Ploeg’s position, 
we observe the persistence and even partial re-emergence of the peas-
antry in Russia and Ukraine.  
This dissertation highlights the importance of the peasant question 
for understanding agrarian transformation in Russia and Ukraine. It does 
not take sides in debates on the disappearance or persistence of the 
peasantry under capitalism, but reveals a number of peasant-like features, 
which allow rural households to survive and persist under contemporary 
conditions. Thus, this research calls for a critical reassessment of the 
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agrarian (peasant) question in the contemporary post-socialist country-
side. 
1.3.2. Coexistence of peasant farming with capitalist agriculture  
The possibility for the coexistence of pre-capitalist alongside capitalist 
modes of production is an old, but still open debate. Marx (1867) and 
later Lenin (1967) were convinced that peasant farming would be com-
pletely replaced by capitalist agriculture under capitalism. Kautsky (1899), 
however, observed that small farms do not disappear as fast as the Marx-
ist-Leninists anticipated. Instead, he argued that poor peasants are an 
integral part of the capitalist mode of production as they are a constant 
source of cheap labour. The commodification of agriculture inevitably 
leads to insertion of peasant farms into the market under subordinate 
positions. Being unable to sustain their competitiveness in markets, peas-
ants engage in wage labour in order to mitigate income deficits of their 
households. Capitalist farms, however, according to Kautsky, are not 
interested in degrading peasants to the position of landless labour, as 
only autonomous peasant households are able to reproduce workers.  
Agricultural capitalist development in the neoliberal era does not need 
as much labour as it did in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries. Thus, the coexistence debate regained its importance. The World 
Bank argued that at low levels of population density, large-scale land ac-
quisitions can be beneficial for both the rural poor and capitalist farmers 
as they can coexist in one territory (World Bank 2007). De Schutter 
(2011) criticised this ‘coexistence scenario’ because of its simplification. 
However, he acknowledged that coexistence is possible if the existing 
rights of land users are clearly defined, and the markets where peasants 
and large agriculturalists operate remain segmented. De Schutter argued, 
however, that such coexistence is ‘a slow-motion path to the transition 
towards a rural economy dominated by large production units, in which 
small-scale farming will be marginalised and subordinalised to the large 
productive units’ (ibid: 261).  
This dissertation argues in favour of the coexistence scenario in the 
context of post-Soviet agricultural development. The competition be-
tween LFEs and rural households for land is insignificant due to the leg-
acy of industrial agriculture and LFEs’ control grabs (as outlined in the 
previous section). Furthermore, this study reveals a division in agricul-
tural markets: large-scale agribusinesses are specialised in monocrop ex-
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port-oriented agriculture (predominantly grain) and have more recently 
started to invest in industrial style meat (poultry and pork) production. 
In contrast, rural households engage in labour-intensive and time-
consuming production of potatoes, vegetables, milk, and meat for family 
consumption and sale in local markets.  
However, is this coexistence temporary, an ‘indicator of a process of 
atypical reproduction’ as Djurfeldt (1981: 142) argued, or is it a stable 
bimodal agricultural system? This doctoral study aims, in part, to answer 
this question by analysing relations between LFEs and rural dwellers, 
their productivity, sustainability and viability, and the structural changes 
within agricultural markets. The analysis of the productivity of small-
scale and large-scale food producers in Russia demonstrates that rural 
households are as productive (in terms of yield) as LFEs (see Chapter 6). 
The LFEs’ productivity is primarily achieved through the use of chemical 
inputs, state subsidies, and advanced machinery. On the contrary, house-
holds produce their food traditionally, manually and without direct state 
support. At first glance, the conclusion might be that small-scale produc-
ers can feed themselves and the country, and substitute the less efficient 
LFEs if the state provides stimuli. However, this research reveals that the 
phenomenally high productivity of rural households is partly achieved 
due to their symbiotic (and even parasitic) relations with LFEs. Many 
rural households are helped by LFEs with ploughing, cheap farm inputs, 
and sometimes allowed to graze their animals at LFEs fields. Lerman et 
al. (2007: 79) wrote: ‘it is virtually impossible to imagine production on 
household plots without assistance from the farm enterprise with 
mechanised field works, with farm inputs and with marketing of farm 
products’. Therefore, most rural dwellers do not strive for autonomy in 
production but benefit from coexistence with large farms.  
Large-scale agribusiness, in turn, mostly does not attempt to subordi-
nate rural dwellers completely by reducing them to dependent labourers 
or evicting them from their lands. Households’ land plots are too small 
to be prime targets for accumulation. Meanwhile, the former collective 
land is already controlled by LFEs. Existing tenant-landlord relation with 
the rural population satisfies many large-scale agricultural producers, as it 
does not entail huge financial investments. According to the analysis of 
Murova (2014), the lease of land by LFEs contributes to the increase of 
technical efficiency of Ukrainian crop sector, whereas ownership would 
decrease it. Kay (1980: 13) suggested that coexistence of the pre-
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capitalist with capitalist farming increases ‘the adaptive rationality of 
landlords to the different and changing situations they encountered in 
their pursuit of profit maximisation’. Therefore, if it is profitable for 
LFEs to tolerate smallholders, the coexistence is maintained. Chapters 5 
and 6 indicate the growing interest of LFEs in the market segments, oc-
cupied by rural households. If the interests of smallholders and LFEs 
collide, the latter resorts to predatory practices to squeeze their small-
scale competitors from the market, which might endanger coexistence.  
1.4. The role of the state  
The existing literature on state-society relations and public policy can be 
divided into three major camps: ‘society-centric’, ‘state-centric’ and 
‘state-in-society’ approaches. From the society-centric viewpoint, the 
state represents the balance of interests of a range of socio-economic 
groups or classes, and its policies correspond to this balance of interests. 
The proponents of this position are Marxist thinkers. Although the state 
plays an important role in Marxist analysis, it is difficult to clearly pin-
point its adherents’ understanding of the state (Hey 1999). Most Marxists 
agree that the primary task of the state is to serve capital accumulation 
and class regulation; however, there is disagreement with regards to the 
nature and position of the capitalist state in class struggles, as shown by 
the emergence of instrumentalist, structuralist, and strategic-relational 
approaches within the Marxist state theory. Instrumentalists – for exam-
ple, Miliband (1969) – see the state as nothing more than a tool of the 
ruling classes (they derive their position from Marx’s (1848) statement 
that ‘the modern state is nothing but a committee for managing the 
common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’). Structuralist Marxists – Pou-
lantzas (1973) and later Offe (1984) – argued that the structure of the 
state (i.e. its bureaucratic and hierarchical organisation) reflects class 
struggles. Poulantzas (1973) asserted that, although class conflict origi-
nates outside the state, the state becomes a part of it by defending the 
interests of the dominant and creating divisions within the dominated. 
However, the state also has to respond to the demands of dominated 
classes and find compromises, which requires ‘relative autonomy of the 
state’ (Poulantzas 1973: 143). The strategic-relational approach was de-
veloped by Jessop (2008a) based on Poulantzas’ and Gramsci’s notion of 
the state as a social relation. Jessop saw the state as a macro-political 
organisation and argued that ‘the impact of state power depended heavily 
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on the changing balance of forces and the strategies and tactics pursued 
by class and non-class forces alike’ (Jessop 2008b: 12).  
The state-centric approach rejects the Marxist standpoint on the class 
nature of the state. According to this position, the state is independent of 
society and classes, and has a monopoly on using coercive power in 
maintaining the existent order. The state-centric approach draws heavily 
on Weber’s theory of the state and political power. Weber (1948: 78) de-
fined the state in a realistic tradition as a ‘human community that claims 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given terri-
tory’. Supporters of this position focus primarily on studying govern-
ment agencies and policy elites (policy makers and state managers), who 
often follow their own interests in policy making, which do not always 
coincide with the interests of society (Grindle 1977, Mann 1986, Skocpol 
1985). The state’s ability to control, force and discipline the society is 
rooted in the specialised state capacities or ‘power resources’ (as dis-
cussed in works of Held 1983, Mann 1986, Skocpol 1985, Tilly 1973). 
The idea of the repressive state is often used in theories of collective ac-
tion to explain the dynamics of social protest (see Tilly 1978 on resource 
mobilisation theory, Skocpol 1985 on social revolutions, or Goldstone 
1991 on the theory of the state breakdown). The state-centric framework 
is also used to explain the nature of the authoritarian state (for example, 
Fravel’s 2008 study of the Chinese state). Modern theories on the 
autocratic power of the ruler are commonly based on Weber’s (1978) 
concepts of patrimonial (traditional) domination and legal-rational bu-
reaucratic domination (which is established rationally and based on legal-
ity).  
The ‘state-in-society’ approach combines elements of the previous 
two approaches and focuses on interactions between the state and soci-
ety, which influence the policy outcomes. Migdal (1988) argued that the 
state is a type of social organisation whose structure is defined by inter-
actions of its members and between members and non-members. Migdal 
gave great importance to state capabilities, which ‘include the capacities 
to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and 
appropriate or use resources in determined ways. Strong states are those 
with high capabilities to complete these tasks, while weak states are on 
the low end of a spectrum of capabilities’ (Migdal 1988: 4-5). Fox (1993) 
developed this idea further in his theory of the state’s capacity and 
autonomy. Building on Migdal’s dichotomy between state ‘strength’ and 
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‘weaknesses’, he argued that the outcome of state policies depends on 
the state autonomy in decision making and its capacity in implementa-
tion of these decisions.  
The state has always played a prominent part in agrarian transforma-
tion and, therefore, is an important subject in critical agrarian studies 
(Byres 2009). However, with the rise of neoliberalism, which is charac-
terised by state withdrawal from active participation in politics, including 
rural, academic interest in the state somewhat declined (Das 2007). Das 
observed a decrease in number of journal articles published in the 1980s 
on the topic of the state. This trend can also be explained by increasing 
popularity of the postmodern theory, ‘the focus of which switched away 
from political economy and the state, and towards cultural issues as these 
manifested themselves at the local level’ (Das 2007: 353). However, 
while reducing its role in welfare provision for the rural population, the 
state became actively engaged in facilitating large-scale agricultural devel-
opment, which triggered a new wave of research on the state from 1990s 
onwards (Das 2007).  
Post-Soviet literature echoes the trends in global agrarian studies on 
the state. The transition period from socialist agriculture to a capitalist 
market economy provoked a wave of studies on the transformation of 
the state’s role in the countryside. The majority of those studies were 
focused on land reform (Wegren 1997, 1998, Csaki and Lerman 1997, 
Infanger 1994). Others became preoccupied primarily with the state’s 
withdrawal from rural politics and the rise of informal economic regula-
tions in the countryside (Kay 2011, Kurakin 2015). Wegren (2007) aimed 
at ‘bringing the state back in’ to the discussion of agrarian transformation 
and highlighted the increasing role of Putin’s state in the regulation of 
economic activity in the countryside. However, the majority of post-
Soviet studies tend to avoid conceptualisation of the state and do not 
discuss its rural politics theoretically.  
This section unpacks the post-Soviet state from a theoretical perspec-
tive (with focus primarily on the Russian state alongside some references 
and comparisons to the Ukrainian case), which is important for under-
standing state-society relations in rural areas. State politics in the coun-
tryside certainly reflect the interests of powerful classes, as Marxist the-
ory suggests. This manifests itself in many national and regional policies, 
which benefit the economically dominant group of large farm enter-
prises. However, it is much more complicated than that. As it is detailed 
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below, the Russian state is characterised by the merger of economic elites 
and the state, which somewhat separates the state from society. Mean-
while, the patrimonial character of the state with the unprecedented role 
of its leader as ‘the present-day tsar’ influences the ways in which rural 
dwellers respond to state policies and frame their resistance. The follow-
ing discussion includes an analysis of state from the Weberian tradition 
with some elements of the relational approach. It is followed by a discus-
sion of ‘official’ rural politics using class analysis, which takes into ac-
count the interests of various state actors and state-society relations.  
1.4.1. Understanding the state in Russia  
Contemporary studies on the Russian state often substitute ‘the state’ 
with ‘the political regime’, which, although being interconnected con-
cepts, represent different phenomena. In his study of ‘State, Regime and 
Russian political development’, Robinson (2008: 3) explained this short-
coming by pointing out that ‘in post-communist transitional systems 
both regime and state are in the process of reconstruction at the same 
time and are mutually constitutive so that distinguishing them is espe-
cially problematic’. These unfinished processes of the state and regime 
building, as well as ‘the locus of power, the rules and limitations govern-
ing its use, and particular constellations of political actors using power’ 
generate a vague distinction between the Russian state and regime in po-
litical and academic debates (Robinson 2008: 4). Many post-socialist 
scholars tend to study the Russian state through the analysis of general 
patterns of governance, which results in literature that has more to do 
with the Russian regime than it does the actual Russian state. Thus, 
Putin’s rule has been characterised as ‘presidential autocracy’ (McFaul 
and Stoner-Weiss 2008), ‘post-imperial authoritarianism’ (Hanson 2006), 
or even ‘neo-tsarism’ (Canciani 2012). These names point towards the 
authoritarian power of the leader and non-democratic governance. How-
ever, how do we understand the state, which generates this regime?  
To understand the interactions within the state and between the state 
and society, I follow the Weberian perspective on the patrimonial state 
and the state monopoly on power resources, modified by Held (1983), in 
order to include the relational component in this framework. The state is 
pictured in this dissertation not as an autonomous actor with its own 
logic and goals, but in competition with other social actors over power 
resources (i.e. economic, bureaucratic-administrative, coercive and ideo-
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logical resources). This framework was advocated by several scholars as 
most appropriate for studying the post-socialist state, characterised by 
‘state capture’ (i.e. Frye 2002, Easter 2008). Below the four key character-
istics of the Russian state are distinguished and discussed. The following 
characteristics are the most important for this analysis: 1) the merger of 
oligarchic capital with top state bureaucracy; 2) neopatrimonialism; 3) 
state’s abuse of its coercive power; and, 4) the cult of the state as the ‘sa-
cred Fatherland’, which is inseparable from the cult of its leader. As 
mentioned earlier, the focus of this thesis is on the period from the 
2000s onwards, thus it is the Putin-era state that is discussed here, with 
some reference to its roots in the Yeltsin and Soviet periods. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a relatively small number of 
Russian industrial tycoons, or ‘oligarchs’ came to control a large share of 
the Russian economy and correspondingly, became influential in politics 
(Goldman 2003, Guriev and Rachinsky 2005, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya 
2004, 2006). The post-Soviet privatisation of collective and state land 
and properties led to the concentration of productive resources in the 
hands of a few, as described in Chapter 2. According to Yakovlev and 
Zhuravskaya (2006), this process, together with the weakness of democ-
ratic institutions and the lack of the state’s accountability to the public, 
led to full-scale ‘state capture’ by new powerful elites.18 The governance 
of the first Russian president Yeltsin (1991-1999) was very much associ-
ated with ‘state capture’ by the biggest and richest enterprises, which in-
fluenced state decision-making ‘from outside’ (i.e. not being a part of the 
state). Putin’s reign is characterised by the nationalisation of some of this 
oligarchic capital and the merger of various large businesses with the 
state apparatus (Afanasyev 2008). This led to state capture ‘from within’ 
by companies belonging to the federal government, and ‘federal oli-
garchs’19 (Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya 2004, 2006). The nationalisation of 
oligarchic capital is partly the result of Putin’s attacks on the Yeltsin-era 
oligarchs (Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya 2006). However, the main reason 
for state capture ‘from within’ was and is the possibility of deploying 
power resources of the Russian state for personal interests. This moti-
vated many businesspersons to take governmental jobs, and, vice versa, 
where state authorities have been encouraged to engage in business ac-
tivities (Afanasyev 2008). Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2006) showed that 
enterprises, which belong to ‘federal oligarchs’ or federal government, 
are the most effective lobbyists and receive significantly greater preferen-
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tial treatment (economic power resources) than those who do not have 
connections with the top-levels of the government of the country. 
In agriculture, this tendency is observed in Uzun et al.’s (2012) analy-
sis of agroholdings in Russia. The authors revealed that nearly 60% of 
the agroholdings in Russia are state (or municipally) owned; whose lead-
ers often occupy important governmental positions. The close connec-
tions between Russian agroholdings and state authorities was also ob-
served by Wandel (2011: 403), who argued that the real danger to social 
welfare and fair competition in agricultural markets ‘does not come from 
[agroholdings’] ability to raise non-legal barriers to entry, but from gov-
ernment protection’. Government protection implies state control over 
oligarchs and their agroholdings, which reduces political competition 
between them, thereby, making the Russian state system relatively stable. 
Meanwhile, in Ukraine – which also experiences the fusion between large 
businesses and the state apparatus – agroholdings compete within poli-
tics (i.e. for an ability to exercise control over members of the parlia-
ment), which shatters the state apparatus. Whereas the Ukrainian state is 
formed through the political and economic competition between oligar-
chic alliances, the Russian state moves towards new Kremlin absolutism 
and presidential patrimonialism (Afanasyev 2008, Easter 2008).  
Patrimonialism, according to Weber (1978: 1029), is a form of gov-
ernance in which the political administration ‘is treated as a purely per-
sonal affair of the ruler and political power is considered part of his per-
sonal property’. The historical continuities are remarkable in Russia. The 
patrimonial rule defined the relations between the tsar and nobles, and, 
later, between the Communist Party leaders and their underlings 
(Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002). The contemporary Russian system is 
often referred as ‘neopatrimonialism’, which implies the coexistence of 
patrimonial politics with modern bureaucracies. Since the 2000s, Russia 
has moved towards significant de-institutionalisation of state governance, 
resulting in a nearly absolute form of presidential power (Afanasyev 
2008). Chapter 4 discusses the principles of ‘vertikal vlasti’ (vertical power 
structure) and ‘ruchnoye upravleniye’ (hands-on/manual management) of 
Putin’s governance, which define power relations in the country. The 
autonomy of public institutions was deliberately devalued not through 
changes in their legal status, but through informal orders and arrange-
ments, bringing the Russian state closer to what Reno (2000) defined as a 
‘shadow state’, which ‘leaves the formal institutions of government little 
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more than an empty shell’ (Ferguson 2006: 39). This explains why rural 
dwellers are unable to obtain justice through official channels of dispute 
resolution and therefore ask Putin directly for patronage (see Chapter 4). 
The principle of ‘ruchnoye upravleniye’ characterises the president’s 
practices of direct intervention in internal affairs, and his power over po-
litical, social and economic institutions. This is one of the factors which 
influences rural dwellers to approach the president, as ‘the tsar-deliverer’, 
who has the power to restrain the court and arrogant elites, and make 
‘wrongs’ ‘rights’, as discussed in Chapter 4 on ‘naive monarchism’ in 
Russia.  
The lower authorities’ obedience to presidential orders is realised by 
means of patron-client relations with the use of state concessions as eco-
nomic incentives. Easter (2008) called this system ‘concession capital-
ism’, attaching a larger importance to state concessions than to private 
property. The patron-client imperative is present at all levels of govern-
ment. It also manifests itself in state-civil society relations, as discussed 
in Chapter 3. Many civil society organisations have become embedded 
within the state, resulting in the development of a ‘state-guided civil soci-
ety’ in Russia. Chapter 3 demonstrates how the state uses the ‘carrot and 
stick’ strategy towards institutionalised social movements: the organisa-
tions that are loyal to the state receive state financial support and politi-
cal space to conduct their activities, but at the expense of their auton-
omy. Meanwhile, more independent civil organisations face major 
financial and institutional obstacles and are often exposed to political 
repression.  
The Russian state does not hesitate to use its coercive power re-
sources. Although coercion is a building block (at different scales) of 
many political regimes, it has gained a special importance in contempo-
rary Russia (Easter 2008). Following Weber’s definition of the coercive 
capacity of the state, Easter (2008: 206) called the Russian state a ‘police 
state’ because of its use of military, police and the Procuracy,20 whereas 
Taylor (2011) referred to the ‘regime of repression’, used to ‘weaken ac-
tual and potential opponents of the Kremlin, such as oligarchs, opposi-
tion parties and movements’ (Taylor 2011: 3). This study takes the lim-
ited political opportunity structure in Russia as its starting point and 
looks beyond statist and liberal approaches to state-society relations. It 
argues that the state embeddedness of many (rural) social movement or-
ganisations does not necessarily make them an extension of the state ap-
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paratus, and the affiliation of grassroots rural protesters with state rheto-
ric, policies and principles does not undermine their resistance (as is 
briefly discussed further in this introduction and elaborated on in Chap-
ters 3 and 4).  
The discussion of the Russian state requires mentioning its 
(re)production of key ideological discourses, or in other words, use of 
ideological power resources. These resources are generated to legitimate 
the state’s/leader’s authority, and to support and strengthen the system 
of domination, according to the Weberian intellectual tradition. The ‘cult 
of the state’, which is inseparable from the cult of its leader, is a part of 
Russian identity and power relations (Molchanov 2002). It ‘involves the 
mystification of the source of authority, justification of the distribution 
of power resources, and sanctification of coercive resources’ (Easter 
2008: 220). The cult of the state is largely influenced by patriotism and 
people’s devotion to the ‘sacred Fatherland’ raised during the Soviet pe-
riod, and by contemporary state propaganda about Russia as a Great 
Power and Putin as the ‘present-day tsar’ (see Molchanov 2002, Easter 
2008). Chapter 4 is largely devoted to the analysis of the cult of Putin’s 
personality and his use of the ‘myth of the tsar-deliverer’. Putin draws 
from the playbooks of Russian tsars to show his benevolence to ordinary 
people for the purpose of social control. Moreover, he resurrects main 
elements of the tsarist legacy to develop patriotism and a unified sense of 
Russian identity, and to create positive historical parallels to justify the 
state’s policy towards the internal opposition and external enemies.  
Contrary to the strong state in Russia, the Ukrainian state is often 
characterised as fragile and ineffective – and is continually being torn 
apart by oligarchic clans competing over power resources. The post-
Euromaidan Ukrainian government has not – at least yet21 – changed the 
essence of the national state. The oligarchic alliance of the former presi-
dent was replaced by another, whereas the system of patron-client rela-
tions and the merger of the business elites with the state bureaucracy 
remain largely unchanged.  
1.4.2. Rural politics of the state  
State interventions in rural areas and the impact on the peasantry and 
agrarian transformation are discussed by Das (2007) as a contradictory 
continuum ‘from dispossession to repeasantisation and back again’. Das 
adhered to Poulantzas’ (1973) views of the state’s role in class struggles 
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and argued that the state – as an instrument of capitalist classes – ne-
glects smallholders’ interests. Yet at times, state policy is ‘designed to 
reproduce peasant economy and – on occasion – even to repeasantise 
landless workers’ (Das 2007: 358). In land grab debates, the state in de-
veloping countries is frequently discussed within a Manichean perspec-
tive:22 either as a weak ‘target’ state, which does not have the capacity to 
resist the pressures from foreign and domestic agricultural businesses, or 
as a ‘host’, which facilitates land accumulation by providing infrastruc-
ture and financial support to large farm enterprises (Hall et al. 2015). 
However, if we view the state as a blend of ‘multiple actors, factions and 
interests, many of which are in direct competition for political influence’, 
as Hall et al. (2015: 475) suggest, the incoherence of state policies and 
contradictory practices at different governmental levels can be explained. 
This section analyses ‘official’ rural politics at different state levels, taking 
into account the interests of various state actors and state-society rela-
tions.  
Rural politics of Soviet and subsequently post-Soviet states reflect 
transformation within the state and its relations with powerful classes. 
The Soviet state exercised control and planning of agricultural produc-
tion and rural social lives.23 After its collapse, the newly emerged states of 
Russia and Ukraine largely followed a neoliberal laissez-faire approach, 
and were particularly influenced by Western consultants, who advocated 
in favour of free market competition and private family farming (Csaki 
and Lerman 1997, Infanger 1994). State intervention in rural areas was 
reduced to a minimum: agricultural subsidies were curtailed, agricultural 
inputs and output prices were left uncontrolled, and rural employment 
was no longer guaranteed by the state (see Chapters 2, 3 and 4). At the 
same time, the Russian and Ukrainian states pursued land distribution 
reforms. According to Wegren (2007), during this period the state was 
active in privatisation, but followed a laissez-faire approach in terms of the 
regulation of the agricultural economy.  
However, the role of authorities – especially at lower levels – was not 
entirely laissez-faire. State capture ‘from outside’ originated at lower state 
levels. As a result of post-Soviet governmental decentralisation, local au-
thorities gained control over resource distribution, and, hence, became 
key actors in capitalist accumulation. The implementation of land reform 
was often locally modified to serve elite interests. For example, 80% of 
rural dwellers in Ukraine were “informed” by local authorities and farm 
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mangers that they could let their land shares be incorporated into farm 
enterprises, while just a few knew that they could establish a farm (Csaki 
and Lerman 1997, referred in Chapter 5). The elites’ use of local state 
power as an instrument of land accumulation is revealed in land grabbing 
and agrarian transformation literature. In his analysis of local rural gov-
ernment in Mexico, Fox (2007) argued that wealth accumulation by the 
elite was a result of their capacity to exercise control over local level au-
thorities. Milgroom (2015) demonstrated with the example of Mozam-
bique that the effect of state policies, which were developed at a high 
level, depends on how they were ‘enacted’ at the local level. This disser-
tation shows that the early post-Soviet period was characterised by the 
elite’s use of the lower state apparatus as an instrument for land and 
capital accumulation. 
Since the early 2000s state policy in Russia has become increasingly 
interventionist. Wegren (2007) characterised this period as ‘bringing the 
state back in’. The crisis of 1998 created the official discourse ‘that the 
laissez-faire, neoliberal model had failed, and that a strong Russian econ-
omy would require a more interventionist state’ (Wegren 2007: 513). 
With Putin’s rise to power, the state revitalised the process of agrarian 
reform with the aim to develop large-scale agriculture (see Chapters 2 
and 3). This coincided with the strengthening of the centralised state and 
state capture ‘from within’, as discussed in the previous section. Thus, if 
in the early post-Soviet period, elites influenced the state policy imple-
mentation via local authorities, since early 2000s state policies have di-
rectly served the interests of ‘federal oligarchs’ and large agribusiness. 
Similar to Russia, the Ukrainian state – although remaining largely decen-
tralised – turned its attention to large-scale agriculture in the early 2000s, 
partly because of the stagnating growth of private family farming (not to 
be confused with the rather successful production from household 
plots), and partly due to state capture ‘from within’ by oligarchic clans. 
According to Kuns (2016), even though president Poroshenko officially 
declared his intention to help small farmers, in fact, his current policy 
follows his earlier assessment ‘that large-scale agroholdings are Ukraine’s 
competitive advantage’ (Poroshenko 2012, referenced in Kuns 2016). 
This resulted in state financial support (i.e. cash transfers, grants, tax 
credits and low-interest loans) and provisioning of essential infrastruc-
tures and services to large agribusinesses. Thus, 60% of the Ukrainian 
state subsidies to agriculture in 2012 went to agroholdings, while the re-
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maining part was largely divided between other large farm enterprises 
with little or nothing reaching medium- or small-scale farmers (see Chap-
ter 5). In Russia, 22.5% of all subsidies were received by 1.4% of the 
largest corporate farms (Uzun 2005).  
State interventionism improved the performance of the agricultural 
sector (Wegren 2007), which indirectly benefited the rural population, at 
least initially through symbiosis with and employment at LFEs. What 
else does the state do for villagers? In a capitalist society, the state cannot 
entirely overlook peasants because the ‘petty commodity producers who 
own land, are a source of legitimacy for private property itself, and there-
fore their continued reproduction has an ideological function for capital 
and its state’ (Das 2007: 358). In the post-Soviet countries, private prop-
erty is not associated with rural households, and state support to them is 
often perceived as ‘compelled necessity’ (Skalnaya and Burykin 2009). 
Russian academics Skalnaya and Burykin (2009: 34) highlighted this dis-
course in their statement: ‘everyone understands that the state agricul-
tural policy should not be based on semi-skilled manual subsistence agri-
culture in the times of high technologies...[however]...the state has to 
deal with it because of nearly an absolute engagement of the rural popu-
lation in this activities’. Therefore, state support to smallholders is a ‘so-
cial question’, not a part of national economic policy in the former Soviet 
Union. 
Wegren (2007: 515) argued that despite state interventionism during 
Putin’s time, the role of the central state remains laissez-faire ‘in rural 
social policy, as the state neither intervened to protect rural standards of 
living, nor acted to close the gap between urban and rural incomes’. 
Many state programmes, which were designed to support smallholdings, 
remain underfinanced. For example, the state programme ‘Social Devel-
opment of the Village till 2010’, adopted in 2002, placed the financial 
burden on regional budgets, which already experienced substantial defi-
cits (Yakimova 2006). In Ukraine, the central state is largely absent in 
rural development, giving local authorities the reins of governance (see 
Chapter 5). Some of the state interventions do not only overlook, but 
also work against smallholders. The 2014 proposal of the Ukrainian gov-
ernment to formalise the informal commercially oriented people’s farm-
ing will most likely have a negative impact on such households 
(Borodina 2014, Kuns 2016). In Russia, the state policy aimed at limiting 
livestock owned by rural households and systematic pig slaughtering re-
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portedly due to swine flu, which jeopardises smallholders’ subsistence, is 
perceived by rural dwellers as ‘a war against them’ by the LFEs interested 
in monopolising the pork meat market (see Chapters 4 and 6).  
State support to the rural population is important for social and po-
litical control (Das 2007). Wolf (1969) argued that villagers, who possess 
landed property, are most inclined to revolution, while Paige (1975) at-
tributed the revolutionary potential to landless peasants and labourers. 
Meanwhile, Chapter 3 indicates how the phenomena of post-Soviet rural 
political apathy, conservatism, patience and endurance is unlikely to lead 
to a revolt. However, as rural dwellers constitute roughly one-third of 
the Russian and Ukrainian population, elected politicians should be re-
sponsive to this group. This responsiveness, however, is varied across 
different state levels. Whereas the federal state declares its intention to 
support ordinary people, the local state is often too underfunded to fulfil 
many of the promises of the federal state. Moreover, if the federal state 
represents the interests of ‘federal oligarchs’, the local state continues to 
be captured by local elites. Rural dwellers face local state capture on a 
daily basis, while federal processes are hidden from the general public by 
the state-controlled mass media. Chapter 4 on ‘naive monarchism’ in 
Russia reveals that rural dwellers have different attitudes towards au-
thorities at various state levels. People blame local authorities and elites 
for rural scourges, while Putin is often seen in a positive light. This is 
largely a result of Putin’s public appearance as an ordinary people’s inter-
cessor, whose noble orders are distorted by unfaithful officials. This 
myth of ‘the tsar-deliverer’ and ‘arrogant nobles’ is important for Putin 
to maintain or increase his popularity, and for purposes of social control 
and political stability. 
The state’s coercive power is applied in rural areas much less often 
than in large cities, where the majority of political protests take place. 
Ruzhkov (2012) argued that Putin aligned himself with the conservative 
population of provincial towns and rural areas, and ‘initiated a war 
against the values important to progressive Russia[ns, particularly in ur-
ban areas]: freedom of speech, the right of assembly, etc.’ Chapter 4 ex-
plains the federal state’s tolerance to rural grievances given the fact that 
these grievances are framed within the ‘naive monarchist’ discourse that 
reinforces Putin’s authority and neopatrimonial regime. Rural activists 
primarily target local authorities and elites in their campaigns and de-
mand nothing more than compliance with official state laws and regula-
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tions. This resistance is unable to challenge the existing order but pro-
vides rural dwellers with a means to remedy local injustices, as is dis-
cussed below.  
1.5. Advocacy politics: rural resistance and mobilisation  
Existing research on rural resistance and mobilisation falls within three 
main paradigms depending on the unit of analysis: classical collective ac-
tion theory, Marxist class-based analysis, and heterodox theories of social 
movements, which analyse rural resistance at the individual, class and 
social movements’ levels, respectively.  
The classical collective action paradigm is based on rational choice 
theory, which implies that rural dwellers are rational and engage in open 
collective protests based on costs-benefits calculation (Popkin 1979, Ol-
son 1965). If the participation in collective action is too risky and their 
costs are higher than the anticipated benefits, people chose a ‘free rider’ 
strategy, hoping to benefit from risks borne by others (Olson 1965). 
However, this approach often overlooks ideological and emotional as-
pects of social relations (see Edelman 2001).  
The Marxist school of thought understands resistance as the result of 
class struggles over productive resources in the process of capitalist de-
velopment. According to Marxists, peasants constitute a ‘class in itself’, 
which cannot represent itself, but must be represented, whereas rural 
labourers are free from prejudice and property, and, therefore, are more 
likely to engage in revolt (Marx 1852, Paige 1975). Marxists see current 
rural resistance and mobilisation as struggles against dispossession 
or/and incorporation into the capitalist agricultural system (Harvey 
2003). 
The heterodox social movement paradigm includes: political oppor-
tunity structure theory, agrarian populism, and the studies of transna-
tional agrarian movements (TAMs).24 Political opportunity structure 
theorists argue that success or failure of social movements depends on 
political opportunities – ‘dimensions of the political struggle that encour-
age people to engage in contentious politics’ (Tarrow 1998: 19). The 
agrarian populist approach is related to ‘grassroots’ social movements 
and small-scale farmers’ resistance to capitalism, inspired by Chayano-
vian ideas on ‘peasant economy’ and the ‘eternal’ family farming system 
as a backbone of society (Chayanov 1966). In their explanations of rural 
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resistance, agrarian populists often refer to the notion of the ‘moral 
economy’. According to Scott (1976: 3), moral economy is the peasants’ 
‘concept of economic justice and their working definition of exploitation 
– their view of which claims towards their product were tolerable and 
which were intolerable’. If the expropriation of peasant households’ sur-
plus by the state and landlords exceeds the peasant understanding of 
economic justice, rural revolts might occur (Chayanov 1966, Scott 1976, 
Siméant 2011). Furthermore, many populist scholars recognise gossiping, 
non-compliance, pilfering, and foot-dragging as hidden forms of rural 
resistance, following Scott’s theory on ‘everyday peasant resistance’ or 
‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott 1985). Finally, TAM studies focus on 
transnational or global rural social movements and their politics in re-
sponse to land grabbing and globalisation of agriculture. However, as 
Edelman and Borras (2016: 5) remarked, ‘peasant organisations, whether 
transnational or not, tend to represent themselves as sui generis processes 
originating in and developing exclusively through the agency of their 
peasant supporters’, while their leaders are not classical peasants, but well 
trained rural activists. 
Although many theories on collective action are based on the histori-
cal analysis of Russian rural resistance and peasants wars in the era of the 
Tsars and the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 (Field 1976, Wolf 1969, 
Shanin 1986), contemporary studies on resistance and mobilisation 
largely overlook rural discontent in post-socialist settings. The research 
on rural resistance in the FSU is limited to a few studies, which link the 
failure of distributive land reforms to villagers’ resistance to capitalism 
and the market economy (see for example Leonard 2000, Pallot and Ne-
fedova 2007). This dissertation contributes to revitalising studies on rural 
resistance in the region and demonstrates their importance in global de-
bates on contentious politics.  
As mentioned previously, the post-Soviet rural population is consid-
ered peaceful, politically apathetic, and unwilling to defend their interests 
in open protest. This is, perhaps, the major factor, which lowered aca-
demic interest in rural contentious politics in the region. The reluctance 
of the post-Soviet rural population to engage in overt political resistance 
and mobilisation is often explained by the history of 70 years of 
socialism, under which disagreements with governmental actions were 
banned and prosecuted (Visser 2010). In addition, Chapters 3, 5 and 6 
discuss other reasons. The first of those is the possession of household 
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plots (different from the distributed former collective land) that secures 
rural families’ subsistence in times of crisis. Second, the lack of rural re-
sistance can be explained by overall ageing and ‘negative social selection’ 
processes (i.e. when young and active dwellers migrate from rural to ur-
ban areas, see Nefedova 2012). Third, some authors conceptualise villag-
ers’ pilfering and foot-dragging at LFEs as ‘everyday forms of resistance’ 
(i.e. Nikulin 2003, 2010). However, it can be difficult to distinguish these 
practices from socially accepted petty thefts, which are a continuation of 
the former socialist legacy of ‘everything collective, everything is mine’, 
as discussed later in this chapter. Finally, Putin’s regime creates a limited 
political opportunity structure, as it is able to divide, demobilise and re-
press undesired civil protests. In Ukraine, the political space for rural 
contestations is also narrow, not due to the coercive power of the central 
state, but because of the local elites’ (often criminal) control of the exist-
ing order, as discussed in Chapter 5 based on the example of the ‘milk 
mafia’. Visser and Mamonova (2012) detected more rural protests in 
Ukraine than in Russia during the last decade. Villagers protest against 
the arbitrariness of local state authorities and misconduct of elites, local 
state capture, land grabbing, or even against their fellow villagers, al-
though the latter conflicts are primarily resolved at the household level 
and rarely take the forms of overt resistance and mobilisation. Post-
Soviet rural protests do not challenge the political regime or the status 
quo; instead, they are related to ‘bread-and-butter’ issues and local 
wrongdoings, as discussed further. 
Many classical studies on popular resistance either focus on official 
institutionalised acts and political participation, or analyse institutional-
ised resistance in the forms of demonstrations, protests, and revolts. 
McAdam et al. (2001) defined these two different forms of resistance as 
‘contained and transgressive contention’. O’Brien (2002: 52), however, 
argued that the boundary between these two kinds of contention is very 
vague, as they ‘interact incessantly’. By studying protests in rural China, 
he revealed that rural dwellers combine the authorised channels of dis-
pute resolution (collective petition writing, meetings with state authori-
ties, etc.) with disruptive non-institutionalised, but peaceful protests (e.g., 
silently parading with candles). Rural protesters employ the official state 
laws, norms and rhetoric to force power-holders to meet their official 
obligations and promises, and to exploit the division between different 
level officials. This boundary-spanning contention was conceptualised as 
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‘rightful resistance’ in the context of China (O’Brien 1996, 2002, Li and 
O’Brien 1996).  
This study attempts to contribute to the discussion on the boundary-
spanning rural contention by applying the concept of ‘naive monarchism’ 
to study rural resistance in contemporary Russia (see Chapter 4). I used 
the theoretical framework from Field’s (1976) historical analysis of peas-
ant resistance in Tsarist Russia, which argued that ‘naive monarchism’ 
(i.e. peasant traditional expressions of reverence for the tsar as their 
benefactor) was a common rural belief during Tsardom and was fre-
quently employed by peasants for certain ends. The veneration of the 
tsar in peasant grievances reinforced the tsar’s authority and existing or-
der, thereby, protecting peasants from state repression. At the same time, 
this allowed peasants to blame local authorities of disloyalty to the tsar 
and demand their compliance with the tsar’s orders. Although Russia is 
no longer a monarchy and rural dwellers are not traditional tsarist peas-
ants, elements of naive monarchism are present in the countryside. 
Chapter 4 presents the analysis of rural petitions and letters to the presi-
dent, demonstrations and peasant marches to the Kremlin, and geo-
graphical renaming in honour of Putin. In this chapter, it is argued that 
many rural activists deliberately exploit the image of Putin as ‘the present 
day tsar’ in their grievances to shield themselves from repressions and to 
threaten their local offenders with a possible presidential intervention. 
Rural activists also refer to official laws and regulation to legitimate their 
causes and demand local authorities to meet their obligations. However, 
contrary to ‘rightful resistance’ in rural China (O’Brien 1996), where rural 
workers use authorised channels of dispute resolution and do not hold 
illusions of patronage ties to the head of state; Russian villagers appeal 
directly to the president, due to the corruption of the judicial system and 
Putin’s neopatrimonial governance with its ‘ruchnoye upravleniye’ prin-
ciple. Rural grievances that have traits of naive monarchism are unable to 
challenge the existing order in Russia, but they do provide the rural poor 
with a means to tackle occasional local injustices.  
Thus, this study demonstrates that alliance with the state’s official dis-
course, norms and policies is a more effective and less dangerous strat-
egy than direct confrontation with it. This corresponds to the recent shift 
in the understanding of state-society relations in Russia and globally (see 
for example Kröger 2011 on the Brazilian rural movement MST). Until 
recently, civil society in the FSU was considered as inexistent, underde-
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veloped, or ‘state-guided’ (Janoski 1998, Salamon and Anheier 1998, 
Hale 2002). However, if we look beyond the liberal and statist models of 
state-society relations, which understand civil society as antagonistic to 
the state, we can discover unforeseen forms of collective action that 
emerge in a constrained political opportunity structure (see Chapter 3 on 
rural social movements in Russia). Recent studies on environmental, dis-
ability and animal rights movements in Russia have demonstrated that 
social movements are most efficient if they cooperate with the state, but 
preserve their autonomy (Chebankova 2012, Fröhlich 2012, Henry 2006, 
2010, Kulmala 2011). Chapter 3 builds its analysis upon this assumption 
and takes the limited political opportunity structure as a point of depar-
ture. It analyses the paradoxical emergence of various rural social move-
ment organisations (RSMOs) in Russia during the last decade, taking into 
account the increased coercive power of the state and reluctance of the 
rural population to engage in collective action.  
The existing analysis on rural contentious politics (except TAM stud-
ies) tends to prioritise bottom-up resistance and mobilisation over pro-
fessional formal organisations. Meanwhile, formally structured social 
movement organisations can provide resources and an institutional 
framework to social movements, guide protests, and carry movements’ 
goals and values throughout the periods of low mobilisation activity 
(Zald and McCarthy 1987, Taylor 1989). Chapter 3 distinguishes five 
types of RSMOs in Russia: semi-institutionalised grassroots movements, 
professionalised organisations, government affiliates, politically oriented 
organisations, and phantom movements, each with different goals, re-
sources and levels of institutionalisation. Many of them are established 
top-down, lack constituency (real connection with the rural population), 
and largely support the status quo. The state-embeddedness of the ma-
jority of RSMOs reflects the existing development of civil society in Rus-
sia, where civil organisations have to cooperate with the state in order to 
pursue their activities. On the one hand, these organisations can be la-
belled as ‘state marionettes’. On the other hand, ‘the state-oriented or-
ganisations correspond more with the population’s ideas on civil society’ 
(Vorobjev 2009) and the patrimonial governance in the country, leading 
to a rethinking of the reasons for their embeddedness (Chapter 3). Con-
sidering the villagers’ unwillingness to participate in the collective action 
and general distrust of the post-Soviet population to social and political 
movements (Shevchenko 2008), the RSMOs’ alliance with state policies, 
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norms and rhetoric could be the way to gain support from the popula-
tion.  
Mobilisation of rural dwellers for collective action is one of the main 
obstacles of RSMOs and grassroots rural activists. This study challenges 
several assumptions about the rural dwellers’ participation motives in 
collective action. Globally, agrarian populist movements frequently re-
sort to ‘peasantness-as-empowerment’ as a mobilising ideology. Some 
scholars, like Brass (2000), argue that many rural social movements revi-
talised romantic populist discourses on the ‘peasant way of life’ to 
counter the destructive model of capitalist agriculture, largely inspired by 
the Chayanovian theory of the peasant economy. However, while social 
movements proclaim a ‘peasant way of life’, ‘food sovereignty’, ‘envi-
ronmental justice’, or ‘resistance to land grabbing’ as their main goals, 
individual members may have other reasons for collective action. In this 
vein, Pye (2010) identified a discrepancy between the campaigns of in-
ternational agrarian movements, and the interests of Indonesian villagers: 
while movements were preoccupied with ‘biodiversity conservation’ and 
‘climate justice’, rural dwellers were more concerned about their land 
rights and employment. Similarly, Mamonova (2013) analysed the mis-
match between the aims of the movement ‘Defenders of the country-
side’, who fought against grabbing of historical land of Radonezh in the 
Moscow region, while local villagers protested against the restriction of 
their physical access to forest and river due to unauthorised construction 
on Radonezh land. This dissertation, therefore, calls for a critical assess-
ment of reasons behind rural dwellers’ participation in collective action. 
Chapter 3 argues that material bread-and-butter reasons for mobilisation 
(such as a compensation for lost land rights) are more effective in post-
Soviet settings than ideological motives related to peasantness and a 
peasant way of life. The general negative attitude to the peasant lifestyle 
and small-scale family farming in the FSU influences the motives behind 
mobilisation. Furthermore, there are no visible social movements that 
advocate for ‘food sovereignty’ or ‘a peasant way’, making these ideas 
very abstract and unpopular among the rural population. However, these 
are not the only reasons. Chapter 5 analyses the villagers’ concerns with 
personal gains in their response to land grabbing. It reveals that many 
rural dwellers put their own interests above a community’s interest. In 
their discourses on the moratorium cancellation, rural Ukrainians foresee 
negative consequences for the village from land sales; nevertheless, they 
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would be willing to sell their land plots as soon as land sales are legalised. 
This collision of private and collective interests adds one more dimen-
sion to the political dilemma, formulated by Borras and Franco (2012: 
56-57), ‘when a situation is acceptable in terms of labour justice, but not 
in terms of agrarian justice; when it is acceptable in terms of agrarian jus-
tice, but not in environmental justice terms, and so on’.  
1.6. Everyday rural politics  
Everyday rural politics are commonly associated with hidden or everyday 
rural resistance in peasant societies (Scott 1985, Scott and Kerkvliet 
1986, Adnan 2007, 2011 among others). Everyday resistance is a hidden 
unorganised form of protest by subordinate rural groups/peasants 
against a system of domination (oriented towards powerful classes within 
the state and in society), in which protesters express their dissatisfaction 
with what they regard as unjust, but do not attribute any political dimen-
sion to their insubordination. This everyday resistance does not occur at 
official dispute resolution places, but happens at places where people live 
and work through interactions within subordinate rural groups or be-
tween subordinates and superiors. Although there are divergences in the 
definition and understanding of everyday rural resistance, scholars gener-
ally agree on the ‘intention and upward orientation’ of rural acts 
(Kerkvliet 2009: 233). However, Kerkvliet25 argued that everyday rural 
politics is a much broader concept than just everyday rural resistance. In 
his recent work ‘Everyday politics in peasant societies (and ours)’ he dis-
tinguished four types of everyday politics: support, compliance, modifi-
cations and evasions, and resistance. This study analyses different types 
of everyday rural politics in the post-Soviet countryside and aims to con-
tribute to a better understanding of their diversity.  
Everyday forms of peasant resistance were first mentioned, although 
without conceptualisation, by Adas (1981) in his study of Burmese and 
Javanese peasants who engaged in destructive acts against the colonial 
system without direct confrontation with their oppressors. Scott is one 
of the most influential thinkers in the field of everyday peasant resis-
tance. In the book ‘Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resis-
tance’, he conceptualised and provided a multi-layered analysis of hidden 
resistance in a Malaysian village (Scott 1985). Scott saw peasant foot-
dragging, pilfering, false compliance, poaching, sabotage, anonymous 
threats, jokes and gossip about their oppressors as the means by which 
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peasants manifest their political interests. This non-explicit, yet political, 
resistance often takes the forms of individualised, unorganised and local-
ised practices, and is therefore difficult to repress.  
Das (2007) criticised ‘everyday forms of resistance’ for being self-
defeating. He argued that everyday peasant resistance ‘confined to and 
aimed at a power structure within its own immediate vicinity, [while] 
class power is concentrated in the state at the national level, and those 
who proclaim the efficacy of everyday forms of resistance tend to forget 
this’ (Das 2007: 363). However, many studies on everyday resistance 
prove the opposite and observe a slow transformation of the system un-
der gradual pressure from peasants. In his notable study of peasant eve-
ryday resistance to the collective farming system in northern Vietnam, 
Kerkvliet (2005) revealed that the Vietnamese government eventually 
moved away from collective agricultural production due to continuous 
peasant sabotage at collective farms. Moreda (2015) had a similar per-
spective in his analysis of contemporary resistance of Gumuz rural 
communities to land grabbing in Ethiopia. He argued that, on one side, 
everyday hidden resistance of Gumuz people is unable to challenge the 
status quo and the state’s patronage of agribusiness. On the other side, 
peasant covert insurgency (i.e. destruction of crops and machineries of 
land investors) and more open acts (i.e. refusal to pay taxes or disregard 
for investors’ properties) negatively affect the economic viability of large-
scale agricultural projects, which might decrease the Ethiopian state’s 
interest in supporting such projects.  
As mentioned earlier in this introductory chapter, Nikulin (2003, 
2010) characterised the post-Soviet villagers’ pilfering and foot-dragging 
regarding LFEs as ‘everyday rural resistance’. However, these rural de-
structive acts are often situated at the intersections of resistance against 
domination and traditional rural behaviour. There is a strong legacy of 
rural thefts in Russia. Ioffe et al. (2006) referred to the popular legend 
about Nikolai Karamzin, a famous Russian historian and writer of the 
early nineteenth century, who characterised the situation in rural areas 
with just one word: ‘voruyut’ (they steal). Of course, this could have been 
a common (mis)perception among educated urban people at that time. 
However, more recent history likewise indicates that rural theft is a 
common and socially-accepted practice. Humphrey (1983: 136) discov-
ered that the Soviet villagers used the ‘word theft to refer only to stealing 
from one another’ while pilfering from collectives was named ‘takes’. 
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According to Humphrey, people explained it as ‘recovering things that 
were rightfully theirs, either because they had worked on those things 
(harvested corn, pulled potatoes, or collected fruit) for inadequate pay or 
because they had once owned the land for growing these things and they 
were not getting enough to live on’ (ibid 1983: 136). The theft can be 
also interpreted as rational economic behaviour at the individual level 
(yet with irrational outcomes at the farm/community level) (see e.g. Vis-
ser 2003). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rural population 
continued to practice petty theft, this time around on the fields of LFEs 
that replaced kolkhozy and sovkhozy in the agricultural system (see 
Chapter 2). Chapter 6 continues the discussion on everyday rural resis-
tance in Russia and argues that rural dwellers do not resist against LFEs, 
as they ‘can hardly imagine a future without them’. However, villagers’ 
foot-dragging and pilfering can be classified as everyday resistance 
against LFEs’ decreasing support to rural households, in other words, 
against gradual termination of the ‘social contract’ (Pallot and Nefedova 
2007).  
Whether post-Soviet rural pilfering and foot-dragging are intentional 
acts of resistance or traditional rural behaviours, they do not represent a 
significant force to change the status quo. However, they may influence 
the activities of large farms. Spoor and Visser (2004) were sceptical about 
the effectiveness of post-Soviet everyday politics of rural resistance. 
They argued that these practices could only satisfy their adherents’ need 
for food and vengeance. This study, however, revealed that rural foot-
dragging and pilfering have some impact on LFEs. Many companies 
have to accept this behaviour and call these losses, for instance, the ‘an-
gel’s share,’ as in the case for the Swedish company Black Earth Farm-
ing26. Those companies that fight against villagers’ foot-dragging and pil-
fering deal with more significant losses. For instance, a Russian 
agroholding in Rostov hired a helicopter to monitor the fields during 
harvesting (Prishchepov et al. 2012). In this context, Rylko (2011) jok-
ingly suggested that modern LFEs might have installed such departments 
as an ‘anti-trespassers brigade’, ‘field-theft accounting’ and a ‘department 
of field security’, leading to increased monitoring and management costs. 
Chapter 5 demonstrates that rural foot-dragging and pilfering motivate 
LFEs to engage with rural development projects and to provide some 
help to rural households in order to formalise this kind of ‘social con-
tract’ and, thereby, keep it under control.  
Processed on: 6-9-2016
505017-L-bw-Mamanova
 Introduction 49 
Everyday support and compliance are at the other end of the spec-
trum of everyday rural politics. Kerkvliet (2009) argued that not all eve-
ryday practice is rural resistance to the state authorities or to the existing 
order. Some villagers express support, which involve ‘deliberate, perhaps 
even enthusiastic endorsement of the system’, others just go ‘through the 
motions of support without much thought about it’ – i.e. are in compli-
ance with the system (Kerkvliet 2009: 235). Kerkvliet argued that subor-
dinate groups sometimes accept their subordinate position and act in 
accordance with patron-client relations within and outside rural commu-
nities. Chapter 5 discusses acceptance of Ukrainian rural households of 
their disadvantageous socio-economic position in comparison with 
LFEs. Instead of resistance to land and control grabbing and large-scale 
agricultural development, many rural households choose to adapt their 
production, distribution, and use of resources in order to coexist with 
large-scale farming. These everyday forms of villagers’ support and com-
pliance are among the major factors, which make the coexistence sce-
nario possible and guarantee the persistence of small-scale people’s farm-
ing.  
Besides acceptance of power relations at the rural community level, 
everyday forms of support and compliance can be related to ‘particular 
authorities, governments, and regimes’ (Kerkvliet 2009: 236). In his study 
of rural politics in socialist Czechoslovakia, Havel (1985) observed that 
many rural residents symbolically supported communism in their daily 
practices (he referred to the example of a rural dweller, who displayed a 
poster ‘Workers of the World, Unite!’ on his window). Havel argued that 
although this obedience to the regime might be not a deliberate political 
act, this behaviour guaranteed a ‘relatively tranquil life in harmony with 
society’ (Havel 1985: 28). Chapter 4 on naive monarchism in Russia 
represents another example of everyday rural politics of support and 
compliance. For instance, it reveals that some rural streets and other 
geographical objects were recently renamed in honour of Putin. Thereby 
rural dwellers express their love for and appreciation to the Russian 
president, corresponding to the patrimonial governance of Putin and his 
role as a ‘present-day tsar’. This rural behaviour reinforces the existing 
order, but at the same time allows rural dwellers to put pressures on local 
authorities and elites in order to force them to act in compliance with the 
system.  
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Everyday modifications and evasions are the everyday rural politics 
that fall between compliance and resistance. According to Kerkvliet 
(2009: 237) ‘indifference to the rules and processes regarding production, 
distribution, and use of resources’ are the most common everyday forms 
of modifications and evasions. In his study of collective farming coop-
eratives in Vietnam, Kerkvliet describes a case where rural labourers 
complied with the requirements of the system in terms of field fertilising. 
However, without close supervision, they ‘did the work sloppily, such as 
dumping excessive amounts of fertiliser in a few spots, so as to complete 
the task quickly and easily, rather than spreading it evenly, which would 
take more time and effort’ (Kerkvliet 2009: 237). This study provides 
another example of everyday evasions or indifference. Chapter 5 de-
scribes cases where rural households show little or no adaptability to 
neoliberal agricultural development in Ukraine. While most elderly wid-
ows and some working-age villagers do not resist the existing power rela-
tions in the countryside, however, they also do nothing to support or 
adapt to the existing order, which often contributes to their socio-
economic marginalisation.  
Besides analysing the everyday support, compliance, modifications, 
evasions, and resistance of the post-Soviet rural population, this study 
discusses food self-provisioning as a type of everyday rural politics. Peo-
ple’s farming and the food exchange and consumption practices associ-
ated with it are not everyday resistance, compliance, nor indifference. 
They represent an alternative way of food production and distribution, 
which falls outside the LFEs’ dominated food system and is not con-
trolled by any formal institutions. This study discusses everyday food 
practices of the post-Soviet population within the concept of food sov-
ereignty. It argues that although post-Soviet rural dwellers do not oppose 
large-scale industrial farming, the idea of the right to food and the right 
to define their own food systems is not completely lost on them. These 
rights are not explicitly discussed in the post-Soviet countryside; and cul-
turally appropriate and ecological food production is done in a ‘quiet’ 
way, without attaining a great importance to it. This resembles the Nyé-
léni definition of food sovereignty,27 although without associated dis-
courses and social movements. Chapter 6 introduces a distinct form of 
‘hidden’ or ‘quiet’ food sovereignty without a movement in post-socialist 
Russia.  
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The concept ‘quiet food sovereignty’ was largely inspired by Smith 
and Jehlička’s (2013) concept of ‘quiet sustainability’. According to their 
research in Eastern and Central Europe, up to one-third of post-socialist 
Europeans grow their own food. These food practices represent a highly 
productive, localised and ecological form of farming, which carries so-
cial, cultural and environmental benefits for the population and the re-
gion. This food self-provisioning is not related to market transactions 
and is ‘not represented by the practitioners as relating directly to envi-
ronmental and sustainability goals’ (Smith and Jehlička 2013: 155), ex-
plaining the presence of the word ‘quiet’ in its name. Chapter 6 analyses 
the food self-provisioning of Russian smallholders as an everyday form 
of food sovereignty, which is not accompanied by public discourse and 
social mobilisation. It argues that the production of one’s own food is an 
important right for Russian dwellers. However, this right is rather im-
plicit in post-Soviet countries: small-scale farming is seen as the natural 
order of things, and only if household food production is directly threat-
ened (as in the case of organised pig slaughtering reportedly due to swine 
flu, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 6), open resistance and mobilisation 
might occur.  
1.7. Methodological reflections on conducting research in 
post-socialist settings  
This section introduces and rationalises the general methodology of data 
collection and analysis used in this dissertation. It discusses the applied 
research design, strategy and techniques within present and past meth-
odological debates. This study combines certain elements of realist and 
constructivist schools of thought – the so-called ‘realist constructivism’ 
approach – in order to understand the objective and subjective factors 
that influence agrarian capitalism and rural politics in the FSU.  
Until recently, constructivism and realism were defined in opposition 
to one another. Constructivists saw the social world as a product of 
‘meaning-making activities of groups and individuals’ that are shaped by 
norms and ideas (Lincoln and Guba 2000: 164, Onuf 1989, Charmaz 
2003). According to these scholars, social phenomena ‘are contextualised 
events which are perceived intersubjectively, […] recur in the flow of 
time, and are only meaningful when understood in context’ (Cupchik 
2001: 4). They argued that knowledge of social phenomena could not be 
detached from the observer/viewer, who ‘creates the data and ensuing 
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analysis through interaction with the viewed’ (Charmaz 2003: 273). Real-
ists criticised constructivists for subjectivity and utopianism, and argued 
that social phenomena are independent of the observer and can be ana-
lysed even without hers or his direct engagement with the viewed or ana-
lysed reality (Patomiki and Wight 2000). Realist research aims at ‘the neu-
tral discovery of an objective truth’ (Jonassen 1991: 10). These two polar 
positions have greatly influenced research methodology. Constructivists 
use qualitative methods of primary data collection, such as in-depth in-
terviews, focus group discussions and participant observation, and em-
phasise the importance of researcher self-awareness and reflexivity. In 
comparison, realist researchers prefer to use quantitative measures to 
study phenomena, and attempt to make their analysis free from personal 
bias or judgments (Creswell 2007). 
Barkin (2003) suggested that the antagonism between constructivism 
and realism is not as straightforward as commonly presented in discus-
sions. In his study of international relations theory, Barkin argued that 
constructivist epistemology and classical realist theory are able to com-
plement each other. The merger between these two approaches – the so-
called ‘realist constructivism’ (or ‘constructivist realism’) – is a way to 
combine ‘postmodern28 theory’s study of subjective text, positivist real-
ism’s study of objective phenomena, [and] constructivism’s study of in-
tersubjectivity of norms and social rules’ (ibid: 338). According to this 
ontological position, ‘physical phenomena can exist without human ap-
prehension but they only become meaningful events, in the sense of in-
fluencing action, when noticed or observed by a group of people’ (Cup-
chik 2001). This approach has gained popularity among scholars working 
on topics such as international relations, social inequality, morality and 
power (Jackson and Nexon 2004, Mattern 2004, Sterling-Folker 2004). 
Although this approach was criticised for focusing primarily on methods 
through which to study power relations, and not to understand the na-
ture of power, it contributed the concepts of norms and ideas to realism, 
which allows its application across different schools of thought.  
This dissertation applies the realist-constructivist ontology that ac-
commodates realism and constructivism and the methods that they sub-
tend. It combines an analysis of objective facts with subjective opinions, 
both of which shape agrarian transformation in Russia and Ukraine. At 
the same time, it recognises that fully objective interpretation of facts is 
impossible and reflection on the role of the researcher is paramount for 
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credible research (see further on). It examines the political economy of 
land and capital accumulation in the FSU, and delves into the four key 
questions of agrarian political economy, advocated by Bernstein (2010): 
Who owns what? Who does what? Who gets what? And what do they do 
with the surplus created? This study attempts to understand these proc-
esses holistically and from the perspective of the participants. It analyses 
rural dwellers’ own discourses about their socio-economic position, 
power relations in the countryside, the socialist past, the contemporary 
dual agricultural system, and so on. This analysis encompasses an exten-
sive set of primary qualitative data, which was collected through in-depth 
interviews, focus groups discussions and participant observation. The 
primary data is complimented with secondary data (a detailed discussion 
of data collection techniques is presented below). Together, ‘qualitative 
and quantitative methods provide complementary views of the phenom-
ena and efforts at achieving their reconciliation can elucidate processes 
underlying them’ (Cupchik 2001). 
Furthermore, this research attempts to exhibit maximum transparency 
in regard to the researcher’s personal assumptions, biases, and normative 
commitments, which might influence knowledge production. Smith 
(1987: 72) argued that relations between the researcher and informants 
are a ‘socially organised practice’ and need to be studied and reflected on 
in the analysis. She believed that the academic researcher should be pri-
marily ‘responsible not for impartiality or replicability of his/her re-
search, but for the ‘situated knowledge’,29 which was produced during 
interactions between the researcher and hers or his informants. Accord-
ing to Haraway (1988: 577), knowledge in the field is ‘always situated [...] 
and produced by positioned actors working in/between all kinds of loca-
tions, working up/on/through all kinds of research relation(ships)’. In 
this section, I discuss my fieldwork roles and how they influenced my 
interaction with rural communities and power-holders during the data 
collection process. This section also presents reflections on the impact of 
my personal and professional position over the course of the interpreta-
tion of data and post-fieldwork interactions with informants. The princi-
ples of researchers’ self-awareness and reflection enable this study to 
meet the criteria of rigour (‘trustworthiness’) in qualitative research, 
which increases the credibility of the data and conformability30 of re-
search findings (Darawsheh 2014). 
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1.7.1. Choice of fieldwork areas and primary data collection 
techniques 
The primary data was collected during fieldwork conducted from 2012 
to 2014 in Russia and Ukraine in the following regions: the Moscow and 
Vladimir regions (the central part of European Russia), the Stavropol 
Krai (the South of Russia), the Kiev region (Central Ukraine) and the 
Khmelnitsk region (Western Ukraine). A field trip to Eastern Ukraine 
was planned for the summer of 2014; however, it was cancelled due to 
the outbreak of civil war in that part of the country. The fieldwork sites 
were chosen to reveal rural politics in settings that differ across the fol-
lowing areas: infrastructural development, agricultural specialisation, 
proximity to large cities, and presence of large-scale agribusiness. The 
Moscow region is known for its rapid process of (sub)urbanisation and 
semi-legal/illegal transformation of farmland into construction sites. 
More than 80% of newly built houses in this region are built on former 
agricultural land, and often entail dispossession of the rural population’s 
land (and property) rights (Visser et al. 2012, Mamonova and Sutherland 
2015). The majority of open land conflicts and rural mobilisation against 
land grabbing take place in the Moscow region. The Kiev region has 
been experiencing suburbanisation as well, although to a lesser extent 
due to the moratorium on farmland sales. Similar to the Russian capital’s 
suburbs, the Kiev region is characterised by good infrastructural devel-
opment, the gradual expulsion of agriculture, and the daily commute of 
many rural dwellers to work in urban areas. The Khmelnitsk region of 
Ukraine and the Stavropol Krai of Russia are agriculture-specialised re-
gions, located partly in the fertile Black Earth zone.31 The largest agricul-
tural (multinational) corporations operate there and the majority of the 
rural population depend on (semi-)subsistence farming. The Vladimir 
region was selected to represent an area outside the Moscow city 
agglomeration, and is characterised by the instability of its agricultural 
development and the financial losses of the majority of its agricultural 
enterprises (Tsarkov 2014). The rural population in the Vladimir region 
is unable to commute to the capital daily, while employment in regional 
urban centres is limited. Furthermore, as Visser (2009) indicated, the 
productive symbiosis between rural households and LFEs is weaker in 
regions with weaker LFEs, which is the case in the Vladimir region. The 
fieldwork in every region included visiting32 a minimum of three districts, 
in which residents of at least two villages were interviewed. Every em-
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pirical chapter of this dissertation contains detailed information on the 
fieldwork sites and periods of primary data collection. 
 Map 1.1. The fieldwork sites  
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration.  
 
The primary data collection was conducted in ‘naturally occurring set-
tings or “fields” by means of methods which capture their social mean-
ings and ordinary activities’ in accordance with the main principle of 
ethnography (Brewer 2000: 10). In-depth interviews, focus groups dis-
cussions, and participant observation were important methods to ob-
serve and understand ‘everyday’ rural politics, social networks, and to 
reveal ‘hidden transcripts’ – i.e. rural dwellers’ hidden critique of power-
holders and the regime, which manifests itself in daily discourses, jokes, 
and rumours about the dominant group (see Scott 1990 on ‘hidden’ and 
‘public’ transcripts). Besides that, primary data was collected in settings, 
which were less natural for the participants, such as at dispute resolution 
institutions (the public prosecutor’s office, local and regional courts, 
etc.), or during organised rural protests in various locations. Participant 
observation of ‘advocacy’ rural politics and interviews with activists pro-
vided information on the motives of collective action, the transformation 
of rural protests, state-society relations, and ‘public transcripts’ (i.e. the 
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open official interaction between the dominated and the dominants). 
The analysis of ‘hidden’ and ‘public transcripts’ is important to under-
stand the power relations in the countryside and to explain rural politics.  
Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with different 
members of rural communities (subsistence and semi-subsistence small-
scale farmers, commercial family farmers, rural workers, and many sub-
groups in-between – of different ages, genders, occupations, experiences 
with socialist agriculture, and household compositions). The snowball 
sampling technique was applied to recruit informants for the interviews. 
Snowball sampling is often criticised for its community bias33 and a non-
random selection (Morgan 2008). However, taking into account the low 
population density and relatively small size of post-Soviet villages,34 this 
technique provided access to the majority of the households in the vil-
lages, which is likely to minimise the error of non-random choice. Nev-
ertheless, some villagers remain outside the sample, which influences its 
representativeness and is acknowledged as a limitation of the study. Most 
members of the commercial family farmers group, which constitute less 
than 1% of the rural population, were selected based on purposive sam-
pling in order to increase the scope of observations (Palinkas et al. 2013).  
Access to and cooperation with different informants was often facili-
tated and ensured by ‘gatekeepers’. For the purposes of this research, 
gatekeepers were selected among rural residents, who are respected 
within their communities, but did not belong to groups of power-holders 
(they were: rural teachers, postal workers, senior villagers, etc.). This 
helped to build trust with rural communities and avoid ‘public tran-
scripts’ and socially desirable answers, which would be given in front of 
power-holders. However, as Bryman (2001) argues, gatekeepers might 
have their own hidden agendas, ideologies and cultures, which may lead 
to a bias in the selection of informants. This requires a careful choice of 
gatekeepers and deliberate explanation of research goals to them, which 
was done in this fieldwork (see the discussion on researcher-informant 
field relations in the following section).  
The guidelines for in-depth interviews were designed to cover the 
main topics under investigation, such as rural income generating activi-
ties, attitude toward subsistence farming, relations with LFEs and au-
thorities, etc. Many questions were open-ended, which, according to 
Hancock et al. (2009: 16), ‘provides opportunities for both interviewer 
and interviewee to discuss one topic in more detail’. These testimonials 
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give ‘insights into how people think about certain events and what they 
perceive their own role to have been… an expression of the personality 
of the interviewees, of their cultural values, and of the particular histori-
cal circumstances which shaped their point of view’ (Hareven 1992: 275). 
In addition to interviews with ordinary villagers, this research includes a 
number of interviews with rural social movement members and leaders, 
local authorities, LFEs’ managers, representatives of NGOs, agrarian 
universities, and other informants inherent to the nature of the study.  
In some cases, a household survey was conducted to obtain additional 
data on household activities and was a tool to recruit informants and ini-
tiate a mutually productive discourse. Post-Soviet rural dwellers have ex-
perience participating in household surveys and are often willing (or feel 
obligated) to answer the survey questions. National social research insti-
tutes frequently carry out sociological surveys and public opinion polls 
on behalf of the state or non-state organisations. For example, every ru-
ral Russian was required to participate in the All-Russian Agricultural 
Census of 2006. The villagers’ familiarity with, and openness to, survey 
practices allowed me to recruit more participants and discuss many is-
sues beyond the scope of the questionnaire. The survey data provided 
interesting insights into the studied phenomena and revealed some 
common trends and patterns. Thus, Chapter 5 builds its argument on the 
correlation between rural response strategies and intra-community dif-
ferentiation on the small household survey conducted during fieldwork 
in Ukraine. The questionnaire was designed to cover the following re-
search topics: household response strategies, relations with LFEs, socio-
economic transformations, and attitude toward land sales. In total, 44 
rural households were surveyed. The detailed description of the survey 
data analysis is presented in Chapter 5. An example of the questionnaire 
can be found in Appendix 1.  
Focus group discussions were organised in order to reveal collective 
discourses and group dynamics. As Ackerly and True (2010: 172) argued, 
‘often multiple people who have shared the same experience can come 
to a different understanding of the experience if they arrive at that un-
derstanding through shared conversation than they might have arrived at 
it through individual reflection’. This was particularly important for 
studying the reasons for rural resistance and mobilisation or lack thereof. 
Some of the focus groups were composed directly during or after a col-
lective action occurred and included its participants. Other groups were 
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organised by inviting village members to gatekeepers’ homes. In the lat-
ter case, focus groups were conducted taking into account the diversity 
of rural communities and included its various members (of different 
genders, ages, and occupations), but excluded power-holders (local elites 
and authorities).  
Participant observation, which implies observing and participating in 
the activities of the people under study, was used to gain insights into the 
daily practices of the rural population and intra-community dynamics. 
This ‘written photographing’, as Erlandson et al. (1993) put it, was used 
to capture rural households’ responses to land grabbing, detect elements 
of the peasant mode of production, and to experience the relationship 
between authorities and rural dwellers. In addition to ‘written photo-
graphing’, photos were taken in order to vividly remember rural activi-
ties, and as a means of engaging with informants in a more interactive 
manner.35 
In the beginning of every interview or focus group discussion, infor-
mation sheets in the Russian or Ukrainian languages were distributed to 
every participant with information about the research, the terms and 
conditions of data collection, storage, and use, and the researcher’s con-
tact details (according to the ERC Ethical Guidelines, see Appendix 2). 
In the case of participant observation, the distribution of the information 
sheets was done upon request or during natural interactions between the 
researcher and informants. In order to protect the informants’ anonym-
ity, I considered changing their names and their settlements’ names to 
pseudonyms. However, contrary to my expectations, many villagers did 
not mind having their real names mentioned in the research. Some of 
them were against using pseudonyms for their villages, as they wanted 
the story of their village to be told. White (2004) reported similar experi-
ences in her study of post-socialist livelihoods and identities in a small 
Russian town, as did Kay (2011) in a case study of the Burla village in 
Russia’s Altai Krai. In this dissertation, the real geographical names are 
used, and the informants are referred to by their first names (either their 
real names or pseudonyms, depending on preliminary agreements). If the 
informant was interviewed as an official representative of the authorities, 
LFE, a social movement, or other organisation, his or her name and sur-
name were used (with permission), unless otherwise stipulated. Managing 
and sharing research data was carried out in accordance with the guide-
lines of the ERC Scientific Council. 
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Note taking and audio recording were the principal means of re-
cording observations and interviews. A voice recorder was used only af-
ter verbal permission from each informant, according to the require-
ments of the ERC Ethical Guidelines. However, I noticed that 
informants are inclined to give more socially desirable responses during 
audio recording. Many rural dwellers were worried that the information 
they gave could be used against them, if it is taped. Meanwhile, handwrit-
ten notes were considered as less dangerous, and, therefore, a more reli-
able data recording technique. I often began interviewing using a voice 
recorder as a part of the official process of data collection, and continued 
with note taking, which led to a more confidential conversation. The 
transcription of field notes and audio-recordings, and detailed descrip-
tions of observations were done in the evening of the same day of data 
collection (or as soon as possible) to maximise recall. The transcripts, 
notes and other textual information were later coded using the data 
analysis software programme Atlas.ti. Cluster analysis was applied to 
coded qualitative data in order to develop typologies within the existing 
qualitative data set. Codes and clusters were created based on the themes 
in interview guides and then reviewed with regard to theoretical con-
cepts. Furthermore, elements of discourse analysis were applied to ana-
lyse the transcripts of interviews in order to reveal informants’ percep-
tions and popular discourses (every empirical chapter contains a detailed 
description of the data analysis techniques).  
1.7.2. Secondary data and challenges in working with national 
statistical information 
Secondary data analysis techniques are not widely discussed among social 
scientists, primarily because of the complementary role of secondary data 
in developing arguments (Heaton 2008). Meanwhile, almost every re-
searcher uses qualitative and/or quantitative secondary data sets. More-
over, the researchers’ re-use of their own data for new research purposes 
also falls into the category of secondary data. According to Heaton 
(2008), the application of secondary data analysis requires the following 
methodological and ethical considerations: origin and trustworthiness of 
the secondary data; ‘match’ between the purpose of the analysis and the 
qualities of secondary data; and transparency in the analysis of secondary 
data.  
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Secondary data is used in this dissertation to support, complement or 
extend the research findings to a broader population. Thus, qualitative 
data from secondary sources, such as national and international analytical 
reports, academic publications, and news articles, was collected in order 
to gain relevant background information on the implementation of post-
socialist land reform, state policy, civil society, and general discourses on 
food, land, and small-scale versus large-scale farming. Every empirical 
chapter has specific secondary data sources, which correspond to its 
topic. For example, Chapter 4 on naive monarchism in Russia includes 
an analysis of rural complaint letters to president Putin and top govern-
mental authorities, derived from the online petition platform 
Change.org. Chapter 3 uses ‘grey literature’ and web pages of the ana-
lysed state-embedded social movement organisations in order to com-
pare their stated goals with their actual accomplishments. In the case of 
extensive sets of secondary qualitative data (such as the rural complaint 
letters in Chapter 5, or texts with written discourses on large versus 
small-scale agriculture in Chapter 6), Atlas.ti software was used to assist 
with qualitative data analysis. In other cases, the data analysis was man-
ual.  
Statistical data from national statistic agencies, such as Rosstat and 
Ukrstat, quantitative information from state land cadastre, ministries of 
agriculture, and various state registries and agencies were used to support 
the results of primary data analysis and/or to reveal regional or national 
trends. However, as stated in Chapters 2 and 5, Russian and Ukrainian 
official statistics are incomplete, often outdated, and do not always rep-
resent reality as it occurs on the ground. Thus, it was particularly chal-
lenging to find reliable quantitative data on rural households’ farming. 
The official statistics on small-scale food production of post-soviet 
populations are often unclear concerning categories of food producers 
included in estimations,36 and smallholders’ farm output is calculated 
based on the multiplication of data from a selective sample of the general 
population, which often overlooks regional differences and leads to 
statistical discrepancy. In order to mitigate the weakness of statistical 
data, some additional calculations were carried out based on data derived 
from different sources. Some problems with secondary data could not be 
resolved, such as a difference in the amount of commercial family farm-
ers reported by Rosstat and AKKOR.37 In such cases, a footnote was 
added to specify the inconsistency of multiple data sources.  
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The national statistical information was also compared (when possi-
ble) with data from international databases on Russia and Ukraine (such 
as FAO), and adjusted accordingly. Furthermore, this study uses quanti-
tative data from various national and international (agricultural) surveys 
and public opinion polls, such as the All-Russian Agricultural Census 
2006, surveys carried out by Russian and Ukrainian Academies of Sci-
ences, FAO Farm Surveys, and various studies of the Levada Center.38 
This allows for the development of judgements about the representa-
tiveness of primary data and its generalisation at the national level.  
1.7.3. Fieldwork roles of the researcher and ‘situated knowledge’ 
production 
Adams (1999: 332) argued that ‘the researcher-informant relationship 
brings into play dynamics of race, gender, class, nation, and age’. This 
influences the roles assigned to the researcher in the field. When my in-
formants and gatekeepers introduced me to those who did not know me, 
they often mentioned the following characteristics: ‘a researcher/student 
from a Dutch university’ often followed with ‘but she is from here39 
originally’, and ‘a charming/pretty girl’. Such characterisation was, appar-
ently, seen by my informants as the best way to introduce me in order to 
guarantee a productive collaboration. These three major roles – among 
many other roles – influenced my relations with informants and the pro-
duction of ‘situated knowledge’.  
The first two roles, ‘a researcher/student from a Dutch university’, 
and ‘from here’, expose the contradiction between my ‘outsider’ and ‘in-
sider’ positions. Although the fieldwork researcher is commonly per-
ceived as the ‘other’ in the field (De Soto and Dudwick 2000), this 
‘otherness’ can be on different scales. A foreign researcher – as discussed 
by De Soto and Dudwick – is a complete alien to the population under 
study, which requires longer-term research-informant interactions for 
trust-building. Meanwhile, researchers, who speak the same language and 
have similar cultural backgrounds as their informants, need less time to 
build trust and initiate productive conversations. I was able to associate 
myself with both countries under study by ‘adjusting’ my identity’ – em-
phasising my Ukrainian origin or Russian nationality accordingly. 
Nationality and national identity became very sensitive issues in Rus-
sia and Ukraine since the Ukrainian Euromaidan revolution of 2014, fol-
lowed by the civil war in Eastern Ukraine and ongoing geopolitical con-
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flict with Russia. Although these two countries share a somewhat com-
mon history, and ‘Ukrainian identity evolved close to the Russian one 
and within the envelope of Russian state institutions presented Ukrainian 
elites’, the new Ukrainian government has chosen to advance ‘the nega-
tive identity of Ukraine as a “non-Russia” par excellence’ (Molchanov 
2015). At the same time, 17.3% of the Ukrainian population identify 
themselves as ethnic Russians, and the Russian language is commonly 
used in many cities in the East and South of the country (Pavlenko 
2008). The current crisis has drawn Russia and Ukraine apart, and politi-
cal propaganda on both sides has exacerbated anti-Russian movements 
in Ukraine and created anti-Ukrainian moods in Russia. Although the 
majority of field trips were conducted before the culmination of the Rus-
sia-Ukraine political crisis, nationality and national identity were already 
sensitive issues at that time. My biographical characteristics helped me to 
associate myself with both countries. Having a Ukrainian mother and a 
Russian father, I was born in Ukraine, but lived and studied in Russia 
before moving to the Netherlands to do academic research. I was raised 
in a Russian language environment, while Ukrainian became my passive 
language.40 A similar mixed autobiographic context was described by 
Florescu (2006), who was Romanian by origin, but appropriated a num-
ber of other identities throughout her lifetime – which she called, ‘not 
the incarnation of the twenty-first-century cosmopolitanism, but the 
“disordered personality” of an aphasic post-socialist subject’. This post-
Soviet ‘disordered personality’ was beneficial to me, as I was able to re-
late better to my informants, and occupy the position ‘from here’ in both 
countries. 
Besides its advantages, the role ‘from here’ imposed certain limita-
tions on primary data collection. For example, the interview guide con-
tained several questions related to ‘universal knowledge’, which a re-
searcher ‘from here’ should be familiar with. According to Wall (2006: 
116), an ethnographer can be perceived as ‘ignorant for being unaware of 
seemingly universal knowledge’. To mitigate negative consequences from 
asking naive or obvious questions, Wall occupied the position of a for-
eign researcher who ‘was eager to learn’ during his fieldwork in Uzbeki-
stan (Wall 2006: 116). Although my position ‘from here’ did not allow 
me to take the role of ‘eager-to-learn foreigner’, I resorted to my role of 
‘a researcher/student from a Dutch university’ to explain my scientific 
interest in rural dwellers’ perceptions and discourses – as a method of 
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constructivist ethnography – which allowed me to ask seemingly obvious 
questions.  
Furthermore, my affiliation with a foreign institution sometimes pro-
voked the ‘pragmatic identity’ of rural dwellers that have experience with 
(or knowledge about) rural development projects, initiated or sponsored 
by foreign institutions (which is especially common in Ukraine). The 
‘pragmatic identity’ of small farmers and peasants was characterised by 
Landini (2012: 520) as ‘one that encompasses peasants’ view of them-
selves as poor and in need of assistance, which in turn legitimises efforts 
to obtain public assistance’. In their discourses, some of my informants 
deliberately understated their households’ productive resources or exag-
gerated rural poverty, which was later exposed in further conversations.41  
The third characteristic, which was given to me in the field – ‘a 
charming/pretty girl’ – was less an assessment of my attractiveness, but 
rather an appeal to a traditional principle that young women need help 
and assistance (Adams 1999). According to Warren (1988), a female eth-
nographer ‘can achieve her research goals more easily by abandoning her 
cherished feminist identity’ (quoted by Adams 1999: 337). My gendered 
role provided a number of advantages in the post-Soviet countryside. 
First, people are more likely to help a young woman travelling alone in 
the countryside. Second, women are traditionally considered less harmful 
with regard to discussing political themes, especially in politically con-
strained environments (Golde 1986). In interviews with rural dwellers, I 
emphasised the peaceful nature of my research, aimed at revealing villag-
ers’ everyday practices and response strategies. In interviews with man-
agers of LFEs and local authorities, I used apolitical language and called 
land grabbing ‘large-scale agricultural investments’. However, besides 
these advantages, my gendered role also caused some obstacles, espe-
cially in interactions with representatives of higher-level authorities and 
business elites. Whereas my age and gender were associated with ‘harm-
lessness’ by rural communities and village authorities, the top power-
holders often did not take me seriously, which resulted in refusal or too 
little time for interviews.42  
Besides performing the three main fieldwork roles, I was also a 
‘guest’. People in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are 
known for their overwhelming hospitality, which is often associated with 
food, drinks, and gift giving (Polese 2009, Werner 2000). Post-Soviet 
hospitality rituals underwent a simplification process due to the marketi-
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sation and modernisation of society. However, food and drink customs 
remain an important means to construct host-guest relations (Adams 
1999, Polese 2009). Similar to the fieldwork experiences of Polese (2009) 
in post-Soviet Georgia and Ukraine, I was fed plentifully and received 
gifts from my informants, primarily self-grown and self-made farm 
products. This obliged me to enter into reciprocal social relations. I gave 
little gifts brought from Holland (usually stroopwafels, typical Dutch cook-
ies), to my informants, or sent them their photos by post, which I took 
during fieldwork, as a way of thanking my informants for their time and 
hospitality. 
The guest role leads to a number of benefits, such as local people’s 
care of, assistance to, and protection of the researcher. However, it also 
implies the loss of the researcher’s independence. In her analysis of re-
searcher-informant power relations in Uzbekistan, Adams (1999: 341) 
argued that ‘the guest dynamic plays a trick in which the apparent power 
relations are inverted. The guest is treated with great generosity and by 
custom can demand a great many things from the hosts, but entering 
into the guest mode actually implies acceptance of submission’. My hosts 
– which were concurrently gatekeepers in many cases – had a great influ-
ence on my access to information and data collection. They tended to 
select informants for my interviews based on their own understanding of 
what and whom I should research. This often results in biassed sam-
pling, which I had to mitigate by returning to the field sites without gate-
keepers. Furthermore, being a guest from Holland obliged me to be pre-
sent at various social occasions to perform the functions of the 
‘honoured guest’, which was similar to what Adams (1999) experienced 
being a ‘mascot researcher’ in Uzbekistan. The most challenging was to 
control my research directions and identity when local authorities hosted 
me. Before being allowed to work in the field independently, I had to 
make a number of official ceremonial visits to the most promising enter-
prises and farms, together with representatives of local authorities, ac-
cording to the socialist legacy of official hospitality. The connection with 
local power-holders endangered my identity as an independent re-
searcher; however, it is difficult to avoid becoming an ‘officially recog-
nised guest’ when doing an ethnographic study in post-Soviet rural areas.  
The researcher’s presence in the field is always ‘consequential’ – it un-
avoidably provokes reactive effects. In other words, it influences the be-
haviours and discourses of the people under study (Emerson et al. 2011). 
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However, this ‘consequential presence’ should not be seen as diminish-
ing the quality of fieldwork data, but rather as a source of observation 
and learning in and of itself (Clarke 1975). Considering this, I studied 
reactive effects from my presence in the field as part of ‘situated knowl-
edge’ construction. Many rural dwellers, with whom I collaborated in the 
field, were interested in my opinion on the topics of research and chal-
lenged me with difficult questions. Such a role reversal, according to 
Lohmeier (2009), ‘blurs the lines between researcher and researched and 
underlines the performative and relational aspect of self [...] which allow 
for mutual disclosing and exchanging’. Furthermore, my interactions 
with informants have continued even after the fieldwork, leading to a 
correspondence with some of my informants (through post letters or e-
mails) to receive their feedback on my observations and preliminary find-
ings. In several cases, informants themselves initiated post-fieldwork cor-
respondence. Those interactions helped to reveal differences in interpre-
tation of events, and provoked reactive effects, which were not detected 
in the field.  
Thus, after conducting fieldwork in the Sergiev Posad district (in the 
Moscow region), which was aimed at analysing rural mobilisation against 
land grabbing, I was asked by activists to share my preliminary conclu-
sions with them. I wrote a popular article, where I discussed the process 
of social mobilisation and the state-society relations in this district, which 
was later uploaded on the movement’s webpage (Mamonova 2013). In 
my analysis, I tried to be very objective and to not hurt anyone’s feelings; 
nevertheless, the reaction was ambivalent. Many activists agreed with me 
on many points and provided additional information and clarifications 
for my analysis. However, a few of them reacted painfully to my conclu-
sion that social mobilisation and movements in Russia are weak, discon-
nected, and lack the ideological component for large-scale political mobi-
lisation. Thus, one of my opponents acknowledged that I was right 
concerning the weakness of political protest in Russia; however, he ac-
cused me of writing this article ‘upon the order of western enemies’. This 
reaction points to the insecure position of political activists in Russia and 
their intolerance to criticism and western ideas, and made me even more 
conscious of my role as ‘a researcher/student from a Dutch university’ in 
the ‘situated knowledge’ construction. 
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The following five empirical chapters present a detailed analysis of ru-
ral politics in Russia and Ukraine. The political economy of large-scale 
land acquisitions and the role of the state and other stakeholders in con-
temporary agrarian transformation in Russia are examined in Chapter 2. 
Following it is an analysis of the ‘advocacy politics’ of institutionalised 
rural social movement organisations in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 investigates 
state-society relations, which lead to the emergence of ‘naive monarchist’ 
practices of the rural population in Russia. The Ukrainian situation is 
presented in Chapter 5, providing an analysis of resistive and adaptive 
household strategies to land deals and industrial agricultural develop-
ment. Chapter 6 discusses everyday practices of food production by the 
post-Soviet rural population within the concept of ‘quiet’ food sover-
eignty. Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the research findings, initiates a 
discussion on their generalisability, implications and limitations, and 
identifies potential directions for future research. 
 
Notes 
 
1 This phrase became the slogan of the social movement Narodnichestvo during the 
1960s - 1970s (from the Russian word ‘narod’, which means ‘common people’), 
whose proponents saw the peasantry as a revolutionary class and the rural com-
mune lifestyle as a prototype of socialism. This movement was also known as 
Radical Populism, and its ideas formed the foundation of Agrarian Populist 
school of thought and contemporary populist agrarian social movements.  
2 These are approximations, used to show the general trend; for exact numbers, 
see Chapters 5 and 6. 
3The agrarian question and the peasant question are often mistakenly used as 
synonymous; there are conceptual differences between them. The Great Soviet 
Encyclopedia (1979) defines the agrarian question as ‘the question of the laws of 
development of capitalism in agriculture, the relations between classes which arise 
on this basis, and the class struggle connected with it’. Meanwhile, the peasant 
question is ‘the question of the historical destinies of the peasantry and of the role 
of the peasantry and its place in the revolutionary transformation of society’ (The 
Great Soviet Encyclopedia 1979). These two questions remain continued to be 
debated and their definition continues to be reformulated by contemporary 
scholars in order to include the latest agrarian transformations.  
4 This study uses the term ‘post-socialism’ in reference to the FSU and post-
socialist Europe, and ‘post-Soviet’ when discussing the FSU only. Besides the 
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FSU and post-socialist Eastern Europe, the countries of China, Vietnam, Laos, 
Cuba and several others, share the history of socialism and often called as post-
socialist societies. This study draws some parallels with rural China, for example, 
when discussing the within-the-system protest (see Chapter 3 and 4). However, 
an inclusion of those countries in this doctoral analysis would blur its focus and 
be undoable in the given timeframe. 
5 Earlier studies on land grabbing considered the global financial crisis as one of 
the factors that triggered land grabs (see, for example, Jouko and Granberg 
2011 as referred in Chapter 2). However, the global rise in food prices is signifi-
cantly more influential than the global financial crisis (see the discussion of Vis-
ser 2016 about land investments in the FSU and beyond). The global financial 
crisis had differentiated impacts on investment activities. To some extent, the 
financial crisis made investors suspicious of complicated financial products, 
leading them to turn their attention toward the real sector of food and land. 
However, the financial crisis also limited liquidity for investing. In 2009, when 
the financial crises belatedly reached Russia, it reduced the flow of money avail-
able for agricultural investments. Moreover, the land rush globally and in Russia 
started before the financial crisis (Visser 2016).  
6 In his later work, Byres (2009) included the example of France that experienced 
a process of ‘delayed capitalism’, which is neither ‘from above’ nor ‘from below’. 
7 LFEs can be state or private owned, with domestic or foreign capital, in the 
form of a single enterprise or agroholding, etc. Although the organisational form 
does impact the corporate politics, the major operational principles remain the 
same: LFEs feature large land holdings, economies of scale, modern labour-
saving technology, and the accumulation of state subsidies. 
8 Burawoy’s argument about involution to the former socialist structures or ‘tran-
sition without transformations’ was largely based on the analysis of post-Soviet 
restructuring during the 1990s. The 2000s are characterised by further develop-
ments towards capitalist economy, however, aspects of involution remain exis-
tent. Therefore, Burawoy’s concept of ‘transition without transformation’ is 
slightly modified in this study and referred to as ‘transition with limited social 
transformation’ for a more precise definition of the current state of the post-
Soviet transformation. 
9 The small-scale personal farming of the rural population (and, to some extent, 
urban dwellers’ gardening) are commonly united in the category of ‘khoziaystva 
naseleniya’ (people’s farming) and used in the Russian and Ukrainian agricultural 
statistics.  
10 Marx (1977) argued that capitalist production leads to the emergence of two 
classes: the class of labourers, who are divorced from the means of production 
and, therefore, have to sell their labour power, and the class of capitalists, who 
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accumulate the means of production and employ wage labour. However, not all 
even orthodox Marxists argue that the class of labourers (or proletariat) lacks ac-
cess to land resources. For example, Kautsky (1899) argued that agricultural la-
bourers are not necessarily completely dispossessed from the land as industrial 
labourers are. According to him, the proletarianisation in the countryside takes 
the form of peasant families who do not have enough land to meet their subsis-
tence, and have to sell their labour, while land cultivation remains just a house-
hold activity.  
11 The theory of food regimes was developed by Friedmann and McMichael 
(1989) and is aimed at explaining the strategic role of agriculture in the global 
capitalist economy. The current ‘corporate’ food regime, which emerged in the 
1980s, is the neoliberal model of industrial and transgenic export-oriented agricul-
ture, which is dominated by transnational corporations and institutionalised 
through the WTO (McMichael 2012). 
12 It important to note that domestic agroholdings are those who primarily 
conduct control grabbing in the food chain. Foreign agroholdings generally are 
less integrated vertically, and focus mainly on the agricultural production (with 
as a light form of vertical integration and control related to storage facilities). 
For more information, see Kuns et al. (2016). 
13 The ‘disappearance thesis’ states that the peasant mode of production is (or 
inevitably will be) expelled in competition with more ‘effective’ industrial agricul-
ture. This position is advocated by Marxist (class-based) theorists (see Bernstein 
2014). The populist thinkers, to the contrary, argue in favour of ‘the persistence 
thesis’, which refers to the persistence of the peasantry despite the pressures of 
agrarian capitalism due to the moral economy, subsistence logic, self-exploitation 
and other principles of the peasant economy (van der Ploeg 2013).  
14 This includes family farmers (krestyansko-fermerskiye khoziaystva), individual rural 
entrepreneurs (individualniye predmrinimately), as well rural households, which have 
not officially registered their entrepreneurial farming activities.  
15 The Museum of the Romanian Peasant Anthropology Review (MARTOR). 
16 At the onset of the post-socialist transformation process in the early 1990s, 
high rural unemployment and overall rural poverty prevented any significant 
stratification within rural communities. The small exception to this trend was 
the emergence of a group of commercial family farmers (less than 1% of the 
population). The early 2000s were characterised by large-scale industrial agricul-
tural development and state investments in rural areas, which provoked some 
economic stratification in rural areas (although limited compared to urban ar-
eas). Furthermore, it is important to note that economic stratification in rural 
communities differs geographically. In the northern regions with weak condi-
tions for agricultural development, stratification remains insignificant, while the 
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diversification of rural households occurs in the well-endowed southern regions 
(for the latter see the study by Nikulin (2003) on the growing inequalities in the 
countryside).  
17 Odnoosibnik is translated from Ukrainian to mean an independent and autono-
mous peasant, although the word ‘peasant’ is not specifically included in the 
Ukrainian term.  
18 State capture is not exclusively a post-Soviet or post-socialist phenomenon, but 
can be observed in other parts of the world. Thus, Visser and Kalb (2010) re-
vealed many similarities in state capture between the FSU and the West. Accord-
ing to these authors, state capture in western societies is carried out by big banks 
and multinational corporations, but this process is more hidden than in the FSU 
and occurs at different scales. 
19 i.e. the oligarchs who are connected to or employed by the federal government. 
20 Procuracy (in Russian Prokuratura) is a state bureau, which ensures administra-
tive legality in Russia. According to Burger and Holland (2008: 142), ‘the Russian 
Presidential Administration under President Vladimir Putin misused the Procu-
racy for political purposes in high profile cases having great economic or political 
significance’. 
21 There are attempts by the Ukrainian central government to constrain the oli-
garchic influence, yet the effect of it is unclear. 
22 Here, it refers to a dichotomy between good and evil (or victim and predator).  
23 Collective and state enterprises (kolkhozy and sovkhozy) were heavily subsi-
dised by the state and their agricultural activities were organised in accordance 
with production targets and directives from the state central planning organs. The 
state regulated rural incomes (by bringing them closer to urban ones) and directly 
and indirectly (through kolkhozy and sovkhozy) was responsible for rural ser-
vices, such as education, transport, medical and health care and cultural activities, 
and even pension payments (see Wegren 2007, Pallot and Nefedova 2007, Visser 
2008) 
24 Transnational agrarian movements (TAM) - the term, proposed by Borras et al. 
(2008: 170), which, in its loose definition, means ‘movements, organisations, coa-
litions, networks and solidarity linkages of the rural poor, [...] and some of the 
national peasants’ and farmers’ groups directly linked to these transnational 
movements’. The term is challenged by different scholars, including its authors, 
because of the ambiguity between ‘movement’ and ‘organisation’ (see Borras 
2010 referring to Fox 2009) and the controversy of the term ‘transnational’ or 
‘global’ when it is used to describe civil society, as discussed by Hearn (2001) and 
referenced by Borras (2010). 
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25 Kerkvliet is one of the authors of the concept of ‘everyday politics’, which he 
developed in the co-authored book with Scott about everyday forms of resistance 
in Southeast Asia (Scott and Kerkvliet 1986) and in the study of everyday politics 
in the Philippines (Kerkvliet 1990).  
26 Black Earth Farming is one of the largest landowners in Russia. It was estab-
lished in 2005 in Russia and was among the first foreign-financed companies 
(primarily based on Swedish capital investments) that invested in the Russian ag-
ricultural sector. In 2014, the company controlled 271,000 hectares of Russian 
farmland, of which 86% were in ownership. 
27 Food sovereignty is ‘the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate 
food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their 
right to define their own food and agriculture systems’ (Nyéléni 2007: 1) 
28 Postmodernist constructivism argues that social structures are not independent 
from our observations and discourses about them; therefore, no ‘true’ reality ex-
ists. 
29 Until recently, ‘situated knowledge’ and researchers’ self-reflection were central 
to feminist epistemology (Adams 1999, Smith 1987). However, according to 
Hughes (2012: 35) ‘self-reflection upon the constraining conditions is the key to 
the empowerment “capacities” of research and the fulfilment of its agenda’, 
which is especially important for critical agrarian studies. 
30 Objectivity in qualitative studies is commonly associated with the ‘conformabil-
ity’ of research findings and is related to research neutrality. Conformability is ‘the 
potential for congruence between two or more independent people about the 
data’s accuracy, relevance, or meaning’ (Elo et al. 2014: 2). In other words, it is 
the degree to which readers of a qualitative study agree with and can corroborate 
(and to some extent duplicate) the research findings.  
31 Besides Black Earth soils, the Stavropol Krai has ‘kastanozems’, i.e. relatively 
less fertile, dry soils, that are rich in humus and calcium ions, often used for pas-
tures. 
32 The periods of field visits were relatively brief – about one month on aver-
age. This is a result of doing research in multiple regions (and villages within 
them). The fieldwork roles of the researcher (as discussed further) enabled trust 
to be built up between the researcher and informants relatively quickly, which 
facilitated data collection.  
33 Community bias in snowball sampling occurs when the first informant has a 
strong impact on the sample. 
34 Excluding the Stavropol Krai, where villages are relatively large and can have 
up to several thousand inhabitants.  
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35 In Ukraine, I travelled with an Italian photojournalist, who took pictures of 
post-Soviet rural dwellers. I discovered that many villagers were open for interac-
tion and interested in posing for pictures. This behaviour can be explained by the 
Soviet legacy of photographing for local newspapers or ‘doska pocheta’ (billboard 
of honour), aimed at telling the stories and displaying the portraits of the heroes 
of socialist labour, which led to developing positive associations with photo-
graphing. Furthermore, photos remain special in the post-Soviet countryside, 
and, therefore, highly appreciated. Many people asked me to send their photos to 
them by post. I took my semi-professional camera with me on every fieldtrip af-
terwards. This method helped me to recruit more people for my interviews, facili-
tated collaboration and was a perfect means to thank my informants for their 
hospitality and the stories they shared with me. 
36 Two terms are commonly used to refer to small-scale food production: ‘peo-
ple’s farming’ or ‘personal subsidiary farming’. The category of ‘people’s farming’ 
often includes rural household production and small-scale farming of urban 
dwellers at their dacha [country house] plots. It is different from ‘personal sub-
sidiary farming’, which usually includes only rural household production (but not 
always). These two categories are used in Russian and Ukrainian statistical analy-
sis interchangeably, which leads to the general confusion of terms and errors in 
estimations.  
37 Association of Family Farmers in Russia. 
38 Russian independent, non-governmental polling and sociological research or-
ganisation. 
39 The phrase ‘from here’ was used to indicate the national affiliation of the re-
searcher to the country of informants. 
40 Not being a fluent speaker of Ukrainian language did not harm my ‘from here’ 
identity, as many urban citizens in Ukraine speak Russian as their mother tongue, 
while Ukrainian language skills often remain passive. 
41 Despite the fact that this research project was exclusively aimed at academic 
research, it facilitated a collaboration between a rural community in the Khmel-
nitsk district (the Kiev region) and a Dutch charity fund that sponsored a re-
placement of windows in a rural kindergarten. 
42 I conducted an experiment. After several weeks of unsuccessful attempts to 
arrange an interview with a CEO of a large multinational agricultural company, I 
asked my supervisor to call and schedule an appointment. I believe that the fact 
that he was a male and held a senior position at a university, made the company’s 
PR manager (who was a woman) forward his call directly to the CEO, with 
whom he made an appointment for an interview (which I conducted afterwards). 
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2 
Oligarchs, Megafarms and Land 
Reserves: Understanding Land Grabbing 
in Russia 
 
 
Abstract  
This chapter seeks to unravel the political economy of large-scale land 
acquisitions in post-Soviet Russia. Russia falls neither in the normal cate-
gory of ‘investor’ countries, nor in the category of ‘target’ countries. Rus-
sia has large ‘land reserves’, since in the 1990s much fertile land was 
abandoned. This study examines how particular Russia is with regards to 
the common argument in favour of land acquisitions, namely that land is 
available, unused or even unpopulated. With rapid economic growth, 
capital of Russian oligarchs in search of new frontiers, and the 2002 land 
law allowing land sales, land began to attract investment. Land grabbing 
expands at a rapid pace and in some cases, it results in dispossession and 
little or no compensation. This chapter describes different land acquisi-
tions strategies and argues that the share-based land rights distribution 
during the 1990s did not provide security of land tenure to rural dwellers. 
Emerging rural social movements try to form countervailing powers but 
with limited success. Rich land owners easily escape the implementation 
of new laws on controlling underutilised land, while there is a danger that 
they enable eviction with legal measures of rural dwellers. In this sense, 
Russia appears to be a ‘normal’ case in the land grab debate. 
2.1. Introduction 
The topic of large-scale land acquisition or ‘land grabbing’ has recently 
received growing attention among academics and policy makers (von 
Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009, World Bank 2010a, HLPE 2011). Spe-
cifically, land grabbing has been studied in Africa (Cotula et al. 2009, Hall 
2012), South-East Asia (Julia and White 2012), Latin America (Zoomers 
2010, Borras et al. 2012) and China (Ding 2007, Hofman and Ho 2012). 
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However, until now, the vast land masses of the former Soviet Union 
constitute a blank spot in the global investigation of land grabbing, as 
noted by Visser and Spoor (2011) in the first overview of land grabbing 
in this region. This chapter builds on the study of Visser and Spoor 
(2011) with a more elaborate investigation of land relations and mecha-
nisms of land acquisition, focusing on the case of Russia. Furthermore, 
the present study is based on recent fieldwork, whereas Visser and Spoor 
(2011) was predominantly based on media and web research. The current 
literature on land grabbing predominantly tries to map the magnitude 
and speed of land grabbing, the main types of countries or private actors 
involved worldwide, and the general drivers of the global land grab. Fol-
lowing new research lines advocated by Borras et al. (2011: 211), this 
chapter pursues a closer look at the actors involved, their motivations 
and interests, and especially the mechanisms through which large-scale 
land deals are enacted. The link with the global land grab debate will be 
made in particular through analysing the ‘availability of land’ and what 
this means in the Russian context. 
Russia is the largest agricultural producer in post-Soviet Eurasia, and 
worldwide it is one of the countries with the largest land reserves for ag-
ricultural production, as well as the country with the potential for the 
largest increase in grain production worldwide (World Bank 2010a). Rus-
sia has one of the highest levels of arable land in the world, namely 0.9 
hectares (ha) per capita (World Bank 2010a, b). This ratio is higher only 
in Canada and Australia, but these countries have less potential to in-
crease production, as most agricultural land is being used, with high land 
productivity. Moreover, it is to be expected that climate change will re-
duce the acreage of arable land, whereas in Russia the acreage of cultiva-
ble land might expand northward, for instance. According to the World 
Bank, water availability will increase (5–15%) in the north of Russia and 
Kazakhstan (FAO 2011), which may offset the higher occurrence of 
droughts in the south of Russia (HLPE 2011, Dronin and Kirilenko 
2011). Whereas most countries in the world face declining availability of 
agricultural and arable land per capita, in Russia the availability of land 
per capita has actually increased over the last two decades, because of 
stagnation of the population1. Moreover, a substantial amount of Rus-
sia’s agricultural land was taken out of production in the 1990s. Accord-
ing to the former president of Russia Dmitry Medvedev, the amount of 
unused or inefficiently used agricultural land may total 30 million ha 
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(Wegren 2011b: 152). However, reports differ on the amount of land 
taken out of production (IAMO 2011, Ioffe and Nefedova 2004). This 
abundance of available ‘unused’ but often very fertile land has raised the 
interest of investors, not only of domestic investors (the Russian oli-
garchs amongst others), but also of foreign companies and governments. 
However, whether all of the land classified as such really is ‘unused’ or 
‘abandoned’ needs further scrutiny.  
The phrase ‘global land grab’ has become a catch-all to describe and 
analyse the current explosion of large-scale (trans)national commercial 
land transactions. Some see land grabs as a major threat to the liveli-
hoods of the rural poor and oppose such commercial land deals. Others 
see them as a necessity to modernise agriculture and as an economic op-
portunity for the rural poor, although they are wary of corruption and 
negative consequences, and hence, call for improving land market gov-
ernance (Borras et al. 2011). Often land grabbing has been defined as 
large-scale land acquisitions by foreigners (GRAIN 2008), but currently, 
a substantial share of land grabbing is conducted by domestic investors, 
or by coalitions of foreign and domestic actors. Land grabbing is defined 
in this study as ‘the large-scale acquisition of land or land-related rights 
and resources by a corporate, non-profit or public buyer for the pur-
poses of resource extraction geared towards external consumers 
(whether external simply means off-site or foreign)’(Borras et al. 2012). 
Extraction and alienation are essential to this definition rather than the 
type of capital invested, the intended market or the act of commodifica-
tion or privatisation of land per se.  
The widespread farm restructuring and share-based land reform in 
Russia in the first half of the 1990s ‘opened up’ a huge and fertile area of 
land for investors in agricultural land. However, for more than a decade 
this sparked little interest among investors. The picture changed when 
Russian oligarchs and Western investors started to search for new fron-
tiers of investment with domestic economic growth and the influx of 
Russian offshore capital as well as due to the global financial crisis 
(Jouko and Granberg 2011)2. Moreover, rapidly increasing local demand 
for livestock products (related to demand for grains) in Russia, and sub-
sequent legal and policy changes stimulating agricultural investment, 
caused a high demand for agricultural land. Large-scale land investments 
became popular among Russian and foreign companies. Foreigners are 
not officially allowed to acquire agricultural land in Russia. However, 
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they do so by means of their Russian subsidiaries, which are considered 
as Russian domestic companies by Russian law. ‘We are seeing a land 
grab bigger than anywhere else in the world, and it has attracted a mighty 
cast of characters’, stated Kingsmill Bond, a chief strategist at the Mos-
cow Brokerage firm Troika Dialog (Kandell 2009). 
This current rush of investors for land (and the earlier experience 
with industry) raises serious concerns about the transparency, inclusive-
ness and fairness of land acquisitions. There is a danger of widespread 
dispossession of rural inhabitants who recently acquired entitlements to 
property in the form of land shares in the ‘cosmetically’ privatised, large-
scale successors of the state and collective farms, which are developing 
into megafarms. Will land grabbing cause rural dwellers to lose their land 
rights, soon after they received them in the 1990s? In the absence of 
studies on land grabbing in the former Soviet Union, we know relatively 
little of the various effects.  
This chapter focuses on the investors in land and their strategies. 
However, effects of these land acquisitions for the rural population re-
garding land ownership (and potential dispossession) will also be ad-
dressed. This study examines the main players in the Russian land market 
and the strategies and mechanisms they use for land acquisition, such as 
deliberate bankruptcy of collective farms in order to buy their lands, the 
massive purchase of land shares acquisition after land law (2002), and 
using the inequality in power relations. Finally, the role of the Russian 
state vis-à-vis large-scale land acquisitions is discussed.  
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section (Section 2.2), 
the specificities of research on land grabbing in Russia are described, 
with special attention to difficulties with data collection. In Section 2.3, it 
will be shown that the land rights (‘shares’) the population received dur-
ing the restructuring of state and collective farms were rather insecure, 
which facilitated land grabbing later on. Section 2.4 investigates the mag-
nitude of large-scale land acquisitions in Russia, and the actors and struc-
tures behind them, such as Russian oligarchs, megafarms and foreign 
investors. Section 2.5 looks at the motivations of investors and the land 
acquisition strategies that are used to avoid different restrictions on land 
sales in legal (using loopholes in Russian legislation) and illegal ways. Sec-
tion 2.6 looks at the issue of abandoned land, land reserves and dying 
villages, distinguishing between discourse and reality. Section 2.7 analyses 
land accumulation strategies and responses of rural dwellers attempting 
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to counter or mitigate unfair land acquisition. In Section 2.8 the role of 
the Russian state in the facilitation of land grabbing is analysed, which is 
often crucial. Finally, Section 2.9 looks at land grabbing in Russia in the 
years to come, arguing that it is expected to continue at great pace, and 
that proposed government interventions to constrain land grabbing will 
likely not prevent illegal land acquisitions, and might even have adverse 
effects.  
2.2. Doing research on land grabbing in Russia: data 
resources 
To study land grabbing empirically in Russia is complex. The informa-
tion about domestic and foreign land transactions provided by Russian 
statistical institutions such as Rosstat and the cadastral agency Rosreestr 
is incomplete and provides only general information about land owner-
ship and usage. Furthermore, the rapid increase in international transac-
tions in agricultural land renders available information quickly outdated 
(Visser and Spoor 2011). Moreover, according to Uzun et al. (2009), sta-
tistics on landholdings and land deals are collected at the agricultural en-
terprise level and are generally not available for agroholdings (Uzun et al. 
2009), which are the crucial actors in land acquisitions. An agroholding 
includes a number of agricultural organisations whose controlling blocks 
of shares are owned by the holding company. It acts as an umbrella for 
the subordinated (not necessarily only agricultural) units and controls 
their policies and management. Agroholdings often combine agricultural 
production enterprises with other upstream and downstream firms in the 
agri-food chain, such as producers of concentrated fodder, elevators, 
processing units and wholesalers. As a rule, investors (both domestic and 
foreign) invest in Russian land via agroholdings. 
There are no databases in Russia that include full information about 
Russian agroholdings, their capital or the acreage they control. As these 
agroholdings are currently the main actors in the land grabbing process, 
this shortcoming seriously complicates research on land grabbing in Rus-
sia. However, even with more statistical data at this level, the reliability of 
such data would be questionable due to the lack of transparency of Rus-
sian agroholdings and the concealed nature of much of the domestic and 
foreign investment that is taking place.  
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Therefore, this chapter is based on the following methods. First, 
through web research: gathering many dispersed pieces of information 
from the Russian media, reviews in web journals, and examining web 
pages of agroholdings and foreign investment funds operating in Russia. 
Second, in-depth interviews with leaders of some foreign and domestic 
agroholdings operating in Russia, government officials, rural inhabitants 
and representatives of emerging rural movements were conducted in the 
Moscow region during autumn 2010 and winter-spring 20113. This chap-
ter focuses primarily on the general tendencies in land acquisitions in 
Russia, and only limited attention is devoted to the regional differences 
in regard to the analysed processes (for studies that deal extensively with 
regional differences see the work by Pallot and Nefedova (2007) that 
covers a wide range of regions, as well as the work of Visser (2006, 2008) 
and Lindner (2008), which provides a close-up study of farm enterprises 
in three contrasting regions).  
2.3. Post-Soviet land reform: the political economy of 
insecurity 
2.3.1. Post-Soviet land reform after 1991 
The Russian land reform was aimed at changing ownership of farmland 
from state into private property, while the dominant large state and col-
lective farms were to be restructured towards ‘individualised’ production. 
No land restitution policy was followed as it was not possible to deter-
mine who the previous landowners were before the forced collectivisa-
tion of farms and the nationalisation of land in the 1930s. This was only 
done in the Baltics and in some countries of Central Europe. Moreover, 
the collectivisation had often been carried out together with imprison-
ment, deportation and killing of numerous ‘rich’ peasant farmers (the so-
called kulaks). The various farm enlargement campaigns in the later So-
viet period were accompanied by multiple relocations of rural settle-
ments, further adding to the alienation of the rural population from their 
former or ancestral land. Therefore, among both policy makers and the 
rural population, there was no serious interest for restitution of land to 
the pre-communist owners. Instead, the land was to be distributed 
equally among the current rural inhabitants (World Bank 1992), al-
though, as it is shown below, this was not done in a physical sense, but 
through share-based entitlements to land (Spoor and Visser 2001). 
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In the early 1990s, only 1% of the agricultural land was privately used 
(these were the subsidiary household plots of the employees on the state 
and collective farms). The other 99% of land belonged to the state 
(Poshkus 2009: 68). This situation changed dramatically with the post-
1991 land reform. The land was given to the former kolkhozes and sovk-
hozes (collective and state farms) for further distribution among their 
members in the form of paper shares. During that time, investors in ag-
riculture were not able to buy land, but they were not completely passive. 
Some of them waited until the end of this moratorium (2002), in the 
meantime making contacts with the management of attractive farms and 
lobbying with local authorities. 
Land reform in Russia was carried out in two stages. First, in 1990, 
the law ‘On land reform’ focused on taking 10% of kolkhoz and sovk-
hoz land and transferring it to local authorities for distribution among 
rural dwellers who were willing to establish a private family farm. How-
ever, at the end of 1992, there were only 50,000 private family farms that 
owned less than 1% of agricultural land. According to Poshkus (2009: 
68), problems arose due to the unwillingness of kolkhoz leadership to 
hand over the land to local authorities and the lack of understanding of 
land reform among peasants. Second, at the end of 1991 the Presidential 
Decree No. 323 (On urgent measures for the implementation of land reform in the 
RSFSR4) was issued by the first Russian President Boris Yeltsin. This 
involved the transformation of state and collective farms into new juridi-
cal forms (mostly closed joint-stock companies or CJSC) with the em-
ployees becoming ‘shareholders’. Subsequently, each employee received 
non-land asset shares and land shares (on average four hectares) for free. 
However, the shares did not include real, individual ownership. The land 
shares that employees received were paper certificates, that substantiated 
their rights to unspecified land plots on the territory of their former state 
or collective (Poshkus 2009: 68, Spoor and Visser 2001). Gustav Wetter-
ling (Agro-Invest Group – a subsidiary of Swedish Black Earth Farming 
Ltd) calls this process ‘semi-privatisation’, meaning that peasants did not 
become real owners of the land, as they only received the right to be 
owners5. 
Ownership of such land could occur in two cases. First, the land re-
cipient transferred his/her land share to the charter capital of the re-
structured farm enterprise. In this case, the land became the property of 
the farm. Second, the land recipient created a peasant farm6, by register-
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ing the land as his/her ownership. However, private land registration 
required significant time and financial resources due to the highly bu-
reaucratic system in the country. According to Poshkus (2009: 69), the 
main weakness of the reform was ‘the problem with the definition of 
land rights and their usage’. This provided a loophole facilitating future 
land grabbing in Russia and is increasingly generating land conflicts in 
the country. However, more clearly defined property rights alone would 
not have been a solution, as land reform took place in a situation in 
which markets were still in the making, political interference remained 
strong, and distribution of power was highly unequal (Spoor and Visser 
2004).  
During President Vladimir Putin’s first term the Federal Law N136-FZ 
Land Code of Russian Federation (2001) was adopted that modified property 
rights for land with the exception of agricultural land, and in 2002, the 
Federal Law N 101-FZ On Agricultural Land Transactions came into force. 
This law specified procedures for selling agricultural land and served as a 
template for regional legislation (Wegren 2009b). Tamara Semenova (one 
of the leaders of the rural social movement Krestyanskiy (Peasant) Front) 
suggests that this law ‘was lobbied by a group of oligarchs who had al-
ready bought or planned to buy land. This law was worked out to legalise 
their purchases7‘. During Putin’s second term (2004–2008), Russian and 
foreign investors became interested in agricultural land and commenced 
buying land shares. 
2.3.2. High costs of land registration 
Land reform in Russia during the 1990s did not lead to clearly defined 
land rights and tenure security. According to Lerman and Shagaida 
(2007), most (84%) of the peasant farmers in the more agriculturally de-
veloped regions in Russia regarded first, complex procedures of land 
transactions, and second, high registration costs as major problems in the 
development of their farming operations. In order to register their land, 
land shareholders had (and have) to pass three organisational levels: the 
aforementioned district committees, cadastral chambers and registration 
chambers.  
After this long procedure, the land shares are transferable: they can be 
leased or sold, transferring the rights to the underlying acreage to an-
other operator or owner. However, land shareholders have to spend 
considerable costs to pass through the entire procedure. ‘Often people in 
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remote areas do not even have money in order to formalise their land 
shares’, as Tamara Semenova of Krestyanskiy Front stated8. First Deputy 
Premier Viktor Zubkov revealed in February 2009 that of the 12 million 
land shareholders, only 400,000 have been able to register their land 
plots. With the emergence of outside investors (see next section), the 
weaknesses of land reform in securing land rights of the rural population 
have become more and more apparent9. 
2.4. The magnitude of land grabbing and the types of actors 
involved  
2.4.1. Domestic investors 
In the 1990s, most Russian companies considered the agricultural sector 
as unprofitable and preferred to invest in other branches, while interest 
from foreign investors was also limited (with a few exceptions; see be-
low). The new Russian government sharply curtailed investment in the 
agriculture sector (Barnes 2006) and the large farm enterprises (LFEs), 
successors of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, faced severe financial diffi-
culties. 
The privatisation of oil, gas, and mineral resources and industry sec-
tors in the early 1990s led to a rush to acquire former state enterprises. A 
fierce struggle for the most prized assets evolved between the Russian 
oligarchs and sometimes between worker collectives and oligarchs. Later, 
foreign investors and the Russian state (especially in the oil sector) be-
came involved in this struggle over acquisition of property (Barnes 
2006). However, as indicated above, land reform had been ‘largely cos-
metic’, involving little more than ‘changing the name plate of the farm’ 
(Brooks et al. 1996). Comparing agrarian property transformation in the 
1990s with privatisation in other sectors, Barnes wrote that: 
…the struggles in the sector could also seem underwhelming, lacking 
even the guilty fascination provoked by the decadence of conflicts in 
industry. [...] Private farmers did not drive around Moscow in Mercedes 
cars or pull rolls of hundred-dollar bills from their pockets in casinos. 
Newspapers did not brim with stories of upstart speculators battling cor-
rupt managers and organised crime bosses for control over agricultural 
production. Instead, the sector often seemed interesting only for its pity 
value. (Barnes 2006: 141)  
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Indeed, Russian agriculture was in dire straits (with roughly 80% of 
the farm enterprises incurring losses by the mid-1990s). The market-
oriented agrarian reform took place in a period of sharp economic de-
cline of the economy at large and drastic cuts in government spending 
on agriculture in particular (Wegren 2009a, 2011a). In the 1990s, land 
prices were very low and often land even had a negative value because of 
costs in the form of land tax and informal social obligations attached to 
land, such as to provide feed for private livestock of the villagers or pro-
vide social infrastructure (Visser 2006). During this period the sparse 
outside ‘investors’ (from outside the agribusiness sector) who took over 
farm enterprises did so often with the goal of asset stripping. Equipment 
and buildings were sold off, while the land was mostly left unused 
(Kalugina and Fadeeva 2009).  
Due to the dire straits of the large farm enterprises, part of their lands 
ended up in the hands of creditors in order to pay off farm debts, in par-
ticular to suppliers of fuel such as the energy giants Gazprom and Lukoil 
(Barnes 2006: 161). The first substantial agricultural land bank, operated 
by Gazprom, started when farm enterprises were unable to cover their 
fuel debts and had to pay back with their land. The total property of 
Gazprom is more than 500,000 ha. Gazprom is currently engaged in a 
process of selling off its agricultural land again, as the company was not 
successful in agribusiness due to the absence of skills and knowledge in 
agriculture (Uzun et al. 2009). 
‘Attendant with strong economic growth that ensued from 1999 
through 2007, land began to be perceived as a valuable commodity from 
which to build wealth. Agricultural land became the new frontier for 
those with money’ (Wegren 2009b: 3). New changes in Russian land 
laws, focusing on attracting direct and indirect investments to the agri-
cultural sector by guaranteeing private property rights on the land, gave 
impetus to the creation of large-scale agroholdings or megafarms at the 
expense of rural dwellers. In Russia, most agricultural land continues to 
be controlled by LFEs, and since the early 2000s, a growing percentage 
of these are controlled by large agroholdings and corporations, previ-
ously state- and now privately owned.  
According to the All-Russian Agricultural Census of 2006, peasant 
farmers (private family farmers) owned only 13% of agricultural land in 
Russia in 2005 and household plots accounted for less than 5% (Rosstat 
2006: 36). All other land is controlled by LFEs and agroholdings, both 
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national and international, although a large share of this land is still for-
mally in the hands of (former) employees cum shareholders10. Nearly 60% 
of agricultural land is now privately owned, but most of this land (51%) 
is represented by land shares – pieces of paper corresponding to virtual 
plots of specified size in an unspecified location (Lerman and Shagaida 
2007). These land shares are transferable: they can be leased or sold, 
transferring the rights to the underlying acreage to another operator or 
owner. Only 6% of agricultural land is in the form of physically demar-
cated plots, (that means land shares which were actually registered by the 
possessor), most of it owned by individuals (household plots and peasant 
farms) (Lerman and Shagaida 2007).  
The number of agroholdings (as well as the size of their landholdings) 
has rapidly increased since the early 2000s. According to the Russian 
Ministry of Agriculture in 2003, more than 90 agroholdings were active 
in 25 regions. By 2006, 319 private agroholdings were already registered 
(Uzun et al. 2009: 159). By the mid-2000s in various fertile Black Earth 
regions, such as Belgorod, Lipetsk, Voronezh and Tambov, there was 
practically no ‘free’ land available that was not yet controlled by an 
agroholding (Didenko 2009). By mid-2008, according to the Institute for 
Agricultural Market Studies, 196 large agroholdings controlled 11.5 mil-
lion ha (BEFL 2010: 9). Of these agroholdings, 32 had landholdings of 
over 100,000 ha.  
It is hard to say how many land transactions are conducted in Russia 
exactly, let alone those of specifically agricultural land. But, definitely, the 
number of land transactions is growing. In the mid-2000s about 5% of 
agricultural land was transacted annually (Shagaida 2005), a figure which 
has risen further in the last few years to at least 8% (see Table 2.1) with a 
strong rise in the number of land deals (25% in 2009) between citizens 
and legal entities. These data, of course, do not include shady, unregis-
tered deals11. 
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Table 2.1 
Land transactions (sale and lease) in Russia (2006-2009) 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 
Transactions with state and municipalities 
Number of transac-
tions  
3 921 393 3 875 650 3 985 846 3 887 691 
Change in amount  -1% 3% -2% 
Amount of land (ha) in 
transactions 
105 214 779 114 622 029 115 351 558 114 018 863 
Approx ha per deal 27 30 29 29 
Transactions between citizens and companies 
Number of transac-
tions 
623 747 643 443 794 792 996 462 
Change in amount  3% 24% 25% 
Amount of land (ha) in 
transactions  
1 231 830 1 221 829 2 415 179 18 761 609 
Approx ha per deal 2 2 3 19 
Total transactions 
Number of transac-
tions: 
4 545 140 4 519 093 4 780 638 4 884 153 
Change in amount  -1% 6% 2% 
Amount of land (ha) in 
transaction 
106 446 609 115 843 859 117 766 738 132 780 473 
Total amount of land  
Total amount of land 
in Russia 
1 709 800 
000 
1 709 800 
000 
1 709 800 
000 
1 709 800 
000 
Total amount of agri-
cultural land in Russia 
  402 300 000 400 000 000 
Land transacted as % of 
the total amount of land 
in Russia 
    7% 8% 
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Rosreestr (2010). 
Notes: Land transactions include buying, selling or leasing of all categories of land: agricul-
tural land, settlement, industrial land, special protected land, forest, and land reserve. 
Therefore, land transactions were calculated as a percentage of the total amount of land in 
Russia, which somewhat understates the share of land in transaction. However, if this share 
was calculated as a percentage of agricultural land, the share of land in transaction would 
rise from estimated 8% to nearly 30%, which likely overstates the percentage transacted. 
 
2.4.2. Foreign land acquisitions: a brief overview 
Foreign land acquisitions are clearly on the rise in Russia since the mid-
2000s (Visser and Spoor 2011), although already in the mid-1990s some 
Western companies attempted to enter Russian agribusiness. However, it 
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is hard to quantify foreign land acquisitions. Foreign companies are not 
allowed to directly buy land.  
The Land Code (adopted in 2001) prohibits ownership of agricultural 
land by foreign citizens and companies, as well as Russian companies 
with foreigners owning more than 50% of the shares. To avoid the ap-
plication of this law, foreign investors establish Russian subsidiaries that 
are legally not regarded as foreign companies (a strategy that is actively 
promoted by the Russian government, as will be shown in Section 2.5). 
This study estimates that roughly 50 foreign companies control up to an 
estimated 3.5 million ha of Russian agricultural land. However, accumu-
lation of land is a highly sensitive issue for both the leasing and the host-
ing countries, and therefore, it is likely that the process of land grabbing 
in post-Soviet Eurasia has advanced further than official statements and 
media reports suggest (Billette 2009, Visser and Spoor 2011). In terms of 
the total size of the agricultural land obtained, Russia is not a top target 
of foreign investment, but investment by outside investors is indeed sub-
stantial and the size of average land deals, including actually implemented 
ones, is very large. Having access to large financial resources, foreign in-
vestors acquire the most fertile land, use modern technology to achieve 
high productivity, and take leading positions in regional and sometimes 
even national markets. 
The origins of the companies that are interested in Russian land ac-
quisitions are quite diverse. Among them are the Western companies 
investing primarily in the European part of Russia, and the Asian (most 
notably Chinese companies) in Siberia and the Far East12 of Russia (Vis-
ser and Spoor 2011). Investors from the Middle East (in particular from 
the Gulf States) have only been searching for land in some of the former 
Soviet republics very recently and have not yet concluded major deals 
(Visser and Spoor 2011). Until now Gulf States investors have focused 
more on Ukraine and Kazakhstan rather than Russia. When discussing 
the origin of investors it is important to realise that the identity of inves-
tors might be different, and more complex, than what it seems at a first 
glance. Various recent studies in Africa have shown that what appears to 
be a foreign investment is in fact investment by representatives of the 
diaspora from the target country. Furthermore, Hall (2012) has shown 
that the widespread land acquisitions by South African investors across 
the African continent are often indirectly based on Chinese investments 
in South African companies that are funding these acquisitions. Part of 
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what seems like foreign investment appears to consist of investment by 
Russian oligarchs (Visser and Spoor 2011). 
Finally, a note about the aim/orientation of foreign farmland acquisi-
tions. Globally an important share of the large-scale farmland acquisi-
tions is not (solely) for food or fodder but also for biofuel production, 
for instance in Brazil and large parts of Africa13. In Russia, the share of 
land acquisitions aimed at biofuels production is rather insignificant. 
Various factors seem to play a role here. Russia, which is itself a prime 
oil and gas exporter with low internal fuel prices, does not actively stimu-
late biofuel production as is done, for instance, in Brazil and the USA. 
This makes the Russian case special, although the mechanisms of land 
grabbing are often comparable. Foreign investors who want to produce 
biofuels for export (mainly to the nearby EU) prefer Ukraine, which has 
better port infrastructure and a government that is more interested in 
stimulating biofuel production and processing, being very oil-dependent 
on neighbouring Russia14.  
2.5. Motivations for large-scale land deals: finance and the 
political economy of the land rush in Russia 
The recent land rush in Russia has clear characteristics of a new frontier 
for investors. In the creation of this new frontier, global factors play a 
role (such as the financial crisis and the search for an inflation hedge) but 
domestic factors seem to be more decisive. Also, domestic land acquisi-
tions predominate over foreign ones.  
After the slump of the 1990s, the Russian economy has shown im-
pressive growth rates throughout most of the 2000s and demand for 
high-quality food products, such as livestock products, is continuously 
rising. An important factor on the supply side is a large amount of capital 
in the hands of the Russian oligarchs, which after the appropriation of 
the energy and industry sectors are looking for new frontiers of devel-
opment. Whereas in the 1990s they transferred their capital to tax havens 
in the West, with the economic recovery of the 2000s these oligarchs 
increasingly started investing their offshore capital again in Russia. By 
2002, a senior economist of the Moscow Brokerage firm Aton Capital 
Group concluded, ‘Russians are starting to trust Russia’ and therefore 
‘money is coming back’ (Starobin and Belton 2002).  
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The land rush can be seen as part of the larger ‘hunt for the Next Big 
Thing’, the new accumulation drive that started in the 2000s with the 
privatisation of assets which were left in state ownership in the 1990s, 
such as railways, electricity and financial services (Starobin and Belton 
2002). The Russian state plays an important role in enabling the boom in 
large-scale land acquisitions, in legal terms by adopting the 2002 land law 
allowing free sale of land and, even more important, by financial stimula-
tion through mechanisms that lower taxes and increase subsidised loans. 
The fact that the current boom in agriculture takes the form of large-
scale land acquisitions with the predominance of huge agroholdings is 
often portrayed as an inevitable process or the most efficient mode of 
farming for Russia, by investors and authorities alike. While it is true that 
the Russian landscape and the crops cultivated allow for a high degree of 
mechanisation and economies of scale, there are also various disecono-
mies of scale associated with these large farm enterprises (Nikulin 2005, 
Visser 2006, 2008), such as those related to monitoring costs. Another 
justification for large-scale land acquisitions and mega-farming given by 
the major actors in Russia is that the rural population is not willing to 
take up independent farming, that small or medium private family farms 
are not a feasible form of production, or do not have the finances to ex-
pand and modernise production. ‘Today only agro-industrial holdings 
can be profitable in farming, because it requires huge financial resources’, 
stated Zorigto Sakhanov, chairman of Agro-Invest Group, the subsidiary 
of Swedish Black Earth Farming (Bush 2008).  
Indeed, the growth of private farms has been below expectations. 
However, it is important to stress that many of the farmers face obsta-
cles which are not simple natural problems related to their size, but a di-
rect problem of a political economy (and government policy) targeted at 
large-scale farming (Visser 2008). The lack of investment in extension 
services, as well as the large-scale nature of input and output channels, 
form obstacles for private farms (Visser 2008). Further, some regional 
authorities have set limitations on the minimum size of land deals, such 
as in Krasnodar Krai where there is a threshold of 300 ha for land deals, 
hindering the emergence and expansion of small and medium-sized 
farms.  
A very important factor that skews the agricultural boom towards 
large-scale farming is the financial system. There is an urgent lack of ac-
cessible finance/credit. Obtaining loans is virtually only possible through 
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take-over and capitalisation by rich investors who have built up their 
capital in another sector, or via state subsidised credit. Most commercial 
banks are more vehicles for the investment projects of oligarchs than 
accessible sources of credit. Interest rates are very high and agricultural 
land is mostly not accepted as collateral. Furthermore, banks are gener-
ally not much oriented toward agriculture. 
From the early 2000s, the state has increased finance for the agricul-
tural sector. A network of state-owned and operated banks for agribusi-
ness was set up, but in some regions, these bank branches were only es-
tablished when agriculture had already virtually disappeared. State-
subsidised loans have been targeted predominantly towards large farm 
enterprises, and within this group, towards the largest and most success-
ful ones. For instance, Uzun (2005) states that ‘1.4% of the largest cor-
porate farms received 22.5% of all subsidies’. Also, the more indirect 
forms of subsidisation seem to stimulate mostly the largest LFEs15. Vari-
ous requirements of the loans, such as the need for matching of re-
sources and often brief repayment terms, skew the loans towards the 
largest farm enterprises. Due to the abovementioned problems, it is dif-
ficult to develop agriculture without investors that already gained capital 
in lucrative sectors outside agribusiness. Whereas in the 1990s, the few 
investors in agriculture and land were mostly coming from that sector 
(food processors, food wholesalers, or providers of inputs for farming), 
now they often do not have any existing link to the sector. 
2.5.1. Motivations for large-scale land acquisitions 
The precise motivations of outside investors/oligarchs to acquire land 
are not easy to discover since the whole process is highly non-
transparent, not least for the villagers, who often know little more than 
that ‘a rich investor from Moscow’ obtained their land (D’Hamecourt 
2010: 13). However, it is clear that the current land rush cannot be ex-
plained sufficiently by economic incentives or rising food demand only. 
This section investigates the triggers for the large-scale land acquisitions 
taking into account various national and international processes. With 
regard to the global food prices and land grab debate, several authors 
have argued that the idea of the growing global population and rising 
food demand as an explanation for rising food prices and subsequently 
the drive for land acquisitions is a mystification of reality (Jouko and 
Granberg 2011). This is clearly the case for Russia. Except for the more 
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obvious economic reasons for investment, such as increased demand for 
livestock products, and aspects of investment portfolio management (in-
tegration, differentiation and risk-spreading), there are several other mo-
tivations for investment. The following will be discussed: high subsidies, 
speculation, state pressure and state-business agreements, tax evasion 
and money laundering.  
High subsidies 
Acquiring land and investing in agriculture has been made attractive 
by the policy of the Russian government. Since the early 2000s the state 
has stimulated agriculture through a range of instruments such as a debt 
restructuring programme, the establishment of a state-financed agricul-
tural bank, subsidised crop insurance programmes, simplified and low-
ered taxes on agriculture, and subsidised loans for capital investment 
(Wegren 2007: 517). Whereas in the 1990s subsidies for the agricultural 
sector were sharply curtailed, under Putin, from 2006 onwards, agricul-
ture became one of the four priorities of the ‘National Project’. The gov-
ernment set ambitious goals for domestic food security, targeting first of 
all the livestock sector, which experienced the most dramatic decline 
during the 1990s. As a result, cheap, state-subsidised credit is available 
for investments in livestock and especially dairy production. Asked about 
the motivations of the investors he had worked with, a Dutch interim 
farm manager and consultant, Han van Riel, who has worked in several 
agroholdings in Russia, answered: 
…it could be, normally you get 10 million from the state, with a guaran-
tee by Putin. The interest rate is zero percent. […] Yes, there are enor-
mous funds. Look, normally the interest rate is 15% to 16%. But then it 
is zero percent16.  
Western observers often hasten to characterise state intervention in 
Russia as a legacy of, or return to, the Soviet past, but it is more produc-
tive to see it as an example of the wider global tendency of various states 
to stimulate a boom in agriculture. Whereas in some countries the subsi-
dies focus on biofuel/diesel and energy security (such as the biofuel 
(corn) subsidies in the US, or biodiesel policies in Germany), in Russia, 
as a major fossil energy exporter and a weak food (livestock) producer, 
the subsidies focus on livestock production.  
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Speculation and land conversion  
Land brokers and representatives of agroholdings searching for invest-
ment widely mention the expected value appreciation of agricultural land 
in Russia. Also, part of the land is obtained in order to sell it off later 
with a large premium as land for construction sites (in a later section 
several such cases will be discussed):  
I have […] tried to cultivate cabbage, on 20,000 ha, for a real estate 
agent. He wanted it in ownership, at least, the right of usage. But he had 
to cultivate it, otherwise, he would not get it […]. Just what I thought. At 
least 50% to 80% of his territory is now expansion area for construction 
for Moscow for the next 25 years. He knew that already by then. Thus, 
yes, for him it was just to have it, due to its location in Moscow [re-
gion]… (Han van Riel, Dutch interim farm manager17). 
Pressure by the government 
Furthermore, many political and other, often hidden, motives seem to 
play a role, such as creating loyalty and political support among regional 
governors and a tacit agreement with the Kremlin, which seems to have 
promised not to investigate the dubious practices of the oligarchs in re-
turn for their investment in the countryside (Boldyrev 2001: 21). Inter-
views with consultants in agriculture suggested that regional authorities 
made agreements with the largest oligarchs that the latter should invest 
in the cumbersome agricultural sector in return for earlier or forthcom-
ing privileges such as tax breaks, cheap credit or other forms of state 
support (Visser 2008). Obviously, it is difficult to find clear evidence for 
such influence, but anecdotal evidence suggests that this indeed played a 
role. The quoted Dutch interim farm manager confirmed this pressure: ‘I 
think one of the motives is the choice you have: either you pay tax ar-
rears or you start producing food’18. 
For instance, one investor, the director of a fur factory described by 
Kalugina and Fadeeva, started to invest in a near-bankrupt farm enter-
prise after multiple requests by the district authorities, with promises of 
state support and privileges for its development. The investor described 
the interaction: ‘the district head insisted that I who come there [to in-
vest]. He said, “nobody except from you can revive this enterprise”. I 
tried several times to run away from it’ (quoted in Kalugina and Fadeeva 
2009: 165). A German investor even stated that ‘the land was almost 
forced on us’ (Winter 2012).  
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Tax evasion and money laundering 
Furthermore, tax evasion, and probably money laundering, seems to play 
a role (Boldyrev 2001). Agriculture is a complex sector, with large fluc-
tuations in production and profitability year to year, which allowed for 
extensive creative accounting already in the Soviet period (Visser and 
Kalb 2010). Furthermore, the tax on agricultural production is low to 
virtually zero. 
2.6. Abandoned land, dying villages and investment: 
discourse and reality  
Whereas Section 2.5 looked into the motivations behind the land rush, 
this section will turn to a major topic in the legitimisation of these deals: 
the concept of ‘abandoned’, ‘unused’ or ‘available’ land.  
2.6.1. The discourse of abandoned land 
The idea of widely available abandoned land waiting to be (re)cultivated 
is very widespread among media and investors describing the Russian 
countryside:  
You should take the car. Drive to the North, [further] across Belarus, 
and then towards the South, Smolensk, and in the direction of Moscow. 
Or even go further. […] Then you will meet millions of hectares which 
are just abandoned. Nobody is living there anymore (Han van Riel, 
Dutch interim farm manager19). 
and: 
Back then this tradition-rich region was on its knees. The giant state ag-
ricultural collectives of the Soviet era were all bankrupt; their ancient 
equipment was in disrepair, and their land stood largely fallow. Young 
people fled to urban areas, leaving behind ageing parents, decrepit farm 
houses and weed-choked gardens. Today, however, the region has burst 
to life. The capitalist upheaval that years ago began sweeping through 
Russia’s big cities and oil and gas fields have finally made its way to the 
country’s rural heartland. Newly imported tractors and harvesters with 
the latest ground-positioning satellite systems navigate vast privatised es-
tates, producing bumper crops of wheat, barley, rapeseed, sugar beets 
and corn. (Kandell 2009: 1) 
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The director of the largest German investor in Russian agriculture 
(Ekoniva) states: ‘We change the attitude to land. In every farm we start 
restoring abandoned, neglected, often uncultivated lands and some 
points which were marked as fields on the map even appeared to be 
forest-belts in reality’ (Zaslavskaya 2010).  
2.6.2. Is a win-win situation possible? 
If anywhere, it would appear that a ‘win-win’ situation proposed by in-
vestors and for example studies such as World Bank (2010a) on land 
deals would be possible in Russia. A few features of agriculture in Russia 
suggest, at a first glance, that this is indeed the case. First, in general, 
there is no food shortage or hunger. Russia is even a main exporter of 
grain (although importer of livestock products). 
Second, much land is not cultivated. Indeed, rates of land that turned 
from agriculture into non-agriculture were very high in Russia in the 
1990s, with this process already starting in the 1980s during the last dec-
ade of the Soviet Union (Ioffe and Nefedova 2004). Prishchepov et al. 
(2012) show based on detailed Landsat satellite data, that 52% of agricul-
tural land in the North-Western Smolensk region was ‘abandoned’ be-
tween 1989 and 2000. Ioffe, Nefedova and Zaslavsky (2006) estimate 
that about 30% of Russia’s rural settlements ‘have either died out or are 
about to do so’. Ioffe and Nefedova (2004) suggest that as a rule farm 
enterprises are not profitable in areas where population density drops 
below 10 people per square kilometre. Low population density, an ageing 
rural population, and out-migration of working-age people all confirm 
the image of abandoned land. Ioffe, Nefedova and Zaslavsky (2004: 934) 
even speak about ‘black holes’ in the countryside. In some villages, most 
of the titles to land were in the name of people who had disappeared or 
owners who had died. In one district, Shagaida (2005) found that nearly 
half of the land shares were owned by people who had died20.  
Third, the population often appears willing to rent out or sell the 
land. Simon de Schutter (a farm consultant for large-scale farms in Rus-
sia) states:  
Indeed, many do sell their land. Some [of the rural population] do noth-
ing with their land, which is just laying fallow. They don’t get any reve-
nue from it. And as I just said, if they hand it over to the large enterprise 
– let me put it that way – then they get some return from it. They earn 
something from it21. 
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There is no widespread desire to become an independent peasant 
farmer. In fact, in the 1990s, when some new independent family farm-
ers emerged, a large share of the population was quite hostile to these 
efforts as they feared for the break-up of LFEs and the loss of their low-
paid, but until then ‘secure’, jobs and the whole social infrastructure, 
pensions, etc., connected to it (Visser 2008). The majority of the work-
ing-age people (and a lot of people above pension age trying to supple-
ment their low pensions) prefer to have a job at a LFE. Consequently, 
many of them are indeed happy if an investor approaches them to buy or 
rent the shares with the promise to lift up production and re-create em-
ployment. Quite a large part of the population is above working age and 
would physically be unable to work the land.  
2.6.3. A critique of the discourse of abandoned land 
Despite the arguments above, one should not jump to the conclusion 
that therefore land acquisitions in Russia cannot be but beneficial for 
rural dwellers next to the investor. 
First, the empty or uncultivated land is predominantly in the north 
(with poorer soils, and worse climatic circumstances) where hardly any 
investors are interested in obtaining land, with the exception of land near 
the large cities (Uzun 2011). In the well-endowed south, there is fallow 
land in the peripheral regions but here investors are also mostly not in-
terested in obtaining land. A Dutch farmer/investor, who on a trip to 
Russia in search of agricultural land, met with a mayor showing him a 
potential investment site, stated in an interview: 
…we said, ok, that is not worth investing in anymore. If we want to start 
with a big unit, we like to build it near a big road. There we have good 
infrastructure… [...] we didn’t want to build it in the village. We wanted 
to put it in the middle of the fields. That works most efficient (Farmer 
De Boer22).  
Second, when land is not cultivated it does not mean that land is un-
used. Often villagers do use it in some ways and have (informal) entitle-
ments to land for functions other than agricultural cultivation, involving 
such functions as grazing, hunting, bee keeping and mushroom or berry 
collection. It is important to note that in the Soviet era, a symbiosis ex-
isted between the collective farm and the household plots of the em-
ployees and other villagers (see Visser 2006). Households were mostly 
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allowed to let their private livestock graze or bees forage at the fields of 
the collective farm. Further, the collective farm, as a rule, ploughed the 
household plots and provided free inputs such as manure or fodder for 
private livestock. Most of these entitlements were mutually agreed be-
tween farm management and employees, although employees and villag-
ers also had one-sided claims on collective property, which were consid-
ered stealing by the farm management. The land reform and 
reorganisation of the farm enterprises in the 1990s did not take into ac-
count these existing property relations. 
Research on property in other countries has shown that informal 
property rights are often overlooked during property reform, and it is 
not easy to do justice to the complex web of pre-existing property rights 
when formalising them (von Benda Beckmann 2003, von Benda 
Beckmann et al. 2006). While many of the farm directors continued part 
of these longstanding, informal entitlements after the land reform of the 
1990s (Spoor and Visser 2004, Visser 2009), with the emergence of out-
side investors farm property is often fenced off, support to households is 
curtailed and guards are installed (Visser 2008, Nikulin 2010). Nikulin 
(2010) shows in his case study of a large investor in Perm region that 
while villagers quite easily sold their land shares as they did not cultivate 
the land, they often persistently opposed the new production technolo-
gies (industrial ploughing and chemical fertilisation) brought along by the 
investor, which disturbed the livelihood they had built on the ‘aban-
doned’ land. The investors stated:  
Now we …will increase the ploughing area up to 7 thousand, [...] Mean-
while, many people here have formed a certain lifestyle, the lifestyle of 
living in the forest. They go to the woods, they keep bees. When we ar-
rive here with an active production cycle, to some extent we disrupt their 
social rhythm. Now they cannot already wander in the fields and ride as 
they please, because the fields are ours, and they are ploughed by us, 
[…]. Instead of their wild strawberries, there is, let’s say, our pea. We be-
gin ploughing the young forest with which the fields are overgrown, but 
there are mushrooms there (Nikulin 2010: 26).  
Third, even if the land is uncultivated usually there is an owner. Al-
though part of the population is prepared to sell or rent out their land, 
not all of them want to do so. Some would be able to work the land 
physically. Some of them sell the land due to the institutional environ-
ment, described earlier, is such that they have difficulty getting finance or 
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registering their land, and also sometimes there are regional limitations 
(minimal limits to the size of farms). 
Fourth, the rural dwellers are often in unequal power relations vis-à-vis 
the investors and rarely get a good price for their land. Here the difficul-
ties mentioned earlier, of registering land for rural dwellers, play an im-
portant role. Costs of registration hamper them in their opportunities to 
sell the land freely. Often, the costs of registration are prohibitive and 
investors buying the land take up these costs. Even when agroholdings 
‘freely’ buy up the shares of the employees, as is often the case with 
LFEs, the management and employees often sell under pressure from 
the investor. In a survey among 200 farm employees who sold off their 
land shares to an agroholding, 156 answered that they did so under pres-
sure of the holding group (Gerasin et al. 2003: 176). 
2.7. Land accumulation strategies 
A major consequence of the share-based privatisation of land was that 
large farm enterprises (LFEs) retained control over former state-owned 
agricultural land because most land shareowners rented their share al-
lotments back to the large farm in return for payment (incidentally, vil-
lagers rented out their land to private family farms but in many cases 
there was no other actor to rent the land to than the local farm enter-
prise). As a result, investors in search of land normally encounter large 
farms with integrated landholdings, but with actual ownership being very 
dispersed in the form of land shares. A relatively small amount of agri-
cultural land concerns land shares concentrated in the hands of one, or a 
few, owners. Normally these are farm managers or outsiders who man-
aged to obtain shares from the rural population. Finally, as mentioned 
earlier, a minority of agricultural land is still held by the state (often re-
gional authorities or municipalities).  
There are several strategies to acquire land in Russia. Land can be 
leased, or it can be bought in various direct and indirect ways. Buying up 
(or leasing) land from a large number of land shareholders takes quite 
some time. It was shown earlier that the registration procedure leads to 
high transaction costs. Sometimes investors try to avoid the time-
consuming and bureaucratic procedures of acquiring land, in order to 
grab land at a very low cost23. Frequently, the strategies of land acquisi-
tion within the framework of the law are combined with or substituted 
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by means that contradict the national laws or obey the letter of the law 
but not the spirit, using loopholes in Russian legislation to legalise unfair 
land acquisition24. Thus, one could discern a continuum of land acquisi-
tion strategies, running from acquisitions within the framework of the 
law, strategies at the fringe of the law (including misinformation, deceit 
and pressure), and finally outright fraud and dispossession. Due to limi-
tations of space, the discussion below will cover strategies at the two op-
posites of the spectrum and largely leave aside the in-between category. 
2.7.1. Land accumulation strategies within the framework of the 
legal system  
The first way of obtaining land is leasing or buying land from (dispersed) 
land shareholders. The lease was already possible before the 2002 land 
law on land transactions. Buying and selling of agricultural land by indi-
viduals is minor compared to leasing land shares from shareowners (or 
the state). According to the research of Lerman and Shagaida (2007) on 
LFEs and peasant farms, the share of leased land is on average 60% of 
the total area of agricultural land used. In LFEs, three-quarters of the 
leased land are in the form of land shares and only one-quarter is leased 
as land plots.  
Currently, much of the land acquired by agroholdings is rented, but 
there seems to be a growing tendency to buy land, which is of course 
partly due to the law of 2002. Based on web research and in-depth inter-
views, collected for purposes of this study, it can be concluded, not sur-
prisingly, that foreign investors prefer buying to leasing. Thus, Gustav 
Wetterling (a manager of Black Earth Farming) said: 
We have significant costs related to getting rid of all the weeds, all the 
trees… So that’s why we want ownership. So we know that we have it 
for a long period, so we will get this money paid back. There is a signifi-
cant investment in the beginning…25  
Many agroholdings do not disclose information about land in use and 
ownership, but the official web pages of the main ones which do so sug-
gest that the aforementioned statement by the representative of Black 
Earth Farming is indicative of a wider trend. 
This company buys land rights directly from every individual share-
holder, making an agreement with rural dwellers to register the land unit 
in their name and on their behalf and then buying this land according to 
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a sale-purchase agreement. When Black Earth Farming began land acqui-
sitions in 2004, it paid 90 Euros per ha (Kandell 2009). According to the 
director, the shareholders were happy to sell their rights as they were not 
able to register the lands themselves due to bureaucratic obstacles and 
the costs of registration, which can be too high for poor villagers; hence, 
their land did not provide them with any income. Gustav Wetterling 
stated that ‘during the last two years we got one offer per week to buy a 
land plot. There is no shortage of land for sale in Russia right now’. 
The same mechanism was used by Agro-Invest Brinky BV. The CEO 
of this Dutch company, Willeke van den Brink, stated that it was difficult 
to acquire the shares of former collective employees. ‘It was problematic 
not only to agree on the (conditions of the) sale, but even to find all 
these people: someone died, someone had left, et cetera’ (Luchev 2009). 
Acquiring shares for a controlling stake in the hands of Agro-Invest 
Brinky took close to one year. Dealing with large numbers of sharehold-
ers is a common downside for investors building up an agroholding in 
this way. The UK company Heartland Farms Ltd, owner of 18,500 ha in 
2009, concluded contracts with around 1500 land owners (BTA Analitika 
2008: 15).  
A way to obtain large amounts of land in one go without numerous 
negotiations with individual land shareholders is, first, to buy a whole 
farm enterprise (in which land shares were already accumulated by the 
farm management). Buying land in this way is in some cases not done 
completely legally (see Subsection 2.7.2). The villagers-shareholders do 
not always want to invest their shares in the companies. Investors used 
tricks, and some started preparing the documents of the enterprise and 
placing their managers in the farm staff several years before they an-
nounced their wish to acquire the farm26. 
Second, a minor, but increasing, percentage of land has been accumu-
lated by companies and is offered for purchase. For instance, Gazprom, 
which ended up with half a million ha of land, is selling off much of this 
land. Also, some agroholdings which grew rapidly sell off some of their 
lands due to financial problems or to cluster their land in a few regions. 
In these two variants, a (foreign) investor faces fewer transaction costs in 
obtaining land, but of course, it has to deal with all the other organisa-
tional issues of starting up a new farm enterprise, which can be quite a 
laborious process in Russia.  
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With the emergence of increasing numbers of domestic agroholdings 
in the past few years, there are foreign and domestic investors that have 
taken equity (whether a minority or majority share) in these entities. Sev-
eral large domestic agroholdings in Russia and Ukraine are even quoted 
at stock exchanges in Western Europe and others recently have an-
nounced plans to do so. Also, some Western agribusinesses operating in 
Ukraine and Russia are quoted on stock exchanges, such as the French 
farming group AgroGeneration. Although this process of share emis-
sions only started after the mid-2000s, currently Russia and Ukraine al-
ready have more agroholdings at the stock exchange than do the large 
agricultural powers of Latin America, Brazil and Argentina (World Bank 
2010a). In this sense, Russia, which was still a socialist country domi-
nated by state and collective farms two decades ago, is now at the ‘fore-
front’ of financialisation and large-scale global commodification of agri-
culture and land. An expert with Renaissance Capital stated that Russian 
agriculture will increasingly be dominated by agricompanies with a 
capitalisation of over half a billion dollars (Vasilyeva 2008: 2). 
In February 2011, US-based PepsiCo, the second largest beverage and 
food company in the world, obtained a majority share in OJSC Wimm-
Bill-Dann, the largest dairy agroholding in Russia. Wimm-Bill-Dann 
owns 37 food factories, many dairies around Moscow and elsewhere in 
Russia and even in other countries of the former Soviet Union, as well as 
port infrastructure. It also controls 40 large farm enterprises, with 20,000 
ha in ownership and 250,000 ha in leasehold. The legal obstacle concern-
ing foreign land ownership has been solved by transferring the land bank 
formally to the owners-founders, who had the controlling share before 
PepsiCo came in. One of the largest agroholdings in Russia, Cherkizovo 
Group OJSC, which holds numerous pig farms and fodder producing 
farms, is now predominantly owned by US investors, namely JP Morgan 
Chase Bank and MB Capital Partners. Also in the Far East of Russia, 
agroholdings are taken over by foreign investors (Visser and Spoor 
2011). 
2.7.2. Land accumulation outside the legal system  
There is increasing evidence of illegal land deals in Russia, in a land mar-
ket which is generally far from transparent. According to official statis-
tics, the number of land disputes in the first half of 2008 compared to 
the first half of 2007 increased by 63% for the whole system of arbitra-
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tion courts of the Russian Federation27. An analysis of crimes associated 
with illegal registration of land transactions also indicates growing abuses 
associated with the misappropriation and illegal registration of land 
transactions (Moskalkova 2011). The ‘leader’ in terms of criminal investi-
gations is the Moscow region, due to its advantageous location close to 
the capital and due to the high land prices, which reach 1000–1500 USD 
per square metre28 as a consequence of the demand for land to build da-
chas29 . In 2011, the Governor of Moscow region said that ‘almost of all 
of them [the investors who buy large plots of land] have problems with 
documents about the land rights’ (Moskalkova 2011). Tamara Semenova 
(Krestyanskiy Front) stated:  
[S]ince the moment that, in 2002, the state law about the turnover of ag-
ricultural lands came into effect and land became a commodity, illegal 
court practices have become popular in the Moscow region. Before 2002 
the land rights were given to peasants, after 2002 – the other way 
around’30. 
In almost every district of Moscow region, there are land conflicts be-
tween villagers and the new owners of the land, according to the 
Krestyanskiy Front. Moreover, the illegal land deals do not only happen 
in the Moscow region, but also in the well-endowed regions of south 
Russia (for instance, the Stavropol Krai) and in various other regions 
(Visser and Mamonova 2011), where land acquisitions focus less on con-
version into construction sites than in Moscow region. However, due to 
the fact that these regions are covered less by the mass media, the situa-
tion there is less well known.  
According to Tamara Semenova, ‘invaders’ usually pretend to be in-
vestors, offering to invest in the development of agricultural enterprises 
by buying shares. If villagers refuse to sell their shares to these investors, 
then various illegal schemes are used to achieve the goal. Manipulations 
with land units through forgery of farm enterprise documents on land 
ownership is the most common illegal method of weaning the land from 
its official owners, because technically and time-wise it is most simple to 
realise. For example, employees of former state farm Zaoksky in the 
Serpukhov district of Moscow region have lost their land because of the 
enterprise bankruptcy. As a result of bankruptcy proceedings, more than 
6,000 ha of land were purchased for only 10.8 million roubles (approxi-
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mately 270,000 euros) by Center-Capital CJSC. As a result, over two 
thousand people lost their legal right to the land shares. 
Another criminal case has happened with CJSC Matveyevskoye in the 
Odintsovo district. This case can illustrate an important mechanism 
through which land grabbers acquire land. First, there was the falsifica-
tion of a meeting of shareholders, at which they ostensibly gave their 
shares to the capital of the enterprise. This already took place in the 
1990s. There was also a case between the two main shareholders of the 
farm. Supposedly, they were going to share their land shares. This court 
case was specially fabricated to get control over the land shares. During 
this court case, Matveyevskoye acted as a third party. Matveyevskoye 
came with a counterclaim to recognise the rights to the entire land mass 
for Matveyevskoye. Finally, the court recognised the property rights of 
Matveyevskoye on the land shares of a common area of 712.4 ha of land 
of agricultural value (land value of more than 600 million roubles – ap-
proximately 15 million euros). Shareholders came to know about this 
court case, which was carried out in another region, only three years later 
when the statute of limitations had passed. In that period, the former 
CEO of Matveyevskoye N. Dubrovsky and the next CEO V. Bobynin 
were assassinated, murder cases that remained unresolved. 
For six years, the shareholders of Matveyevskoye have been seeking 
the recovery of their land shares. However, the prosecutors and investi-
gative bodies, one after another, refused to initiate criminal proceedings. 
Currently, Matveyevskoye is owned by a company registered in Britain, 
Millhouse Capital UK Ltd, which manages the capital of the famous oli-
garch Roman Abramovich and the company Inteko (headed by Elena 
Baturina – wife of Moscow ex-Mayor Yuri Luzhkov). There seem to be 
no real plans to develop agriculture as had been promised. The lands are 
used to build VIP country houses and business centres. On 1 November 
2008, appealing to the article 159 Part 4 of the Criminal Code (‘fraud, 
committed by a group of persons on a large scale’) the criminal case No. 
152983 was initiated against the ‘raiders’ of Matveyevskoye. However, a 
few months later the case was dismissed at the request of the Moscow 
region Prosecutor’s Office. Currently, the victims are appealing to higher 
authorities for help. 
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2.7.3. Countering illegal land acquisitions 
In a few cases, mobilisation by dispossessed rural dwellers who also pur-
sued court cases resulted in some effect, but only after very long legal 
procedures (often involving multiple court cases at different levels). 
Former employees of a poultry farm in Krasnogorsk, Moscow region, 
were in a similar situation to Matveyevskoye above. The farm was ac-
quired after the bankruptcy of the Agricultural Land Corporation Znak, 
co-owned by oligarch Nikolai Tsvetkov. Since 2001, people have been 
trying to restore their rights, but had not succeeded. However, in the 
middle of March 2010, the equity holders were paid 190 thousand rou-
bles – approximately 4,750 euros – (per share of 0.39 ha), to make them 
withdraw their complaints. The following successful case gives more in-
sight into the enormous efforts and kind of strategies that are required 
by rural dwellers to achieve some form of justice.  
‘It is impossible to fight land grabbing with classical legal instruments 
alone’, says Tamara Semenova of Krestyanskiy Front31. According to her, 
the courts in Russia, especially those that deal with land issues, are 
bought by raiders. The rural social movement Krestyanskiy Front, which 
was founded by dispossessed shareholders of former sovkhoz Gorki-2 in 
the Moscow region, was the most active among the recently emerging 
rural movements in Russia (see Chapter 3). It started by organising pub-
lic events (pickets) in Moscow city in order to draw the attention of fed-
eral authorities to this issue. It did not work particularly well. The state 
did not respond to their repeated appeals to address the large-scale dis-
possession of land held by rural dwellers. After that, the movement de-
veloped another strategy. The movement sought a solution on a case-by-
case basis and mobilised those rural dwellers directly involved and target-
ing the companies and authorities related to each case. Tamara Se-
menova, a shareholder herself, led 600 other deprived shareholders of 
Gorki-2 in protest. In the interview for this study, she explained that, for 
two years, the group held demonstrations on the Rublyovo-Uspenskoe 
highway, where the management office of Agrocomplex Gorki-2 was 
situated. 
We had been standing for two years three days a week from 8 a.m. to 5 
p.m. with placards along Rublevka32. Well, because it was Rublyovo-
Uspenskoe highway, many officials and government members use that 
road every day and they had been asking our raiders: ‘When will you pay, 
when will these protesters leave the road?’ It was the sore point that we 
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found. Courts didn’t work for us, of course. In courts, we lost every case. 
Totally absurd decisions were made by courts, even sometimes hard to 
believe: is that a circus or a court?33 
In total, the fight against the Agrocomplex Gorki-2 took five-and-a-
half years. According to the Krestyanskiy Front leadership, they experi-
enced threats and violence and were offered bribes in attempts to stop 
their efforts. But the activists continued their activities to get compensa-
tion. Finally, in 2008, the shareholders got financial compensation for 
their lands. 
The previous two cases led to compensation being paid, but restitu-
tion of the dispossessed land was not achieved. In Moscow, there was 
only one court case of illegal land acquisition that has led to land being 
returned to the former, rightful owners. One of the main landlords of 
the Moscow region, JSC Vash Finansoviy Popechitel, has more than 
63,000 ha in the Ruza district in the Moscow region. The chairman of 
the Board of Directors Vasily Boyko is currently under home confine-
ment. He is charged under the articles of ‘large-scale crime’ and ‘legalisa-
tion of monetary funds or other property acquired as a result of crime’. 
Boyko used a standard way to assemble the lands: buying up the collec-
tive farm land units. He acquired nine of eleven farms in the Ruza dis-
trict with a plan to develop a real estate project called ‘Ruza Switzerland’. 
The resort should occupy 40 ha in the Ruza district. The project included 
a country hotel with a golf club, equestrian parks and spas, sports facili-
ties and yacht clubs, a ski resort, a mini-airport for sports and business 
aviation, helicopter pads, a safari park and elite cottage villages.  
However, due to the activities of rural dwellers – official owners of 
the Ruza farmland – and the decline in the support from local authori-
ties, the project had to be postponed. Nevertheless, it is questionable 
whether rural mobilisation in the form of a court case and demonstra-
tions alone could have achieved this result. Some observers say that sev-
eral deprived land shareholders had private connections with bodies of 
internal affairs and that due to these connections their request was met 
(Kozyrev and Abakumova 2008). Others argue that Boyko lost the sup-
port of the local authorities and that is why he lost the court case (Solo-
matina 2007). Meanwhile, the CEO of Vash Finansovy Popechitel, Maria 
Loboda, expressed her point of view that the arrest of Boyko is linked to 
the struggle for control over the land in the Ruza district. ‘The purpose 
of this attack is to take away our business by competitors, and law agen-
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cies are used as a tool to achieve this goal,’ she said in an interview with 
Rambler Media Group (Rambler 2007). According to Boyko’s lawyers, 
the criminal case was initiated by organisations that are interested in ob-
taining contracts for the construction of the Central Ring Road and have 
close contacts with the government of the Moscow region. In this last 
version, which might be compatible with the earlier explanations, the 
restitution of land is not a sign of the impartial functioning of the rule of 
law, but rather the result of a power struggle within the arena of the 
business and political elites that offered a rare window of opportunity for 
the rural dwellers, an example of ‘divided elites’, one of the political op-
portunity structures for social movements as described by Tarrow 
(1998). Therefore, it is important to take a look at the role of the state. 
2.8. The state: policies regarding foreign land investment 
and land grabbing 
2.8.1. Attracting foreign investment 
Agrarian policy of Russia in the Putin/Medvedev era (the 2000s and be-
yond) has become characterised by what has been called ‘economic na-
tionalism’ (Wegren 2009a, b); with more focus on food security, in-
creased customs duties (formal, or informal through quality controls), 
and increased use of food policy as a political tool in international rela-
tions34. Nevertheless, the authorities seem to be convinced that moderni-
sation and production increases could be enhanced with foreign invest-
ment. As a consequence, over the past few years, the Russian 
government is actively encouraging this. 
By Russian law, foreign persons and companies are not allowed to 
own land. However, the legal loophole to avoid this, by establishing a 
majority or fully owned daughter company in Russia, is not at all 
frowned upon by state officials. In fact, this loophole is actively pro-
moted. During a seminar on investing in Russian and Ukrainian agricul-
ture, a Dutch farmer, operating in Russia, complained about the fact that 
a foreigner cannot own land. The Russian vice-minister of Agriculture 
responded that it is no problem, as a foreigner ‘you just open a subsidi-
ary in Russia, and buy as much land as you want’35. On the regional and 
local level, the stance of the authorities differs, depending to a large ex-
tent on the governor in charge (Zimin 2010), but most authorities en-
courage both domestic and foreign investment in agriculture36. 
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2.8.2. Policies to address illegal land grabbing 
There are some attempts by the Russian federal state to prevent illegal 
land grabbing, at least in discourse. High-ranking Russian officials have 
recently condemned illegal land grabbing and announced measures to 
prevent it. Former Minister of Agriculture Aleksei Gordeev criticised 
urban ‘raiders’ and warned of ‘wars’ over rural land. As land ‘raiding’ be-
came more frequent Gordeev advocated greater government regulation 
of land relations in order to protect the property rights of land share-
holders (Wegren 2009b). In 2011, president Medvedev condemned land 
‘raiders’ in a speech and proposed laws to limit conversion of agricultural 
land into construction land as the main tool to deal with the issue. Over-
all, there is a very little indication that the regulations by the state are 
guided by a concern for the dispossession of land held by the rural popu-
lation. Rural social movements fighting in defence of the rural dwellers’ 
land rights have not been allowed a single meeting with federal govern-
ment officials. In discussions on land governance between officials and 
academics from the FSU countries within the framework of meetings on 
the voluntary guidelines for land grabbing by FAO in Moscow (Novem-
ber 2010), of all the officials, Russian officials were least inclined to in-
troduce policies to allow free or transparent access to land registration 
for the population.  
Instead, current policies (and proposed new regulations) are largely 
oriented at keeping intact (and furthering) the concentration of land and 
the dominance of agroholdings, with more power for government land 
governance bodies (see also Wegren 2009a, b). In 2010, the Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade began working on amendments to 
the Land Code, although there is no indication as to when these might 
be considered by the Duma. Draft legislation suggested by the Ministry 
of Agriculture will: (1) give right of first refusal to large farms to lease 
reregistered land; (2) give preference to municipal and regional govern-
ments to convert unclaimed, unwanted, and abandoned land to state 
property; (3) increase fines and/or land taxes for land that is used inap-
propriately or is not used for its intended purpose; (4) create a unified 
system of state monitoring of agricultural land.  
At the moment, two main ways of controlling the land market are 
implemented. First, conversion of agricultural land into non-agricultural 
is becoming more regulated. As Anton Mitrofanov, director of the real 
estate agency Housing Strategy, stated, ‘it was relatively easy, in negotia-
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tion with the municipality and with limited expenses, to convert agricul-
tural land into another category, for instance for the construction of da-
cha complexes’ (BFM 2011: 3). Beginning in 2011 it became more com-
plicated as Federal Law (2010) N 435-FZ ‘On Amendments to Certain 
Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation with regard to improvement 
of agricultural lands’ entered into force, which contained additional re-
quirements to a transaction of the land is converted from agricultural to 
construction purposes, making such a conversion more difficult. In the 
Moscow region, where illegal land deals are particularly widespread, to 
prevent the widespread conversion of land for agricultural purposes to 
construction purposes the Federal Law No. 172-FZ ‘On the transfer of 
land or land plots from one category to another’ (2004) has been further 
elaborated. In the near future, there will be annual quotas on the sale of 
land to prevent the sale of agricultural enterprises (to agroholdings). 
However, there is a danger that such measures will only add to further 
bureaucracy and corruption, without substantially reducing illegal con-
versions.  
Second, regulations combating ineffective use of agricultural land 
have been introduced, and are more often enforced. Authorities can pe-
nalise owners for ‘ineffective use’ of agricultural land by penalties and 
even dispossession by the state of agricultural land that is not used for at 
least three years37. In 2009, several regions started to enforce the first 
part of this law. In Leningrad region, the authorities checked 170,000 ha, 
of which 10,500 ha were not properly used, thus, total penalties for these 
land plots amounted to over half a million roubles (40 roubles was about 
one euro) (BFM 2011: 2). Unfortunately, this enforcement can also be 
used to the detriment of land right holders who do not have the funds to 
‘properly use’ their allocated land, and could, therefore, be dispossessed 
by law.  
An important question, therefore, arises: namely, to what extent will 
these new laws and state policies of closer monitoring of land use (and 
penalising or even dispossessing land in case of misuse) lead to con-
straints on illegal land acquisitions? Or will they facilitate dispossession 
and further land grabbing? First of all, the attempt to address the down-
side of land grabbing through handing more power to the state encoun-
ters the problem that the local authorities are strongly in favour of large-
scale land acquisitions and are often part and parcel of the problem. It 
seems that land acquisitions are not possible without ‘friendship’ with, or 
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at least ignorance by, the government. According to Tamara Semenova 
(Krestyanskiy Front):  
[W]hen the raiders came and started buying land, they came not just off 
the street. It was by prior arrangement with the regional and district au-
thorities. Who would let the strangers do this business in the Moscow 
region!? Well, we suppose they got the possibility to do this business for 
‘otkati’38. 
If authorities were willing to address the problem, what are their 
chances of succeeding? As mentioned earlier, authorities have conducted 
legal procedures to withdraw land that is not used for over three years 
from its owners. However, in practice, it is not easy for authorities to 
succeed. In interviews with authorities in Moscow region, it was stated 
that it is very difficult for the state to win such cases, and the interview-
ees did not know of any example in the region where land was actually 
taken by the state. Sources from elsewhere in Russia confirm these 
statements (BFM 2011: 2). Due to breaches of the legal procedures, the 
state loses these disputes (BFM 2011) in court cases with rich investors 
employing highly skilled lawyers.  
Moreover, owners of agricultural land with speculative aims go to 
great lengths to circumvent above-mentioned laws. Some landowners are 
even building (partly) virtual agroholdings to accumulate low-priced agri-
cultural land for other purposes39. Vasily Boyko of JSC Vash Finansoviy 
Popechitel has created the ‘agricultural’ holding Ruzskoe Moloko (Milk 
from Ruza), which sells packaged milk. However, the pastures are empty 
as livestock is sorely lacking. It appears that the company buys milk from 
farmers in neighbouring areas, which it (re)packages to sell under its own 
brand. Another example is oligarch Nikolai Tsvetkov’s agricultural com-
pany Znak, which pretends to be a poultry farming agroholding. The 
bulk of the eggs the company ‘produces’ it actually buys from a poultry 
farm in another region and subsequently resells under its own brand.  
Thus, the law enabling confiscation of ineffectively used land so far 
does not pose a major obstacle for rich land owners, who can hire ex-
pensive lawyers and devise creative business strategies to prevent dispos-
session. At the same time, the law may form a threat for the rural popu-
lation with their small land shares’ land plots. Small-scale landowners 
who are temporarily unable to cultivate their land may easily lose their 
land as they are not able to hire lawyers to dispute confiscation of their 
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land by the state. The situation of a school director in a village in Mos-
cow region gives an indication of the uncertainty among the rural popu-
lation due to this law. The director was close to his pension, but had no 
time to work the land currently. He was afraid that the state would take 
this land, and therefore he considered hiring someone to plough the 
land, to prove that he was cultivating the land40. Proposals in the Russian 
parliament (which to date have not been accepted) to have the state con-
fiscate all land shares not yet registered (Wegren 2009a, 2011a) would 
primarily lead to dispossession of rural dwellers, instead of limiting dubi-
ous land acquisitions by outsiders. 
2.9. Conclusions 
This chapter has analysed the post-Soviet land reform, the emergence of 
domestic and foreign investors, their types and the forms of land acquisi-
tions, and the role of the state in the land grabs. Russia (and the former 
Soviet Union in general) is largely overlooked in the land grab debate, 
although the process of land grabbing is occurring there at a great pace. 
Russia is a special case in the global land grab debate. It has vast 
amounts of land reserves and therefore is attractive to domestic and for-
eign investors. Russian companies, in particular in the energy and min-
eral resources sector, are very active in land acquisitions. Interestingly 
enough, these land deals are not for biofuels production as is the case in 
other parts of the world, since Russia is blessed with ample energy re-
sources and low domestic energy prices as a consequence. The land has a 
speculative value and is meant for food production, urbanisation (con-
struction land) and building dachas (‘dachatisation’). 
Russia does not fit in the mainstream division of ‘land grabbing coun-
tries’ (oil-rich, and highly populated) versus ‘target countries’ (poor and 
land abundant). Russia is both an oil-rich country and at the same time 
one of the most land abundant countries. Also, the case of Russia con-
firms recent critiques of the idea, that land grabbing is predominantly 
carried out by foreigners. In addition, Russia does not conformably fit 
into the two main drivers of land grabs distinguished so far: food secu-
rity (by governments) or commercial motives (by companies). In fact, in 
Russia the government plays an important role in stimulating large-scale 
investments (despite some occasional rhetoric to the contrary), but not 
only with the (primary) aim of food security (at least not in the crop sec-
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tor), but also with the aim of using food export as a political tool in in-
ternational relations (cf. Visser and Spoor 2011, Wegren 2009a, b). 
Although high levels of corruption and government intervention are a 
major drawback of Russia in terms of risk for investors, there is also a 
range of features of Russia that are likely to further raise the interest of 
domestic and foreign investors in large-scale land acquisitions. The huge 
size of landholdings and farm enterprises, and related infrastructure, is 
attractive for investors. Increasingly, the land is available not only as 
large-scale land plots jointly owned in the form of hundreds of individual 
land shares, but also as ownership concentrated in the hands of farm di-
rectors, agroholdings or land brokers, although often not in accordance 
with Russian legislation. Also, foreign investors can take equity in large 
agroholdings registered on the stock exchange (Visser and Spoor 2011). 
Despite the very recent emergence of Russia as an agricultural producer 
and major grain exporter, together with Ukraine, it already has more ag-
ricultural enterprises listed at stock exchanges than the established agri-
cultural powerhouses Brazil and Argentina together. An increasingly high 
degree of ‘financialisation’ of the agribusiness sector in Russian is ob-
served, which furthermore facilitates large-scale land acquisitions or land 
grabs by global investors.  
The important question is whether this investment will be for the bet-
ter or worse. On the positive side, the agricultural sector might receive 
an additional boost when investors introduce new technology to Russian 
farm enterprises. Foreign agricultural companies might set up new busi-
ness standards in the agriculture sector in Russia. Gustav Wetterling of 
Black Earth Farming said that he ‘does not think that it would be possi-
ble without foreign investments, without foreign companies that operate 
on Russian agricultural market, to achieve these results in agribusiness’41. 
Although a foreign company like this one, controlling 330,000 ha, has an 
important impact at a district or regional level, on a countrywide scale 
the predominance of foreign investors is restricted to some sub-sectors, 
such as poultry.  
On the negative side, with growing numbers of domestic and foreign 
investors interested in agriculture, land dispossession and conflicts over 
land have risen as many (predominantly domestic) investors turned to 
illegal ways of acquiring land. While in Russia the 1990s represented the 
decade of struggle over property in industry and energy, in the first dec-
ade of the new millennium (2000–2010) attention for agriculture gradu-
Processed on: 6-9-2016
505017-L-bw-Mamanova
108 CHAPTER 2 
 
ally increased, and the second decade (2010–2020) increasingly looks like 
the decade of struggle over land. Indeed, as Barnes (2006) pointed out in 
the quotation at Subsection 2.4.1 of this chapter, in the 1990s the prop-
erty changes in agriculture still seemed underwhelming. Few investors 
from outside agribusiness (mainly domestic processors and among the 
foreign investors, former food importers to the Soviet Union) acquired 
land at that time. However, this research suggests that in quite a number 
of the illegal land grabs, farm directors, sometimes in cooperation with 
outsiders, already in the late 1990s and early 2000s paved the way for the 
land grabbing that became possible after the 2002 land law. In various 
cases, already in the 1990s meetings of shareholders and other docu-
ments were falsified to transfer land shares of the shareholders illegally 
to the charter capital of the farm enterprise (de facto to the farm direc-
tor)42. Farm managers who forged documents in the 1990s cashed in on 
these early moves in the 2000s when they could sell the land for huge 
profits, while rural dwellers were left landless without compensation. In 
summary, there is a wide range of strategies that are being used by inves-
tors and oligarchs to get land, from within the existing Russian legislative 
framework, to outright use of pressure, violence and fraud. 
It is likely that land acquisitions will proceed at a great pace in Russia. 
There is little indication that the latest laws and the increased enforce-
ment of laws limiting land conversion and ‘ineffective use’ of land will 
seriously contribute to constraining semi-legal and illegal land acquisi-
tions. In fact, they might even contribute to the reverse – namely, in-
creased dispossession of land of rural dwellers, as in the discussion on 
legalisation by Peluso and Lund (2011: 674-675). They argue that rule of 
law often legalises and legitimates the dispossession of the powerless. 
Governments and large corporations frequently ‘operate with virtual im-
punity, while weaker actor may see rights whittled away’ in the name of 
formalisation (Peluso and Lund 2011: 675). In the Russian case, there is 
an urgent need for improvement of the impartiality of courts, and the 
improvement of governance by authorities (in particular the transparency 
of deals between authorities and large-scale agroholdings). Without these 
measures and without stronger rural social movements defending the 
rights of the rural population, regulations and laws most likely will not 
reduce the risk of further land grabbing and dispossession. 
The post-Soviet land reforms actually set the stage for the land grab-
bing that is taking place now, at least de facto, in the way, they were im-
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plemented. Land basically remained under the control of the large farms 
during the reform period of the 1990s, despite the rhetoric of equal dis-
tribution of land shares. Also, part of the farm management together 
with the help of outsiders already changed legal documents to allow for 
quick accumulation of land shares, once the law ‘On Agricultural Land 
Transactions’ was introduced. 
After the approval of this law in 2002, and with the rising profitability 
of agriculture, the large farm enterprises (and the agroholdings) are also 
acquiring de jure control over land, as they increasingly take over land 
through legal and illegal practices. However, de facto control of land by 
the LFEs should predominantly be understood as effective control vis-à-
vis the rural population, whereas in relation to the state, their control re-
mains insecure and depends on cultivating good ties with authorities. 
With recently introduced and proposed legislation giving the state more 
power over land, insecurity of land for rural dwellers, but also for LFEs, 
tends to increase. Only the largest agroholdings have such a financial 
power that the power balance between them and the state remains in 
favour of the agroholdings.  
While it is shown that Russia is particular because it has huge land re-
serves, and therefore there would be a case to be made that ‘win-win’ 
land deals are possible, this availability of (unused) land thesis is under-
mined by the fact that much of the land reserve is available in areas that 
are not attractive for investors, and that where there is fertile land in 
better-endowed regions, an unequal power relations between investors 
and rural dwellers, and the weak legal framework (and enforcement of 
the law), leads often to unfair deals, dispossession and no or low com-
pensation. In that sense, Russia should be considered as a ‘normal’ case 
in the global land grab debate. 
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Notes 
 
1 Russia’s population peaked in the early 1990s (at the time of the end of the 
Soviet Union) with about 148 million people in the country. Today, it is ap-
proximately 143 million. The United States Census Bureau estimates that Rus-
sia’s population will decline from the current size to a mere 111 million by 
2050, a loss of more than 30 million people and a decrease of more than 20% 
(Rosenberg 2012). 
2 The financial crisis led to temporary problems with access to finance in Rus-
sia; however, more fundamentally it stimulated, globally as well as in Russia, a 
major shift of capital towards the agri-food sector, and the primary sector more 
broadly. 
3 The majority of interviews were conducted by N. Mamonova. In addition to 
this, the empirical analysis of this chapter was complemented with the data ob-
tained from interviews with foreign investors conducted by M. Steggerda and 
O. Visser in the autumn of 2011 and winter of 2012. Finally, the paper uses 
data from interviews with domestic and foreign investors in agriculture con-
ducted earlier by Visser in the Moscow, Rostov, Pskov and Saint Petersburg 
regions. 
4 The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) is the republic of 
the former Soviet Union, which after the collapse of the Soviet Union in De-
cember 1991 was renamed the Russian Federation. 
5 Interview conducted on 23 September 2010, Moscow. 
6 Peasant farm (or krestyansko-fermerskiye khoziaystvo) is the official Russian term for 
private family farms, but contains a contradiction in itself. While ‘peasants’ are 
self-sustained small-scale farmers, who use family labour and produce for con-
sumption, not for profit; ‘farmers’ produce for profit and often employ outside 
labour. 
7 Interview conducted on 29 September 2010, Moscow 
8 Interview conducted on 29 September 2010, Moscow. 
9 This large gap between the number of unregistered and registered land 
shares/plots indicates that there is still widespread tenure insecurity. 
10 Also, individual entrepreneurs account for about 1.5% of agricultural land. A 
small part of the land used by LFEs is still owned by the state. 
11 In 2010 the upward trend was temporary affected by the financial crisis. Ac-
cording to some estimates, the registered transactions in 2010 were almost a 
third less than during the same period before the crisis of 2008, due to prob-
lems of investors with financing land deals in context of the global financial 
crisis, which hit Russia hard. 
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12 The Russian Far East concerns the easternmost parts of Russia, between 
Lake Baikal in Eastern Siberia and the Pacific Ocean. In Russia, the region is 
usually referred to as just the ‘Far East’. 
13 Disentangling the food, fodder and biofuel functions of agricultural produc-
tion is sometimes difficult, as it consists in part of ‘flex crops’ which can be 
used for multiple purposes. 
14 In addition, a probably unexpected motivation for biofuel production is the 
following: in Ukraine biofuel production is used as a means to generate value 
from the Northern area around Chernobyl, which due to the radioactive con-
tamination can no longer be used for food and/or fodder production. 
15 However, it should be noted that by the mid-2000s the national budget for 
the first time since the mid-1990s set aside a substantial amount of subsidies for 
household plots and private farms (Wegren 2007). 
16 Interview conducted on 16 November 2011, The Netherlands.  
17 Interview conducted on 16 November 2011, The Netherlands. 
18 Interview conducted on 16 November 2011, The Netherlands. 
19 Interview conducted on 16 November 2011, The Netherlands. 
20 In addition to an indication of aging in the countryside, it is also an indication 
of the difficulties of registering land for rural dwellers. 
21 Interview conducted on 13 January 2012, Holten, the Netherlands. 
22 The mayor did not agree with starting a new investment site further away 
from the village, and as a result the investor continued to search elsewhere. The 
investor could understand the position of the local authorities and mentioned 
their care for the rural inhabitants with some appreciation. The word ‘mayor’ is 
used here following the terminology of the interviewee (Interview conducted 
on 13 January 2012, The Netherlands). 
23 It should be noted that these strategies are mainly used by domestic 
agroholdings or ones that are offshore investment funds of Russian oligarchs. 
24 Also some deals which are within the framework of the law, such as a deal 
involving a farm director selling his land shares to an outsider, may have been 
preceded by a fraud in obtaining these shares from the rural population but 
with the legal period for filing a complaint on the early fraud expired. 
25 Interview conducted on 23 September 2010, Moscow. 
26 Based on interview with Tamara Semenova, one of the leaders of the rural 
social movement Krestyanskiy Front, discussing the case of the farm enterprise 
Matveyevskoye. Interview was conducted on the 29 September 2010 in Mos-
cow, Russia. 
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27 Report of Arbitration Court of Bashkortostan Republic 2008. 
28 The information obtained during the fieldwork of Spoor and Visser in the 
Moscow region in October 2011. 
29 Dacha is a Russian word for seasonal or year-round second homes often lo-
cated in the exurbs of the country. It is estimated that about 50% of Russian 
families living in large cities have dachas. 
30 Interview conducted 29 September 2010, Moscow. 
31 Interview conducted 29 September 2010, Moscow. 
32 The name ‘Rublevka’ is derived from the name of Rublyovo-Uspenskoe 
highway. It is an unofficial name of a prestigious residential area west of Mos-
cow, Russia. 
33 Interview conducted 29 September 2010, Moscow. 
34 Examples of food policy as a political weapon in Russian international rela-
tions have been the wine ban for Georgia and the ‘milk war’ with Belarus 
(Wegren 2009a, b, 2010). 
35 This is based on observations by Visser during a seminar on investment op-
portunities in the Agribusiness of Russia and Ukraine, held in Wassenaar, The 
Netherlands, November 2010. 
36 For instance, Visser had various conversations with Dutch businessmen who 
told him that they were offered agricultural land to start a farm by various re-
gional authorities, on visits for business in other sectors. 
37 According to article 284 of the Federal Law N 136-FZ ‘Land Code of Rus-
sian Federation’ (2001). 
38 Otkati (in English, kickbacks) – a kind of bribe (money or gift) to authorities. 
Interview conducted 29 September 2010, Moscow. 
39 For more on the Soviet and post-Soviet mechanisms leading to ‘virtual pro-
duction’ see Visser and Kalb (2010), and see Lindner (2008: 133-139) for a dis-
cussion of virtual accounting within agriculture. 
40 Interview with school director, Moscow region, 14 February 2011. 
41 Interview conducted 23 September 2010, Moscow. 
42 Whereas in Moscow region farm directors often did so with the perspective 
of selling it on to outsiders, in most other regions in the 1990s rising land prices 
were not (yet) anticipated and control over LFE seemed to be the main motiva-
tion. 
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3 
State Marionettes, Phantom 
Organisations or Genuine Movements? 
The Paradoxical Emergence of Rural 
Social Movements in Post-Socialist 
Russia  
 
Abstract  
Of all the rural social movements in the world, those in post-socialist 
Russia have been considered to be among the weakest. Nevertheless, 
triggered by the neo-liberal reforms in the countryside, state attention to 
agriculture and rising land conflicts, new social movement organisations 
with a strong political orientation are emerging in Russia today. This 
sudden burst of civil activity, however, raises questions as to how genu-
ine and independent the emerging organisations are. This chapter shows 
that many rural movements, agricultural associations, farm unions and 
rural political parties lack constituency, support the status quo and/or are 
actually counterfeits (what is called here ‘phantom movement organisa-
tions’). This study aims to explain the nature of social movements in the 
post-Soviet countryside and offer an original contribution to the theory 
and practice of rural social movements.  
3.1. Introduction 
Faced with the issues of rural poverty, globalisation of food markets, 
land grabbing and other contemporary rural problems, rural people 
around the world have organised themselves in social movements in or-
der to challenge the negative effects of the neoliberal development. Land 
rights movements of Latin America and Africa, peasant organisations in 
Asia, and rural community associations and radical farmers’ groups in 
Europe, North America and Australia are working at village, regional, 
national and international levels to make sure that the voices of rural 
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people are heard at every level of decision-making (Edelman 2002, 
Woods 2008, Borras 2010). 
The Russian rural population, however, is rather passive in defending 
its own interests and is not eager to engage in collective practices of con-
testation. Rural society in Russia is traditionally seen as conservative, po-
litically apathetic and phenomenally patient and endurant (Breshko-
Breshkovskaya 2011). The Russian villagers’ reluctance to engage in 
overt collective protests is often explained by: the legacy of the pre-
revolutionary commune system in rural areas, which was based on mu-
tual support and, therefore, reduced the vulnerability of individual 
households to adverse developments (Male 1971, Atkinson 1983); 70 
years of socialism, when the expression of disagreement with govern-
mental actions was at least heavily frowned upon, with serious protest 
leading to deportation in the labour camps of the Gulag during Stalin’s 
reign or prosecution in later periods (Visser 2010); demographic charac-
teristics such as ageing and the low density of rural population1; and the 
contemporary authoritarian regime of Putin, which is able to repress, 
divide and demobilise undesired public protests. 
In such circumstances, when the rural population is unwilling to en-
gage in political actions and when there is little space for contestation, 
the significant increase in rural social movement organisations that have 
emerged in the last decade might be seen as surprising. The web searches 
and interviews that were conducted for purposes of this study indicate 
that nearly 9 out of 10 rural civil organisations, agricultural associations, 
farm unions and rural political parties were formed and registered in the 
period 2000-20122. These groups claim to protect the interests of rural 
dwellers, to fight against land grabbing and inequality in the countryside, 
and to create a favourable climate for the development of agricultural 
entrepreneurship in Russia. This sudden burst of civil activities has coin-
cided with the economic recovery in agriculture, the increase in state 
subsidies to rural development projects, the rise of agroinvestments and 
the large-scale land acquisitions. 
It is thus important to question the origins and actual aims of con-
temporary rural social movements. What is behind this sudden burst of 
civil activities, and to what extent does it reflect concerns among the ru-
ral population? Is it civil society’s reaction to neoliberal developments in 
the countryside? If so, why did these rural social movement organisa-
tions not appear after the demise of the Soviet regime in 1991, or during 
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the agrarian crisis of the post-socialist transformation period, when there 
were ‘open moments’ for political actions? Why did they only emerge in 
the early/mid-2000s? Do they truly protect the interests of their mem-
bers, are they state ‘marionettes’ or were they established for other rea-
sons? Given the tendencies in post-Soviet Russia towards the creation of 
a quasi- and/or guided civil society (Duacé 2010, Fröhlich 2012), explor-
ing the autonomy (or embeddedness) of these civil organisations and 
their real aims is essential to understanding the contemporary rural social 
movement in Russia. 
Rural social movement organisations (hereafter referred to as 
RSMOs) are defined in this study as formal, civil (non-profit) organisa-
tions, which are established by or on behalf of rural dwellers and have 
specific programmes, policies and practices, but share a common goal of 
representing the interests of the rural population at local, regional and/or 
national levels. RSMOs thus differ from the broad understanding of civil 
or social organisations, the latter of which may or may not have a func-
tion in terms of representing their members politically. 
This research is the first comprehensive study of RSMOs in post-
Soviet Russia. Previous studies on post-Soviet rural politics have focused 
on the response strategies of the rural population to the state’s agrarian 
reforms, and have prioritised informal practices, social networks and 
hidden protests over formal organisations (Humphrey 2002c, Tauger 
2005, Wegren 2005a). However, more formalised collective action 
through social organisations can provide resources and an institutional 
base to rural movements, structure mass protest, and carry the move-
ments’ values and goals during periods of low mobilisation (Zald and 
McCarthy 1987, Taylor 1989). Studies of institutionalised civil organisa-
tions in post-Soviet Russia, which have been carried out on contempo-
rary urban social movements, show the unexpected forms of collective 
action that can be discerned within the limited political opportunity 
structure3, once one goes beyond liberal and statist models of state-
society relations (Henry 2006, 2010, Kulmala 2011, Chebankova 2012, 
Fröhlich 2012). These studies demonstrate that movements (i.e. envi-
ronmental, animal rights and disability movements) often cooperate with 
the state while at the same time being able to preserve their autonomy. 
This position diverges from earlier academic work on post-Soviet social 
movements, which portrayed Russian civil society as underdeveloped 
and suppressed by an authoritarian regime (Janoski 1998, Salamon and 
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Anheier 1998, Hale 2002). This turn, from viewing civil society as a 
counterforce to the state to viewing it as a collaborator with the state, 
defines the recent changes in the studies of state-society relations in Rus-
sia and globally (Kröger 2011). 
This chapter follows the emerging understanding of state-society rela-
tions and takes the limited political opportunity structure as the starting 
point. It analyses RSMOs in the ‘Russian climate’, where civil society or-
ganisations have close relations with the state while sometimes also con-
tributing to the ‘war of position’, i.e. creating alternative institutions and 
alternative intellectual resources within the existing society (Chebankova 
2012, Fröhlich 2012). Many arguments of this chapter are built upon as-
sumptions drawn from contemporary urban social movement studies, 
therefore, it is important to acknowledge the existence of rural specifici-
ties, such as the aversion of rural dwellers to open group actions and 
highly politicised issues of land tenure in agricultural investments. 
This study questions several assumptions in the theories on social 
movements and state-society relations, and aims to provide new insight 
into rural political actions. It contributes to understanding Russian civil 
society from the angle of RSMOs and broadens our view on contentious 
civil politics in rural areas in the post-Soviet context in particular, and 
under (semi) authoritarian regimes in general. 
The next section (Section 3.2) provides an analysis of post-Soviet land 
reform and potential ‘open moments’ for collective political actions that 
appeared at the time. It is followed by the discussion on the current 
situation, which is characterised by the rise of large-scale land acquisi-
tions, agricultural investments and increased state support of agriculture 
and rural development projects. This allows understanding of the con-
text in which RSMOs have emerged. Section 3.3 is devoted to the analy-
sis of RSMOs: it provides their classification and discusses state em-
beddedness, organisational affiliations, connection with the local 
population, and the authenticity (as opposed to a counterfeit existence) 
of these organisations. Five types of RSMOs are distinguished and dis-
cussed: grassroots organisations, professionalised organisations, govern-
ment affiliates, politically oriented organisations/parties and phantom 
movements. Finally, the concluding Section 3.4 presents a discussion on 
the preliminary findings, and an outline of ideas for further analysis and 
theoretical interpretation. As such, this study aims to set an agenda for 
the study of RSMOs in Russia and the post-Soviet area at large (e.g. 
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Ukraine and Kazakhstan), one which is relevant to (semi)authoritarian 
and post-socialist contexts at a broader level. 
This chapter is largely based on qualitative data derived from in-depth 
interviews with representatives of seven RSMOs and two political agrar-
ian parties that emerged from RSMOs. The interviews were conducted in 
March 2011 in the Moscow region. In addition, this research benefits 
from interviews with local activists, local government officials and large-
scale agricultural investors conducted in the Moscow region in 2010–
2013. Data were further obtained from the websites of social movements 
and political parties, as well as from statistical sources of the Russian 
Ministry of Justice, Rosstat, and the Register of Public Organisations in 
Russia. 
3.2. Post-socialist transformations in the countryside and 
‘open moments’ for the emergence of social 
movements 
3.2.1. Land reform and the harsh transition period 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia embarked on a 
course of reforms, which Goodman (2003) has called ‘shock therapy’, 
with the ultimate goal of preventing a return to socialism. The de-
collectivisation of agriculture was pursued through the privatisation of 
collective farmland. Kolkhozy and sovkhozy (collective and state farm 
enterprises), which possessed a majority of the agricultural land in the 
Soviet era, were forced to distribute their farmland by means of share-
based certificates to their former employees. The Russian government 
conducted these reforms with the goal of creating a system of small and 
medium commercial family farms in the country. However, due to the 
absence of financial resources and extension services, the existence of 
fragmented and dysfunctional markets and institutions, and rural dwell-
ers’ unwillingness to leave the collectives, the majority of land recipients 
did not become private farmers (Wegren 2005b, Visser and Spoor 2011). 
Instead, the land became accumulated in the hands of former kol-
khoz/sovkhoz directors (or outside investors), who convinced land re-
cipients to invest their land (and property) shares in reorganised farm 
enterprises in order to preserve the integrity of large-scale production. As 
Spoor et al. (2012) argued, the land reform did not fundamentally change 
de facto land ownership. The kolkhozy and sovkhozy were transformed 
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into private large farm enterprises (LFEs), while a large part of the rural 
population continued to practice subsistence farming on their household 
plots (Pallot and Nefedova 2003, 2007, Visser 2009). Thus, the private 
family farm sector that was envisaged in the early 1990s only emerged to 
a limited extent4. 
The shift from a centralised to a market-oriented economy in the 
countryside was accompanied by price liberalisation and rising prices for 
agricultural inputs; the reduction of state support for agriculture, leading 
to the bankruptcy of many farm enterprises and growing unemployment; 
and the limitation or termination of the social functions provided by 
LFEs, which were formerly the responsibilities of kolkhozy and sovk-
hozy. All of these factors negatively affected life in rural areas. The post-
Soviet transition period in Russia, as well as in many other post-Soviet 
countries, was characterised by the ruralisation of poverty (Spoor 2013). 
The monetary income of rural residents was only 50% of urban incomes 
per capita in the late 1990s. The peak of rural poverty was in 19995, when 
73.1% of rural dwellers had incomes lower than the subsistence level 
(Independent Institute for Social Policy 2002). Many rural dwellers, es-
pecially the young people, ‘voted with their feet’ and moved to cities. 
Those who remained in the villages experienced a declining quality of life 
and increasing social problems. 
According to Gourevitch (1986), this situation should have become 
an ‘open moment’ for political actions. Gourevitch argued that crises 
could open a political system to new challenges and alternative policies, 
and create opportunities for mobilisation within a sector. Furthermore, 
the early post-Soviet period (1991–2000) was characterised by the 
democratisation of the society, expressed as strengthening freedom of 
speech and freedom of associations, which enlarged the political oppor-
tunity structure in the country. However, the civil society organisations 
that emerged during that time were largely urban, and many of them ex-
isted only on paper. Others were generally insignificant in terms of 
members (at most a few thousand people), organisationally amorphous 
or lacked clear programmes (Osokina 2009). 
An important reason for the absence of open bottom-up mobilisation 
and resistance at that time is the fact that almost every rural family pos-
sessed a household plot of 0.2 ha on average (Visser 2003, 2010). The 
production of potatoes and vegetables on these land plots guaranteed the 
survival of the rural population in times of crisis (Pallot and Nefedova 
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2007, Ries 2009). Faced with economic difficulties such as wage arrears, 
rural dwellers did not collectively protest, but resorted to their household 
plots. 
Another reason for the weak rural mobilisation is the demographic 
situation in the countryside. Nearly 20% of the rural population is older 
than 60 (Rosstat 2013b). Moreover, Russia faces a crisis of rural depopu-
lation: 22% of rural settlements have less than 10 inhabitants, and 8% of 
villages are abandoned. The average density of the rural population in 
Russia is about two people per square kilometre (Yermolayeva 2010). 
The dispersed and aged rural population in Russia is not conducive to 
mobilisation. 
Resistance did exist, but it was (and remains) mostly hidden. Nikulin 
(2003, 2010) considers villagers’ gossiping, stealing and foot-dragging to 
be forms of covert unorganised protest against LFEs. These actions fall 
into the category of ‘everyday resistance’ and ‘weapons of the weak’, as 
described by Scott (1985). However, theft at LFEs is, in many cases, bet-
ter qualified as a continuation of the Soviet principle ‘everything is col-
lective, everything is mine’ 6(Humphrey 1983, Panchenko et al. 2012), 
and is an additional source of subsistence rather than an intentional act 
of disagreement. 
The best-known rural social organisation, which emerged at that time, 
was (and is) AKKOR (Russian Association of Farmers and Agricultural 
Cooperatives). It was established top-down by an informal order of the 
Soviet Ministry of Agriculture in 1990 when the first leasehold family 
farms started to emerge (Kopoteva 2012). At that time, government sub-
sidies and credits for private family farms were allocated via AKKOR, 
which gave it a great deal of power. After the subsidies to AKKOR were 
reduced, projects on the ground to support farmers were curtailed, while 
lobbying among, and cooperating with, governmental bodies was main-
tained, if not intensified. This association will be discussed in more detail 
later in this paper. 
Another representative of the rural population during the early transi-
tion period was Agrarnaya Partiya Rossii (Agrarian Party of Russia). While 
not officially communist, it displayed many similarities with socialist ide-
ologies. Also created in a top-down manner, it did not have close links 
with the rural population and lobbied the state on behalf of large collec-
tive farms. Makarkin (2004: 1) refers to the party as ‘a collection of 
Soviet-type rural functionaries, who struggled to slow down the pace of 
Processed on: 6-9-2016
505017-L-bw-Mamanova
120 CHAPTER 3 
 
disappearance of collective agriculture’. In 2009, Agrarnaya Partiya Rossii 
merged with United Russia and terminated its activities for 3 years. It re-
emerged in 2012 as a party that represents interests of large-scale agricul-
tural business7. For a long time, these two top-down organisations were 
the only ones dealing with rural issues in Russia. 
3.2.2. Rise of interest in land and agriculture and the appearance 
of RSMOs  
The situation has changed since the early/mid-2000s – the time of the 
Putin regime and economic recovery in agriculture. The Russian gov-
ernment has turned its attention back to agriculture and revitalised the 
process of agrarian reforms, although now aimed at the development of 
large-scale industrial farming. The new Land Code (2001) aimed to mod-
ify property rights. It was followed by the adoption of the law ‘On Agri-
cultural Land Transactions’ in 2002, which legitimised land transactions. 
This marked the establishment of an open land market in Russia and the 
commodification of farmland. Spurred by instability in financial markets, 
the global food crisis, and the large supply and low cost of Russian farm-
land, many domestic and foreign8 investors became interested in Russian 
agriculture and started to acquire farmland (Visser 2016). The land rush 
was accompanied by the reinforcement of large-scale mono-crop farm-
ing and, especially in sub-urban and fertile agricultural regions, the viola-
tion of the local communities’ rights, i.e. the features that allowed Visser 
and Spoor (2011) to call this process land grabbing9. 
Many villagers lost their rights to the land plots distributed during the 
first stage of the land reform. Land grabbing was carried out through 
different schemes ranging from the purchase of land share certificates at 
a very low price from each landholder to acquiring entire collective farm 
enterprises through forging statutory documents and bribing chairmen 
and local authorities (cf. Chapter 2 on legal, semi-legal and illegal land 
deals). This land rush resulted in the enlargement of LFEs and their in-
corporation in agroholdings, which control the whole agricultural value 
chain10. 
Since the early 2000s, the state has stimulated agriculture through a 
range of instruments such as a debt-restructuring programme, the estab-
lishment of a state-financed agricultural bank, subsidised crop insurance 
programmes, simplified and lowered taxes on agriculture and subsidised 
loans for capital investment (Wegren 2007: 517). Whereas in the 1990s, 
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the state support for the agricultural sector was sharply curtailed, it has 
markedly increased under Putin (Shagaida 2012). Not only do agricultural 
businesses receive more state attention but many federal rural develop-
ment programmes were also recently launched by the Russian govern-
ment in order to improve the socio-economic situation in the villages11. 
At the same time, local governments often remain underfunded, and 
their development projects are largely dependent on corporate social re-
sponsibility initiatives of LFEs, which provide significantly less support 
for the social infrastructure than did their collective predecessors. Over-
all, however, during the Putin era, the economic and infrastructural de-
cline in many rural areas was halted and in some cases reversed. 
As a result of overall economic recovery and the inflow of private and 
state money in the countryside, the poverty rate fell to 25.4% in 2003, 
further falling to 15.4% in 2006 (O’Brien et al. 2011). An extensive study 
by O’Brien et al. (2011: 24) shows that rural dwellers have become less 
depressed and more satisfied with their incomes and their country, while 
their satisfaction with life in their village communities declined. 
Along with the socio-economic improvements in Russia, the last dec-
ade has also been characterised by the contraction of the political oppor-
tunity structure. After Putin’s rise to power in 2000, the process of de-
mocratisation that set in during the early 1990s turned into the direction 
of a ‘guided democracy’, with a growing influence of the state on the po-
litical arena. Effective opposition was curtailed in many ways. The en-
trance levels for new parties were raised, several bureaucratic hurdles 
were created and the media, having become increasingly state-controlled, 
ignored or negatively portrayed opposition forces. Out of fear for the 
penetration of Western values and financial and organisational support 
that might stimulate protests and revolts similar to the colour revolutions 
in Ukraine and Georgia, the Russian state imposed restrictions on the 
activities of foreign non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and social 
organisations with foreign funds (Ostroukh 2012). 
The constitutional ‘right to disagree’ has failed to move beyond the letter 
of the law in contemporary Russia. The state’s hostility towards criticism 
is often expressed through legal restrictions on collective action, such as 
limiting the locations available for pickets and demonstrations (Polit-
gazeta 2012). Formally, the legal system offers the population opportuni-
ties to resolve civil disputes in courts (Saxonberg and Jacobsson 2012). 
However, when the dissent is related to a highly politicised issue such as 
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land grabbing, the courts seem not to work in favour of the rural poor 
(see Chapter 2).  
The last decade has also been characterised by an increase in the 
number of RSMOs. The following analysis aims to reveal to what extent 
the appearance of new and the revitalisation of old RSMOs reflect the 
declining satisfaction of life in village communities. It examines how the 
recovery of agriculture, and limited political opportunity structures, in-
fluence the emergence of RSMOs, and what kind of relations RSMOs 
have with the state and rural population. 
3.3. Rural social movement organisations in Russia 
In mapping the current RSMOs in Russia, this study builds upon the 
categorisation of social movement organisations into (1) grassroots or-
ganisations, (2) professionalised organisations and (3) government affili-
ates, as developed by Henry (2006) in her study of the environmental 
movement in Russia. Furthermore, two additional categories were distin-
guished and included in the typology in order to capture the main types 
of actors working with rural issues. These are: (4) politically oriented or-
ganisations and (5) phantom movement organisations (see Table 3.1). 
Different groups of RSMOs are oriented toward different actors within 
the Russian political and economic environments and tend to pursue dif-
ferent varieties of civil activism. However, the adherence to a particular 
organisational type is not static: one type of RSMOs may transform into 
another over time.  
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Table 3.1 
Characteristics of organisational types within Russia’s rural social move-
ment 
 (Semi-
)institutionalised 
grassroots or-
ganisations 
Professionalised 
organisations 
Government 
affiliates 
Politically 
oriented or-
ganisations/ 
parties 
Phantom 
movement or-
ganisations 
Goals  Resolve local land 
disputes (often 
related to land 
grabbing) 
Gather groups of 
similar interests, 
informational 
support and facili-
tation of their 
activities 
Implement 
state pro-
grammes  
Political repre-
sentation of 
rural popula-
tion, however, 
often used as 
an access to 
‘Big Politics’ 
Represent the 
interests of its 
creators/ fulfil 
promises of the 
parent-
association/get 
access to par-
ticular informa-
tion or networks  
Target group Former kolkhoz’ 
and sovkhoz’ 
employees (land 
shareholders) 
Special interest 
groups (gardeners, 
ogorodniks, fish-
ers, etc.)  
Commercial 
farmers, agro-
companies, 
rural popula-
tion 
Rural and urban 
population 
Sub-groups of 
rural population 
(youth, women) 
or rural (urban) 
population in 
general/in a 
particular region  
Methods  Demonstrations, 
pickets, recourse 
to courts 
Lobbying the 
state, informa-
tional support to 
their members 
Cooperation 
with the 
state, infor-
mational sup-
port to their 
members 
Networking 
with politicians 
inside parlia-
ment 
Participation at 
conferences, 
social events 
Scope  All-Russian All-Russian All-Russian All-Russian Local/All-Russian 
Level of activ-
ism 
Active  Moderately active Active Moderately 
active 
 Focal activ-
ism/Passive 
Organisational 
affiliations 
With political 
parties (i.e. so-
cial-liberal party 
Yabloko, social-
democratic party 
Spravedlivaya 
Rossiya), and with 
other grassroots 
organisations 
Are often mem-
bers of Govern-
ment Affiliates 
With the 
United Russia, 
GONGOs 
With United 
Russia 
With local au-
thority or politi-
cal leaders /as a 
subsidiary of a 
larger social 
organisation or 
political party 
Connection to 
local popula-
tion 
Interpersonal 
connections, so-
cial networks 
Membership net-
works, not di-
rectly connected 
Governmental 
networks, not 
directly con-
nected  
Through social 
organisations, 
not directly 
connected 
Membership 
networks, not 
directly con-
nected 
Registration Yes (as social 
movement) 
Yes (as social 
organisation, pro-
fessional union) 
Yes (as social 
organisation) 
Yes (as social 
organisation, 
with further 
transformation 
to a political 
Yes (various 
forms) 
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party) 
State em-
beddedness 
Partial autonomy  Embedded Embedded Embedded Embedded in the 
state via the 
parent-
organisation 
Source of 
finance 
Sponsorship by 
private actors 
(i.e. businessmen, 
politicians), en-
trepreneurial 
activities 
Small membership 
fees, state sup-
port 
State support Entrepreneurial 
activities, spon-
sorship by pri-
vate actors (i.e. 
businessmen, 
politicians), 
membership 
fees 
Source of fi-
nance 
 Sample Krestyanskiy 
Front (Peasant 
Front), Narodniy 
Front v Zaschitu 
Russkoi Zemli 
(The Peoples 
Front of Russian 
Land Defence), 
Nasha Zemlia 
(Our Land), Sovet 
Initsiativnih 
Grupp (The Coun-
cil of the action 
teams for the 
rights of land 
shareholders) 
Soyuz Sadovodov 
Rossii (Union of 
Gardeners of Rus-
sia), Soyuz 
Arendatorov I 
Zemlepolzovateley 
(Union of Tenants 
and Land Users), 
Ob’edinenie Sado-
vodov (Union of 
Gardeners), Soyuz 
Ribolovetskih 
Kolkhozov Rossii 
(Union of Fishing 
Collective Farms 
of Russia) 
AKKOR (Rus-
sian Farmers’ 
and Agricul-
tural Coop-
eratives’ As-
sociation), 
Rossiyskoe 
Agrarnoe 
Dvizhenie RAD 
(All-Russian 
social organi-
sation Russian 
Agrarian 
Movement 
RAD), Rossiy-
skiy Zemelniy 
Soyuz (All-
Russian social 
organisation 
Russian Land 
Union) 
Agrarii Rossii 
(Agrarians of 
Russia), Sel-
skaya Rossiya 
(Rural Russia), 
Agrarnaya Par-
tiya Rossii 
(Agrarian Party 
of Russia), 
Ob’edinennaya 
Agro-
Promyshlennaya 
Partiya Rossii 
(United Agro-
Industrial Party 
of Russia), Voz-
rozhdeniye 
Agrarnoy Rossii 
(Russian agri-
cultural revival) 
Selskaya Rossiya 
(Rural Russia), 
Rossiysky Soyuz 
Selskih Zhen-
schin (Russian 
Union of Rural 
Women), Dviz-
henie Selskih 
Zhenschin Rossii 
(Movement of 
Rural Women of 
Russia), 
Molodezhnoe 
Krilo Partii 
Agrarii Rossii 
(Youth Wing of 
the party Agrari-
ans of Russia), 
Rossiyskiy Soyuz 
Selskoy 
Molodezhi (Rus-
sian Union of 
Rural Youth), 
Selskaya 
Molodezh (Rural 
Youth) 
Source: The table is developed based on the analysis of 30 RSMOs and agrarian political par-
ties operating in Russia. The data was acquired from various internet sources and in-depth 
interviews with representatives of the analysed organisations during fieldwork in 2010–2011. 
 
Table 3.1 clearly shows the embeddedness of the majority of RSMOs 
in the state. Classic social movement studies contend that movements 
have to choose between autonomy and subordination to the state (Meyer 
2004). However, more recent studies on state-society relations have 
demonstrated that movements can be more efficient if they collaborate 
with the state, while still keeping space to protest (Abers 2000, Dagnino 
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2002, Auritzer and Wampler 2004, Dagnino et al. 2006). Chebankova 
(2012) argues that civil society organisations in Russia have to choose 
close relations with the state in order to pursue their politics. The major-
ity of RSMOs are connected to the presidential party Edinaya Rossiya 
(United Russia). This connection guarantees access to necessary re-
sources for RSMOs’ operations (the possibility to raise funds and par-
ticipate in state rural development programmes, and informational sup-
port), as well political space for their activities. Vasily Vershinin, one of 
the leaders of Partiya Vozrozhdeniya Sela (Party of Village Renaissance), 
calls the state-RSMOs relations ‘a system of the “trough”‘. He asserted 
that, 
Where the trough is, there are those members. When the CPSU [the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union] was in power, they were next to 
that party. Then we had a party called Choice of Russia, then Our Home 
– Russia, then something else, and then United Russia... And this entire 
crowd has been running from one party to another. Their integrity, their 
political orientation is worth nothing. Where the ‘trough’ is, there is a 
possibility of grabbing. Thus, they all are there12. 
The convergence of the state with RSMOs is often mutual: social or-
ganisations gain resources and access; the state gains a firm control and 
the possibility to use civil society as an instrument to improve state gov-
ernance (Richter 2009: 42). 
The popular expression of a Costa-Rican movement leader that ‘there 
are two ways to kill an organisation, with repression or with money’, 
used by Edelman (1999: 165) in his book Peasants against globalisation, 
is also applicable to the Russian case. Along with legitimate control, the 
state sponsors the social activities of the majority of RSMOs. Further-
more, the state establishes state-financed social organisations such as 
government-operated nongovernmental organisations (GONGOs), 
which, in fact, are an extension of the state apparatus. Many RSMOs 
have representatives in GONGOs. 
There are other areas from which RSMOs can gain financial resources 
(such as entrepreneurial activities, donations, membership fees); how-
ever, they often generate insignificant revenues, thus limiting the scope 
of organisational activities. RSMOs’ dependence on domestic donors 
leads to embeddedness with domestic elites, whose interests do not al-
ways reflect the interests of the rural population. 
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While various other Russian social movement organisations (envi-
ronmental movements, for example) joined the global network of 
movements and transnational organisations in the 1990s, making them 
part of the larger global process (Henry 2006, 2010, Tysiachniouk 2010), 
RSMOs in Russia remain isolated from transnational movements13. In 
the past few years of the Putin regime, cooperation with international 
donors and foreign NGOs has been increasingly limited by the state’s 
protectionist policy; therefore, an inflow of foreign concepts such as 
food sovereignty and the idealisation of the ‘peasant way of life’ as pro-
moted by, for instance, Western or Latin American rural movements, is 
nearly absent in Russian rural social settings. 
It is remarkable that the connection between RSMOs and the rural 
population is often vague. The closest relations with rural dwellers are 
seen in the case of (semi-) institutionalised grassroots organisations, 
which mobilise people for collective action. Others have only indirect 
ties with the rural population (through local authority offices and infor-
mational support centres in rural areas), or no ties at all. 
The following subsections examine typical representatives of gov-
ernment affiliates, grassroots organisations, politically oriented organisa-
tions and phantom movement organisations. Professionalised organisa-
tions are not discussed separately because they are often embedded in 
other institutionalised organisations and have a tendency to fall into the 
category of phantom movement organisations. 
3.3.1. Government affiliates 
The typical representative of government affiliates is AKKOR. This or-
ganisation was already mentioned in this chapter. The state-
embeddedness of this organisation can be observed throughout its his-
tory. It was established in 1990 by an informal order of the Soviet Minis-
try of Agriculture, for purposes of government subsidies and credit allo-
cation for emerging private family farms. Later, when the state support 
to farmers was curtailed, AKKOR intensified lobbying among, and co-
operating with, governmental bodies.  
AKKOR participated in the Duma elections with different blocks 
(depending on what was the leading party at that time: in 1993 with 
Choice of Russia, in 1994 with Our Home – Russia and in 2010 with 
United Russia in developing the party’s programme). The words of Ver-
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shinin, quoted above, are suitable: ‘this entire crowd has been running 
from one party to another. Their integrity, their political orientation is 
worth nothing. Where the “trough” is, there is a possibility of grabbing...’ 
Representatives of AKKOR, however, insist that this state-
embeddedness helps ‘the Association to lobby more effectively [for] 
farmers’ interests, to make amendments to laws and to achieve accep-
tance of the important decisions for [the] peasantry in Russian regions’ 
(Kopoteva 2012: 47). Indeed, AKKOR developed and lobbied for the 
inclusion of the Russkiy Fermer (Russian farmer) programme in United 
Russia’s political agenda in 2010. AKKOR’s active participation in gov-
ernment meetings drew the authorities’ attention to the problems of 
small-scale farming, which led to the initiation of several state pro-
grammes oriented towards rural development (AKKOR 2013). 
However, small-scale farmers themselves have experienced a decline 
of support from AKKOR. In 2010, farmers of the Altai region appealed 
to president Medvedev in an open letter, complaining that AKKOR did 
not fulfil its direct task of protecting their interests (Regnun Novosti 
2010). Alexander, a farmer from the Deulino village in the Moscow re-
gion, said in an interview about the help of AKKOR: 
In order to help farmers, there is a need to be politically independent and 
unbiased and to have the courage to say a word against Putin’s govern-
ment. And they [AKKOR] do not have this, unfortunately14. 
Indeed, there is no any indication that AKKOR voiced views differ-
ent from the official United Russia and Kremlin line (cf. Kopoteva 
2012). The state-embeddedness of AKKOR is also indicated by an inter-
view with Tamara Semenova, one of the leaders of the social movement 
Krestyanskiy Front: 
I think AKKOR has somehow moved away from people... private farm-
ers and rural population in general... AKKOR went into the officialdom, 
like all those agrarian parties, which had been created and created and 
dissolved in United Russia15.  
Although the state-embedding gives the organisation an opportunity 
to pursue its activities, it decreases its autonomy and creates a gap be-
tween it and the rural population. The Russian state incorporates many 
RSMOs in order to create ‘state marionettes’ that support the current 
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national agricultural and rural development policy, thus reinforcing state 
power. 
3.3.2. Grassroots organisations 
The prominent representative of grassroots social movement organisa-
tions is the interregional social movement Krestyanskiy Front (Peasant 
Front). It is the antithesis of government affiliates in terms of organisa-
tion and approach to state-society relations. Whereas the majority of 
state-embedded social organisations are established top-down, Krestyan-
skiy Front emerged from the village level. Starting with the cooperation 
of several rural dwellers deprived of their land shares in 2005, Krestyan-
skiy Front had close to 25,000 members in 2010. It aimed to defend the 
rights of former collective farm workers and other small landowners, 
who lost their lands due to illegal/semi-legal land acquisitions. 
The Front’s leaders asserted their claims through approved channels 
and used the regime’s policies and legitimating myths to justify their defi-
ance. As a partly institutionalised form of contention, the Russian anti-
land-grab social movement organised public events such as meetings, 
pickets and rallies within the legal framework. Through these events, it 
drew the attention of federal, regional and local authorities to the dispos-
session of rural dwellers and their property rights violations as a result of 
land grabbing. Krestyanskiy Front represented its members in courts and 
fought against land raiders by demonstrating in front of their offices and 
requesting statutory documents and public explanations. Due to the ef-
forts of Krestyanskiy Front, hundreds of rural dwellers have been com-
pensated for lost land plots. 
Tamara Semenova, vice-chairman of Krestyanskiy Front, described 
her personal story of fighting land grabbing: 
In the Soviet period our farm enterprise was called sovkhoz Gorki-2; 
now it is Agrocomplex Gorki-2, Ltd. It is located on the most expensive 
land in the Moscow region – Rublevka, Zhukovka, Kolchuga, and Raz-
dory. These days many oligarchs and nouveaux riches have houses there. 
Our director, a former chairman of sovkhoz, called us [employees who 
were also land and property holders of the enterprise] for a meeting in 
1998. He said that there was an investor who wanted to invest in Gorki-
2 on the condition that we all invest our shares into the farm enterprise. 
He promised a beautiful future for us and our children. We used to be-
lieve our chairman. However, the will of the shareholders was not regis-
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tered as required by law. Some of us did not have land-share certificates 
at that time yet! [...] Nevertheless, the investor acquired our sovkhoz. 
[…] They [investor in cooperation with the chairman] secretly organised 
an additional issue of shares, which were bought by the investor. We did 
not know about that. They forged a number of corporate documents and 
got full control over Gorki-2 and its lands. Since 2002, they launched 
bankruptcy proceedings. As a result, agricultural activities were termi-
nated, we were fired, and the largest part of the land of Gorki-2 was built 
up with cottages. [...] For 5.5 years, we fought for the restitution of our 
land rights. I was the leader of the group of 600 deprived shareholders of 
Gorki-2. It was a difficult fight. During that time I was threatened, 
chased; they tried to give me a bribe. [...] First, we launched pickets, 
demonstrations in front of local, regional and federal authorities, wrote 
petitions to the prosecutor’s office, and applied to courts. Authorities 
knew our problem, but did nothing. [...] Courts passed sentences over 
and over again not in our favour, although we had documents confirm-
ing that it was an illegal acquisition. [...] Then, we found a weak point: 
Rublevka is the street where many politicians drive daily. For two years, 
we almost did not leave this street. We stood with placards along 
Rublevka for 2 years 3 days a week from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. And we kept 
writing to courts and prosecutors. [...] We received compensation for our 
lands in 200816. 
The contentious politics of Krestyanskiy Front somewhat resembles 
the ‘rightful resistance’ in the Chinese countryside, described by O’Brien 
(1996). However, in contrast with Chinese social movements, Russian 
legitimate protest is more limited. Under the Chinese regime’s dominant 
(socialist) ideology, appealing to higher authorities when lower authori-
ties misbehave can be an effective strategy. In contemporary Russia, ap-
plying to higher authorities is mostly to no avail. It is only occasionally 
successful, when combined with strong media attention and collective 
action. 
Some actors in other social organisations and authorities were critical 
of Krestyanskiy Front’s methods. In the majority of land disputes, 
Krestyanskiy Front demanded financial compensation for its members, 
not a restitution of their land rights on the disputed territories. Accord-
ing to a statement by Vasily Vershinin, one of the leaders of Partiya Voz-
rozhdeniya Sela, Krestyanskiy Front’s staff got a certain share from the 
financial compensations their members received. This raises concerns 
over the motives of the Front’s operations and its choice of particular 
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sites of land disputes. Valeriy Sarbash, head of the Department of Agri-
culture and Food Industry of the Dmitrov district in the Moscow region, 
who has worked with Krestyanskiy Front, criticised its ‘commercialisa-
tion’: 
I do not respect this organisation because Krestyanskiy Front pursues its 
own interests. I already understood this last year. They were here [in the 
Dmitrov district]. They tried to organise something... But those farmers 
and rural residents who have problems with their land shares, they real-
ised that it is better not to work with Krestyanskiy Front. The land issues 
cannot be solved in one day. It is better to work with authorities. The 
Front, you know, has a speculative attitude to these issues17. 
It is not surprising that representatives of the state disliked Krestyan-
skiy Front’s approach of mobilising rural dwellers. The dispossession of 
small-scale landholders is a process in which the state is seldom free of 
blame, with authorities either doing next to nothing to prevent it or se-
cretly partaking in the process themselves (there being strong sugges-
tions to the latter). However, it should be stated that in the case of this 
particular district, there are no indications of an involvement of authori-
ties to the detriment of rural dwellers. The critiques of Krestyanskiy 
Front by other actors must be understood in the Russian context, in 
which people tend to distrust any political action and tend to assume 
hidden self-interests behind every form of collective action (Shevchenko 
2008). 
The money earned by the Front leaders was used to provide services 
to its members (hiring lawyers to represent rural dwellers in courts, pro-
viding free consultancy services to deprived land holders, maintaining 
organisational structure, organising pickets and demonstrations, etc.) and 
guaranteed its independence from donors and sponsors. According to 
McCarthy and Zald (2001: 533), social movements need to generate fi-
nancial resources to be ‘effective, because dissent and grievances alone 
will not generate social change’. For instance, Brazil’s Landless Rural 
Workers’ Movement (MST) actively campaigned to get its representa-
tives elected in senatorial positions in different states and asked these 
senators for sponsorship (Vergara-Camus 2009). As long as the genera-
tion of financial resources does not become the major goal of the 
movement, it should not be seen as a contradiction to its goals. How-
ever, resource mobilisation could shape the choice of the movement’s 
methods, which might influence the outcome. Thus, by asking for 
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money, instead of land, as compensation for their members, Krestyan-
skiy Front did not fight depeasantisation in terms of land ownership, 
which contradicted its goal of preserving the Russian peasantry. 
Nevertheless, Krestyanskiy Front can be considered a successful 
movement. It managed to receive compensation for deprived land-share 
holders, who were predominantly pensioners willing to sell and did not 
intend to cultivate land themselves. In comparison with Ukraine, where 
land dispossession of rural dwellers is similar to Russian cases but practi-
cally without overt resistance (Chapter 5), the Russian villagers partici-
pated in open contentious politics, organised by the leaders of Krestyan-
skiy Front. Of course, on one hand, this civil engagement could be 
considered opportunistic rational behaviour as described by Popkin 
(1979), where the financial compensation for land plots represents the 
incentive that stimulates Russian rural dwellers to act in a group-oriented 
way. However, the appearance of overt organised resistance in Russia 
could also be perceived as an indication of emerging political conscious-
ness among villagers. 
Since its foundation, Krestyanskiy Front underwent several bouts of 
reorganisations and changes in its top management. The increase in the 
Front’s power, and its support from the rural population, influenced the 
transformation of its goals from the restitution of land rights of former 
workers of specific farm enterprises on a case-by-case basis, to demands 
for dismissing district and regional authorities and redirection of Russian 
agrarian politics in favour of small-scale farm producers (Mamonova 
2014). However, since peasants’ demands for financial compensation for 
their lost land plots were met, the desire of the Front’s members to par-
ticipate in contentious politics dropped dramatically, and other goals 
were never reached. Feeling unable to establish goals that would inspire 
rural dwellers to further actions, the leadership of Krestyanskiy Front 
decided to dissolve the organisation in 2013. 
3.3.3. Political parties 
One might expect that an increasingly contained political opportunity 
structure in Russia would lead to more apolitical methods of RSMO 
campaigning, which can be observed in the case of some environmental, 
disability or animal rights movements (Henry 2006, 2010, Chebankova 
2012, Kulmala 2011, Fröhlich 2012). The RSMOs, however, are actually 
becoming more politicised, as a number of these organisations have set a 
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goal to transform into a political party. Our analysis of the political ori-
entation of RSMOs suggests that this is not a by-product of successful 
mobilisation, as Walder (2009) states, but the initial goal of many 
RSMOs in Russia. 
This trend can be seen as a shift to the ‘new game’, first discussed by 
Henry (2006) in her study of environmental social movement in Russia. 
Civil organisations have accepted their failure to change the current 
situation by acting as apolitical associations. Instead, they create alterna-
tive political forces critical of the current political regime, in order to 
‘change the rules of the game themselves, […] something only possible 
from inside the political process’ (Henry 2006: 120). Many RSMO lead-
ers are of the same opinion. Mikhail Varaksin, a member of the associa-
tion/political party Selskaya Rossiya (Rural Russia), stated: 
A social movement or association cannot sufficiently protect the inter-
ests of the rural population. It does not have enough force to unite sup-
porters around it; furthermore, it cannot use legislative measures to 
change the situation. A political party can do this. The party on behalf of 
rural residents can create laws that reflect the interests of rural citizens18. 
Social movements with a political orientation predominantly target 
the state in their claims (McAdam et al. 2003). However, politically ori-
ented Russian RSMOs tend to fall into state embeddedness, and avoid 
politically sensitive issues such as land grabbing. 
Since the dissolution of Agrarnaya Partiya Rossii after its merger with 
United Russia in 2009, its niche in politics became available. Many politi-
cal parties set out to occupy this niche. Some of them built coalitions 
with RSMOs. For example, the liberal party Yabloko (Apple) was in-
volved in public demonstrations for the rights of rural dwellers, organ-
ised by Krestyanskiy Front. However, the description of Yabloko’s par-
ticipation by Tamara Semenova suggests that its involvement was rather 
pragmatic. Leaders from Yabloko gave speeches at public meetings with 
clear visibility, but did not commit to more sustained cooperation19. The 
leader of the political party Volia (Will), Svetlana Peunova, commented 
on the attention of political parties for the rural population: 
Public support is important to political parties registered in the Russian 
Federation only during the elections. In reality, none of them is con-
cerned about the problems of the rural population20. 
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The interest in political representation of the rural population is ex-
pressed by many social organisations. During the late 2000s, a number of 
RSMOs attempted to transform into political parties. Agrarii Rossii 
(Agrarians of Russia) and Selskaya Rossiya (Rural Russia) were among 
those which managed to do this. 
The history of the social organisation Selskaya Rossiya began in 2009. 
It was established by Sergey Shugayev, a lawyer and one of the leaders of 
Krestyanskiy Front who left the Front after its brief union with the social 
movement Nasha Zemlia (Our Land). In 2007, Krestyanskiy Front and 
Nasha Zemlia made an attempt to unite, but the union fell apart after the 
unsuccessful attempt of Krestyanskiy Front to transform into a political 
party. It is worthy to note that the leader of Nasha Zemlia, Dmitry 
Larionov, criticised Krestyanskiy Front for its political ideas: 
Nasha Zemlia believes that the decision of transforming Krestyanskiy 
Front into a political party is premature, opportunistic and does not 
match the current state of civil society in Russia21. 
In 2008, Krestyanskiy Front attempted to form a political party, but 
failed when it did not receive the required number of signatures, and lost 
the support of Nasha Zemlia, which was its main partner in this endeav-
our. One year later, Larionov became a co-founder of the social move-
ment Selskaya Rossiya, which later was transformed into a political party.  
This example demonstrates the inability of Russian RSMOs to form 
coalitions, which decreases the power of the social movement and 
shrinks the political opportunity structure, according to Tarrow (1998a, 
1998b). Henry (2006, 101, 107) explains the difficulties of coalition 
building between social organisations in Russia by arguing that their 
leaders, instead of searching for a consensus, prefer to spin off and es-
tablish movements/political parties that fit their personal political ambi-
tions. This can explain the large number of RSMOs that never passed 
the stage of ‘phantom movements’, a trend that will be discussed in the 
next subsection. 
The analysis of Selskaya Rossiya’s activities reveals that this organisa-
tion resembles an interest group22 more than a political party. Its mem-
bership consists of entrepreneurs operating in the Russian agricultural 
sector. The party acted as a mediator between producers, traders and 
consumers of agricultural products. Businessman Mikhail Varaksin, for 
example, head of the party’s Moscow region office, joined the party in 
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search of new distribution channels and new business partnerships for 
his agricultural company: ‘through the membership in the party, I found 
new regional contacts for the supply of my products’23. Revenue from 
entrepreneurial activities and personal contributions of its leaders cov-
ered the expenses of the party. 
Since the re-emergence of Agrarnaya Partiya Rossii in 2012, Selskaya 
Rossiya has suspended its activities. Its leaders either joined Agrarnaya 
Partiya Rossii, which provided more support to agricultural business, or 
became members of other RSMOs. For example, the chairman of Sel-
skaya Rossiya Dmitry Larionov became a member of the Ural-Siberian 
National Assembly, which was active in developing the state-supported 
rural project ‘New Village – New Civilisation’ in 2012–2013. The politi-
cal party Selskaya Rossiya did not cease to exist, but rather became a 
‘phantom movement’, which will be discussed in the next subsection. 
Agrarii Rossii is another RSMO, which has transformed into a political 
party. It was established in 2002 by political activists and former mem-
bers of Agrarnaya Partiya Rossii who did not agree with the take-over by 
United Russia. Initially, Agrarii Rossii focused on the rural population, 
relied on donations from its leaders and other interested parties, had a 
socialist ideology and openly disagreed with the politics of United Russia. 
Therefore, its activities were limited by political, legal and economic con-
straints. In 2011, while this RSMO was being transformed into a political 
party, one of its leaders, Vasily Vershinin, commented on their chances 
to get into politics: 
The chance is very small. I give it a three to five percent chance that we 
will be able to register as a party. They [United Russia] will not let us. 
These days we have parties that are not what people want. That is all 
about the current government: if they allow it or not...24 
The Putin government did not allow this leftist party to enter Russian 
political circles. Agrarii Rossii had to change its political orientation from 
socialist to pro-United Russia, and the slogan ‘Vote for Putin!’ was 
adopted during the 2012 presidential elections (Agrarii Rossii 2012). A 
few months later, Agrarii Rossii was renamed Partiya Vozrozhdeniya Sela 
(Party of Village Renaissance) and was officially registered as a political 
party in 2013. The party leader, Alexander Zaveryukha, repeatedly 
stressed the non-oppositionist origin of Partiya Vozrozhdeniya Sela: ‘it is 
not an opposition, […] it is created in order to fulfil the orders of the 
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government and the president’ (Anticompromat 2013). Although the 
party received the green light from the Putin government at the expense 
of its autonomy, it did not manage to attract enough regional supporters 
to participate in Russian Election Day 201325. 
The political activities of many contemporary RSMOs have little in 
common with setting the ‘new game’, suggested by Henry (2006). Even 
if RSMOs were initially aimed at creating alternative political forces criti-
cal of the political regime, they often failed under the pressure of the 
Russian government. As a result, RSMOs remain apolitical, while those 
who enter the political circles become ‘state marionettes’ who uncondi-
tionally follow the instructions of the ruling party and do not represent a 
political force that can make actual changes. 
3.3.4. Phantom movement organisations 
Phantom movement organisations are to be understood here as non-
transparent, occasionally (at most) active social organisations that pursue 
goals often different from the ones officially declared – in particular, 
pursuing the aims of umbrella organisations and/or the leaders’ personal 
aims instead of defending the interests of their declared constituencies. 
These movements have similarities with Latin-American ambivalent or-
ganisations studied by Junge (2012) and Edelman (1999). 
The appearance of ‘shadow pseudopublics’, described by Junge in his 
study of grassroots communities and NGOs in Brazil, can also character-
ise the Russian case. Junge (2012: 407) argued that ‘the changing rela-
tionship between state, private sector, and civil society has contributed to 
the destabilisation of the narrative of active citizenship hegemony in ear-
lier years, implanting a market-oriented, individualistic ethos in its place’. 
Junge’s concept of ‘shadow pseudopublics’, i.e. civil organisations acting 
as fronts for a ‘secretive, undemocratic, and non-transparent source of 
power’ (407) can be applicable to some RSMOs in Russia. 
The opaque nature of many Russian RSMOs leads in some cases to 
their use as an umbrella for ‘tertiary’ goals. The scandal around the land 
of the Borodinskoe Pole Museum-Reserve in the Borodino village, Moz-
haysk district, received wide publicity in 2010–2012. The reason for this 
was not only that 11,000 hectares of historical land were partly illegally 
converted into construction sites26, but also the fact that Valeriy My-
aukin, head of the Public Council for the Conservation of Historical and 
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Cultural Heritage of the Mozhaisk district, was the one who organised 
the illegal construction. The director of the museum, Alexander Gor-
bunov, who has been fighting against the acquisition of the museum’s 
lands, said the following regarding Myaukin’s organisation: 
the Public Council exists only on paper and its head, Myaukin, uses the 
council’s networks and credentials to transform the Borodino lands into 
cottage construction27. 
Apart from leading this Public Council, Valeriy Myaukin is also an 
agro-businessman, chairman of the agricultural committee of the Moz-
haysk district, and a member of United Russia. His contacts with power-
holders and his access to information about the museum’s landholdings 
made him a very strategically positioned person to pursue land grabbing 
on the territory of the Borodino museum. 
Remarkably, when several criminal cases were launched against the il-
legal constructions on Borodino lands in 2013, Myaukin did not appear 
in any of them. The head of the local administration, Maya Skluyeva, was 
imprisoned for 5 years for machinations regarding the historical lands. 
According to Sergey Kuznets, the head of the social movement Komitet po 
Naslediyu (Committee on Heritage) in the Sergiev-Posad district,  
The imprisonment of Skluyeva was just a farce. They needed to find the 
‘scapegoat’ in order to calm down the society. Skluyeva was, of course, 
engaged in this fraud, but there were much larger fish...28 
Phantom movement organisations appear in an authoritarian regime 
as a by-product of political party formation. Russian politicians used to 
create RSMOs because they were not able to meet the conditions of the 
Ministry of Justice on the minimum number of members requested for 
political party registration (Kommersant 2011). Since 2012, the proce-
dure of a party registration was officially simplified29. However, as it was 
observed based on the example of Agrarii Rossii, the actual decision of 
allowing one or another group into the country’s politics rests with the 
Putin government. Those RSMOs that do not want to become state 
marionettes, suffer the fate of becoming phantom movements. 
Many phantom movement organisations were active RSMOs 
previously, but have reduced their activities for one reason or another. 
Their inactive (sleeping) mode might be similar to the languid existence 
of ‘imagined organisations’, analysed by Edelman (1999). Edelman de-
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scribes examples in Costa Rica less critically than Junge with his concept 
of ‘shadow pseudopublics’; however, the idea of the ambiguity and am-
bivalence is similar. According to Edelman (1999: 5), imagined organisa-
tions exist primarily in the minds of their leadership and donors, and can 
‘undergo metamorphoses that lead to their re-emergence and reinsertion 
in a vital and genuine political practice’. Selskaya Rossiya, which has re-
cently suspended its activities, was mentioned in the previous subsection. 
Recently, its leaders have changed their priorities and joined other active 
organisations, while keeping Selskaya Rossiya registered in the State Reg-
istry, apparently as a backup option for the future, in case they will need 
to engage in rural politics again. 
Phantom movement organisations might be subsidiaries of other 
RSMOs, which are used to provide evidence of the accomplishment of 
proclaimed goals. For example, AKKOR argued for the protecting the 
rights of agrarian women, and thus established Dvizhenie Selskih Zhenschin 
Rossii (Movement of Rural Women of Russia). Using the financial 
sources of its parent organisation, the movement does not go further 
than participating in conferences, mainly organised by AKKOR. 
The existence of various phantom movement organisations in Russia 
demonstrates that the current political regime does not allow sufficient 
space for civil and political activism. State control over civil society or-
ganisations generally leads to the stagnation of local initiatives, and the 
emergence of pseudo-organisations run by powerful elites. 
3.4. Conclusions 
This chapter has addressed the question of why rural social movement 
organisations (RSMOs) in Russia have been so weak. From narrow, lib-
eral and statist views of state-society relations, it is tempting to see the 
(increasingly) repressive regime as the overarching determinant. How-
ever, on closer inspection, this cannot be the sole, overarching argument, 
for various reasons. If we look more closely at the periodisation of the 
emergence of social movements in Russia, we see that the early post-
Soviet period, which was characterised by the democratisation of society 
and deep rural poverty, did not generate significant ‘open moments’ for 
political group actions, as some expected (Gourevitch 1986). Only a few, 
rather top-down, civil society organisations dealt with rural issues at that 
time. The continued dependence of rural dwellers on their subsidiary 
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household plots and the demographics of rural society were discussed in 
this chapter among the factors that muted the potential for collective 
political action. 
Contrary to the calm of the early post-Soviet period, the emergence 
of RSMOs occurred in the last decade, when the political space for con-
testations became heavily constrained by the Putin government. 
This chapter explains the recent burst of RSMOs, both phantom and 
real, by the growing insecurity that villagers confront regarding their land 
rights, along with booming land investment and land speculation by Rus-
sian elites. This argument is in line with the deprivation thesis. Moreover, 
the mobilisation of rural dwellers over a bread-and-butter issue such as 
defending their land (and property) rights is easier in Russia than gener-
ating support among the population for more abstract issues such as 
food sovereignty, food imports, environmental protection, organic farm-
ing or a peasant lifestyle, which have been the basis for mobilisation of 
rural dwellers in other countries (e.g. Evans 2012). 
Second, the state’s attention to agriculture has increased (although it is 
still at a low level). During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the countryside 
more or less disappeared from the political agenda, as reflected for in-
stance by the disappearance of the Agrarian Party. Since Putin came to 
power, political attention has started to rise, spurred by the increased 
economic importance of the sector. With the growing economic impor-
tance of agriculture, the state has had an incentive to become more in-
volved in influencing, and/or establishing, RSMOs as a way to control 
rural society. 
Third, from an interest groups perspective, an important factor is 
that, with the recovery of agriculture and state subsidies and private 
money entering the sector, it has become more attractive for different 
actors to establish (or join) RSMOs in order to receive benefits from ag-
ricultural and rural development projects and emerging businesses. The 
appearance of numerous phantom movement organisations and politi-
cally oriented RSMOs is rather difficult to explain, whether starting from 
their constituency’s needs or from the stated aims in the organisations’ 
statutes. However, the rise of RSMOs becomes less paradoxical once 
one approaches it from the angle of the narrow personal interests of 
their leadership. 
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The next major question this paper dealt with was the character of 
RSMOs in Russia and how genuine they are. Are they state marionettes, 
counterfeits or genuine movements? This question of authenticity 
touches upon several dimensions: their constituency (the link with the 
population), the degree of their independence (the relation with the 
state), and actual performance (the execution of their statutory objectives 
or other, hidden goals). 
In answering these questions, it was necessary to distinguish between 
various types of RSMOs. As revealed in this chapter, there is a wide di-
versity of RSMOs (government affiliates, professionalised movements, 
politically oriented organisations, phantom organisations and grassroots 
movements), with a rather limited cooperation between them. The grass-
roots RSMOs are characterised by the highest autonomy from the state 
and the closest ties with the rural population. The bottom-up emergence 
of these RSMOs, and the bread-and-butter issues they are dealing with, 
allow them to mobilise villagers for open collective protest (against land 
grabbing, as in the case of Krestyanskiy Front). At the same time, the 
relative independence from the state restricts political space for their 
activities, and limits their access to necessary resources (fund raising pos-
sibilities, participation in state rural development programmes, informa-
tional support). Therefore, these RSMOs have to search for alternative 
ways to mobilise resources. The issue of raising money for RSMOs’ ac-
tivities is very sensitive in a Russian context in which people tend to dis-
trust any political action and assume hidden self-interests behind every 
form of collective action30. The grassroots RSMOs often act within the 
legal framework. They innovatively use laws, policies and other officially 
promoted values to defend the rights of their members and attack dis-
loyal authorities and elites. In this sense, there is some resemblance to 
the Chinese ‘legitimate protest’ as conceptualised by O’Brien (1996). 
However, the political opportunity structure in Russia is more restricted 
than in rural China. The understanding of protest in Russia and, more 
broadly, post-socialist and (semi-)authoritarian settings, would benefit 
from future research on how a protest in these contexts resembles and 
deviates from ‘legitimate protest’31. 
On the other end of the spectrum are the phantom movement or-
ganisations (the opposite of grassroots RSMOs in terms of activeness) 
and state-oriented RSMOs such as the politically oriented organisations, 
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professional organisations and, of course, government affiliates (opposite 
to grassroots RSMOs in terms of independence). 
The existence of phantom movement organisations in Russia reflects 
the state policy of constraining the room for civil and political action. 
State control leads to stagnation or shadowing in many local initiatives, 
and the appearance of pseudo-organisations set up by powerful elites. 
According to Edelman (1999: 5), despite the ambiguity and ambivalence 
of imagined organisations, they might be characterised by ‘the deepest 
and most selfless commitments to fundamental change and the greatest 
capacities for envisioning creative solutions to profound development 
dilemmas’. So far, there is little evidence that phantom movements are 
able to generate such creative solutions. 
It might be tempting to see grassroots RSMOs as the only genuine 
movements, but according to some Russian scholars (e.g. Vorobjev 
2009), the more state-oriented organisations correspond more with the 
population’s ideas on civil society; they should, therefore, certainly be 
classified as part of civil society, and perhaps even be seen as the genuine 
movements in Russia. This study does not take sides here, but instead 
argue that there is no one genuine type of movement/organisation. 
Moreover, it is important not to discard movements with strong state 
embeddedness too quickly as co-opted. Recent studies on Russian 
movements (Abers 2000, Dagnino 2002, Henderson 2011) have argued 
that social movement organisations can be more efficient if they collabo-
rate with the state, while keeping space to protest. Those RSMOs which 
are close to the state are able to lobby for the interests of their members 
and gain necessary resources for their activities (as in the case of 
AKKOR). However, this chapter did not reveal a significant struggle of 
the state-embedded organisations to represent the interests of rural 
dwellers outside the state-legalised spaces. Any attempts to oppose the 
state openly and directly have been suppressed until now (as in the case 
of Agrarii Rossii). This brings to mind the formation of ‘state mario-
nettes’. 
Perhaps more productive than applying such labels as ‘state mario-
nettes’ would be to attempt to analyse why these state-embedded 
RSMOs have not engaged in social and political struggles32. With the 
emergence of the RSMOs being such a new phenomenon, and as this 
contribution is the first study on the topic, this chapter can only indicate 
a few factors that play a role and require further investigation. The first 
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reason seems to be the power (or rather the lack of it) of the rural popu-
lation in society. During the past few years, protests in large cities have 
grown in number (Evans 2012). The government tries to channel such 
discontent into arenas it can control to some extent. To give such initia-
tives legitimacy and attractiveness, the regime has to provide some room 
for voicing alternative views. With the rural population generally less 
economically significant, less politically engaged and more supportive of 
the regime, the government would feel less of a need to give leeway to 
such organisations. Second, RSMOs are rather young (with the exception 
of AKKOR) and, therefore, they might yet find the room to voice dis-
content and strategies of operation. 
Whatever the exact reason for the strong state-embeddedness and 
lack of independence of RSMOs, these organisations pay a high price for 
it. The state affiliates experience a rupture in the already-precarious rela-
tions with the rural population (most aptly illustrated by the case of 
AKKOR). The tendency of state affiliates to drift away from their con-
stituency and the existence of phantom movement organisations are 
likely to reinforce beliefs among the population that social movement 
organisations cannot be trusted, and that the leaders only follow their 
own political or economic interests.  
Thus, overall, the contemporary RSMOs in Russia face a wide range 
of challenges, among which are their limited political space, inter-
movement fragmentation, often counterfeit or state-dependent character 
and, most crucially, a weak link with the rural population. Nevertheless, 
some of them constitute genuine movements, in a rural setting where 
less than a decade ago they had been absent. 
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Notes
 
1 See Perrie (1972) about rural mobilisation during the Russian Revolution, and 
Visser (2010) on the present-day mobilisation problems. 
2 This finding was based on data collected from secondary sources and through 
in-depth interviews with representatives of rural social movement organisations 
(RSMOs). In total, this research analysed 30 RSMOs and agrarian political parties. 
A short summary is presented in Table 3.1. 
3 The political opportunity structure is defined here as the relative openness or 
closeness of the institutionalised political system, influenced by state-elite align-
ments and the state’s capacity and propensity for repression (Tarrow 1998a, 
1998b). 
4 In 2010, there were 261, 700 private (family) farms, which cultivated 11.4% of 
the agricultural land and contributed 8% of the gross agricultural product in Rus-
sia, and there were 16 million rural households which cultivated 5% of agricul-
tural land and produced 45% of the gross agricultural product. The rest (nearly 
half of the gross agricultural product) was produced by LFEs, which control 
more than half of all agricultural lands in Russia. 
5 A longitudinal study conducted by O’Brien et al. (2011) indicated that the pov-
erty rate was 49.5% in 1999, while the peak of rural poverty occurred in 1993 
when 69% of the rural population had incomes lower than the subsistence level. 
The difference in numbers can be explained by various techniques used to define 
income and subsistence levels. 
6 In the Soviet Union, stealing from collective farms was institutionalised. Hum-
phrey (1983: 136) discovered that the Soviet villagers used the ‘word theft to refer 
only to stealing from one another’. People presented pilfering at the farm as ‘re-
covering things that were rightfully theirs, either because they’d worked on those 
things (harvested corn, pulled potatoes, or collected fruit) for inadequate pay or 
because they had once owned the land for growing these things and they were 
not getting enough to live on’ (Humphrey 1983, 136). For an account of how 
foot-dragging and mediocre work was institutionalised at collective farms, see 
Nove (1973). 
7 The Agrarian Party of Russia re-emerged in 2012. Its re-emergence was caused 
by initiatives of some of its former members who did not want to continue the 
consolidation with United Russia. The newly emerged party refused the former 
left-wing ideology of agrarian socialism and moved to centrism. Currently, the 
party represents the interests of the agrarian elite and supports large-scale strong 
agricultural producers. We do not study this organisation in detail as it does not 
represent the interests of the rural population. 
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8 Foreigners are not officially allowed to acquire agricultural land in Russia. How-
ever, they do so by means of their Russian subsidiaries, which are considered 
Russian domestic companies under the Russian law. 
9 Land grabbing is the large-scale acquisition of land or land-related rights and 
resources by a corporate, non-profit or public buyer for the purposes of resource 
extraction geared towards external consumers (whether external means simply 
off-site or foreign) (White et al. 2012). For more about land grabbing in Russia 
see Visser and Spoor (2011). The latter shows that land acquisitions take many 
forms, from deals within the framework of the law, to clearly illegal deals. See 
Visser (2013) for a critical examination of the Russian ‘land rush’ which markedly 
slowed down from 2009 onwards. 
10 Many farm enterprises in suburban areas (especially those located close to 
Moscow and St. Petersburg) were artificially bankrupted and the status of their 
lands was transformed into land for construction purposes. Investment in land 
for (sub) urban development brings quick and high profits. 
11 For example, The Federal Programs: Social Development of the Village Until 
2012, 2013, 2014; Sustainable Development of Rural Areas, 2014–2017 and for 
the Period Until 2020; The National Priority Project for the Development of an 
Agro-Industrial Complex (launched in 2006). 
12 Interview conducted in March 2011, in Moscow. 
13 In 2010, a connection between the Russian interregional social movement 
Krestyanskiy Front and the international peasant movement La Via Campesina 
was forged by the researchers from ISS in order to generate a knowledge transfer 
and facilitate the internationalisation of Krestyanskiy Front, which would give the 
organisation more power in fighting land grabbing and protection of peasants’ 
rights in Russia. However, the leadership of Krestyanskiy Front showed no inter-
est in collaboration with the international movement, explaining this through the 
ongoing depeasantisation of the Russian countryside and the lack of rural dwell-
ers who would share peasant values and a desire for food sovereignty and land 
ownership (see Chapter 6 on quiet food sovereignty in Russia). However, the 
disconnection from international movements is not only caused by the absence 
of discourse among the Russian rural population or the decisions of the RSMOs’ 
leadership. The state prevents the internationalisation of social movement organi-
sations. Furthermore, the Russian state is currently actively blocking some of the 
already internationalised social movements, such as RAIPON (Russian Associa-
tion of Indigenous Peoples of the North). In November 2012, Russia’s Ministry 
of Justice ordered the closure of RAIPON, because of an ‘alleged lack of corre-
spondence between the association’s statutes and federal law’. RAIPON was 
closed for six months to adjust its statutes, and in March 2013 was revitalised 
(Staalesen 2013). 
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14 Interview conducted in village Deulino, Sergiev Posad district, Moscow region, 
April 2013 
15 Interview conducted in March 2011, in Moscow.  
16 Interview conducted in October 2010, in Moscow. 
17 Interview conducted in March 2011, in Dmitrov, Moscow region. 
18 Interview conducted in March 2011, in Odintsovo, Moscow region. 
19 Interview conducted in March 2011, in Moscow 
20 Interview conducted in March 2011, via email 
21 Interview with Larionov, newspaper Klyuch, March 2008. 
22 An interest group is virtually any voluntary association that seeks to publicly 
promote and create advantages for its cause. For more information about the 
differences between social movements and interest groups, see Meyer and Imig 
(1993). 
23 Interview conducted in March 2011, in Odintsovo, Moscow region. 
24 Interview conducted in March 2011, in Moscow. 
25 At Russian Election Day, which took place on 8 September 2013, Partiya Voz-
rozhdeniya Sela was not allowed to participate in regional parliament elections by 
the Central Election Commission, due to the Party’s lack of registered regional 
offices. 
26 During the 2010–2012 period, an illegal development was underway at the 
Borodino museum reserve, where the Russian army fought Napoleon’s troops 
in 1812. This area is considered a national heritage by Russians. The boundaries 
of the Borodino reserve have never been officially defined or registered due to 
lack of funds. This has also enabled corrupt officials to manipulate this ‘no 
man’s land’. Nearly 100 private houses were built on the Field of Borodino, a 
federal-level historical reserve, despite the challenge posed by law enforcement 
bodies and cultural protection agencies (Visser and Mamonova 2011). In 2013, 
the court considered two criminal cases against the former head of the 
Borodino rural settlement, Maya Sklyueva. According to investigators, Sklyueva 
had taken advantage of her official position and, from January 2007 to March 
2008, used forged documents to acquire land in the field of Borodino from the 
towns of Kosmovo and Old Village. Sklyueva is condemned to five years and 
six months’ imprisonment. The houses will be demolished.  
27 Interview conducted March 2011, in Borodino, Mozhaysk district, Moscow 
region. 
28 Interview conducted April 2013, in Sergiev Posad, Moscow region. 
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29 Federal Law No. 28-FZ ‘On Amending the Federal Law On Political Parties’, 
which was adopted in April 2012, has significantly reduced the list of require-
ments for establishing a political party and simplified the procedure of its regis-
tration. 
30 At the same time, taking into account the political indifference of rural dwell-
ers, providing individual economic rewards to staff and participants is perhaps 
the only method to involve people in social movement activity. 
31 ‘In the most repressive regimes, resistance is largely limited to the ‘weapons of 
the weak’, according to O’Brien (1996: 47). This chapter does not want to suggest 
that this is the case in Russia. There are various important differences from rural 
protests in China, such as the lack of a clear overarching state ideology that would 
enable framing the protests in legitimate terms, and the achievement of gradual, 
but fundamental changes in the system. 
32 It should be noted that ‘state marionettes’ are not just present in authoritarian 
regimes and/or a sign of weak civil society. In the Netherlands, for instance, the 
country’s communist party was established during the Cold War by the Dutch 
secret service to enable the monitoring and control of communist forces in soci-
ety. 
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4 Naive Monarchism and Rural Resistance 
in Contemporary Russia  
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter applies the concept of ‘naive monarchism’ (i.e. the tradi-
tional peasant expressions of reverence for the tsar as their benefactor) 
to study contemporary rural politics in authoritarian Russia. While Russia 
is not a monarchy, and its rural dwellers are not traditional illiterate peas-
ants, the veneration of its leader manifests itself in many rural grievances. 
Three types of rural politics, which have traits of naive monarchism, are 
analysed: written petitions to the president, rural pickets and delegations 
to the Kremlin, and geographical renaming in honour of Putin. Griev-
ances, voiced in this way, are rarely subjects of repression from above, as 
they reinforce presidential authority and the existing order. This raises 
the question of whether rural dwellers faithfully believe in a benevolent 
president or intentionally exploit their subordinate position and Putin’s 
image as the present-day tsar. Whether sincere or strategic, these rural 
politics aim to enforce the existing state commitments. Although they 
are unable to challenge the status quo, they provide rural dwellers with a 
means to remedy occasional local injustices. 
4.1. Introduction 
In the summer of 2008, peasant delegates from 17 Russian regions left 
their villages and travelled to Moscow to participate in the ‘Krestyanskiy 
Khod (Peasant Walk) for the salvation of the Russian village’. The aim of the 
khod was to inform the president about the woes of the Russian coun-
tryside. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian villages have 
been experiencing hard times. The land reform hardly benefited the rural 
population: the land of former collective and state enterprises was 
grabbed by oligarchs and agroholdings, collective agriculture failed, and 
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the social infrastructure – formally maintained by the collectives – crum-
bled (Visser and Spoor 2011). Being unable to adjust to the new capitalist 
system, the majority of the rural population fell into poverty and experi-
enced social exclusion and high unemployment. Despite various state 
programmes of socio-economic development in rural areas, villagers 
have not experienced significant improvements. Large-scale agriculture 
has flourished, whereas the Russian village has been decaying. The 
khodoki (khod participants) intended to bring these and many other is-
sues before the president, whom they dubbed the ‘keeper of the villagers’ 
hopes for a better life.’ People believed that the president could resolve 
their problems, if only he knew about them: ‘President, you are misin-
formed,’ the khodoki wrote on their posters. However, the dialogue be-
tween the peasants and the country leader never took place, as the presi-
dent (then, Dmitry Medvedev) did not come to his Kremlin office on the 
day of the Krestyanskiy Khod.  
The peasant behaviour of expressing reverence and devotion to the 
sovereign – whom they identified as their benefactor and intercessor, 
whereas all failures were ascribed to officials, who deliberately misrepre-
sented and misinformed the country’s leader – is known in history as 
popular or naive monarchism (see Luebke 1997 on naive monarchism in 
early modern Germany; Sandall 2012 on sixteenth-century England; 
Field 1976, Perrie 1995 on tsarist Russia). Some scholars interpreted na-
ive monarchism as the naive belief of illiterate peasants in the supreme 
power (Lenin 1960, Luebke 1997). Others considered it a political 
weapon of powerless groups, who framed their protests within the offi-
cial hegemony to lessen the risks of insubordination (Field 1976, Scott 
1990). Naive monarchism has declined with the emancipation of the 
peasantry and the democratisation of society in many countries; how-
ever, it seems to remain present in rural Russia today. 
This chapter applies the concept of ‘naive monarchism’ to the study 
of present-day rural politics in Russia. This country is not a monarchy, 
and rural dwellers are no longer traditional illiterate peasants; however, 
the veneration of the country’s leader manifests itself in many rural 
grievances. Rural Russians write petitions to the Kremlin, hold pickets, 
or organise khody to persuade the president to intervene on their behalf 
in conflicts with local power-holders.  
Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian regime provides limited opportunities 
for people to express their discontent in an open political manner (Hen-
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derson 2011). On one hand, this suggests that peasant resistance in the 
name of the president is a strategic means for powerless groups to ad-
dress their grievances while avoiding severe punishment – which Scott 
(1990:100) referred to as a ‘not-so-naive use of naive monarchism’. On 
the other hand, Putin’s patrimonial autocratic style of governing, with 
direct presidential intervention in a wide range of internal affairs, as well 
as his domestic popularity (89% of Russians supported Putin in 20151), 
might contribute to the people’s unfeigned belief in the president’s supe-
rior ability to solve their problems. 
This chapter analyses three types of rural politics that have traits of 
naive monarchism: written petitions to the president (and some other 
top-governmental authorities2), rural pickets and khody to the Kremlin, 
and geographical renaming in honour of Putin. These actions are related 
to conflicts with local authorities or business elites, and concern the 
withdrawal of services (schools, hospitals, transport services, and infra-
structure maintenance) and of access to land resources.  
Although not all rural politics in the name of the president can be 
conceptualised as a conscious strategy of defiance, many activists delib-
erately exploit the gap between the rights promised by the president and 
the rights delivered by local authorities, demanding that the latter fulfil 
their obligations. This research demonstrates that rural activists often use 
Putin’s name to attract public attention and threaten local power-holders 
with possible presidential interventions, thereby holding them account-
able. Voiced in this way, grievances are rarely subject to repression from 
above, as they reinforce presidential authority and the existing power 
structure. This chapter argues that naive monarchist politics are not able 
to challenge the status quo; however, they provide rural dwellers with a 
means to remedy occasional local injustices. 
The topic of ‘naive monarchism’ in rural Russia arose in 2014 through 
my ethnographic research, which focused on rural resistance strategies in 
the Stavropol Krai (Southern Russia). Aside from a number of in-depth 
interviews with Stavropol rural residents, the research for this chapter 
included qualitative data from the longitudinal study of the rural social 
movement Krestyanskiy Front (Peasant Front) from 2010 to 2013. Fur-
thermore, a qualitative thematic text analysis was conducted on a sample 
of 35 petitions written by rural dwellers to the Russian president (and 
some other top governmental authorities). These petitions were derived 
from the online petition platform www.change.org3 and fieldwork in the 
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Moscow region in 2013 and the Stavropol Krai in 2014. This analysis 
also includes an extensive set of secondary data obtained from internet 
publications, academic literature, and Russian statistical services.  
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section (Section 4.2) in-
troduces the reader to the theory of naive monarchism in tsarist Russia, 
and discusses its core elements. It is followed by an argument that naive 
monarchism did not completely fade after the tsardom’s collapse, but 
continued to be used in state-society relations (Section 4.3). After a short 
discussion of how Soviet peasants employed the regime ideology in their 
protests, Section 4.4 addresses the contemporary Putin regime and the 
power relations in the countryside. An analysis of various present-day 
rural practices with naive monarchist appearances is presented in Section 
4.5. Finally, Section 4.6 discusses whether the detected phenomenon is 
an expression of true belief or a resistance strategy of subaltern groups.  
4.2. The theory of naive monarchism 
Naive monarchism derives from the contractual nature of the rule, which 
implied that domination was based on reciprocal obligations of the ruler 
with his/her people: in return for obedience and support, the ruler had 
to provide protection and guardianship (Luebke 1997). Although it was 
identified as a common belief in many monarchies (see Sandall 2012 on 
sixteenth-century England; Luebke 1997 on early modern Germany), 
naive monarchism became primarily associated with the Russian peas-
antry during the tsardom (Perrie 1995). Russian studies employ different 
terminologies and interpretations of this phenomenon. Lenin (1960: 216) 
called it ‘monarchist illusions’ to stress the utopian character of peasant 
beliefs. He argued that peasants ‘naively and blindly believed in the tsar-
batushka’ (tsar-affectionate father/deliverer) and ‘were only able to peti-
tion and pray’. Perrie (1995) called this behaviour ‘popular monarchism’ 
to emphasise the belief of the ordinary people (narod) in the tsar’s be-
nevolence. Field (1976) used the term ‘naive monarchism’ to problema-
tize the notion of ‘naivety’ in this behaviour. In his analysis of sixteenth 
and eighteenth-century peasant revolts, Field argued, that, although 
many peasants ardently believed in the idea of a benevolent tsar, some of 
them intentionally used this myth in their protests. By demonstrating 
their “naivety” and “misguided” loyalty to the tsar, peasants obtained 
significant immunity from prosecution and managed to defy noblemen 
and reduce tributes and taxes.  
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Field distinguished two elements of naive monarchism: the ‘myth of 
the tsar-deliverer’ (a tsar-protector of deprived peasants) and the ‘myth 
of the loyal peasants’ (a submissive, tsar-loving narod). Peasants employed 
these myths in their grievances: they wrote petitions and organised khody 
to complain to the tsar about ‘disloyal’ noblemen, who, in peasant (pub-
lic) opinions, deliberately misrepresented the tsar’s will. Peasants asked 
for the tsar’s patronage and intervention. Although these peasant prac-
tices were formally outlawed, they were often encouraged by the tsar, as 
peasant appeals reinforced the tsar’s authority, diffused rural rebellious 
energy, and provided the tsar with alternative information about rural 
conditions (Palat 2001).  
There are debates on whether the belief in the ideal tsar-peasants rela-
tions was a product of peasant cultural practices, or inculcated by the tsar 
(or pretenders to the throne) in order to guarantee the existing order or 
manipulate rural unrest in own interests (Perrie 1995, Scott 2012). Field 
(1976) argued that naive monarchism – either the peasants’ sincere belief 
or their strategic use of the myth for certain ends – was a result of auto-
cratic power, which imposed a sense of peasant inferiority and subordi-
nation, and prohibited the peasants from manifesting their self-will and 
engaging in open politics. The myth of the tsar-deliverer was personally 
maintained by the tsar for the sake of social order. Symbolic acts such as 
‘standing godfather to the child of a poor peasant’ or public instances of 
‘humiliating or executing arrogant nobles and officials’ were practised by 
many Russian tsars, including Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great 
(Field 1976:5). The Orthodox Church also reinforced peasant obedience 
to power by portraying the tsar as God’s representative, whereas rebels 
were associated with evil forces (Dunning 2010).  
While naive monarchism secured the tsar’s authority and existing or-
der, it was also a catalyst for peasant rebellion. In her analysis of peasant 
wars in the Times of Troubles at the end of the sixteenth century, Perrie 
(1995) argued that numerous pseudo-Dmitrys (who claimed to be the 
tsetsarevich (crown prince) Dmitry) used the myth of the ‘true-tsar’ in or-
der to mobilise peasants for a revolt against the ruling ‘false-tsar’. Simi-
larly, peasants supported the ‘true-tsar’ myth during Pugachev’s rebellion 
in the 1770s, whose leader claimed to be the legitimate tsar Petr III 
(Field 1976). 
Scott (2012: 49), however, argued that naive monarchism ‘was any-
thing but a belief imposed by elites and the church in service of social 
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order, it was rather a cultural property of the peasantry as a class.’ He 
asserted that the myth of the tsar-deliverer was a peasant vision of jus-
tice, and the means to realise this vision. He noted a remarkable ‘plastic-
ity of the myth in the hands of its peasant adherents’ (Scott 1990: 97). 
The myth was used to resist local oppressors, who violated ‘the good 
tsar’s will’ by imposing heavy taxes, conscription, and so on. When peti-
tions failed and oppression continued, peasants used this myth to claim 
that a ‘false-tsar’ was on the throne, and justified their rebellions as loy-
alty to the monarchy. The myth of the tsar-deliverer was able to meta-
morphose into proactive resistance. Scott illustrates this by referring to 
the Ukrainian peasant rebellion of 1902 when peasants claimed that the 
tsar gave them permission to take grain from their landlords.  
This not-so-naive interpretation of naive monarchism was used by 
Scott to analyse power relations in contemporary nondemocratic socie-
ties. He argued that subordinate groups use existing hegemony to their 
advantage: they make their appeals within the official discourse of 
deference, which lessens the possible risks of their insubordination. Sub-
ordinates purposely reinforce the hegemonic appearances in their griev-
ances, which lead to the emergence of public (loyal) transcripts in dia-
logues with power, and hidden (disloyal) transcripts ‘spoken behind the 
back of the dominant’ (Scott 1990: xii).  
O’Brien (1996) analysed how disaffected peasants apply official state 
ideology, rhetoric, and commitments in their grievances to interrogate 
power-holders for violating the rules by which they justify their author-
ity, and to exploit divisions within officialdom (so-called ‘rightful resis-
tance’ in China). Rightful resisters do not appeal to imaginary patronages, 
but use the legislative system in their dissents. O’Brien (2002: 54) argued 
that rightful resistance and naive monarchism are types of ‘boundary-
spanning contention,’ which operate on the border between conven-
tional civil participation and political resistance. These politics are diffi-
cult to dismiss, as they appear as nothing more than a ‘scrupulous en-
forcement of existing commitments;’ however, they can be ‘an engine of 
change’ (O’Brien 2002: 53).  
Field (1976) asserted that naive monarchism declined on the eve of 
the Russian Revolution because the regime could no longer draw on it 
(the myth of the tsar-deliverer was false: officials - peasant enemies - 
were just executors of the tsar’s orders). According to Lenin (1960), the 
Bloody Sunday of 1905, when the tsar’s soldiers shot down participants 
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of a peasant khod, completely disillusioned the peasantry regarding the 
tsar’s benevolence. However, peasants did not join the proletarians in 
their uprising against the tsardom, as Marxists had anticipated. The revo-
lutions of 1905 and 1917 demonstrated that peasant revolts started inde-
pendently and followed their own dynamic: contrary to the agitation of 
proletarians, peasants fought for land, not against the tsar (Shanin 1986). 
4.3. Elements of naive monarchism in Soviet state-society 
relation 
After the fall of imperial Russia in 1917, the new Soviet government 
aimed to create a class of rural workers by eradicating peasant features 
such as land property and family labour. The peasants’ collectivisation 
into kolkhozy and sovkhozy (collective and state farms) in the 1930s was 
not only aimed at generating the resources needed for the country’s 
industrialisation, but also at eliminating the ‘naive’ ‘tsar-loving’ peasantry 
as a class. However, the elements of naive monarchism continued to be 
used in state-society relations.  
Although the Soviet state presented itself as a proletarian ‘people’s 
governance’ – contrary to the overthrown monarchy – in practice, one 
autocracy was replaced by another (Hedlund 2006). Whereas the tsardom 
was harshly disparaged in the early Soviet period, Stalin’s government 
revitalised the image of a ‘stern but fair tsar’ to promote a unified sense 
of Russian identity (as the proletarian ideology failed to stimulate), sup-
port the authoritarian regime, and justify the state’s internal terror and 
external aggression (see Perrie’s 2001 study on the cult of Ivan the Terri-
ble in Stalin’s Russia). The ‘myth of the tsar-deliverer’ was transformed 
into the cult of the immortal ‘clever Lenin’ and the cult of Stalin as the 
‘father of all peoples’ (Bittner 2003). As during the tsardom, peasant peti-
tions and khody were encouraged and used by the government to dem-
onstrate the benevolence of the Soviet power ‘by personally intervening 
on behalf of troubled citizens’ and were a ‘form of controlling bureau-
cratic inefficiency and corruption’ (Bittner 2003: 282). 
Soviet peasants frequently applied naive monarchist principles in ar-
ticulating their grievances. Whereas open disagreement with governmen-
tal actions was repressed, the peasants’ allegiance to the ruler and dedica-
tion to the official ideology in their grievances provided a means to deal 
with local bureaucrats’ abuse of power. Fitzpatrick (1996: 260) argued 
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that peasants used the regime’s ‘sensitivity on the question of class ene-
mies’ to punish their oppressors by just labelling them ‘kulaks’. Written 
petitions to the country leader were complemented by letters to local 
newspapers, which appealed to ‘higher authorities to intervene and cor-
rect the misbehaviour of lower authorities’ (86). Despite their loyalty and 
socialist ideology, these appeals can be interpreted as disguised anti-
regime rebellion. Alexopoulos (2003) discovered sarcasm and irony in 
peasant letters to Stalin: petitioners criticised the implementation of the 
orders and, indirectly, the regime itself.  
In the later Soviet period, petitioning remained a rural practice, but 
became less subservient with the weakening of the repressive authoritar-
ian regime. Workers’ letters to Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Kosygin were 
more direct and critical, but contained the same elements: beliefs in an 
impartial ruler and complaints about unlawful local officials (Workers 
Force 2012). Gorbachev’s memoir (2014) contains a number of such let-
ters, which feature complaints, but also advice, empathy, and support. 
The policies of ‘perestroika’ and ‘glasnost’ provided subordinate groups 
with new tools to defend their interests, and personal petitions to the 
ruler resembled a rather informal state-society dialogue.  
4.4. Contemporary rural Russia and the ‘myth of the tsar-
deliverer’ 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the new Russian gov-
ernment initiated a course of reforms aimed at the de-socialisation of the 
country’s economy and the democratisation of society. In the country-
side, land reform was initiated to distribute the kolkhozy’s and sovk-
hozy’s land to rural dwellers by means of land share certificates for pri-
vate farming development. However, due to the absence of financial 
resources and informational support, fragmented and often non-
functioning markets, and the rural dwellers’ unwillingness to leave the 
collectives, the majority of land recipients did not become farmers (Pal-
lot and Nefedova 2007). The restructured kolkhozy and sovkhozy ex-
perienced severe financial difficulties in free market conditions. This led 
to increased rural unemployment and poverty. The peak of rural poverty 
was in 1999, when 73.1% of villagers had incomes lower than the subsis-
tence level (Independent Institute for Social Policy 2002). Many rural 
residents, especially young people, ‘voted with their feet’ and moved to 
cities. Those who remained in the villages became highly dependent on 
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subsistence farming on their household plots, and experienced social ex-
clusion and poverty.  
However, the first Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, was not ap-
proached by rural dwellers as their intercessor and benefactor. This can 
be explained by Yeltsin’s remarkable unpopularity: his approval rating 
was only 2% in 1999 (Moroz 2012). Yeltsin was viewed as someone who 
caused chaos rather than imposing order, and people, therefore, did not 
pin their hopes on him. The letter-writing, however, remain in use in a 
dialogue with power-holders. Nikulin (1999) analysed peasant letters 
from the Kuban region to the liberal political party leader Grigory Yav-
linsky, who initiated this correspondence to engage directly with rural 
dwellers in his political campaign. In their letters, people complained 
about local injustices, blamed Yeltsin for rural scourges, and asked Yav-
linsky for patronage (Nikulin 1999).  
Putin’s rise to power in 2000 changed the situation. The second Rus-
sian president reversed unpopular democratic transformations initiated 
by his predecessor. His ‘guided democracy’ is characterised by state con-
trol over political, economic, social, and civil institutions. The democracy 
is now used rather ‘for decoration, than direction:’ election results are 
predefined, the mass media is state-controlled, and court decisions fol-
low the interests of the authorities (Dawisha 2014: 8). Anderson (2007) 
argued that Putin’s regime is a restoration of the Soviet patrimonial au-
thoritarian regime, albeit with weaker ideological foundations. This al-
most absolute presidential power relies on a small group of oligarchs, 
who hold key positions in state and business institutions. Putin’s 
‘superpresidency’ is characterised by direct presidential intervention in 
any political process and decision-making – a so-called ‘ruchnoye uprav-
leniye’ (hands-on state governance) which is often portrayed by the state-
controlled mass media as the only efficient way to rule the country 
(Fortescue 2015). 
Putin’s policy in rural areas is aimed at developing large-scale agri-
business. Land sales were legalised in 2002, which brought oligarchic 
capital to the countryside. Russian oligarchs and foreign investors bought 
(or rented) large tracts of farmland, which led to the emergence and 
spread of large farm enterprises (LFEs) in agricultural regions (currently, 
83.2% of farmland is controlled by LFEs) and the development of a real-
estate business on former farmlands in suburban areas (Mamonova and 
Sutherland 2015). Land accumulation was often carried out in fraudulent 
Processed on: 6-9-2016
505017-L-bw-Mamanova
 Naive monarchism and rural resistance 155 
schemes that deprived the local population of land and property rights, 
which allowed Visser and Spoor (2011) to characterise this process as an 
instance of land grabbing.  
Although Putin’s rule is characterised by a general reduction of pov-
erty, rural areas continue to experience serious socio-economic prob-
lems. Ineffective small-scale farm development programmes and LFEs’ 
control over productive resources prevent the development of rural en-
trepreneurship. LFEs invested a great deal in the development of large-
scale industrial agriculture, while needing significantly less labour than 
former kolkhozy and sovkhozy. Kalugina and Fadeeva (2009) estimated 
the real rural unemployment at 55% in 2009. The elimination of collec-
tive agriculture led to the decline of the social infrastructure, which had 
been formally maintained by the collectives. During the last 16 years, 
34% of rural schools have been closed down, with the existing schools 
being overpopulated and in need of major overhauls; the majority of 
medical facilities require renovation and refurbishment, and have a 35% 
shortage of medical personnel; the existing road system is in a very bad 
state, leading to the isolation of many settlements from the outside 
world; 26% of rural housing is dilapidated, and only 9% has central heat-
ing (Kiseleva et al. 2013). 
The fieldwork in the Stavropol Krai revealed that rural dwellers blame 
‘the government’ for their households’ woes and for the rural areas’ 
problems. In their discourses about wrongdoings (such as the bank-
ruptcy of kolkhozy/sovkhozy, the destruction of village infrastructure, 
land grabbing, etc.), people use the word ‘they’ to allude to the state-elite 
coalition. At the same time, president Putin is often seen in a positive 
light. The statement of Natalia, an old woman living in the Rasshevat-
skaya village, is illustrative:  
I support Putin. He is a good man. He increased our pensions... He 
makes it better for people, but you cannot be a warrior when you are 
alone in the field. He cannot cover everything. The local authorities are 
those who do things wrongly.4 
Natalia’s statement expresses the peasant belief in the benevolent 
president, whereas the local authorities are perceived as obstacles be-
tween Putin and his people, which explains why the ‘noble’ presidential 
orders do not have the desired outcome in rural areas. Nothing captures 
this position better than the old tsarist peasant adage: ‘the tsar wants it, 
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but the boyars (noblemen) resist.’ How did the myth of the tsar-deliverer 
re-emerge in contemporary rural Russia? The explanation can be found 
in the existing power relations and the state’s neo-tsarist policy.  
Rosow and George (2014:111) argued that ‘the old feudal order still 
exists in the countryside. It is just put on a democratic coat.’ Rural dwell-
ers remain in the bottom ranks of Russian society and have hardly any 
economic or political power to influence the status quo. Rural socio-
economic marginalisation has exacerbated the sense of inferiority and 
subordination among the rural poor. The fieldwork in the Stavropol Krai 
revealed that villagers often characterise themselves as ‘slaves’ or 
‘hodges’ (the lowest social class of farm labourers) to stress their living 
conditions and powerlessness. This feeling of subjection is reinforced by 
the rural population’s substantial dependence on governmental support 
in the forms of social transfers and pensions, which leads to their obedi-
ence to state power (Ruzhkov 2012). Furthermore, according to Mac-
Kay’s (2002) study on utopia in slave and serf narratives, the belief in the 
tsar-deliverer gives the peasants a hope for future positive changes in 
their native place – changes, which the tsar would implement as soon he 
learned about the local problems. Seemingly, Putin became this tsar for 
many rural Russians. This is manifested in the interview with Sergei, who 
participated in an informal meeting with Putin during the president’s 
election campaign in February 2012:  
We are khodoki appealing to the tsar. I know you are supposed to call 
Putin the President or Prime Minister these days. But to us, he is the 
Tsar. Not much has changed.5 
Putin’s regime ably reconstructs the ‘myth of tsar-deliverer’ to justify 
its autocracy and to guarantee the existing order. Recent studies analyse 
Putin’s personality cult (Montefiore 2007; Canciani 2012). The president 
uses the traditional methods of Russian tsars to show his benevolence to 
ordinary people. He often acts as an intercessor for the deprived, dem-
onstrating his will to intervene and solve local injustices. Fortescue 
(2009) describes how Putin visited the Pikalevo settlement after receiving 
a petition from its inhabitants about the greedy and anti-social behaviour 
of local businessmen. Putin arrived, reprimanded the businessmen, and 
re-established order. However, Fortescue suggests that Putin’s interven-
tion was nothing more than a PR stunt and brought only short-term re-
lief to the Pikalevo residents. Another tsar-like behaviour of Putin’s is 
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demonstrating his ‘closeness’ to the people – for example, when allowing 
‘himself to be photographed shirtless on a fishing trip, he could have 
been channelling Peter the Great, who projected a virile style by posing 
as an ordinary sailor’ (Montefiore 2007). Furthermore, the annual ques-
tion-and-answer session ‘Hotline with President of Russia Vladimir 
Putin’ demonstrates Putin’s will to interact personally with the Russian 
people and to solve their personal grievances.  
The emergence of neo-tsarism in the Putin era is discussed by many 
Western scholars (Corum 2010, Canciani 2012). This emergence is re-
lated not only to a paternalistic autocracy, but also to the revitalisation of 
the image of the tsar. Similarly to Stalin’s rehabilitation of Ivan the Terri-
ble’s figure in the Soviet period, Putin resorts to the tsarist legacy to de-
velop patriotism and a unified sense of Russian identity, and to create 
positive historical parallels to justify the state’s policy toward internal 
opposition and external enemies. The propaganda of the tsardom is ob-
served in such religious undertakings as the canonisation of the last tsar-
ist family in 2000, and the construction of a cathedral in the centre of 
Moscow devoted to this family’s martyrdom in 2017. Moreover, the gov-
ernment is discussing a possible return of the heirs of the Romanov royal 
dynasty to Russia to help the country ‘return its global influence’ and re-
store ‘traditional Russian culture and pride’ (Perring 2015).  
The Orthodox Church gained an important role in constructing a uni-
fying ideology and loyalty to the country’s authoritarian leadership. 
Ruzhkov (2012) argued that the church replaced the Communist Party in 
the control and moral education of society: civil disobedience is por-
trayed as blasphemy or even a crime. Although loyalty and submission to 
the authoritarian power are imposed on all Russians, it is accepted differ-
ently by the rural and urban populations. Ruzhkov indicated that there 
are two Russias: the first one consists of a small progressive group of 
‘modernist and European’ citizens of large cities, and the second – 
prevalent – consists of conservative residents of outlying provinces, 
small towns, and villages. Putin ‘aligned himself with the conservative 
Russia and initiated a war against the values important to the progressive 
Russia: freedom of speech and expression, the right of assembly, etc.’ 
Political opposition is repressed. Whereas civil disobedience occasionally 
manifests itself in large cities, rural areas and the periphery seem to be 
overwhelmingly loyal to Putin and his regime.  
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4.5. Application of naive monarchism in rural resistance 
Although political protest is virtually undetected in the countryside, there 
are many instances of parochial grievances and contention. Many of 
them share the features of naive monarchism. This section analyses: (1) 
written petitions to the president (or top authorities), (2) group pickets 
and peasant khody, and (3) geographical renaming in honour of Putin.  
4.5.1. Written petitions 
This part of the analysis is based on 35 rural written petitions to the 
Russian president (or top state authorities) that were obtained from two 
sources: the online petition platform www.change.org (28 petitions) and 
fieldwork in the Moscow region in 2013 (7 petitions). The platform 
change.org provides a database of several thousand petitions, initiated by 
urban and rural Russians. For this research, 124 written petitions were 
selected using the words ‘villagers’ and ‘rural’ as search criteria. These 
petitions were further examined on urban/rural origin and addressee: 
only the petitions that were related to rural problems, written by rural 
dwellers, and addressed to top governmental authorities were selected. 
Twenty-eight petitions met these requirements, of which 26 were written 
by groups of rural dwellers, and 2 individually on behalf of rural com-
munities. These petitions represent cases from different Russian regions, 
were initiated during 2008-2014, and were addressed to Putin (22 cases) 
and heads of republican and regional governments (6 cases). The peti-
tions obtained from the fieldwork were group petitions, written to Putin 
(4 cases) and the Moscow regional governor (3 cases). The petition texts 
were entered in Atlas.ti qualitative data analysis software. The key themes 
were identified for every petition and clustered into seven categories 
based on the context of their claims and problem statements. The data-
driven structural coding distinguished a number of codes, which oc-
curred frequently across the themes. Table 4.1 presents the key themes 
and codes relevant to the purpose of this study, and their frequencies 
and co-occurrence. 
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Table 4.1 
Key themes of the analysed petition texts 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on the output of the codebook, generated by Atlas.ti 
for the analysis of rural petition letters.  
 
Compared to urban petitions (which were excluded during the selec-
tion process), rural petitions contain more adages, allegories, and emo-
tional expressions. Appeals to the president as ‘the one who is capable of 
solving the problem,’ in contrast to the local authorities who only ‘feed 
[the people] with breakfasts’ (a folk saying, which refers to unfulfilled 
promises of future actions), demonstrate the ‘myth of the tsar-deliverer’. 
The key themes of the analysed petitions are related to local problems, 
such as: the absence of a rural school, a hospital closure, water shortages, 
the cancellation of train/bus connections between two villages, or the 
 
Key themes  
 
Number 
of peti-
tions 
(theme 
frequen-
cies) 
Codes  
Align-
ment 
with 
state 
policy 
Refer-
ence to 
constitu-
tional 
rights 
and state 
laws 
Inac-
tion of 
local 
au-
thori-
ties 
Refer
ence 
to 
elec-
tions 
 
Warn-
ing of 
resis-
tance, 
bad 
times 
Iron
y, 
sar-
cas
m  
Need for renova-
tion/construction of 
hospitals, schools, sports 
and cultural centres, 
churches 
12 7 5 6 3 5 4 
Bankruptcy of kolkhoz, 
misuse of kolkhoz’s land  
8 5 7 5 2 3 2 
Absence of or irregular 
public transport connec-
tions, poor road condi-
tion 
7 3 2 4 2 2 3 
Illegal deforestation and 
waste dumping, and 
related ecological conse-
quences  
4 2 2 2  3  
Mass slaughtering of pigs 
due to swine flu6 
2 1 1   1 1 
Arbitrariness of local 
authorities 
1    1  1 
Water supply problem 1 1  1   1 
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unlawful acquisition of a kolkhoz. Some of them ask for money to reno-
vate a rural church or sports/cultural facilities. 
The petition reproduced below (hereafter, the example petition) is 
written by villagers from the Novgorod region about the cancellation of 
the train connection between several rural settlements. The recent state 
policy of fiscal decentralisation led to the reallocation of transport ex-
penditures from federal to regional budgets, which in turn led to the un-
derfunding and consequent cancellation of nearly 600 provincial train 
connections since 2012. These changes primarily affected rural residents, 
whose mobility depends on these trains. A brief analysis of this petition 
and an abstraction of common features with other petitions from the 
sample follow.  
Respected Vladimir Vladimirovich,  
We, residents of villages: Khvoynaya, Pestovo, Lubutino appeal to 
you. The reason is that from January 2014 all local trains between sta-
tions Khvoynaya–Budogosch and Khvoynaya–Pestovo are cancelled. 
The RZhD [Russian Railways] is boasting about new ‘Sapsan’ and ‘Al-
legro’ trains, while we, provincial residents, are cut off from the outside 
world. And this is happening on the backdrop of the programmes… 
your programmes, which are aimed at rural and agricultural develop-
ment, the improvement of rural living conditions, the attraction of the 
youth to the countryside.  
Our local and regional authorities did not inform us about their plans 
until the very last moment. Obviously, they were afraid of our appeals to 
higher authorities against these changes. The governor of the Novgorod 
region, S.G.Minin, is not concerned about trains on the edge of the re-
gion. Of course, he has a private car with a driver, and all roads are 
blocked every time he rushes to his office to perform his duties. But no 
one wants to think about us. […] 
To tell you that we are worried about what is going on with the rail-
ways, and what could happen with us due to this reformation, is to tell 
nothing. The wave of public anger and indignation grows every day.  
They [regional authorities] say that we will not use these trains after 
the ticket price increases, and they do not intend to cover the losses be-
cause of us. The officials elected by us do not have money for us, tax-
payers, the electorate. They remember us only during elections. […] 
Respected Vladimir Vladimirovich, we ask you to help our governor 
S.G.Minin with money (or to tell him where to get this money), as he is 
Processed on: 6-9-2016
505017-L-bw-Mamanova
 Naive monarchism and rural resistance 161 
unable to make ends meet in order to pay for the train connection be-
tween our villages. And to help the RZhD director V.I.Yakunin to un-
derstand that there are some important things in this life which are not-
for-profit. 
Sincerely grateful, villagers of Khvoynaya, Pestovo, Lubutino (sub-
mitted 28 December 2013, signed by 541)7  
As many others, this example petition is written within the official 
discourse of deference. Petitioners describe the failure of local authori-
ties to fulfil their official responsibilities and naively (or not) ask the 
president to remedy the situation.  
Two purposes of such appeals can be distinguished. The first is a plea 
for help from the president; the second is a threat to local power-
holders. Although Putin’s interventions do not often occur, their prob-
ability is likely to keep local authorities accountable. For this reason, vil-
lagers send the original letters to the presidential office and copies to 
their oppressors. The example petition was forwarded to the president, 
the governor of the Novgorod region, and the RZhD director. Petition-
ers do not directly challenge the authority of local authorities, but accuse 
them of ignorance and inactivity. 
The hidden critique of the existing power relations manifests itself 
through satire. Petition-writers often resort to irony and sarcasm in de-
scriptions of local power-holders. The example petition ridicules the 
governor: ‘he rushes to his office to perform his duties,’ and it assaults 
regional authorities for neglecting local interests: ‘they remember us only 
during elections.’ The election theme appears in many petitions in the 
sample. Thus, petitioners from the Filino village (Ivanovo region) use 
Putin’s elections as an argument in their request to build a rural school: 
‘we voted for you because we believed in you!’ In this way, rural dwellers 
remind the country leadership about its dependency on the electorate.  
Contrary to common assumptions about peasants’ juridical illiteracy, 
the present-day petitioners are familiar with their rights8, and refer to 
state laws and regulations to support their complaints. ‘This territory falls 
within the scope of the federal law ‘On specially protected areas’’ - wrote 
villagers of Argunovo (Moscow region) against unsanctioned landfills on 
the communal land. Petitioners from the Nizhniy Baskunchak village 
(Archangelsk region) exploited their rights for free and accessible medi-
cal care in their objection to the closure of a rural hospital: ‘the regional 
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government’s attempts to save money on public health contradict Gov-
ernmental Decree N932’9. However, juridical literacy does not help vil-
lagers to obtain justice using the prescribed democratic channels of dis-
pute resolution. Many petitioners went through numerous and 
unsuccessful appeals to various authorities and institutions. Thus, villag-
ers of Shemetovo (Moscow region), who have been lacking hot water 
and heating for almost half a year, wrote to Putin: 
We complained to the Shemetovo administration – they do not have 
money for new plumbing, we wrote to the Moscow region governor, but 
with no response, we sent letters to newspapers – no one listens to us! 
Winter is coming; we do not know to whom to address our problem. 
You are our last hope!  
The former Soviet practice of letter-writing to newspapers appears to 
be inefficient, as it is no longer employed in the social control system. It 
is not encouraged by the government, and journalists are rarely interested 
in the ‘little’ problems of ‘little’ people. In order to emphasise the impor-
tance of their causes, petitioners link them with national (and interna-
tional) policies. The example petition alludes to Putin’s national policy: 
‘your programmes, aimed at rural and agricultural development…’ Other 
petitions link to the Food Security Doctrine – such as the one written by 
the Katlino villagers (Leningrad region) who ask the president to prevent 
the bankruptcy of a local agricultural enterprise – or even to the Kyoto 
Protocol – mentioned by petitioners from the Argunovo village, who 
protest against unauthorised landfills.  
Along with legalistic definitions of their grievances, villagers often re-
fer to ‘people say…’ arguments. On one hand, this expression is a part 
of folk vocabulary; on the other, it demonstrates the growing discontent 
among the people. The example petition notes that ‘the wave of public 
anger and indignation grows every day.’ The petitioners from the Ilovka 
village (Volgograd region) warn about the return of the Times of Trou-
bles when describing the ecological consequences of chemical factory 
activities:  
The state tolerance towards the governmental halfwits caused this prob-
lem. The new Times of Troubles are coming! If we will not bring stur-
geons back to the river – there is no future! 
Although current rural discontent is unlikely to develop into uprisings 
in the name of the ‘true-tsar,’ as in the historical Times of Troubles, 
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these rebellious statements can be interpreted as peasant intimidation of 
the government. 
The president’s personal intervention in local conflicts is rare. Peti-
tions are sent from the presidential office to federal, regional, or munici-
pal petition commissions (according to the complaint topic). These 
commissions make resolutions and forward them to local level authori-
ties for implementation (Lenta.ru 2013). A similar system, but without 
specialised commissions, is employed when petitions are addressed to 
regional top-authorities. In both cases, the outcome greatly depends on 
the motivation of local power-holders to remedy the situation. For in-
stance, the authors of the example petition managed to preserve two 
trains between Khvoynaya and Budogosch, although trains between 
Khvoynaya and Pestovo were cancelled. However, some petitions work 
to the detriment of their authors. The procurement price of milk in the 
Grachevskiy rayon (the Stavropol Krai) is lower than the production 
costs peasants incur. The villagers reported that the local ‘milk mafia’ 
controls the milk collection and punishes those who dare to complain. 
Olga, from the Krasnoye village, shared the following story:  
There was one woman with cows. The price is too low, you cannot sur-
vive. Her sister decided to help her. She wrote a letter to the governor 
about that... Well, the governor considered it, and sent it to the SMF 
[Stavropol Milk Factory] with an order to solve the problem. SMF or-
dered: no more milk to be collected from this woman. That was it... She 
tried to sell milk by herself, make cottage cheese, but nothing worked 
out. Finally, she had to slaughter her cows. No one wants to complain 
anymore.10 
Not every petition from the sample could be traced to its final resolu-
tion. The 14 petitions for which the outcome is known suggest a higher 
probability of positive results from petitions addressed to the president 
(4 out of 10) than to other top-authorities (1 out of 4). However, no 
solid conclusions about the effectiveness of writing to the president can 
be drawn due to the small sample size. In addition, there is no indication 
that the key theme has a significant impact on the resolution. The out-
come tends to depend on a combination of factors: the scale of the 
problem, local power relations, and the political situation. According to 
Sergey Kuznets, who has been fighting for many years against illegal 
construction in the Sergiev-Posad district, roughly 20% of written peti-
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tions are successful. Although it does not seem a high percentage, it is, in 
fact, a significant share for Russia.  
4.5.2. Peasant pickets and khody 
The analysis of peasant pickets and khody is derived from my longitudi-
nal study of the rural social movement Krestyanskiy Front during 2010-
2013. In-depth interviews (6 with the leadership and 21 with members), 
participant observations of four pickets, three group discussions, and 
extensive document analysis constitute the empirical part of this section. 
Furthermore, participant observation data of three non-Front group 
pickets in the Moscow region during 2013 and nine in-depth interviews 
with their activists are also analysed. Transcripts of the interviews were 
coded according to the same methodology as the written petitions. The 
primary focus was on resistance strategies, goals and obstacles, and 
popular discourses regarding Putin, his regime, and local power-holders. 
Similar to the written petitions, the group pickets and peasant khody 
inform the president (or a head of the regional government) about local 
injustices. Organised rural protests occurred around large cities during 
the first decade of 2000. Many of them were related to illegal acquisitions 
of former collective farmland. Villagers protested against the violation of 
their land rights, the artificial bankruptcy of collective farms, and the 
construction of country houses for urban middle and upper classes on 
former agricultural fields. Land use transfers from farming to construc-
tion purposes became a very profitable, often unlawful, business after 
the legalisation of land sales in 2002. Krestyanskiy Front was organised 
in 2005 by a group of former collective farm workers, who had lost their 
land shares due to the illegal acquisition of their farm. By 2010, 
Krestyanskiy Front had more than 25,000 members from 80 farm enter-
prises located in different regions of Russia. The movement defended its 
members’ interests by applying to courts and organising pickets, demon-
strations, and peasant khody to the president (Chapter 3).  
The ‘myth of the tsar-deliverer’ is evident in the Krestyanskiy Front’s 
appeals. In their public transcripts, protesters call the president the 
‘keeper of the villagers’ hopes for a better life’ and ask for his interven-
tion in land conflicts (see the introductory description of the 2008 peas-
ant khod). Similarly to the petition-writers, the Front activists are rarely 
able to get fair dispute resolutions from appellate institutions, and appeal 
to the president as a last resort. Maria Zharova, the head of the Moscow 
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regional branch of Krestyanskiy Front, stated the following in one of the 
interviews: 
We have applied to local and regional courts, appealed to the prosecu-
tion office. The answer is always negative, although all our documents 
confirm that we are right. The corruption comes to the fore! Only the 
president has the power to rein in the court.11  
The judiciary is among the most corrupt public institutions in Russia 
(Global Corruption Barometer 2013). The Front activists oppose land 
investors, who often operate in coalition with local authorities and the 
courts. In such circumstances, the ‘rule of law’ does not work in favour 
of ordinary villagers. However, even though rural activists ask Putin to 
‘rein in the court’, they do not share the belief in a benevolent and just 
president, who does not know, what is happening on the ground. This 
becomes evident in the interview with activist Taisia, who lost her land 
shares due to illegal land acquisition of the sovkhoz ‘Serp i Molot’ and 
has been fighting for compensation: 
Everything happened during Putin’s rule. Thus, it was his will. Courts are 
not fools, it was his order, I think. It is impossible that the master does 
not know what is going on in his country!12 
Therefore, the goal of rural activists is not only to inform the ‘master’ 
about their problems, but also to make their appeals as loud as possible 
and publicly confront the president with local injustices. For this reason, 
Maria, an activist from the sovkhoz ‘Serp i Molot’, registered her group 
petition for the ‘Hotline with President of Russia Vladimir Putin’:  
I will raise our question and will see. The question will be addressed to 
him directly. Live stream. I think he will not avoid answering13. 
Rural activists combine lawful tactics (e.g. petition-writing, applying to 
courts, seeking audiences with power-holders) with disruptive and loud 
campaigns (e.g. individual and group pickets, peasant khody, road block-
ing, distribution of flyers). These tactics attracted mass media attention, 
which, especially in the beginning, described peasant protests with en-
thusiasm. Krestyanskiy Front also published and distributed its own 
newspaper. According to Tamara Semenova, one of Krestyanskiy 
Front’s leaders, the diversified resistance tactics determined the initial 
success of the movement.  
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The ‘myth of the tsar-deliverer’ has gained remarkable plasticity in the 
hands of rural activists. They apply it in accordance with the addressee 
and the political situation. Thus, activists seek benefits from PR and elec-
tion campaigns of the president and other authorities. Ekaterina, who 
fights the deforestation of the Pereyaslav Forest near the town of Ser-
giev-Posad (Moscow region), said that it does not matter which politician 
will use their problem in his/her election campaign, as long as the prob-
lem is solved. Similarly to the president, many politicians practice selec-
tive intercessions for the poor in their political campaigns. Being aware 
of this, rural activists plan their activities accordingly. Lilya, a protester 
from the sovkhoz ‘Leninskiy Luch’, identified the following main influ-
encing factors on their decision to hold a picket: 
We consider the weather and the political situation in the country. Now, 
for example, the election of the Moscow region governor is coming. 
Therefore, we are going to organise pickets more often. The weather is 
getting better too.14  
In the land rights-related disputes, rural activists often resort to the 
services of lawyers and jointly collect money to pay for juridical consul-
tancies. Possible victory implies a financial compensation for lost land 
rights, which in some cases can guarantee a good life for the activist and 
his/her family. In addition to financial costs, the protest entails signifi-
cant emotional and even physical costs. Tamara, a leader of 600 rural 
dwellers – former workers of the ‘Gorki-2’ sovkhoz – who had been 
fighting against the unlawful acquisition of their enterprise, said in an 
interview: 
For 5.5 years, we had been fighting for the restitution of our land rights. 
It was a difficult fight. During that time I was threatened, chased; they 
tried to give me a bribe. My underage daughter was taken to the police; 
they wanted to shake out something from her. […] Not many can handle 
such pressure…15  
Expressions of loyalty to the president do not protect rural activists 
from the pressures of local power-holders. However, persistent protests, 
applying state laws and regulations, and gaining public attention allowed 
Krestyanskiy Front to win a number of disputes and be active during 
nine years, which is a long period for a Russian civil society organisation. 
Even such provocative actions as Krestyanskiye (Peasant) Khody were 
carried out without significant punishments from above. Sheltered by the 
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traditional peacefulness and loyalty of peasant khody, rural activists de-
manded a reformation of the judicial system and the implementation of 
civil self-governance in 2008. The Krestyanskiy Khod of 2011 appealed 
for the elimination of all taxes in rural areas, while participants of the 
2012 Khod protested against Russia’s accession to the WTO. None of 
the khody reached the president, and no request was met. The benefits 
to the authoritarian regime from a public presidential intervention were 
insignificant compared to the potential economic and political costs. 
However, the khody were not complete failures. The public attention 
surrounding these delegations and the presidential tolerance towards 
khodoki motivated some politicians to engage with the peasants’ causes. 
Thus, after the 2008 Khod, Sergey Mironov, the chairman of the Federa-
tion Council, invited the khodoki to his office to develop a collective 
project aimed at revitalising Russian villages. Although no countrywide 
policy change followed, this project was implemented in several villages 
(predominantly the khodoki’s residences) and positively influenced the 
social infrastructure, rural employment, and living conditions in the se-
lected settlements. 
4.5.3. Named after Putin 
Recent rural practices demonstrate that it is not always necessary to 
appeal to Putin personally in order to solve local problems. One strategy 
is to invoke his name in public activism. A number of internet publica-
tions reveal the ongoing geographical renaming in Putin’s honour, which 
became especially widespread in the countryside (Podrez and Prikhodina 
2014, Baimukhametov 2007).  
Thus, in 2007, local dwellers of the Kholodniy Rodnik settlement 
near Stavropol organised a movement to protect their local forest from 
urbanisation-driven deforestation. They initiated the renaming of the 
forest into ‘Putin Grove’ and attached Putin’s portraits to every tree. 
Inna Bakulina, an activist in this movement, explained their actions in an 
interview to NEWSru.com (2007): 
…we thought that our local authorities and constructors will not dare to 
touch Vladimir Vladimirovich […] we do not have a copier, we multi-
plied his portraits in the city […] They [construction workers] only cut 
the trees which are without Vladimir Vladimirovich. If his portrait is 
there – they are afraid. The truth and Putin are on our side! 
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The construction workers indeed refrained from cutting down the 
trees with Putin’s portraits attached, and a few days later the court de-
clared the deforestation and construction to be illegal (Kommersant 
2007).  
Podrez and Prikhodina (2014) describe a number of cases where a ru-
ral street was renamed in honour of the president. Thus, the residents of 
the small village of Kasatkino (Udmurt Republic) initiated the renaming 
of their main street into ‘Putin Street’ in 2008. They hoped it would 
stimulate local authorities to asphalt the road and more broadly improve 
the living conditions in the village. Tamara, a resident of the Kasatkino 
village explained: ‘We are proud of our president; why should we hide it?! 
Moreover, if the street gets the name of Putin – it will be asphalted!’ 
(quoted in Podrez and Prikhodina 2014). Although the asphalting has 
not occurred yet, villagers indicated that the municipal snow blowers 
have cleaned the snow away from the village road every winter since the 
name change took place. Residents of the underpopulated village of 
Tyuli (Smolensk region) named their street after Putin in 2002 in order 
to attract new residents. One more ‘Putin Street’ emerged in the Kar-
dailovo village (Orenburg region) in 2006. The renaming in Kardailovo 
was a form of rural protest against the unlawful actions of the local au-
thorities, who did not want to delegate their responsibilities to a local 
village council in accordance with Putin’s programme of self-governance 
empowerment (Podrez and Prikhodina 2014). As soon as a geographical 
feature receives the president’s name, it attracts attention from the mass 
media and society, which motivates local power-holders to fulfil their 
duties and remedy local problems. 
Some reorganised collective farm enterprises have also received the 
name of Putin. Thus, the former ‘Kolkhoz of V.I.Lenin’ in the Par-
fenovo village (Irkutsk region) is the ‘Joint Stock Company of V.V.Putin’ 
since 2006. A local entrepreneur in the Gornovka village (Altai Krai) 
similarly named his farm: ‘JSC named after Putin’ (Baimukhametov 
2007). Galina Ivanova, a historian at the Russian Academy of Science 
(quoted in Podrez and Prikhodina, 2014), explains this renaming as fol-
lows: 
As part of the Bolshevik tradition, the name of the leader was not only 
used as a talisman and amulet, but also as a way to convey local problems 
to the authorities […] I would not attribute this to the people’s love. You 
know, kolkhozy were named after Khrushchev during his lifetime. This 
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was done to attract the Party’s attention to the kolkhozy’s problems and 
to receive some help. 
4.6. Conclusion 
This research demonstrates that the naive monarchist ‘myth of the tsar-
deliverer’ is widely used in state-society relations in contemporary Russia. 
The traditional, culturally-embedded image of the benevolent ruler is 
ably inculcated by the authoritarian regime for the purpose of social con-
trol. President Putin increasingly adheres to tsarist paternalistic methods 
to express his ‘benevolence’ to the people, and promotes the tsarist leg-
acy to develop a unified sense of Russian identity and to create positive 
historical parallels that justify his domestic and foreign policies. The 
principle of ‘ruchnoye upravleniye,’ which implies direct presidential in-
tervention in any internal affair, creates the image of a supreme, just 
president, who is able to remedy every situation and defend deprived 
people. In this context, villagers’ appeals to the president for help seem 
to be a matter of course. People write petitions and organise pickets and 
khody to persuade Putin – the ‘present-day tsar’ – to intervene on their 
behalf in conflicts with local power-holders. These ideal president-people 
relations could be an essential stabilising element of Russian regime, if 
the ‘myth of the tsar-deliverer’ would not be false. Similarly to the tsarist 
(and Soviet) governmental system, local officials are executors – rarely 
distorters – of the country leader’s orders. Field (1976) argued that this 
was the reason why naive monarchism faded and peasants no longer 
supported their monarch in the late tsarist period. Will this be the case 
for Putin’s Russia? Contrary to Field’s assumption, this research revealed 
that peasants continued to frame their dissents within the official dis-
course of deference and express their loyalty to the ruler and the regime, 
even after the fall of the tsardom. Therefore, the second component of 
naive monarchism – the ‘myth of the loyal peasants’ – is essential. 
Whereas the ‘myth of the tsar-deliverer’ is a myth, the rural loyalty to 
and obedience of the president reflect more ambivalence. This research 
revealed that many villagers sincerely believe in the figure of a benevo-
lent president, on whom they pin their hopes for justice and security. 
This is a result of state propaganda and the economic, social, and politi-
cal marginalisation of the rural population. However, the analysis of dif-
ferent rural grievances – which have traits of naive monarchism – dem-
onstrates that many rural activists deliberately employ ‘the myth of the 
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loyal peasants’ to avoid accusations of political opposition and conse-
quent repression, while ‘the myth of the tsar-deliverer’ helps them to ex-
ploit the gap between the rights promised by the president and those de-
livered by local authorities. Similarly to ‘rightful resisters’ in China, who 
refer to the state laws and regulations to justify their resistance and defy 
‘disloyal’ elites (O’Brien 1996), rural Russians use the official legislation 
to accuse local power-holders of misconduct. However, if rightful resist-
ers do not appeal to imaginary patronages but use legal channels of dis-
pute resolution; Russian villagers, although being similarly ‘rightful’ in 
their claims, address their grievances directly to the president.  
This research has revealed that rural activists went through many un-
successful appeals to various authorities and institutions to remedy their 
situations. The Russian system formally provides citizens with ‘democ-
ratic’ methods of resolving disputes, but as a rule, the outcomes are not 
in favour of subaltern groups. Conversely, appeals to the president may 
lead to a successful resolution. Although presidential interventions on 
behalf of the poor are rather exceptional, their probability is likely to mo-
tivate local authorities to fulfil their responsibilities. This option is often 
intentionally exploited by rural activists, who forward petitions addressed 
to the president to their oppressors, and make their protests in the name 
of Putin as loudly as possible. The not-so-naive use of naive monarchism 
manifests itself in the myth’s plasticity. Rural protesters intensify their 
activities during election periods, and their loyalty may shift from the 
president to other political leaders if the latter are willing to remedy the 
situation. Furthermore, rural public letters and missions to Putin express 
the villagers’ allegiance to the president and the regime, while the critique 
is often spoken behind the scenes (such as in the interviews with group 
protesters). Therefore, this research suggests that the veneration of the 
president in expressions of rural grievances, while not fully fictitious, is 
less a demonstration of peasant reverence and devotion to Putin, and 
more a defence strategy of the subaltern population.  
The alignment of the protesters’ causes with state policies and ideol-
ogy contradicts liberal and statist models of state-society relations, which 
view civil society as a counterweight to the state. Until recently, Russian 
civil society was considered underdeveloped and state-controlled. How-
ever, new studies have revealed that the state-embeddedness of many 
social movements and organisations should be interpreted not only in 
terms of a weakness, but as a strategy to perform and achieve discernible 
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results in a highly constrained political environment (Henry 2006). This 
study contributes to the latter discussion and looks beyond the liberal 
approach to state-society relations. It reveals that rural protests are more 
effective when they are framed within the official power discourse. Rural 
activists link their claims to state programmes in order to defy their local 
oppressors, and express their loyalty to Putin to lessen the risks of in-
subordination. Whether sincere or strategic, these rural politics are un-
able to challenge the status quo; nevertheless, they provide rural dwellers 
with a means to remedy occasional local injustices. 
 
Publication information: 
This Chapter is based on the article: Mamonova, N. 2016. Naive Monar-
chism and Rural Resistance in Contemporary Russia. Journal of Rural Soci-
ology, ahead-of-print. 
  
Notes 
 
1 Putin’s approval rating has always been high, and has varied from 61% to 83% 
since 2001. After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, it rose to 86%, and reached 
89% in June 2015 (Levada-Center 2015). 
2 The idea of the just, far-away supreme power that is benevolent to peasants – 
contrary to local power-holders – is detected in petitions to some other top au-
thorities, which justifies their inclusion in the sample. 
3 Change.org is a global non-profit petition platform established in 2007 in the 
USA, which became popular in many countries, including Russia. It provides a 
freemium tool for people to leave their personal and group petitions, and organ-
ize non-profit campaigns. Currently, there are more than 65 million users; popu-
lar topics are human rights, economic and criminal justice, the environment, 
health, and sustainable food. 
4 Conducted 20-07-2014, Stavropol Krai. 
5 Conducted in a rural school near Kurgan, published in Shuster 2012. 
6 Regular swine flu affects the pork production of rural households (contrary to 
LFEs, villagers are not able to ensure the quarantine and overall vaccination of 
their livestock). Pig slaughtering in rural households is often perceived by villagers 
as ‘a war against them’ that is initiated by LFEs, which are interested in monopo-
lising the pork meat market (Visser et al 2015). 
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7 The full text of this petition is available in Russian here: 
www.change.org/p/владимир-владимирович-путин-предотвратите-отмену-
поездов-хвойная-пестово-хвойная-будогощь-хвойная-подборовье 
8 Petitioners obtain the legalistic information from TV, newspapers, internet, ur-
ban relatives, and occasionally lawyers. 
9 Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation N932 ‘The programme 
of state guarantees of free provision of medical care to citizens in 2014’ 
10 Conducted 15 July 2014, Stavropol Krai. 
11 Conducted 30 May 2013, Purschevo village, Moscow region. 
12 Conducted 30 May 2013, Purschevo village, Moscow region. 
13 Conducted 30 May 2013, Purschevo village, Moscow region. 
14 Conducted 20 April 2013, Krasnogorsk, Moscow region 
15 Conducted 28 September 2010, Moscow 
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5 
Resistance or Adaptation? Responses of 
Rural Communities to Large-Scale Land 
Acquisitions in Ukraine 
 
 
Abstract 
While globally it is reported that peasants and smallholder farmers are 
fighting against land grabbing, Ukrainian villagers show tolerance and 
peaceful acceptance of land grab-related changes. This chapter analyses 
the “exceptional” case of non-resistance of the Ukrainian rural popula-
tion and argues that it is not as exceptional as it seems at first glance. By 
studying various rural responses to the large-scale agricultural develop-
ment in Ukraine and the resulting socio-economic transformations 
within rural communities, this study demonstrates that: the politics of 
dispossessed groups depend on the terms of inclusion in land deals; 
adaptive response strategies are common and can be advantageous for 
smallholders; and villagers are more concerned with personal gains from 
land grabs than with benefits for the whole community, which often 
leads to their acceptance of large-scale land acquisitions. This chapter 
challenges the dominant assumptions about rural resistance to land 
grabbing and calls for rethinking the nature of the contemporary rural 
politics worldwide. 
5.1. Introduction 
The assumption that resistance is an indispensable response of the rural 
poor to land grabbing is ingrained in the politics of many social move-
ments, NGOs, and rural development groups (i.e. La Via Campesina, 
MST). A number of academic and non-academic studies have been 
launched to find ways of helping rural dwellers all over the world in their 
struggles against the development of large-scale industrial agriculture and 
for a redefinition of their ‘way of life’ (Quan 2000, Adnan 2011, Schnei-
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der 2011). However, this focus on resistance suffers from simplification. 
Land grabs affect different rural groups in different ways, which creates a 
variety of reactions to them, from outright resistance to reckless enthusi-
asm or cautious acceptance. 
This research challenges three major assumptions about peasants’1 re-
sponses to land grabbing, namely: (1) resistance is the only response of 
rural communities toward large-scale land acquisitions; (2) peasants and 
smallholder farmers are unable to adapt and coexist with large-scale in-
dustrial agriculture; and (3) ideological concerns about the ‘peasant way 
of life’, food and land sovereignty dominate in rural struggles. This chap-
ter exposes these assumptions based on an empirical study of rural 
households’ response strategies to land grabbing2 and the development 
of large-scale agriculture in Ukraine.  
Ukraine was recently included by the World Bank in the list of re-
source-rich and finance-poor countries that became targets for land 
grabbing. The country possesses more than 25% of the world’s richest 
and most fertile soil, so-called Black Earth, and was the Soviet Union’s 
Bread Basket. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Ukraine launched 
a land reform aimed at breaking down kolkhozy and sovkhozy (collective 
and state farms) and distributing their lands to rural dwellers for private 
farming development. However, as all the necessary factors complemen-
tary to land (capital, know-how, upstream and downstream markets, the 
rule of law) disappeared with the breakdown of the collectives, rural 
dwellers could not make use of their new resource. Instead, the land be-
came concentrated: first in the hands of rural elites, and later accumu-
lated by large domestic and foreign investors that were motivated by the 
upswing in world food markets and the global land rush of the early 
2000s (Visser and Spoor 2011, Plank 2013). To date, 60% of Ukrainian 
farmland is controlled by large farm enterprises (LFEs), whose size and 
scale are comparable with the largest latifundia in Brazil and Argentina 
(Visser and Mamonova 2011, Lapa et al., 2008). Similar to many other 
countries affected by land grabs, the large-scale land acquisitions in 
Ukraine are often carried out in “shadow” schemes, which deprive the 
local population of their rights (Visser and Spoor 2011).  
The distinguishing feature of Ukraine lies in the near-absent overt 
protests3 of rural dwellers against large-scale land acquisitions (Visser and 
Mamonova 2011). Even the recent political crisis and the 2014 Ukrainian 
Revolution, which created ‘open moments4‘ for contestations, did not 
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stimulate rural dwellers to mobilise and resist the LFEs’ domination. The 
lack of open resistance among post-Soviet villagers is usually explained 
by 70 years of socialism (a time when expressions of disagreement were 
prosecuted), an ageing rural population (24.1% of rural residents are 
older than 60), households’ traditional dependency on large-scale farm-
ing, and a ‘culture of repression’ that limits the political consciousness of 
the post-Soviet population (see Visser and Mamonova 2011). That being 
said, although historical legacies and socio-political contextual factors are 
important variables in explaining the passivity of post-Soviet rural dwell-
ers, they make up only one side of the coin.  
This chapter explains the Ukrainian villagers’ tolerance and peaceful 
acceptance of land grab-related changes by analysing ‘terms of inclusion’ 
of the rural population in land deals. The analysis distinguishes between 
illusive inclusion, subordinate inclusion, and competitive exclusion, and 
reveals the reactive behaviour of rural dwellers to each of these terms. 
The chapter also analyses the most and least adaptive response strategies 
of rural households and the subsequent socio-economic transformations 
in rural communities. It indicates that the adaptive response strategies 
often lead to more advantageous positions in the rural society, and, as 
frequent as non-adaptive strategies. Finally, this chapter shows that vil-
lagers are more concerned with personal gains from land grabs than with 
benefits for the whole community, which often leads to their acceptance 
of large-scale land acquisitions. This study aims to challenge our assump-
tions about rural resistance in the post-Soviet countryside, and calls for 
rethinking the nature of the contemporary peasant politics worldwide.  
This research is largely based on fieldwork conducted during the 
summer of 2012 in two regions of Ukraine: the Letichevsk district (the 
Khmelnitsk region, Western Ukraine) and the Pereyaslav-Khmelnitskiy 
district (the Kiev region, Central Ukraine). These two regions are charac-
terised by high soil fertility and a large number of LFEs operating there. 
The analysis of rural responses to land grabbing is drawn from 52 semi-
structured in-depth interviews with inhabitants of the analysed districts 
(44 small-scale farmers and rural workers, 3 chief managers of LFEs, and 
5 representatives of local authorities). The small-scale farmers and rural 
workers also participated in a household survey (see Appendix 1). The 
survey findings were supplemented by a number of all-Ukrainian sur-
veys: the ‘Socio-economic situation in the contemporary Ukrainian vil-
lage’ survey, conducted by the Gorshenin Institute in 2011, the ‘Land 
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relations in Ukraine: sociological portrait of the situation’ survey, con-
ducted by the Centre of Social Expertise of the Institute of Sociology of 
the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) of Ukraine in 2013, and the 
FAO Farm Survey conducted in 2005 (referred in the analysis as 
Gorshenin survey 2011, NAS survey 2013, and FAO Farm Survey 2005, 
respectively).5 Furthermore, various sources of academic literature, mass 
media publications, and statistical sources such as the State Committee 
of Ukraine for Statistics (Ukrstat), and World Bank reports informed the 
analysis.  
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section (Section 5.2) 
discusses three major assumptions about peasant responses to land 
grabbing in academic and non-academic literature. Section 5.3 provides a 
historical analysis of Ukrainian agrarian relations, in order to characterise 
the level of socio-economic stratification within rural communities at the 
moment land grabbing occurred. Section 5.4 analyses the different proc-
esses of villagers’ exclusion and inclusion in modern agricultural devel-
opment that shape their attitudes toward land deals. Section 5.5 demon-
strates the pros and cons of the Ukrainian rural households’ adaptive and 
resisting response strategies to large-scale agribusinesses. Section 5.6 ex-
amines rural attitudes to land grabbing by using the attitude toward land 
sales as an indicator. Finally, Section 5.7 discusses the generalisability of 
the findings and their application in wider rural communities.  
5.2. Three major assumptions about peasant responses to 
land grabs  
In recent literature on land grabbing, rural dwellers are considered vic-
tims of large-scale land acquisitions whose traditional subsistence 
schemas are threatened by limiting their access to land and other natural 
resources (Quan 2000, Adnan 2011, Schneider 2011). Adnan (2011: 4) 
writes: ‘the political responses of the dispossessed groups have involved 
resistance to land grabbing and dispossession as well as struggles for 
gaining possession or repossession of land’. The common assumption 
that peasants and smallholder farmers inherently oppose large-
scale land acquisitions is applied by many anti-land grab social move-
ments, such as La Via Campesina and MST (McMichael 2006). ’Farmers 
and civil society groups have strongly opposed land grabbing every-
where...’ – stated La Via Campesina in its call for mobilisation at the In-
ternational Day of the Peasant’s Struggle (La Via Campesina 2013). 
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Meanwhile, according to the World Bank Group, large-scale land ac-
quisitions can be, to some extent, beneficial to the local population. In-
deed, there are many people being included or incorporated into the 
emerging enclaves of land-based investments, through a variety of 
schemes: contract farming, plantation workers, and so on. (Borras and 
Franco 2013). The critics of this ‘win-win’ scenario argue that this inclu-
sion of rural dwellers is an ‘adverse incorporation’, i.e. the exploitation 
and subordination of incorporated groups in highly unequal power rela-
tions. According to Hickey and du Toit (2007: 21), this leads to the mar-
ginalisation of subordinated groups and their chronic poverty.  
However, different academic studies show that even under adverse 
incorporation, rural dwellers manage to find advantages. Thus, many vil-
lagers benefit from the recent large-scale agricultural development in Ka-
zakhstan by taking the jobs it creates. Rural Kazakhs, according to Pet-
rick et al. (2013: 164), ‘due to the socialist tradition of industrialised 
farming operations […] regard themselves primarily as workers and not 
as land owners’, and therefore, do not struggle for autonomy, and accept 
work at the new latifundia. Smalley and Corbera (2012: 1050) found that 
the attitude to land investments varies across different rural groups in 
Kenya. Their interviews with farmers indicated the ‘vision of develop-
ment through jobs’ and the ‘desire for agricultural development projects’ 
as the reasons behind the support of land deals; in contrast, the majority 
of the interviewed pastoralists opposed land acquisitions, referring to 
‘fear of eviction or lost access’. Consequently, for some rural groups and 
sectors, land grabbing does not necessarily bring negative changes.  
The peasants’ attitude to land grabbing critically depends on the 
‘terms of inclusion’ of local population in land deals (McCarthy 2010). 
According to Witcher (2003: 7) ‘terms of inclusion’ are derived from ‘so-
cietal relationships and criteria for access prioritised by whichever domi-
nates’. Therefore, understanding the political economy of the new social 
structures and the labour regimes that emerge from them is highly im-
portant for analysing various rural responses to land grabbing. 
The second popular assumption is that peasants and smallholder 
farmers are unable to adapt to and coexist with large-scale indus-
trial agriculture. This revitalises the long-standing debate on the persis-
tence and disappearance of the peasantry (see Araghi 1995, Boltvinik 
2012). Populist social movements redefine the ‘peasant way’6 in opposi-
tion to a globalised neo-liberal corporate-driven model of agricultural 
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production in order to mobilise peasants against land grabbing 
(McMichael 2006, Desmarais 2002). Class-based theorists, on the other 
hand, observe how the peasantry disappears under the competitive pres-
sures of modern corporate agriculture, and see the ongoing rural unrest 
as a class struggle (Bernstein 2004, Adnan 2011).  
These positions largely overlook the ability of small-scale food pro-
ducers to adapt to and coexist with industrial agriculture, and become 
active participants, not protesting victims. The possibility of combining 
large-scale agriculture with peasant farming is advocated by the World 
Bank. The Bank suggests that, at low levels of population density, large-
scale investments in land are appropriate, and ‘voluntary land transfers 
that make everybody better off are possible’ (World Bank 2010a: 55). 
Olivier de Schutter (2011: 259-261), a former UN Special Reporter on 
the Right to Food, criticised the Bank’s position for ‘simplification’. 
However, he acknowledged that the ‘coexistence’ scenario is possible, if 
the existing rights of land users are clearly defined, and the markets 
where peasants and large agriculturalists operate can remain highly seg-
mented - for instance, when all the production of large-scale agriculture 
is shipped abroad, while the food security in the home country is guaran-
teed by small-scale producers. 
Analysing market niches where rural households and large-scale agri-
business operate, as well as the structural changes in the peasant mode of 
production, is highly important for understanding rural response strate-
gies to land grabbing. 
The third assumption about peasant struggles is that peasants and 
smallholder farmers are concerned with the ‘peasant way’, food 
and land sovereignty, and economic and ecological justice, when 
they adopt strategies to respond to land grabbing. This position is 
centre-stage in the works of many academics (Kay 2012, Rosset et al. 
2011), and grounds the programmes of rural social movements defend-
ing peasants’ rights for food and land sovereignty (McMichael 2006).  
Meanwhile, Pye (2010) identifies the frequent mismatch between the 
global campaigns of civil society and rural social movements, and the 
local concerns of villagers in the context of Indonesia. For example, 
while biofuel debates are globally framed in terms of biodiversity conser-
vation and climate justice, local concerns focus on land rights and em-
ployment conditions. As Pye argues, the complaints of palm oil small-
holders and plantation workers are conspicuously absent at the 
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international level of civil society and social movement campaigns 
(Borras et al. 2010). Boyer (2010) studied the failure of the global food 
sovereignty campaign of La Via Campesina in post-war Honduras, and 
came to the conclusion that the transnational agrarian movement ignores 
local peasant understandings, needs, and organisations. According to the 
author, La Via Campesina’s food sovereignty programme was associated 
by Honduran peasants with the powers of nation states, while the con-
cept of food security resonated with deeply held peasant understandings 
of security for their continued social reproduction in insecure social and 
natural conditions. Edelman and León (2013), in their analysis of land 
grabbing cycles, noticed that, contrary to the fact that palm oil planta-
tions are often linked with land grabbing, the rural population in Hondu-
ras is very positive about this crop and is willing to engage in contract 
farming agreements7 with large private investors despite heavy criticism 
from Honduran civil activists. Mamonova (2013) analysed the mismatch 
between the demands of the ‘Defenders’ social movement in the Mos-
cow region (who clamoured against the grabbing of historical land in 
Radonezh), and the local rural population (who was more concerned 
with access to the forest and river, which were blocked by the land grab-
bers).  
Placing the land and food sovereignty concepts in the centre of peas-
ant struggles and romanticising peasants’ motives for land grab resistance 
might bring us to the wrong conclusions, and, consequently, to the de-
velopment of wrong policies and programmes for the protection of 
smallholders’ rights. 
The following analysis of the contemporary everyday rural politics in 
Ukraine is an attempt to look beyond the common assumptions on rural 
resistance toward land grabs.  
5.3. Ukrainian agrarian relations and socio-economic 
stratification before land grabs 
In order to understand the nature of rural responses to land grabbing 
and transformations within rural communities, it is important to address 
the pattern of agrarian evolution and the level of socio-economic stratifi-
cation in Ukraine at the moment land grabbing occurred. 
Traditionally, Ukrainian peasants, like many peasants in the Russian 
Empire8, belonged to communes, which were responsible for collective 
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decision-making, tax payments, and the periodic redistribution of land 
among peasants9. The Stolypin land reform (1905-1915) aimed to break 
down the commune system and create private land ownership. The 
emerging system of private agriculture caused an increase of agricultural 
yields and sown area in Ukrainian provinces; however, it only lasted a 
short period (Malienko 2010). The socialist revolution of 1917 and the 
establishment of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1919 ended 
the prospects for private property. Leninist ideologies consider private 
property as the basis of class exploitation and the dependency of em-
ployed workers on a privileged group of owners. The Soviet goal was to 
abolish ‘immoral’ capitalist private property and to create a class of rural 
labourers who would share the socialist values of common ownership 
and equality between people (Zemstov 1991).  
The socialist agrarian reforms of 1919-1921 revitalised the commune 
system and launched podroskladka (a campaign of confiscating grain and 
other agricultural produce from the peasants for a fixed price). The so-
cialisation of agriculture and the subtractive policy of the Soviet state 
caused mass peasant revolts in Ukraine. These uprisings, along with 
other threats to Bolshevik dictatorship, forced Lenin to reconsider his 
economic policy. The New Economic Policy (NEP) was implemented in 
1921-1927 and was primarily a new agricultural policy (Cohen 1980). It 
established a mixed socialist market economy, which allowed private 
landholdings, and substituted podroskladka with prodpodatok (a tax on the 
peasants, payable in the form of raw agricultural product). This allowed 
small-scale producers to keep their surplus, which positively affected 
their productivity and caused an increase in gross agricultural production.  
Stalin, who became the USSR leader in 1928, saw the NEP as a return 
to capitalism and launched the Collectivisation campaign (1929-1933), 
which aimed to consolidate individual land, property and labour into 
kolkhozy and sovkhozy - and therefore eliminate independent small-
scale agricultural producers. The Soviet leadership was convinced that 
these measurements would increase agricultural productivity and create 
the grain reserves needed for the country’s industrialisation. Although 
the increase in agricultural productivity was rather unfeasible and ac-
complished predominantly by violent measures like harvest expropria-
tion and dekulakisation10 (leading to famines in 1931-1932 in Ukraine), 
the relative equalisation of rural dwellers was indeed achieved by the col-
lectivisation (Humphrey 2002a). Throughout the Soviet period, the state 
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exercised total control over the stratification of rural communities by 
regulating household incomes and equalising the size of household plots 
(Wegren 2005b). 
The ‘Soviet peasant’11 lost the peasant-like features of ‘autonomous, 
property-conscious economising’, but retained ‘corporatism’ and ‘egali-
tarianism’ (Humphrey 2002a). Despite the proclaimed proletarianisation 
of society, Soviet villagers did not completely become rural labourers. 
Even though nearly all Ukrainian peasants had official jobs at kolkhozy 
and sovkhozy, they also conducted subsistence farming on their house-
hold plots of 0.4 ha on average, which villagers had been allowed to have 
since the late 1930s. This highly productive small-scale agriculture was 
‘outside the state planning and procurement system’ (Wegren 2005b: 8). 
Even the ‘state war against personal subsidiary farming’12 launched by 
Khrushchev in 1958-1959 did not eradicate this form of production (al-
though it minimised the amount of livestock held by the rural popula-
tion). The Brezhnev government (1966-1982), instead, stimulated self-
food provisioning due to the failure of the centrally planned economy to 
provide enough food for the population. Therefore, despite the Soviet 
anti-smallholders policy, Ukrainian rural dwellers preserved important 
elements of the peasant mode of production, i.e. family-based subsis-
tence agriculture and land possession.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine launched a 
land reform aimed at revitalising peasant agriculture. During the first 
stage of land reform (1990-1999), former collective lands were distrib-
uted to rural dwellers by means of land-share certificates for private 
farming. Consequently, in addition to household plots, rural dwellers 
gained the right to use land plots (average 4 ha), which were located usu-
ally at a distance from villages. Ownership of the distributed lands could 
occur if the certificate-holder underwent the process of land registration 
and privatisation, or devoted his or her share to the authorised capital of 
the reorganised collective farm. Contrary to the expectations of the re-
form developers, land recipients did not show much interest in leaving 
the collectives to establish individual family farms. Only 3% of certifi-
cate-holders registered their land rights by 1995 (Lerman et al. 2007). 
A common explanation for the failure of this stage of the land reform 
has been that exit costs for individual workers were too high (in terms of 
finance and equipment), and emerging markets were still largely geared 
toward large collective successor farms (Mathijs and Swinnen 1998). 
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Some authors refer to the rural population’s possession of household 
plots as a reason for the unsuccessful collective land distribution. We-
gren (2005a: 19) indicated that ‘at the onset of market reforms some 
97% of rural households already had [household] land plots, and most 
households had limited human capital. Therefore, the expansion of 
landholdings through privatisation would be attractive or feasible to a 
relatively small percentage of rural households’.  
Lerman et al. (2004: 149) argue that farm managers, who were seen as 
‘omniscient community leaders’, were interested in the preservation of 
large-scale organisation as a way to keep their power and perquisites – 
and, therefore, used their authority to manipulate information about the 
land reform. A 1997 World Bank survey shows that only a few Ukrainian 
rural dwellers knew about the possibilities of establishing private farming 
on the distributed lands, while the majority of the rural population (80%) 
was informed that they could “invest” their land shares back to farm en-
terprises (Csaki and Lerman 1997). This concentrated the collective lands 
in the hands of the rural elites, who ‘gained de facto ownership of land 
and with it, the autonomy and economic incentive to persist in their new 
roles as leaders in a quasi-feudal system’ (Allina-Pisano 2002: 314). Those 
few private farmers13 that emerged in the post-1991 period were almost 
always either former Party-connected functionaries or rural elite, who 
had known how to organise business under the Soviet rule. The majority 
of the post-Soviet rural population had lost the historical memory and 
cultural tradition of entrepreneurship due to a 70-year reign of socialist 
principles and socialist ideology (Petrick and Carter 2009, Visser 2010). 
The first stage of the land reform was accompanied by a sharp reduc-
tion of state subsidies in agriculture and the price liberalisation of agricul-
tural products. This led to the bankruptcy of many collective farms and 
the abandonment of collective farmlands (Visser and Spoor 2011). This 
in turn induced a rapid growth of rural unemployment, a drastic decline 
in the livelihood conditions and living standards of many rural families, a 
lack of social security, and a rising psychosocial tension caused by little 
hope for the future (Borodina 2009). In order to guarantee their subsis-
tence, many Ukrainian villagers became largely dependent on subsistence 
farming on their household plots. Von Braun and Lohlein (2003) ob-
served a significant increase in the share of agricultural land devoted to 
subsistence production and the number of rural dwellers engaged in sub-
sistence farming during the period of 1990-1999. At the time, in-kind 
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income from subsidiary plots accounted for 44.4% of the total rural 
household income, while wages and social transfers made up 16.3% and 
13.4%, respectively (Moroz 2010).  
The first stage of the land reform had, indeed, revitalised peasant ag-
riculture in Ukraine; however, it created a large group of small traditional 
subsistence cultivators, instead of individual family farmers. On the eve 
of massive land grabbing in Ukraine, the stratification within rural com-
munities was minimal: a first, very small group, was that of the rural el-
ites (5% of the population, according to Wegren 2005b), who had main-
tained their ruling positions since the Soviet Union; the second group (in 
fact, the main rural population) was represented by impoverished small-
holders – who did have some small incomes from wage work but were 
largely dependent on subsistence farming on their household plots. 
5.4. Large-scale land acquisitions and ‘terms of inclusion’ of 
rural population in land deals 
Large-scale land acquisitions by domestic and foreign investors started in 
Ukraine with the beginning of the second stage of the land reform (1999 
to present) (Borodina 2009, Plank 2013). The 1999 Presidential Decree 
forced the collective agricultural enterprises to distribute the land shares 
in kind to rural dwellers. Since then, nearly 7 million rural residents have 
become official owners of physical land plots (not just paper-based cer-
tificates), and about 65% of the arable land is physically owned by rural 
individuals (Lerman et al. 2006). In 2001, the Land Code came into 
force, which legally guaranteed land titles and imposed a moratorium on 
land sales until 2005. The moratorium has already been extended several 
times (until 2008, 2012, 2013, 2016), and was shelved indefinitely after 
the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution14. Although the moratorium aims to pro-
tect land ownership of the rural population, in practice, it only serves as a 
formal prevention of land deals (Plank 2013, Visser and Spoor 2011).  
The rise of global food prices and the relative stabilisation of the in-
vestment climate in Ukraine brought new players to the Ukrainian land 
market. Many domestic and foreign investors gained control over 
Ukrainian farmlands through various leasing schemes, and in some cases 
through fraudulent purchases, despite the land sale moratorium (Visser 
and Mamonova 2011). As a result, export-oriented LFEs emerged in 
Ukraine. Their size and scale are comparable with the largest latifundia in 
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Brazil and Argentina. To date, the 18 largest LFEs control 1.7 million ha 
of agricultural land, which constitutes approximately 11% of all farmland 
controlled by large and middle-size private farms of Ukraine (Lapa et al. 
2008). The leading position is held by ‘agroholdings’ (vertically and hori-
zontally integrated groups of affiliated and associated agroenterprises), 
which has become a customary term to characterise the Ukrainian agri-
cultural development. Agroholdings contribute up to 20% in total agri-
cultural production (Kobuta et al. 2012). These operators expand much 
faster than the average farm producers and are often associated with land 
grabbing (Rylko 2009).  
The rapid development of large-scale industrial soil-intensive agricul-
ture put Ukraine on the list of the major agricultural exporters in the 
world. In 2008–2009, Ukraine was the third largest exporter of grain 
worldwide. Even the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution and consequent civil 
war did not affect the country’s leading position in food exports. In 
2014, Ukraine ranked second among exporters of sunflower seed, fifth 
for barley, sixth for rapeseed and corn (maize), and ninth for wheat (In-
dexMundi 2014). 
But what has happened to Ukrainian rural dwellers? One might ex-
pect a rise of rural resistance to large-scale agricultural development, as 
occurred in many other countries affected by land grabs (McMichael 
2006). Instead, Visser and Mamonova (2011) reported incredibly weak 
rural opposition to large-scale land acquisitions in Ukraine. Even the 
‘open moments15‘ for contestations, which occurred during the 2014 
Ukrainian Revolution, did not trigger rural rebellion against the system 
of LFE’s domination16.  
According to McCarthy (2010), the peasants’ attitude to land grabbing 
depends on the ‘terms of inclusion’ of the local population in land deals. 
He argues that the way land tenure systems and informal land markets 
work, the type of land investments, and the implementation of small-
holder development schemes in villages are critical factors that influence 
the exclusion or inclusion of local people in land deals. 
Below three different terms, upon which Ukrainian rural dwellers are 
incorporated in land deals, are distinguished and discussed. These terms 
largely influence rural attitudes to land grabbing.  
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5.4.1. Illusive inclusion 
The term ‘illusive inclusion’ is borrowed from poverty and inequality 
studies. The illusive inclusion occurs in social settings when ‘inclusion is 
ensured but the outcome is not different from that of being excluded’ 
(Joseph 2012: 6). The illusive inclusion of Ukrainian villagers in land 
deals started with the titling programme in 2001. Although rural dwellers 
received titles on the distributed land plots, they were hardly able to de-
rive substantial benefits from them. At the time, 95% of the title recipi-
ents were of retirement and pre-retirement age, and were unable to culti-
vate the given lands (Koteneva 2010). According to Bondarchuk (2011: 
1), ‘this process was just a farce, aimed at showing the “fairness” of land 
distribution and led to the concentration of Ukrainian black soil in the 
hands of rich rogues’.  
Nevertheless, the land titles allow their holders to lease the distributed 
land plots to LFEs and receive a ‘pai’ (from the Ukrainian word for 
‘share’, a word used by the local population to name annual monetary or 
in-kind compensation for leased land plots). The current average size of 
the pai, reported by agricultural enterprises, is 500 UAH (equal to 47 Eu-
ros) per land parcel of 4 ha (NAS survey 2013). In practice, many enter-
prises pay the pai in-kind in shares of 5% from the crop harvested on the 
leased lands, which is less than the declared average price (estimations 
derived from the fieldwork interviews). Many villagers are dissatisfied 
with the low price they get for their land shares. The pai accounts for up 
to 4.2% of the average household income (Lerman et al. 2006). In cases 
when rural families hold livestock, the in-kind pai becomes an additional 
feed source. 
The pai-system is, in fact, the continuation of the former kolkhozy 
and sovkhozy support of households. In the Soviet times, ‘households 
were allowed to use a whole array of collective facilities, from obtaining 
young livestock from the collective to letting private cattle graze on col-
lective pastures, using kolkhoz machinery, and selling their produce 
through the sales networks of the collectives’ (Visser 2010: 
289). Furthermore, collective farms regularly supplied their production 
to their workers as a compensation for meagre wages. Previously, this 
support was informal. It has currently become formalised through con-
tractual transfers, but has also shrunk to only crop sharing. Nevertheless, 
the formalisation of support has made rural dwellers feel included in the 
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distribution of benefits from land use. Maria (65) an inhabitant of the 
village Rysanivtsy said:  
Formerly, kolkhoz brought grain to our road with a truck – take as much 
as you want... Now they [agroenterprise] pay us the pais. I receive 800 
kilogrammes of wheat for my land plot of 3 hectares. It is not as good as 
in the Soviet Union, but it is at least something. [...] I feed my chickens 
with it17. 
Most of the elderly rural population welcomes large-scale land in-
vestments in Ukraine. LFEs are seen as successors of Soviet collective 
farms. Elderly villagers still call them ‘kolkhozy’ and ‘sovkhozy’. The per-
sistence of old terms not only expresses the habits of colloquial speech, 
but also demonstrates the actual and perceived continuity of the dual 
system of agricultural production: large-scale “collective” agriculture ver-
sus small-scale subsistent farming. Visser et al. (2014), based on the ex-
ample of Russian agriculture (which underwent a transformation roughly 
similar to the one in Ukraine), argued that there was no significant redis-
tribution of farmland during the post-socialist land reform: kolkhozy and 
sovkhozy have been transferred into LFEs, while the rural population 
continues subsistence farming at their household plots. Nikulin (2011) 
even applies the term ‘post-kolkhoz’ to contemporary LFEs to stress the 
continuity of collective farming. This continuity influences villagers’ 
emotional expectations of their relationships with LFEs. Furthermore, 
the use of Soviet language in contemporary speeches demonstrates the 
rural population’s strong nostalgia for the Soviet past. Heady and Gam-
bold-Miller (2006), for instance, demonstrate in one of their case-studies 
how villagers welcome the revitalisation of an abandoned kolkhoz by a 
new investor, hoping to return to the ‘good old times’. 
Therefore, the continuation and formalisation of some Soviet prac-
tices meets the emotional expectations of elderly villagers and creates a 
positive attitude towards the ongoing large-scale land acquisitions in 
Ukraine. These pai-recipients feel included in the land deals, although on 
a smaller scale than they wish to be. Furthermore, the elderly people do 
not have sufficient labour resources to cultivate the distributed lands, 
which results in a lack of competition for lands between these rural 
dwellers and LFEs.  
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5.4.2. Subordinate inclusion 
The fieldwork data indicate that the majority of working-age rural dwell-
ers see large-scale land acquisitions as an opportunity for wage work. 
The use of the distributed land plots for family farm business is highly 
constrained by a number of factors: the pro-large scale agricultural policy 
of the Ukrainian state, the LFEs’ control over the agri-food value-chain, 
the erosion of peasant entrepreneurial features during the Soviet period, 
and rural poverty. According to the 2005 FAO Farm Survey, 96% of the 
Ukrainian rural population did not want to start individual farming 
(Lerman et al. 2006). In the meantime, 24% of rural respondents to the 
2011 Gorshenin survey indicated a strong desire for a job at LFEs. 
The post-Soviet legacy of industrial farming largely defines the rural 
demand for wage work (Petrick et al. 2013). However, villagers prefer 
the work at agroholdings to employment at individual farms or kolkhoz-
style LFEs. This might be explained by their rational cost-benefit calcula-
tions from the subordinate inclusion in the new form of farming. Agro-
holdings, as a rule, provide decent wages to their employees and offer 
higher labour standards (Lapa et al. 2008). To date, the average monthly 
salary in agriculture is about 1,960 UAH (equal to 187 Euros) (Ukrtat 
2014). The field research for this study indicates that the workers of 
agroholdings receive 2-3 times more.  
This causes a struggle for incorporation into large-scale agriculture in 
subordinate positions (subordinate inclusion) among rural dwellers. Ac-
cording to Viktor Prikazhnuk, the director of the ‘Obry’ agrocompany (a 
subsidiary of a large American agroholding), more than 30 people are on 
a waiting list for the position of a combine driver. However, 
agroholdings require skilled workers without ‘bad habits’ (i.e. drinking, 
unreliability), which is often missing in Ukraine (Lerman et al. 2007). Ac-
cording to the FAO Farm Survey (2005), 40% of LFEs complain of a 
rural labour shortage, despite high rural unemployment. 
The last decade of large-scale agricultural development in the Ukrain-
ian countryside is characterised by the reduction of overall rural poverty. 
The share of rural households with average per capita monthly expenses 
below the living wage decreased from 82.6% in 2000 to 63.9% in 200618 
(Moroz 2010). Furthermore, there is an increase in the wage-work share 
in household income: from 16.3% in 1999 to 23% in 2012 (Ukrstat 2014, 
NAS survey 2013). At the same time, however, the rise of salaries in ag-
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riculture is accompanied by declining employment rates. The rapidly ex-
panding agroholdings strive to achieve economies of scale and apply la-
bour-saving technologies. This caused the decrease in the rural labour 
force from 8.9 million people in 1999 to 8.3 million people in 2005, a 
6.7% decrease (Moroz 2010).  
5.4.3. Competitive exclusion 
A negative attitude to LFEs is inherent among private family farmers. 
Many of these farmers are the former Soviet rural intelligentsia and elite 
(agronomists, accountants, chairmen of reorganised kolkhozy and sovk-
hozy), who managed to detach their land plots during the land reform 
and accumulated additional lands by leasing them from their neighbours. 
The average size of the lands cultivated by these farmers is 175 ha (NAS 
survey 2013). Currently, these farmers account for 5% of the gross agri-
cultural product of the country (Ukrstat 2014). 
Farmers have to compete with LFEs for leased lands and are forced 
to pay a pai sum equal to the share paid by regional agroenterprises, 
which is usually beyond farmers’ financial capacities.  
Furthermore, LFEs, especially agroholdings, are major recipients of 
indirect and direct state subsidies, such as cash transfers, grants, tax cred-
its, and low-interest loans. According to Volodymyr Lapa19, the general 
director of the Ukrainian Agribusiness Club, 60% of the total national 
agricultural subsidies in 2012 were obtained by LFEs. Moreover, the ver-
tical integration of the agroholdings allows them to control the value-
chain and exclude other agricultural operators from it (Plank 2013). 
These factors create the competitive exclusion (i.e. exclusion through 
competition) of private farmers from agribusiness and consequently 
from land markets in Ukraine. Farmer Nikolay (45) described the un-
equal competition with agroholdings:  
Agroholdings! Who are they? They are bandits! They evade taxes. They 
do not pay taxes at all! […] Moreover, they receive millions in state sub-
sidies. No farmer, no odnoosibnik [independent peasant] has received any 
kopeyka [cent] from the state. Furthermore, they export the grain. They 
have access to foreign markets. They export it at a good price. Mean-
while, the resellers grab my grain at the lowest price…20  
Due to such unfair competition, many private farmers go bankrupt. 
The Ukrainian State Committee for Statistics declared a slight decrease in 
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the number of private farmers: from 43,000 in 2006 to 40,800 in 2013 
(Ukrstat 2014). The Committee explains this through farm consolida-
tions and the global financial crisis. However, Kropivko (2012) suggests 
that, in reality, this decrease is much larger. The fieldwork for this re-
search identified that many farmers are bankrupt or on the brink of 
bankruptcy, but remain registered in the State Register of Legal Entities. 
In fact, they are subsistence farmers – producing just enough to guaran-
tee the subsistence of their families, or being hired by LFEs to work the 
field with their private machinery.  
The three above-mentioned terms upon which Ukrainian rural dwell-
ers are incorporated in land deals refute the assumption of peasants’ out-
right opposition to large-scale agricultural development. The land tenure 
system in Ukraine allows the large group of elderly pai-recipients to 
benefit from the activities of LFEs by engaging in land leasing relation-
ships with them. The absence of smallholder development schemes in 
Ukrainian villages, as well as the absence of entrepreneurial features 
among many working-age villagers, prevents them from establishing in-
dividual family farms, which leads to their desire for wage-work at LFEs. 
Only when the rural dwellers and LFEs operate in the same markets and 
compete for the same land (as in the case of private farmers) is the resis-
tance to large-scale agribusiness unavoidable.  
5.5. Household response strategies and socio-economic 
stratification  
As shown in Section 5.3, the stratification in rural communities on the 
eve of land grabbing was minimal. Therefore, I accept the relative ho-
mogeneity of the rural society as the starting point of analysis, and do 
not disaggregate different rural strata in advance. However, I do agree 
that demographic characteristics, occupation, and slightly different access 
to production resources in Ukrainian villages in the late 1990s influenced 
the choice of households’ response strategies.  
Table 5.1 summarises the arguments presented in this chapter about 
rural attitudes to land grabbing, terms of inclusion, different response 
strategies, and consequential stratification within rural communities. This 
table is based on the household survey developed and conducted for the 
purposes of this analysis (see Appendix 1). The rural households were 
sampled through a random process, except for the category of family 
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farmers, which was selected based on purposive sampling in order to 
increase the observations-to-variables ratio for this category. The sample 
size met the requirements of the ‘Rule of 5’ (the number of observations 
is no lower than five per variable); therefore, this sample size is large 
enough to define the differences between the five groups.  
Table 5.1 
Household response strategies to land grabs and their outcomes in Ukraine. 
N Household 
response 
strategies 
Terms of 
inclusion 
Outcome Consequential 
rural stratifi-
cation 
Atti-
tude to 
land 
sales 
Number 
of re-
spon-
dents 
S1 Competi-
tion with 
LFEs 
Competi-
tive exclu-
sion 
Bankruptcy Farmers, peas-
ant-workers, 
subsistence 
farmers  
Nega-
tive 
5 
S2 Taking a 
free market 
niche 
Illusive 
inclusion 
Coexistence, 
semi-
independence 
Odnoosibniks  Nega-
tive 
13 
S3 Employ-
ment  
Subordi-
nate inclu-
sion  
Semi-
proletarisation 
Peasant-workers  Positive 6 
S4  Rural out-
migration  
Illusive 
inclusion  
Social exclu-
sion 
Jobless  Positive 7 
S5 Indiffer-
ence  
Illusive 
inclusion 
Dependence on 
social transfers 
(pension) 
Pensioners-
subsistence 
farmers 
Nega-
tive  
7 
 
Social exclu-
sion  
Marginals Positive  5 
Source: Author’s own elaboration. 
 
The ‘household response strategies’ were defined by analysing the 
daily activities and the main income source of households. The various 
‘terms of inclusion’ were distinguished based on how the rural dwellers 
managed the distributed land shares and gained access to the products of 
their own labour. The category ‘outcomes’ was derived from the analysis 
of changes in income, occupation, and relations to the means of produc-
tion (land, labour, and capital). The agrarian transformation theories 
were used to construct the ‘consequential rural stratification’ category. 
‘Attitude to land sales’ refers to the villagers’ opinions about the morato-
rium. The last column presents the number of respondents per category. 
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5.5.1. Competition with LFEs (strategy S1) 
The ‘competition with LFEs’ strategy conducted by Ukrainian private 
farmers was partly discussed earlier in Subsection 5.4.3. The present sec-
tion is devoted to the analysis of the farmers’ efficiency and resilience, as 
well as prospects for private farming.  
Private farmers constitute less than 1% of the rural population. The 
core business of Ukrainian farmers was (and is) grain production, which 
is threatened by agroholdings that became dominant in this market seg-
ment (Kobuta et al. 2012). In comparison with large-scale agribusiness, 
small farmers in the fieldwork area have lower yields per hectare. Thus, 
farmers from the Pereyaslav-Khmelnitskiy district harvest 20 centners21 
of wheat per ha, while the Ukrainian-British agroholding ‘Niva Pere-
yaslavschiny’ operating in the same region harvests twice as much be-
cause of its intensive use of fertilisers. The board chairman of this hold-
ing, Olexander Yaroschuk, said about the farmers’ choice for 
competition with large-scale agriculture:  
I do not understand what they [private farmers] are doing in this busi-
ness! They do not know how to be efficient; they do not know the tech-
nologies. They cannot compete with us. I do not understand why they 
keep on growing wheat and reject the idea of planting… strawberries, for 
example, which is much more labour-intensive and does not require 
economies of scale!22 
Repositioning to another market niche requires significant financial 
investments, which are often unavailable to farmers. Commercial farmers 
are less flexible and adaptive (than subsistence-oriented rural house-
holds) to changing environments as they do not control their resource 
base (more than 50% of their lands are leased), often use hired labour, 
and have fixed obligations to suppliers and counterparts (e.g. leasing 
storage facilities). Furthermore, the labour-intensive farming sector is 
occupied by rural households, who manage to produce these products at 
lower costs (see Subsection 5.5.2).  
Unequal competition and farmers’ reluctance (and inability) to adapt 
to large-scale agricultural development, as well the absence of state pro-
grammes supporting private farmers, lead to the gradual disappearance 
of commercial family farming in Ukraine. Lapa et al. (2008) expect that, 
in the coming years, large agroholdings will squeeze the majority of pri-
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vate farmers out from the agriculture sector, and that those who will re-
main will only hold single niches in agricultural production.  
5.5.2. Taking a free market niche (strategy S2) 
The majority of agroholdings in Ukraine specialise in export-oriented 
intensive monocrop production that brings quick profits. Meanwhile, 
less profitable, more time- consuming and labour-intensive farming 
(such as the production of potatoes, vegetables, fruits, and milk) was left 
outside the focus of large agribusiness (Prokopa and Borodina 2012). 
The adaptation strategy of the majority of Ukrainian households con-
sisted of abandoning the grain production sector (where they had been 
present before the year 2000), and specialising fully in labour-intensive 
farming.  
Table 5.2 outlines such changes in the production of three major farm 
products: wheat, potatoes and milk (so chosen because they characterise 
the division of market niches between rural households and large agri-
business). The period before the year 2000 is characterised by a drastic 
decline in the production and share of agricultural enterprises in total 
agricultural output, and a rise in commercial family farming. With the 
expansion of LFEs after the year 2000, the market division occurred. 
LFEs became specialised in wheat production, producing more than 
80% of the total wheat harvested. According to official statistics, the 
share of households has not changed. However, the fieldwork observa-
tions showed a drastic decline of wheat production in rural households 
compared to previous years. This mismatch between the official data and 
the actual situation can be explained by calculating the household pro-
duction based on household consumption, which in the case of wheat is 
supplemented by the in-kind pai received from LFEs (which is not re-
flected in official statistics).  
The reverse is observed in the milk production sector. The share of 
dairy farm enterprises has decreased by 30% from the year 2000 to now; 
in contrast, rural households continued increasing milk production and 
have become dominant in this market segment. Currently, rural house-
holds contribute up to 81% of the milk produced and up to 67% of the 
milk marketed in Ukraine (Tarassevych 2005). Potato production is less 
indicative, as households were always the major potato producers, and, 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union, their share in potato yields has 
Processed on: 6-9-2016
505017-L-bw-Mamanova
 Resistance or adaptation?  193 
been increasing. LFEs are not interested in potato production, even 
though domestic demand for this farm product is high. This demand is 
met by potatoes from rural households. Today, rural households con-
tribute up to 98% of the total harvest of potatoes in the country. Fur-
thermore, they produce 86% of the vegetables and 85% of fruits and 
berries. In total, 52.7% of the gross agricultural output is produced by 
rural households (Ukrstat 2014). 
Table 5.2 
Production (and share in total production) of wheat, potatoes, and milk per 
agricultural producer (mil tonne). 
  1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2004 2007 2009 2012 
Wheat  
Agr.enterprises23 30,2 
(100%) 
15,7 
(97%) 
9,2 
(90%) 
18,7 
(88%) 
17,1 
(83%) 
14,6 
(83%) 
11,5 
(83%) 
17 
(83%) 
12,7 
(82%) 
Households  0,1 
(0%) 
0,5 
(3%) 
1 
(10%) 
2,6 
(12%) 
3,5 
(17%) 
2,9 
(17%) 
2,4 
(17%) 
3,8 
(17%) 
3,1 
(18%) 
Total  30,3 
(100%) 
16,2 
(100%) 
10,2 
(100%) 
21,3 
(100%) 
20,6 
(100%) 
17,5 
(100%) 
13,9 
(100%) 
20,9 
(100%) 
15,8 
(100%) 
Potatoes  
Agr.enterprises 4,9 
(29%) 
0,6 
(4%) 
0,2 
(1%) 
0,3 
(2%) 
0,2 
(1%) 
0,3 
(1%) 
0,4 
(2%) 
0,4 
(2%) 
0,7 
(2%) 
Households  11,9 
(71%) 
14,1 
(96%) 
19,6 
(99%) 
17 
(98%) 
16,4 
(99%) 
20,5 
(99%) 
18,7 
(98%) 
19,2 
(98%) 
22,5 
(98%) 
Total  16,8 
(100%) 
14,7 
(100%) 
19,8 
(100%) 
17,3 
(100%) 
16,6 
(100%) 
20,8 
(100%) 
19,1 
(100%) 
19,6 
(100%) 
23,2 
(100%) 
Milk  
Agr.enterprises 18,6 
(76%) 
9,4 
(54%) 
3,7 
(29%) 
3,6 
(27%) 
3,5 
(24%) 
2,5 
(19%) 
2,2 
(18%) 
2,2 
(18%) 
2,4 
(20%) 
Households  5,9 
(24%) 
7,8 
(45%) 
9 
(71%) 
9,8 
(73%) 
10,7 
(76%) 
11,2 
(81%) 
10,1 
(82%) 
9,4 
(82%) 
8,9 
(80%) 
Total  24,5 
(100%) 
17,3 
(100%) 
12,7 
(100%) 
13,4 
(100%) 
14,1 
(100%) 
13,4 
(100%) 
12,3 
(100%) 
11,6 
(100%) 
11,3 
(100%) 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on Ukrstat 1990-2013. 
 
In their study of the post-Soviet rural adaptation, O’Brien et al. (2004: 
474) argued that ‘those households that have made a more successful 
adaptation to a developing market economy by growing and selling more 
food would also receive a higher proportion of income from that 
source’. Indeed, Ukrainian villagers who took the free market niches be-
came relatively independent (the largest income share comes from sub-
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sistence farming and selling their products at local markets). These rural 
dwellers are called ‘odnoosibniks’ (independent peasants). 
Odnoosibniks are largely reminiscent of the middle peasants, who 
have a self-controlled resource base, derive their income wholly or 
mainly from their own labour, and exhibit a degree of self-sufficiency 
(Deere and de Janvry 1979). According to the fieldwork observations, 
every small village of 40 households has at least 1-3 odnoosibnik fami-
lies. The southern regions of Ukraine feature even larger concentrations 
of these independent peasants. Typical odnoosibniks are middle-aged 
and older married couples who hold livestock, cultivate household plots, 
and engage in local market relations, but produce just enough to meet 
the pressures of simple reproduction. Although not every subsistence 
farmer is called ‘odnoosibnik’ by their fellow villagers (due to their being 
of retirement age, or the death of one of the spouses), this study distin-
guishes 13 rural households (out of the 43 participants) which adopted 
the ‘taking a free market niche’ strategy. These small-scale agricultural 
producers out-compete commercial family farmers due to their capacity 
for ‘self-exploitation’24 (increasing labour inputs at the expense of leisure) 
that allows them to produce at lower costs and adjust to market changes. 
Odnoosibnik Luba (54) describes the impact of market price fluctuation 
on her family’s labour: 
We are like slaves, working from sunrise until late at night. What did my 
children see? No vacation, nothing. We have to pay for everything: for 
milk certification, for feed, for a place at a local market... And then they 
[buyers] say: “your milk is too expensive25, it costs 8 hryvnias in a su-
permarket, and you sell it for 10”. We have to sell for 8, what else can we 
do...?26 
The labour-intensive type of niche farming operated by rural dwellers 
and the lack of productive resources to expand their households at the 
expense of former-collective land plots prevent any competition between 
rural households and LFEs at this stage of agricultural development. Vil-
lagers’ occupation of market niches free from large agribusiness guaran-
tees their subsistence and makes the coexistence scenario possible. How-
ever, for how long? Olivier de Schutter (2011: 261) argued: ‘the 
coexistence scenario will likely be short-lived: it will simply be a slow 
motion path to the transition towards a rural economy dominated by 
large production units, in which small-scale farming will be marginalised 
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and subordinated to the large production units and in which further rural 
migration will be encouraged’.  
5.5.3. Looking for employment opportunities (strategy S3) 
The struggle for incorporation into large-scale agriculture on terms of 
employment was already mentioned as one of the rural strategies. This 
subsection discusses means of subsistence and persistence of this rural 
stratum. Wage-work accounted for 41% of the rural family income, with 
at least one family member employed by an agroenterprise (FAO Farm 
Survey 2005); subsistence farming on household plots remains the sec-
ond source of subsistence for such families. The combination of wage 
work with subsistence farming created the basis for the ‘peasant-worker’ 
label. This rural stratum of semi-peasants, semi-workers is not unique. In 
the American colonies, slaves were forced to grow some part of their 
own subsistence (Mintz and Price 1973), in Zanzibar rural dwellers re-
ceived small food plots in exchange for a rent in labour (Cooper 1980), 
and in colonial Sumatra plantation coolies were assigned unused estate 
fields to cultivate consumption crops in their ‘spare time’ (Stoler 1986).  
The Ukrainian case might be seen differently, as the peasant-workers 
are often landholders who lease their lands to LFEs. Farmer Olexander 
(41) calls this situation ‘the Ukrainian land paradox’, under which ‘the 
bourgeoisie leases lands from its proletariat’27. Indeed, many farm work-
ers are owners of land shares cultivated by the enterprises that employ 
them. However, the shareholders’ engagement in corporate decision-
making is rather nominal, and these relations remain characterised as 
‘illusive inclusion’ in land deals.  
According to class-based theory, the ‘peasant-worker’ is a temporary 
formation: the capitalist class would tend to subordinate small landown-
ers by reducing them to dependent labourers (Paige 1975). In contrast, 
Stoler (1986: 43) argued that the combination of wage-work and subsis-
tence farming is a stable mode, and represents ‘a state of “flux equilib-
rium” advantageous to management and labour alike’. LFEs in Ukraine 
make no efforts to have the lands in ownership and are satisfied with a 
long-term lease, as it does not require huge capital investments. For rural 
dwellers, the employment at LFEs increases the family monetary income, 
while also allowing land ownership and a peasant mode of production. 
As a result, this rural stratum has the lowest poverty risk, according to 
Vlasenko’s (2008) estimations.  
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5.5.4. Rural out-migration (strategy S4) 
During the economic recession that came after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, many people moved to rural areas, as it was easier to survive by 
relying on private subsistence economies. During 1990-1999, Ukrainian 
villages gained more than 350 thousand people28 (2% increase of the ru-
ral population) due to the in-migration of former rural residents. These 
in-migrants had moved to the cities prior to the economic crisis of the 
1990s, but were now forced to come back due to limited employment 
opportunities in urban areas (Skryzhevska and Karacsonyi 2012).  
The direction of the migration flow reversed with the emergence of 
large-scale land investments. Since 2002, rural out-migration has out-
paced in-migration. During 2002-2011, more than 2 million people (15% 
of the rural population) left the countryside (Ukrstat 2014). The 
incomers did not compensate this decrease, and the net migration was – 
265,000 people (or – 1.6% of the rural population) during the last dec-
ade. The escape from villages can be seen as a population response to 
large-scale land acquisitions. The reluctance to adapt to capitalist agricul-
ture made some rural dwellers move to the cities (or abroad). The out-
migration was stimulated by the short-term possibility to sell land shares 
(through various exchange schemes that were not forbidden by the 
moratorium at that time29), which provided some rural dwellers with the 
money to leave the countryside. 
However, the out-migrated rural dwellers are not able to compete 
with urban residents for well-paid jobs due to the low quality of rural 
education. As a result, rural dwellers accept low-paid and often informal 
work in the cities, or join the ranks of the urban unemployed (Skryz-
hevska and Karacsonyi 2012).  
Since 2005, the rural net migration outflow has been slowing down: 
the out-migration remains the same, while the in-migration has in-
creased. The return of many rural dwellers to villages was caused by ur-
ban ‘push factors’ (i.e. high costs of living, demand for qualified labour, 
urban unemployment). Contrary to the population return in the transi-
tion period when the land rights were still secured, current in-migration 
does not guarantee the subsistence of those who are coming back to the 
villages. The absence of household- and land plots made these people 
bound for miserable living conditions. The fieldwork data shows that 
many of the returning rural dwellers experience social exclusion, and 
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later find employment in a (non)agricultural sector or join their parents 
(or relatives) in household farming.  
5.5.5. Indifference (strategy S5) 
The rural residents who showed no changes in response to land grabbing 
were elderly widows and working-age villagers who are not able/willing 
to adapt to socio-economic changes. While the indifference of elderly 
widows can be explained by the guaranteed income from social transfers 
(pensions) and the lack of labour resources for taking free market niches, 
the second group depicts the inability of a few people to adapt to market 
conditions, which often leads to their social exclusion30 and marginalisa-
tion.  
The elderly widows represent about 12% of the rural population 
(NAS survey 2013). They continue household cultivation at the scale 
they used to do before the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is difficult to 
distinguish this group from those who have chosen the ‘taking a free 
market niche’ strategy, because elderly widows also produce labour-
intensive farm products, which are included in the total agricultural out-
put of rural households in statistics. However, their agriculture-derived 
income is much lower than that of odnoosibniks, and the major source of 
their living is their pension, which provides a small but stable income 
(Vlasenko 2008). 
The above-mentioned rural household strategies demonstrate that the 
least adaptive strategies (i.e. competition, migration, and indifference) are 
more likely to lead to poverty. The resilience to changes often results in 
lower income, social exclusion, and socio-economic dependency. Mean-
while, the adaptive strategies (i.e. taking a free market niche, and search-
ing for employment) are less risky and practised by nearly half of the 
survey respondents31. This demonstrates the ability of many rural house-
holds to adapt to and coexist with the capitalist agriculture. Thus, under 
the present conditions, the development of large-scale industrial agricul-
ture in Ukraine does not lead to the disappearance of the peasant mode 
of production and the creation of landless rural labour. Instead, it stimu-
lates the appearance of self-provisioning small-scale rural households 
and creates peasant-workers (reminiscent of the ‘Soviet peasant’), who, 
although they have wage-work, remain dependent on subsistence agricul-
ture.  
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5.6. Personal gains from land grabbing versus community 
benefits 
The villagers’ choice between pursuing self-interests and the interests of 
the whole community, and their concerns over material rather than im-
material benefits from land deals, became demonstrable in their talks 
about the cancellation of the land moratorium.32 Although the opening 
of land markets will only formally legalise the ownership of LFEs, which 
are already de facto landholders in Ukraine, rural dwellers express a nega-
tive attitude toward land sales. According to the 2011 Gorshenin survey, 
70% of villagers are convinced that farmland should not be sold as a 
commodity. Petro (76) from the village Trebukhovtsy forecasts negative 
consequences for rural communities from land sales: 
As soon the moratorium is eliminated, bandits will grab all the lands. 
People will not get the pai anymore, nobody would care about villagers, 
nobody would need them. The Ukrainian village will disappear, it will 
die...33 
Despite these negative predictions, Petro plans to sell his land plot 
and move to a city. The personal benefits seem to outweigh community 
interests.  
The 2013 NAS survey indicates the desire to sell land among 23% of 
the rural population; 12% have not decided yet. The share of those who 
would not sell the land after the moratorium’s cancellation has been de-
creasing. In 2010, the share of rural dwellers who wanted to continue 
leasing their land plots to LFEs after the moratorium’s cancellation was 
84%; in 2011, they accounted for 80%; and in 2013, their number has 
dropped to 65% (NAS survey 2013). This could be explained by an age-
ing rural population (24.1% of rural residents are older than 60), and 
their unwillingness to see their offspring working on these lands and/or 
living in the countryside (40% of the respondents of the 2011 Gorshenin 
survey answered that they want their children to live in urban areas). 
Therefore, a number of elderly villagers are intending to sell their lands 
in order to improve their material standing or help their children in cities. 
Maria (69) from the village Rusanivtsy explains her choice in favour of 
land sales:  
I will sell my land plot. Why do I need it? I am already an old woman. I 
will not farm it. If they give me at least a kopeyka [cent] for this land... I 
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need to help my children. One of my sons lives in poverty. I will sell my 
land and give the money to him. Maybe he will get out of his troubles...34  
The villagers’ preferences for personal benefits despite the negative 
consequences for the whole community can also be inferred from their 
reaction to the soil degradation caused by large-scale agricultural devel-
opment. In the in-depth interviews for this research, rural dwellers criti-
cised the LFEs’ monocrop agriculture and fertiliser usage; however, no 
one was intending to withdraw his or her shares from their tenants, even 
though they violate environmental standards. The rent price was the fac-
tor that made a difference, while environmental sustainability played a 
minor role. Only 5% of rural dwellers are concerned about ecological 
problems in their villages (Gorshenin survey 2011). In fact, LFEs often 
entice villagers from more eco-friendly private farmers by offering larger 
pais for leasing their lands.  
When choosing between possible tenants for their land plots, rural 
dwellers are also guided by the prospects of social support from LFEs. 
Apart from the formalised support (pai-payments), LFEs frequently pur-
sue corporate citizenship programmes, which allow them to gain the 
sympathies of the local population; this, in turn, ensures their control 
over farmlands. Viktor Prikazhnuk, the director of the ‘Obry’ 
agrocompany, describes his idea of corporate social responsibility:  
Formerly, kolkhozy helped rural dwellers a lot. People expect the same 
from us. We have to help, otherwise, they could lease their lands to 
someone else [...] People ask us to buy equipment for the local hospital, 
or to repair the roads. We allocate money for this... There was a case of 
fire in one rural house. The inhabitant asked us to help. We gave him 
some money and cypher to repair the roof.35  
Furthermore, rural households get some assistance with household 
plot cultivation and seeds from LFEs (FAO Farm Survey 2005). Accord-
ing to the fieldwork, this support is the major argument of villagers 
against land sales; meanwhile, concerns over land sovereignty or land 
ownership do not play a part. Tamara (55) from Hreblya village is con-
vinced:  
If we will sell our lands, the new owners will do nothing for rural dwell-
ers. The renting gives us a possibility to control them, to ask for assis-
tance...36  
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These arguments contradict the assumption of many rural civil society 
organisations, which believe that peasant resistance to land sales comes 
in protest to the ecological unsustainability of large-scale industrial agri-
culture, the destruction of the ‘peasant way’ of life, and the deprivation 
of rural community interests. The Ukrainian case demonstrates that the 
rural attitude toward land deals and large-scale agriculture largely de-
pends on the personal gains villagers receive from land leases versus 
sales (which outmatch community interests), and that material benefits 
(such as social support and pai size) take precedence over more ideologi-
cal concerns (i.e. about environmental sustainability and land sover-
eignty). 
5.7. Discussion of the research findings’ generalisability  
This chapter has presented an analysis of various rural response strate-
gies toward large-scale land acquisitions and industrial agricultural devel-
opment in Ukraine, and investigated socio-economic transformations 
within rural communities as a consequence of smallholders’ adaptation 
to these processes (as opposed to resistance). The study went beyond the 
common assumption of peasants’ outright opposition to land grabbing. 
It critically looked at the post-Soviet villagers’ attitudes to land deals, on-
going changes in rural household activities, and popular arguments for or 
against land sales.   
This analysis provides an empirical confirmation of McCarthy’s 
(2010) argument that the peasants’ attitude to land grabbing critically de-
pends on the local population’s terms of inclusion in land deals. The 
‘illusive inclusion’ of the Ukrainian rural population in land deals is done 
through the formalisation of LFEs’ support to households (pai-payments 
and corporate social responsibility programmes), which, together with 
the continuity of the dual system of agriculture (large-scale versus small-
scale) creates a positive attitude among many original landholders. Some 
villagers’ sympathy toward large-scale land acquisitions is achieved 
through the option of ‘subordinate inclusion’ by employment at LFEs. 
In a context of high rural unemployment, low salaries in agriculture, and 
a lack of material and cultural stimuli for creating independent family 
farming, subordinate inclusion is seen as a desired option and leads to 
the struggle for incorporation of rural dwellers in large agribusiness. 
Only when the villagers and LFEs operate in the same markets and 
Processed on: 6-9-2016
505017-L-bw-Mamanova
 Resistance or adaptation?  201 
compete for the same land is the rural resistance to land grabbing un-
avoidable.  
This chapter has demonstrated that rural households’ response strate-
gies toward large-scale agricultural development influence the socio-
economic stratification in the countryside. The more adaptive responses 
lead to more advantageous positions of households in rural 
communities, while the least adaptive strategies cause villagers’ social ex-
clusion and increase their poverty risk.  
Furthermore, this study questions the idealisation of the peasantry. 
The empirical data demonstrates that Ukrainian rural dwellers respond to 
land sales based on their estimation of possible material benefits derived 
from the lease, sale, or cultivation of their lands, while concerns with 
land sovereignty, the ‘peasant way’ of life, and environmental sustainabil-
ity are largely absent in the countryside. Moreover, despite collectivist 
features of the post-Soviet population, villagers’ self-interest in land deals 
often outweighs the importance of community interests. 
However, how generalisable are these findings?  
Because of high land availability and low rural population density in 
Ukraine, land grabbing is pursued without the physical displacement of 
the local population. This factor might be seen as a point of difference in 
comparison with many “typical” cases of land grabbing. However, recent 
scholars have noted a shift from land grabbing to land control grabbing, 
which is not always accompanied by land purchases and peasants’ reloca-
tions (White et al. 2012). The various forms of acquiring control over 
land and related resources include purchase, lease, contract farming, for-
est conservation, and so on. In his analysis of expansion of sugarcane 
and oil palm plantations in Guatemala, Alonso-Fradejas (2012) gives an 
example of lease schemes and contract farming agreements, which re-
sulted in the disenfranchisement and impoverishment of the local popu-
lation. Wilkinson et al. (2012) analyse land grabs for soy cultivation in 
Brazil where some agricompanies apply models that are based on land 
leases and complete responsibility for the management of agricultural 
production, turning the landowner into a mere ‘rentier’. Thus, the 
Ukrainian example does not seem to be an exceptional case.  
Another fact, which could influence the general application of the 
findings, is the exclusion of Ukrainian villagers from the distributive land 
reform in its early stages. The land distribution process did not make the 
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official landowners dependent on their lands, and therefore, the loss of 
control over their property does not endanger their subsistence. How-
ever, voluntary transfers of land ownership are common even in coun-
tries where peasants had a chance to farm their lands before land grab-
bing. Thus, in Chile, lack of access to loans for land reform beneficiaries 
and the existence of agrarian debts prevented them from investing in the 
emerging fruit and vegetable activities. Consequently, most peasants sold 
their lands to entrepreneurs, who could invest in these profitable activi-
ties (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2002).  
Certainly, there are a lot of country-specific factors that influence ru-
ral responses to land grabbing. The moratorium on land sales and the 
official landownership by rural population is not a common practice in 
the countries affected by land grabbing. However, the prohibition of 
open land sales is just a formal ban for agroholdings, who are de facto 
landholders in Ukraine (Spoor and Visser 2011). Furthermore, the degree 
of population ageing is very high in Ukraine and is significantly 
higher than in other counties affected by land grabs: 24.1% of Ukrainian 
rural dwellers are older than 60 (Skryzhevska and Karacsonyi 2012). As a 
comparison, the number of rural inhabitants in this age group constitutes 
7% of the rural population in Ghana (which is among the highest in Af-
rica), and 7.5 in rural India (Chuks 2004, CensusIndia 2010). Among the 
other country-specific factors are: the Soviet history of collective agricul-
ture, the erosion of peasant-like features such as ‘individualism’ and 
‘property consciousness economising’, and the abandonment of farm-
lands previous to land grabs. However, how significant is the influence 
of these factors on rural responses to large-scale land acquisitions?  
This study argues that the common assumptions about rural politics 
in large-scale agricultural development should be reconsidered. The rural 
propensity to adapt and find benefits even in land grabbing can play an 
important role in shaping policies of rural social movements and devel-
oping recommendations to governments and investors in regard to large-
scale land acquisitions. Moreover, taking into account the specificity of 
the Ukrainian case, the new insights on smallholders’ decision-making 
and their response strategies to land grabbing should be integrated into 
the land grab academic debates. This study indicates the need for further 
research on rural communities’ responses and differentiation in the con-
text of large-scale land acquisitions.  
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Notes 
 
1 This study uses the terms: ‘rural dwellers’, ‘villagers’, ‘rural households’ or 
‘smallholders’ when talking about post-Soviet small-scale food producers and 
rural workers (see the discussion on the peasant (agrarian) question in Chapter 1). 
However, the vast majority of literature on rural resistance to land grabbing em-
ploys term ‘peasantry’. Therefore, the terms: ‘peasant’ and ‘peasantry’ are occa-
sionally used in this chapter when discussing other contexts or general assump-
tions.  
2 It should be noted that there are on-going debates on how to interpret the cur-
rent process of large-scale land acquisitions in Ukraine (and in the former Soviet 
Union at large). Some authors argue that it is a land grabbing process, which 
might jeopardise the subsistence of small-scale farmers and lead to irresponsible 
land use (Visser and Spoor 2011, Plank 2013). Others are convinced that it is a 
development opportunity, when more efficient large-scale agricultural producers 
substitute less efficient former collectives and small- and medium-scale farming 
(Lapa et al 2008, Petrick et al. 2013). The latter position is often supported by the 
fact that large-scale land acquisitions are predominantly taking place on former 
collective lands; although distributed to rural dwellers during the land reform, 
these lands were not used for private farming and were abandoned for a decade. 
This latter position sees land deals as investments, not grabs. Although in this 
chapter I analyse the on-going land acquisitions within a land grabbing frame-
work, I do acknowledge the less dramatic character of this process in the case of 
Ukraine (and in the former Soviet Union at large); therefore, I generally refer to it 
as ‘large-scale land acquisitions’, and only use the ‘land grabbing’ term in the most 
extreme situations, when land deals were done with violation of rural dwellers’ 
rights and jeopardised their subsistence. 
3 This research purposely overlooks covert forms of rural politics toward land 
grabbing. According to Scott (1985), peasant resistance acts often remain hid-
den in social settings where open rural protest is restricted by political and eco-
nomic factors. There is an on-going debate on whether gossiping, stealing, and 
foot-dragging should be classified as: the post-Soviet villagers’ covert resistance, 
a ‘parasitic symbiosis’ between households and large farm enterprises, or just 
hooliganism (see e.g. Chapter 2). That being said, hidden politics do not repre-
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sent a significant force of change in the current post-Soviet countryside, no 
matter what they are referred as (Spoor and Visser 2004).  
4 Political crises can open the political system to new challenges and alternative 
policies, creating what Gourevitch (1986) terms ‘open moments’ for contesta-
tions. State failure can politicise the citizenry and fragment elite unity, potentially 
prompting the re-examination of both government policy and political alliances.  
5 The results of the Gorshenin survey are available (in Ukrainian only) at: 
http://institute.gorshenin.ua/researches/81_Sotsialnoekonomichne_stanovishch
e_.html; the results of FAO Farm survey are presented in Lerman et al. (2006); 
the results of the NAS survey are available (in Ukrainian only) at: 
http://www.dazru.gov.ua/terra/control/uk/publish/article;jsessionid=4A3099E
DFB03CBDA0B75C604240F01B2?art_id=144665&cat_id=130839;  
6 The concept of ‘peasant way’ is characterised as ‘involving a subsistence family 
economy, stem family arrangements and a highly localised cultural and co-
operative system’ (Síocháin 2003: 1). 
7 The contract farming model was proposed by large private palm oil investors in 
Honduras. According to this model peasant households produce raw African 
palm fruit and assume all production risks, while the large private plants process 
and market the palm oil, and, therefore, accrue the value added in processing. 
Although this model is not beneficial to small-scale palm fruit producers, it tran-
scends simple economics and engages with the cultural meaning of African palm 
oil plantations, which evoke images of a better life and success. 
8 The majority of Ukraine was incorporated into the Russian Empire after the 
second partition of Poland in 1793, while the remaining section (the principality 
of Galicia) remained part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until World War I. 
9 Households mostly did not have fixed entitlement to the land they cultivated. 
Land was frequently redistributed anew among the villagers’ households accord-
ing to the needs (and capacity) of the households (e.g. depending on changes in 
household size). 
10 Dekulakisation was the Soviet campaign of political repression, including ar-
rests, deportations, and executions of millions of the better-off peasants and their 
families in 1929-1932. The richer peasants were labelled kulaks and consid-
ered class enemies. 
11 The ‘Soviet peasant’ terminology was used as an official social category, evolv-
ing through the 1930s-1940s, the 1950s-1960s, and peaking in the Brezhnev pe-
riod of the 1970s-1980s (Humphrey 2002a).  
12 Nikita Khrushchev believed that the low agricultural production at kolkhozy 
and sovkhozy was caused by the population’s personal subsidiary farming. In 
1958 he initiated a policy directed against private households. Since then it was 
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forbidden to keep livestock at rural households. The state offered rural dwellers 
the option to sell their livestock to kolkhozy and sovkhozy at a fixed price. How-
ever, this caused a mass slaughtering and led to a significant reduction in livestock 
and poultry in the country (Taubman 2004). 
13 Private family farms are often referred as selyans’ke-fermers’ke gospodarstva (peasant 
family farms) in official Ukrainian documents. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the 
term ‘peasant family farming’ contains contradiction and can lead to misunder-
standing. In order to prevent the association of this commercial farming with the 
peasant mode of production, this chapter uses terms ‘family farming’ or ‘individ-
ual commercial farming’ to refer to this type of agricultural production. 
14 According to the State Service of Geodesy, Cartography and Cadastre, the 
moratorium on farmland sale will not be lifted earlier than in 2018. However, 
there is the Law Proposal N2791, which suggest extending the moratorium until 
2020. 
15 Political crises can open the political system to new challenges and alternative 
policies, creating what Gourevitch (1986) terms ‘open moments’ for contesta-
tions. State failure can politicise the citizenry and fragment elite unity, potentially 
prompting the re-examination of both government policy and political alliances.  
16 ‘During the revolutionary events, the rural population participated in the pro-
tests very little, because it is initially more passive and elderly. The typical active 
participants in the protests are relatively young city dwellers with higher educa-
tion. In general, the revolution had no impact on the activities of rural house-
holds. They keep doing the same things they used to do. The new government 
has not made any significant changes in agricultural policy until this mo-
ment’(interview with Andrey Martyn, head of the Department of Land Use Plan-
ning of the National University of Bioresources and Nature Management of 
Ukraine. Interview was conducted by email on 18 June 2014). 
17 Interview conducted in the village Rusanivtsy (Letichevsk district, Khmelnitsk 
region); 29 July 2012. 
18 In rural areas near cities, rising income might partly be caused by the rural 
dwellers’ increased employment in the cities, or by their engaging in non-
agricultural activities.  
19 Interview conducted in Kiev; 22 July 2012. 
20 Interview conducted in the village Hreblya (Pereyaslav-Khmelnitsky district, 
Kiev region); 1 August 2012. 
21 1 centner = 0.1 ton (centner is a unit of weight often used in Ukraine) 
22 Interview conducted in the village Pereyaslavskoye (Pereyaslav-Khmelnitskiy 
district, Kiev region); 1 August 2012. 
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23 State Committee of Ukraine for Statistics does not distinguish LFEs from 
commercial family farmers in its reports, and calculates ‘agricultural enterprises’ 
production as a sum total of the LFEs and farmers’ production.  
24 The concept of ‘self-exploitation’ was developed by Chayanov in The Theory of 
Peasant Economy (1925). 
25 Meanwhile, the milk prices in Ukraine are very low, especially according to 
international standards, which allows resellers to make a profit on it (see Van 
Der Ploeg (2009) about the Parmalat corporation’s imports of Ukrainian milk 
to Italy) 
26 Interview conducted in the village Hreblya (Pereyaslav-Khmelnitsky district, 
Kiev region); 2 August 2012. 
27 Interview conducted in the village Yerkivtsi (Pereyaslav-Khmelnitsky district, 
Kiev region); 1 August 2012. 
28 It should be noted that migration is not the major component of the rural 
population change in Ukraine. The natural decrease has been (and remains) very 
high in Ukraine, which is the major reason for depopulation in the countryside. 
During 1991-2011, the mortality rate exceeded the natality rate and produced a 
natural decrease of 2 million people, which accounted for 14% of the rural popu-
lation. 
29 During 2002-2004, the option existed to exchange land plots for other proper-
ties, which did not contradict the moratorium on land sales. In such a way, many 
rural dwellers “sold” their lands. Later, these exchange operations were forbidden 
by the new version of the moratorium (Yurchenko and Miroshnichenko 2006). 
30 Social exclusion is a process in which individuals or entire communities of 
people are systematically blocked from rights, opportunities, and resources, which 
are normally available to members of society and which are key to social integra-
tion (Silver 1994). 
31 The least adaptive strategies (competition, migration, and indifference) are 
practiced by 24 households out of the participating 43, while the adaptive strate-
gies (taking a free market niche, and searching for employment) are practiced by 
19 respondents. Taking into account the fact that the sample for private farmers 
was chosen according to the purposive selection method, the proportion of those 
who adapt and those who do not adapt might be approximately the same at the 
population scale. 
32 The fieldwork interviews were conducted in the summer of 2012. At that time, 
the moratorium on land sales was expected to be cancelled in January 2013. It 
was a very important topic for the rural population, and they actively discussed 
the pros and cons of the coming changes. 
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33 Interview conducted in the village Trebukhovtsy (Letichevsk district, Khmel-
nitsk region); 28 July 2012. 
34 Interview conducted in the village Rusanivtsy (Letichevsk district, Khmelnitsk 
region); 29 July 2012. 
35 Interview conducted in the village Trebukhotsy (Letichevsk district, Khmel-
nitsk region); 28 July 2012. 
36 Interview conducted in the village Hreblya (Pereyaslav-Khmelnitsky district, 
Kiev region); 2 August 2012. 
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6 
‘Quiet Food Sovereignty’ as Food 
Sovereignty without a Movement? 
Insights from Post-Socialist Russia 
 
 
Abstract  
What does food sovereignty look like in settings where rural social 
movements are weak or non-existent, such as in countries with post-
socialist, semi-authoritarian regimes? This chapter presents an analysis of 
a divergent form of food sovereignty, based on the example of Russia. 
Being inspired by the concept of ‘quiet sustainability’, this study distin-
guishes and investigates a dispersed, muted, but clearly bottom-up vari-
ant of food sovereignty – ‘quiet food sovereignty’. In ‘quiet food sover-
eignty’, the role of the very productive smallholdings is downplayed by 
the state and partly by the smallholders themselves. Those smallholdings 
are not seen as an alternative to industrial agriculture, but subsidiary to it 
(although superior in terms of sociality and healthy, environmentally 
friendly produce). As such, ‘quiet food sovereignty’ deviates from the 
overt struggle frequently associated with food sovereignty. This chapter 
discusses the prospects of ‘quiet food sovereignty’ to develop into a full 
food sovereignty movement, and stresses the importance of studying 
everyday rural politics within the food sovereignty framework. 
6.1. Introduction 
What shape does food sovereignty take in settings where rural social 
movements are weak or non-existent, such as in countries with post-
socialist and (semi)-authoritarian regimes?1 Food sovereignty is generally 
seen as something tightly connected to social movements, which are able 
to formulate a food sovereignty discourse and follow it up with collective 
action. 
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The expanding studies on food sovereignty have until now focused 
on the Global South and the West but have left Eurasia’s post-socialist 
states – such as Russia, Ukraine, the Central- Asian states, and China, 
accounting for a large share of the world’s countryside and population – 
out of the picture. Russia and most of the former Soviet Union’s other 
major agricultural producers (i.e. Ukraine and Kazakhstan) constitute an 
area where the discourse on, and practices of, food sovereignty strongly 
diverge from the global understandings of it as defined by Via Cam-
pesina and the Nyéléni forum. Although the Global South and West al-
ready feature varying definitions and approaches to food sovereignty 
(Patel 2009), this study contends that the Russian take is radically differ-
ent from the basic premises of the food sovereignty variants studied until 
this time2. Therefore, a closer look at the post-Soviet space – and Russia 
in particular – may contribute to the critical examination of food sover-
eignty, which is registering a global rise in popularity. 
With no study conducted on food sovereignty in Russia until now, 
and virtually none in the post-socialist area3, the first question that arises 
is whether food sovereignty exists at all as a concept or practice in the 
country. Food sovereignty is hardly used in government policy and me-
dia in Russia, and even then it is mostly as a synonym for ‘national food 
security’ (e.g. Super 2012). Government policy is focused on food secu-
rity and in particular national food self-sufficiency, through the devel-
opment of large-scale farming. Although food sovereignty rarely figures 
in Russian debates in its literal translation (prodovolstvenniy suverinitet), the 
concept is certainly not irrelevant. 
This chapter argues that a kind of food sovereignty does exist in Rus-
sia, but in a less pronounced form – as it practically thrives without any 
organisations that could formulate outspoken discourses or coordinate 
actions. However, some of the actions and implicit ideas related to the 
concept are widespread among the population and clearly emerge bot-
tom-up. Inspired by the concept of ‘quiet sustainability’, as introduced by 
Smith and Jehlička (2013), this study distinguishes and investigates a dis-
persed, muted, but clearly bottom-up variant of food sovereignty, which 
is called here ‘quiet food sovereignty’. This study demonstrates that food 
sovereignty in practice plays an important role in Russia, with smallhold-
ings producing a large share of the food consumed, in or near their local 
places of living, and in a largely ecologically friendly way. These elements 
match well the vision of food sovereignty advocated by global social 
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movements. This chapter reveals that a rights discourse, which is an im-
portant element in the food sovereignty concept (Claeys 2013, Nyéléni 
2007), is rather implicit in ‘quiet food sovereignty’. Moreover, the agri-
cultural and environmental importance of Russian smallholdings – which 
produce, for instance, more potatoes than all the commercial farmers in 
the US and the UK put together (Ries 2009) – is grossly overlooked and 
downplayed by the government. Even more strikingly, it is also partly 
overlooked by the smallholders themselves. The following analysis will 
demonstrate that this extraordinary productivity and ‘quiet food sover-
eignty’ are primarily linked to: first, longstanding concepts and practices 
of household security and self-reliance, which date back to the Soviet era 
food deficits; and, second, the symbiosis between LFEs and smallhold-
ings, which consisted of LFEs providing smallholders with large farm 
assets, and the smallholders’ pilfering from LFEs. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 introduces the lim-
ited political opportunity structure and the level of rural civil society de-
velopment in Russia. Section 6.3 sketches the theoretical (and methodo-
logical) approach for studying settings with weak or non-existent 
movements. Section 6.4 explains the weakness of rural social movements 
in Russia. Section 6.5 describes the Russian food system and the symbio-
sis between large-scale and small-scale farming. Section 6.6 deals with the 
discourses and practices of Russian smallholdings, and explains how they 
constitute ‘quiet food sovereignty’. Section 6.7 discusses the implicit po-
litical dimension of quiet food sovereignty. Section 6.8 discusses the per-
spectives for the emergence of a genuine food sovereignty movement. 
Section 6.9 presents the conclusions and discusses the wider relevance of 
‘quiet food sovereignty’. 
6.2. Rural social movements in Russia 
In Russia, the policy space for social movements is very limited. In the 
Soviet era, virtually all social organisations were established top-down. 
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, it became legally possible to 
establish social movements. However, due to 70 years of socialist reign 
without genuine social movements, the population starkly distrusted new 
collective endeavours and ideologies and lacked the experience of grass-
roots collective action. In addition, it was too distracted by the ‘shock-
therapy’ reforms of the 1990s, with their sudden price liberalisation, 
widespread privatisation, and drastic reduction in state spending. Faced 
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with such a context, Russians did not mobilise to resist changes collec-
tively, but instead coped with (food) shortages by intensifying the Soviet 
practices of smallholder farming and informal exchange networks. 
As a consequence, in the 1990s, only a limited number of social 
movements emerged in the cities, and virtually none in the countryside. 
This chapter uses the term ‘rural movements’, although some of them 
also include urbanites with smallholdings. From the mid-2000s onwards, 
some rural movements emerged (see Chapter 3). However, due to in-
creasing constraints imposed on civil society organisations by the Putin 
regime, practically all these movements became either strongly state-led, 
with very weak links to their supposed constituency, or ‘phantom 
movements’, without substantial activities. The only movement that re-
mained closely connected to rural dwellers was the countrywide move-
ment Krestyanskiy Front (Peasant Front), which defended rural dwellers 
faced with land grabbing. However, due to mounting constraints by the 
state and the lack of social will to mobilise, the movement was disbanded 
in 2013. Thus, it is hardly an overstatement to characterise rural social 
movements in Russia as extremely weak or virtually non-existent. More-
over, it is increasingly problematic to call these organisations social 
movements: they are weak in terms of both their lack of popularity 
among the population and their lack of power (see Chapter 3 for further 
details). 
6.3. Studying food sovereignty without a movement: 
analytical tools 
Food sovereignty is generally seen as something tightly connected to a 
social movement, which is able to formulate, promote, and execute a 
food sovereignty discourse, and convert it into collective action. The 
emergence of food sovereignty in the global policy arena is clearly 
strongly connected to the rise of Via Campesina as a transnational social 
movement, and various other peasant and farmer associations and net-
works (such as members of the International Planning Committee on 
Food Sovereignty). The study of food sovereignty, aside from being 
(among others) a response to the limitations of the food security studies, 
is very much a branch of social movement studies, with its focus on dis-
cursive aspects (discourses, visions on farming) and organisational issues 
(leadership, transnational alliances, and open/massive collective action). 
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Recently, some studies have explored food sovereignty beyond the 
node of social movements. Particularly relevant here are the studies that 
have gone beyond the ‘global summitry’ of large social movements, by 
looking at localised forms of resistance against the global food system 
(Ayres and Bosia 2011). But so far, the localism of such micro-
encounters ‘is still overshadowed by protest summitry and large-scale 
mobilisations’ (Ayres and Bosia 2011)4. Even with the growing attention 
for the various actors operating beyond social movements and the study 
of actors (or scales) in food sovereignty issues as ‘multiple sovereignties’ 
(McMichael 2009), the social movements still remain the touchstone of 
analyses. This raises the question of what food sovereignty looks like (or 
might become) in settings where social movements are extremely weak 
or non-existent. Does food sovereignty exist in (semi)-authoritarian 
states where social movements are mostly forbidden (such as in China) 
or heavily restricted (as in Russia)? For settings such as Russia as well as 
other post-socialist and/or semi-authoritarian settings with weak or non-
existent movements, additional analytical tools are necessary to study 
food sovereignty. This study suggests paying more attention to the level 
of everyday practices and customs (including the interconnections be-
tween large and small farms), ‘everyday resistance’ (Scott 1985), as well as 
‘muted discourses’ (Ardener 1975). This chapter advances these tools in 
contrast to the existing focus on outspoken discourses such as public 
speeches and declarations, and concepts from the social movement lit-
erature that are frequently used in the food sovereignty literature, such as 
‘framing’, ‘mobilisation’, and social movement strategies (e.g. Claeys 
2013, Desmarais 2007, Torres 2003). 
The research on food sovereignty was initially very much a study of 
the framing, mobilisation, and genealogy of the transnational movement 
La Via Campesina (Desmarais 2007, Torres 2003). This is, of course, 
fully understandable, taking into account the crucial role of the move-
ment in defining and propagating – though not inventing (Edelman 
2014) – the concept. A focus on customs and everyday practices instead 
of social movements enables another approach to rights and entitle-
ments. In the food sovereignty literature, the term ‘right’ appears fre-
quently. The Nyéléni food sovereignty declaration (Nyéléni 2007: 1) de-
fines food sovereignty as: 
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…the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food pro-
duced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their 
right to define their own food and agriculture systems. [emphasis added] 
However, it is debatable whether this is about strict rights in the ju-
ridical sense, or about entitlements which would, for example, have a 
more social, informal character. Hospes (2014), for instance, argues that 
the choice of ‘peoples’ instead of ‘humans’ (individuals) as actors seri-
ously complicates the conversion of food sovereignty claims into legally 
recognised rights, such as human rights (a more optimistic evaluation is 
provided by Claeys, 2013). As the legal impact of food sovereignty is 
(still) weak, it seems relevant to include ‘entitlements’ under the label of 
rights. Following up on Hospes’ (2014) call for more attention to legal 
pluralism within food sovereignty, this chapter will draw upon work in 
legal pluralism and anthropology (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006), and 
view rights (for instance in the sphere of property) as multi-layered. Von 
Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006) propose the analysis of property on four 
levels; ideology, legislation, social norms/customs, and (everyday) prac-
tices. The literature on property focuses mostly on the first two levels 
(which often fall together), while ignoring the latter two (von Benda-
Beckmann et al. 2006). Applying this multi-layered analysis helps us to 
uncover the symbiosis between Russian smallholders and LFEs, which 
exists underneath the ideological and legal divergence between the two 
groups, and which is an important element for understanding ‘quiet food 
sovereignty’. As mentioned above, this concept is inspired by the ‘quiet 
sustainability’ concept by Smith and Jehlička (2013). They argue, based 
on research in post-socialist central Europe, that healthy and environ-
mentally sound agriculture can also be reached without explicit dis-
courses and social movements, and therefore, they call it ‘quiet’. The 
concept does not incorporate a political dimension, as there is no men-
tion of rights and entitlements. This chapter will contend that quiet food 
sovereignty does include a political dimension – although a rather im-
plicit one. In analysing this implicit political dimension, this study will 
draw on the earlier mentioned anthropological work on property rela-
tions and the concept of ‘everyday resistance’ (Scott 1985). 
Aside from interviews with rural social movement leaders (see Chap-
ter 3), the data collection for this article consists predominantly of quali-
tative interviews and observations among the rural population and dacha 
cultivators. In total, 60 interviews were used in this analysis. Most of 
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them are conducted in Vladimir and Moscow region during October – 
November 2013. This study also benefits from the interviews with 
smallholders and state and agribusiness officials, conducted by Visser in 
the Belgorod region during winter 2013. 
Before elaborating on (quiet) food sovereignty, this chapter will de-
scribe Russia’s large- and small-scale agriculture (and their interconnec-
tions), loosely based on the above-mentioned property relations frame-
work. 
6.4. Post-socialist agrarian reform and the soviet legacy of 
symbiosis 
Large-scale agrarian reform started in Russia after the Soviet Union’s 
demise in 1991. Farmland privatisation took place through a ‘share-
based’ land distribution, as opposed to the ‘plot-based’, physical land dis-
tribution conducted in most Central and Eastern European countries. 
The rural population could choose to keep their shares in the privatised 
successors of the collective and state farms, or take out their paper 
shares and convert them into real land plots in order to establish a family 
farm. 
Few rural dwellers established private farms, and the growth of such 
farms already stagnated by the mid-1990s due to insecure property rights, 
bureaucratic hurdles, and lack of market access (Pallot and Nefedova 
2007). As a result, LFEs, successors of the collective and state farms, 
stayed largely intact. The number of LFEs, with an average size of sev-
eral thousand hectares, remained remarkably stable. Moreover, so-called 
agroholdings emerged in the course of the 2000s – companies that con-
sist of various integrated LFEs and/or other firms in the food chain. Ru-
ral dwellers largely remained employees in LFEs, while simultaneously 
expanding (more than doubling) their ‘subsidiary household plots’ (Ros-
reestr 2012). 
Two opposing forms of production existed in the Soviet agriculture: 
on one hand, the highly mechanised and subsidised, but inefficient, state 
and collective farms; on the other, the small, but highly productive, semi-
private parcels of their employees. Although they only represented 5% of 
the total farmland (Rosreestr 2012), the rural population – using manual 
labour on their tiny plots (of 0.10 – 0.25 ha) – nevertheless accounted for 
an astonishing 22% of the total agricultural production value of the Rus-
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sian Soviet republic in 1989 (World Bank 1992). Moreover, many house-
holds had (and still have) their dachas (summerhouses with a garden 
around the cities); as dachniks (dacha owners), they cultivated several 
fruits and vegetables for own consumption and exchange. Currently, 
every second family has a dacha plot, with an average size of about 0.01 
ha; 47% of them cultivate half or more of this land (Nefedova 2008). 
The impressive production on the household plots (further enlarged 
by dacha cultivators) was seen as a strong indication that – once Soviet-
era restrictions on private production would be lifted – rural dwellers 
would establish fully independent farms. This expectation was based on 
a fundamental misunderstanding of the existing (informal) property rela-
tions. 
Although, on the ideological and legislative levels, the state/collective 
farms and the household plots were opposite and fully separated, on the 
level of rural norms and daily practices, they were interlinked in a so-
called symbiosis (Nikulin 2003, 2009, Visser 2006). Household plots 
could produce relatively large amounts of food because they were al-
lowed to use a whole array of collective facilities: from obtaining young 
livestock and letting private cattle graze on collective pastures, to using 
machinery. As a result, households were able to ensure their own food 
security and get extra revenue through sales or exchange. The chairmen 
of the collectives were also interested in providing such support, as it 
was a way to motivate their low-paid workers. Finally, aside from the 
support provided to households, there was also a wide practice of goods 
being taken (pilfered) by the households. 
The boundaries between the collectives and household plots were 
thus permeable – a situation which largely continued in the post-Soviet 
era (Visser 2006). An LFE decline set in during the 1990s, and farm 
wages began not being paid for months. In reaction, rural households 
enlarged their plots and intensified pilfering from the collective. In the 
course of the 2000s, with some recovery in LFEs and improved wage 
payment, households somewhat declined the intensified smallholder 
production, though it remained at a high level5. While towards the end of 
the Soviet era (1989) the Russian household plots produced 22% of the 
agricultural output value, in 2012 this was estimated to be 43.2% (Rosstat 
2013b). In sum, land reforms unintentionally led to a continued co-
existence of LFEs and (intensified) smallholder production. 
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6.5. Quiet food sovereignty: discourses, importance, and 
quietness 
Although rural (and some urban) households are a fundamental part of 
the Russian food system, producing a large share of total agricultural 
output, their role in the pursuit of the national food security and sover-
eignty is overlooked or consciously ignored. This section will examine 
the state and agribusiness discourses on small-scale farming, discuss 
smallholder productivity and sustainability, and smallholders’ own dis-
courses. 
6.5.1. Discourse on smallholder farming by state and agrobusiness 
The Russian government and the agribusiness elite regard the large-scale 
industrialised sector in a positive light, despite such social and environ-
mental risks of large-scale, industrial farming as soil degradation (due to 
mono-cropping) (Nikulin 2009). The smallholder sector is largely de-
picted in negative terms – at least where it’s agricultural and economic 
functions are concerned. Descriptions like ‘backward’, ‘relic of the past’, 
‘without long-term perspective’, ‘low hygiene standards’ abound. This 
statement by the vice-president of the Russian Grain Union, Alexander 
Korbut, illustrates this view: 
The reduction of the share of personal subsidiary farming is a normal 
process, because this farming is inefficient. And in the light of the forth-
coming accession of Russia to the WTO, their fate seems pretty dismal6. 
Western scholars have also frequently described the post-Soviet in-
crease of the smallholders in such negative terms as ‘muddling through 
transition with garden plots’ (Seeth et al. 1998). Pallot and Nefedova 
(2007: 202) correctly state that, in Russia, ‘people’s farms have been por-
trayed as the official “other” of the agri-food system’. They are seen as 
the opposite of the supposedly modern and efficient LFEs. 
However, while smallholders are construed as backward and ineffi-
cient, and get little direct state support, they provide a substantial share 
of Russia’s basic foodstuffs. Households produce 93% of the country’s 
potatoes, 80% of the vegetables, 51% of the milk, and 54% of the meat 
(Rosstat 2013a). It should be noted that smallholdings (especially dacha 
plots) are sometimes seen as positive by the state, but then as a ‘healthy 
life style’ (in terms of working with nature and consuming fresh produce) 
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or ‘recreation’, and rarely in terms of its productive function and its role 
in the agri-food system. 
6.5.2. Productivity, sustainability, and localness 
Food self-provisioning in Russia is quite productive and resource-
efficient (in terms of material inputs). Table 6.1 presents the yields of the 
most essential crops. 
Table 6.1 
Yields of LFEs and rural households (tonne/ha) 
 1991 2001 2012 
Large Farm Enterprises (LFEs) 
Grain* 1.44 1.83 1.69 
Potatoes 9.24 9.95 16.64 
Vegetables 13.59 13.58 21.44 
Rural households 
Grain* 2.67 1.80 1.37 
Potatoes 11.52 10.86 12.63 
Vegetables 15.96 15.40 19.90 
Source: Yields calculated based on output and cultivated land data (by producer and 
crop) from Rosstat (2013a).  
* – Includes legumes. 
 
The table shows that rural households are currently nearly as produc-
tive (in terms of yields) as LFEs, having been even more productive until 
recently. The productivity of LFEs is primarily achieved through state 
support, use of chemical fertilisers, pesticides, and machinery. House-
holds have comparable yields, with essentially no direct support from the 
state and with largely traditional methods7. 
Those traditional methods result in environmentally friendly agricul-
ture. Organic fertilisers (manure, compost) are used instead of agro-
chemicals, and fuel input is minimal as tractors are rarely used (occasion-
ally for ploughing) and much work is done by using animal traction 
(Pallot and Nefedova 2007, Visser 2009). These environmentally friendly 
practices do not emerge from wider concerns about sustainability or con-
tributing to an environmentally sound or localised agricultural system. 
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They arise mostly from the desire to grow healthy food (especially 
among dacha cultivators), the inability to buy expensive inputs, and self-
interest in cultivating the small plots in a way that ensures longer-term 
fertility. The following quote by Tamara Semenova, a representative of 
the rural social movement ‘Peasant Front’, describes how the self-
interest of smallholders brings about favourable environmental results: 
They are interested in maintaining the fertility of their land. […]. Peas-
ants use predominantly organic fertilisers. They maintain the fertility of 
the land through the use of green manure. They also use crop rotations 
[…]8. 
A 61-year-old inhabitant from Vladimir region said in the interview 
for this study: 
Potatoes we plant for ourselves […] not to buy the potatoes from the 
store! Look at those [latter] potatoes. They are 5 years old and still look 
gorgeous, clean, no rots, nothing! […] It tells us that there are so many 
pesticides in those potatoes! And in the potatoes we plant – there is 
nothing.  
Although the benefits of smallholder farming are not uncontested, 
globally, there is an increasing body of work arguing that smallholder 
farming is more ecologically sustainable (e.g. Altieri et al. 2011). Relevant 
here is the fact that, while aversion of fertilisers (and in particular pesti-
cides) is widespread in Russia, it is perhaps not surprising that some of 
the millions of smallholders do use chemical inputs. In a survey con-
ducted in 2001–2002 among 43 LFEs, 12% of them indicated their pro-
vision of pesticides to households (Visser 2009). This figure (as is the 
one for fertiliser) is much lower than that for other forms of support, 
such as ploughing plots (98%), fodder provision (79%), and use of pas-
tures (53%). Overall, the intensification of household production from 
the early 1990s onwards was mainly achieved by expanding the small 
plots and, above all, by putting in much more labour (Visser 2009). 
Finally, smallholder production in Russia is highly localised, with a 
short food chain and distance from field to fork. Both the production 
and the wider food chain of these smallholders are rather sustainable. A 
large portion of the smallholders’ produce is simply consumed by them 
and/or exchanged with fellow villagers. The sale of produce occurs 
within the district at market places, along roadsides, or via itinerant trad-
ers (Pallot and Nefedova 2007). Much of the households’ surplus, how-
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ever, is exchanged via networks of relatives and acquaintances, and 
represents a sociality that is highly valued and has a long cultural history 
in the Soviet era (Zavisca 2003).  
6.6. The ‘quiet’ discourse of smallholders themselves 
The discourse of the smallholders themselves is less pronounced and 
more implicit (with many adhering to the official view, but also some 
deviations), but it is also widespread. Essentially, they see their small-
holdings as a means of survival when wages are not sufficient, or when 
one suddenly loses one’s job – hence, responding to insecurity. The same 
holds for dacha cultivators. This study follows the position of Ries 
(2009: 200), who argued that the aspect of a fall-back option, a means to 
survive in times of sudden economic crisis or personal misfortune, 
trumps other elements such as recreation, health, and ecological values 
(Zavisca 2003). A dacha cultivator interviewed by Reis (Zavisca 2003) 
stated: 
You can trust that, if everything really falls apart, you have the skills and 
habits to survive.  
A rural dweller from the Prokuzino village of the Vladimir region, 
who currently cultivates only half of his plot, said in the interview for 
this study: 
If there will be a year of famine, we will cultivate all our 10 sotkas [0.1 
ha] with potatoes9. 
There is a remarkable paradox that smallholdings are so important, in 
terms of both economic and ecological value, while at the same time the 
rural population is rather ‘quiet’ about these facts, and see them simply 
as a coping strategy. With the silencing of the smallholdings’ role, the 
term ‘quiet food sovereignty’ – as inspired by the ‘quiet sustainability’ 
concept (Smith and Jehlička 2013: 148) – would probably be the best 
way to characterise this muted, diffuse form of food sovereignty. The 
‘quiet’ food sovereignty would then be one oriented towards coping with 
insecurity (also featuring a subsidiary function, as will be shown below), 
instead of aspiring to a role as an independent mode of farming. As for 
the overlooked smallholding benefits to the environment (partly due to 
lack of income to buy fertilisers, herbicides etc.), the concept of ‘quiet 
sustainability’ seems apt. The concept of quiet sustainability was devel-
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oped based on research in Poland and the Czech republic, and, there-
fore, it is important to acknowledge the major differences between Cen-
tral European Countries and (post-)Soviet countries regarding socialist 
agriculture and post-socialist land reforms (to name but a few). Particu-
larly between Poland and Russia, an important difference is that the 
symbiosis between LFEs and smallholders is hardly found in Poland, 
where few state farms were established and independent farmers re-
mained the mainstream. However, and most importantly for our argu-
ment, the countries do share a common post-socialist setting and a wide-
spread practice of urban and rural dwellers engaged in smallholdings. 
Smith and Jehlička (2013: 148) have described ‘quiet sustainability’ as 
follows: 
This novel concept summarises widespread practices that result in bene-
ficial environmental or social outcomes and that do not relate directly or 
indirectly to market transactions, but are not represented by their practi-
tioners as relating directly to environmental or sustainability goals. 
The practices are ‘quiet’ in terms of sustainability because ‘the con-
cern is with the state and quality of the food rather than the environ-
mental impact of the food system per se’ (Smith and Jehlička 2013: 155). 
And they constitute: 
not a programme to be implemented, a future ambition for society or an 
exceptional contrast to the norm. Rather it is a quiet but purposeful par-
allel to the market economy of food. (Smith and Jehlička 2013: 155) 
In Russia, the quiet and parallel nature of smallholder production is 
clearly indicated by the widespread adherence of the rural population to 
the official categorisation of rural smallholdings. As in the Soviet period, 
the smallholdings of the population are called ‘subsidiary household 
plots’. The absence of terms like ‘farm’ or ‘agriculture’ is telling. The 
term ‘household’ has connotations of household chores (much of the 
work on the household plot is done by women, and seen as an extension 
of housekeeping). 
Furthermore, the term ‘subsidiary’ is also crucial. In the Soviet Union, 
with its principle of full employment, rural smallholdings indeed func-
tioned as a subsidiary income and food source, secondary to collective 
farm employment. However, during the slump in agriculture, with wide-
spread wage arrears that came after the demise of the Soviet Union, 
smallholdings quickly rose in importance. Rural dwellers intensified 
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smallholder production (and urbanites did likewise on dacha plots) (Vis-
ser 2009). Even with a slight decrease in their share in the total agricul-
tural production since 2009, these plots still constitute the main source 
of income for a substantial part of the rural population, and an important 
source of food and saved expenses for many urbanites (Visser 2009). 
Thus, while the term ‘subsidiary household plot’ might have been appro-
priate during the Soviet period, it is now a stark understatement of its 
actual role in both agriculture and rural incomes.  
However, as mentioned above, rural households still adhere to the 
idea of the subsidiary nature of their plots vis-a-vis LFEs. 
While the personal smallholding is seen as crucial for survival, and 
few would do away with it completely, few rural dwellers actually aspire 
to expand their plots if they can get a salaried job that provides them 
with sufficient income (Nefedova 2008). A considerable share of the ru-
ral households would in fact decrease production (although not fully). 
Furthermore, few rural dwellers (or dacha cultivators) would see their 
smallholdings as a viable alternative to the large-scale food system. On 
the contrary, rural dwellers have strong nostalgia for the Soviet past and 
welcome the revitalisation of former kolkhozy and sovkhozy (Pallot and 
Nefedova 2007). The striking fact is that the state and agribusiness’ nega-
tive view on smallholders partly resonates among the latter themselves10. 
While this is mainly the result of the longstanding subsidiary role of 
household plots, it is also caused by the longstanding stigmatisation of 
rural dwellers (Ries 2009), and reinforced by the official media discourse. 
However, while smallholders often expect a decline in the importance of 
smallholdings in agriculture, this study did not encounter smallholders 
who expect their complete disappearance. 
6.7. The political dimension of quiet food sovereignty 
Many authors argue that the political dimension of food sovereignty is 
key (Claeys 2013, McMichael 2009, Patel 2009). Desmarais (2007), for 
instance, speaks of ‘a collective struggle to define the alternatives to the 
globalisation of a neoliberal, highly capitalised, corporate-led model of 
agricultural development’. Elements of the political dimension are: a 
clear vision to shift the control of productive resources to farmers, their 
subsequent claiming of rights, and finally their struggle (against state 
and/or agribusiness) to achieve those rights. 
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In Russia, at a first glance, the political dimension seems to be absent. 
There are no outspoken food sovereignty visions and claims. There is 
hardly any open struggle for food sovereignty. Could we then classify the 
Russian case as food sovereignty? In other words, in addition to quiet 
sustainability, can we call it quiet food sovereignty? 
In terms of aims and claims, proponents and researchers of food sov-
ereignty often state that it is, first a drive to roll back the mainstream 
large-scale food system (in terms of what it is against) and, second, a de-
sire to gain democratic control over food production (and consumption) 
by establishing autonomous smallholder production (in terms of what it 
is in favour of) (Desmarais 2007, McMichael 2009, Nyéléni 2007, Patel 
2009). This section discusses the relevance of these two aims for the 
Russian case. 
Regarding the first point, it should be stressed that, whereas in many 
countries food sovereignty is inspired by the threats of the large-scale 
system for smallholders, this has not been the case in Russia. Russian 
rural dwellers have traditionally experienced numerous benefits of the 
large-scale food system as rural workers and citizens (full employment, 
good social services, and support for their smallholdings have all been 
connected to their workplace in LFEs). As consumers, rural and urban 
dwellers’ major concern constituted the frequent deficits of fresh and 
varied food. Long queues in front of half empty food shops became 
iconic images of this failure of the system. Thus, whereas elsewhere the 
dominance and pervasiveness (in terms of outcompeting other food op-
tions) of the large-scale food system is the main concern, in Russia the 
lack of pervasiveness and the resulting food insecurity have traditionally 
been the concern. 
Second, are claiming more control by smallholders and striving for 
full autonomy essential criteria for acknowledging Russian practices as a 
form of food sovereignty? This study argues that the Russian small-
holders see cultivating their own food as an important right. However, 
this right is implicit. It is hardly expressed as it is a longstanding tradi-
tion, and a substantial degree of control over their own production is 
seen as the natural order of things. Why would smallholders state the 
obvious? 
Moreover, the right to cultivate (a part of) their own food does not 
necessarily mean that the right for autonomous food provision is 
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claimed. As defined by the Peoples’ Food Sovereignty Network (2002), 
food sovereignty is: 
the right of peoples to define their own food and agriculture; [...] to de-
termine the extent to which want to be self-reliant. [emphasis added] 
For Russian smallholders, a parallel existence of smallholdings next to 
LFEs seems to be the appropriate cultural form, with a symbiosis be-
tween LFEs and households preferred over full self-reliance. 
As long as the right to produce their own healthy food is not threat-
ened, smallholders will not have much of an incentive to protest. Rural 
dwellers ‘have the core land resource, the household plot, in their inal-
ienable property’ (Pallot and Nefedova 2007: 203), and this resource is 
hardly threatened as the plots are too small for LFEs. The access to 
LFEs’ resources, however, has always been informal, and here ‘the legal 
basis for their claims is often tenuous or non-existent’ (Pallot and Nefe-
dova 2007: 106). Access to these resources seems to be based on an im-
plicit social contract in which rural dwellers keep quiet as long as the 
symbiosis between LFEs and smallholdings is maintained by the former, 
or at the very least the smallholders are not restricted.  
As the rights discourse is so implicit in quiet food sovereignty, it 
raises the question of whether the rights discourse is muted or in fact 
absent. In other words, does quiet food sovereignty have a potential for 
political struggle or is it intrinsically apolitical? 
It seems that people will claim their rights and engage in struggle 
when the implicit social contract of LFEs and smallholders’ symbiosis 
(or at least co-existence) is threatened. A strong indication of this is the 
smallholders’ fierce reactions to the state policy aimed at fighting swine 
flu in the autumn of 2013. After the outbreak of the disease in the 
swineherd of a household in the Belgorod region, the governor decided 
to slaughter all the pigs held by the households in the region and to pay 
them compensation. This policy triggered a widespread response: letters 
to newspapers, demonstrations, roadblocks, and even the emergence of a 
small social movement (‘Kolos’) to counter it. The state policy was fre-
quently interpreted by smallholders as a pretext to eradicate smallhold-
ings – to the benefit of LFEs. As a smallholder stated; 
Initially, pigs will be liquidated, then chickens, other birds. […] In the 
end, by hook or by crook, the last peasants will be eliminated. (Park 
2013) 
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Furthermore, the current pilfering of farm assets by rural dwellers 
could be seen as a struggle in the form of ‘everyday resistance’ (Scott 
1985). It is not a form of resistance against LFEs as such, as rural house-
holds can hardly imagine a future without them; but it can be classified 
as resistance against the tendency of LFEs to curtail their support to 
smallholders in order to cut costs (Nikulin 2003, 2009) – in other words, 
as resistance against the erosion of the ‘implicit social contract’ of sym-
biosis (cf. Pallot and Nefedova 2007: 124). 
These examples show that quiet food sovereignty is not apolitical. 
This study agrees with Pallot and Nefedova (2007: 106) that: 
…rural Russia has been the scene of a muted, but real, contestation of 
market reform on the part of the population intent on defending their 
access to resources and services to which they believe they are still enti-
tled. 
That active claim making and open struggle have been rare is caused 
first of all by the fact that, by and large, people are able to engage in pro-
ducing and consuming ‘healthy and culturally appropriate food’ as they 
wish. 
6.8. Preconditions for an emerging food sovereignty 
movement 
To gauge how likely it is that a food sovereignty movement would 
emerge out of ‘quiet food sovereignty’, it is necessary to discuss various 
obstacles and opportunities. 
One cognitive obstacle for a food sovereignty movement is that the 
rural population associates sovereignty exclusively with the state level 
(such as the ‘sovereign’ or ‘guided’ democracy propagated by the Putin 
regime, or the national food self-sufficiency – for which food sover-
eignty is occasionally used as a synonym. The rural dwellers’ own food 
practices and narratives are mainly concerned with a secure food provi-
sioning – control over food production is only a means to that end. At 
this point, it is possible to draw some parallels with the situation in Hon-
duras (Boyer 2010), where Via Campesina’s food sovereignty campaign 
failed because it did not take into account the understandings of the 
Honduran peasant. The latter associated food sovereignty with the pow-
ers of nation states, and the concept of food security with their deeply 
held peasant understandings of, and desire for, security in terms of their 
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continued social reproduction in insecure social and natural conditions. 
This resonates with the Russian case, with its tradition of food deficits 
and smallholder farming as a vital survival strategy for coping with that. 
Another obstacle is the low potential for mobilisation among the rural 
population. This is related to the fragmentation of Russian rural society 
(with, for instance, numerous divisions between private farmers, house-
hold plot holders, and dacha cultivators (Pallot and Nefedova 2007: 36–
38), in addition to a demographic composition which is strongly skewed 
toward the elderly and economically inactive (Nefedova 2008). Further-
more, there is a generally low proneness toward collective action (as de-
scribed in Chapter 3). 
Another major hindrance is the earlier discussed symbiosis between 
LFEs and household plots. This symbiosis, while favourable to the 
smallholders, at the same time hinders the further growth of independ-
ent family farming. What is more, it reinforces the status quo of the 
dominance of LFEs. More generally, this symbiosis precludes a more 
assertive, rights-based stance toward farm enterprises and the state, 
which could hold the seeds of a food sovereignty movement. When sala-
ries or land rents are not paid, when a crisis strikes, the ingrained reac-
tion is to seek refuge at the household/dacha plots. As a Russian farm 
director, interviewed by Visser in 2002, stated (cf. Ries 2009: 201 on da-
cha cultivators): 
In France, farmers take to the streets to protest, but in Russia, rural 
dwellers remain quiet because they can always get by on their household 
plots. 
However, when the symbiosis is threatened, one might expect in-
stances of sudden mobilisation, as indicated by the earlier mentioned ex-
ample of the smallholders’ response to the state’s swine flu policy. The 
ongoing modernisation (read: further industrialisation) of agroholdings, 
the sharpening of sanitary standards, and the rising influence of foreign 
agribusiness through Russia’s recent accession to WTO might put addi-
tional pressure on the continuation of this symbiosis, and subsequently, 
create incentives for a Russian mobilisation around food sovereignty is-
sues. 
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6.9. Conclusions 
Normally, one would expect to find food sovereignty within rural 
movements; in Russia, genuine rural movements are extremely rare and 
weak. The food sovereignty term is rarely used in Russian debates in its 
literal translation. 
However, the food sovereignty concept is neither irrelevant nor fully 
absent. Food sovereignty in its Russian guise is a more implicit, but 
widespread approach and clearly emerges bottom-up. This type of food 
sovereignty without a movement is called ‘quiet food sovereignty’ in this 
chapter and was conceptualised based on recent insights regarding ‘quiet 
sustainability’ (Smith and Jehlička 2013). This study demonstrated that 
food sovereignty in practice plays an important role in Russia, with the 
rural and urban population as smallholders being able to produce a sig-
nificant share of the food consumed, in or near their local places of liv-
ing, in a largely ecologically friendly and healthy way. Furthermore, the 
exchange of food from those smallholdings generates a sociality that is 
generally highly valued, and has a long cultural history (Ries 2009), which 
presents a purposeful parallel to market exchange in agribusiness. These 
aspects match the vision of food sovereignty put forward by global social 
movements rather well. 
However, at the same time, the productive and environmental impor-
tance of such smallholdings is grossly overlooked and downplayed by the 
Russian government, but even more strikingly, also partly by the small-
holders (cf. Kitching 1998, Pallot and Nefedova 2007). Quiet food sov-
ereignty does not challenge the overall food system directly through its 
produce, claims, or ideas, but focuses on individual economic benefits 
and ecological production for personal health, as well as a culturally ap-
propriate form of sociality, generated by the exchange of self-produced 
food. 
Furthermore, a rights discourse – which is so central in food sover-
eignty – while not absent, is rather implicit. It is grounded in the long-
standing tradition of self-provisioning, and taken for granted. 
Quiet food sovereignty is yet too diffuse to be classified as a genuine 
food sovereignty movement. Some emergent rural social movements do 
exist in Russia. However, for a national food sovereignty movement to 
take shape, there are many hindrances to overcome such as: the diver-
gent understandings of food sovereignty and security among the Russian 
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smallholders, and the low potential for mobilisation among the rural 
population (due to, for instance, social fragmentation). The symbiosis 
between smallholdings and LFEs also impedes resistance; however, 
when this symbiosis is threatened – it might trigger sudden mobilisation. 
This chapter contends that the Russian case is relevant for the wider 
food sovereignty debate and movement. Some media sources even her-
alded Russian smallholdings as offering a model that might be the key to 
feeding the world (NaturalNews.com 2012). This study suggests that 
food sovereignty as an everyday practice and discourse is more wide-
spread in post-socialist and semi-totalitarian settings than one would 
suspect by evaluating food sovereignty by the presence of food sover-
eignty movements. Acknowledging this would further the global reach 
and inclusiveness of the food sovereignty movement, and build new 
transnational linkages with parallel struggles in non-democratic contexts. 
Viewed critically, some might wonder whether considering ‘quiet food 
sovereignty’ a form of food sovereignty makes for a slippery slope, with 
the risk of weakening an already broad concept. It is important to ac-
knowledge this risk, and recognise that the inclusion of ‘quiet food sov-
ereignty’ will be a major challenge, both conceptually and practically, for 
network building in settings without strong movements. However, the 
definition of food sovereignty has never been static over the past two 
decades, and the ambition to incorporate new local experiences to 
achieve ‘a fine balance’ between ‘local realities and global actions’ (Des-
marais 2007: 135) or visions is key to keep food sovereignty vital. Fur-
thermore, this chapter argues that – for food sovereignty to constitute 
the global movement it claims to be – it should be inclusive of the large 
numbers of rural (and urban) people in non-democratic settings who in 
many ways practice the ideal of food sovereignty, even if they are less 
vocal in doing so. 
Finally, this chapter argues that the finding that ‘quiet food sover-
eignty’ has not (yet) turned into a solid social movement should not only 
be seen as a shortcoming. In fact, in less than democratic settings with 
limited open space for contention, the implicit practices and narratives, 
the strong orientation toward co-existing with large-scale farms, and the 
hidden or ad-hoc struggles of ‘quiet food sovereignty’ might be more 
effective than full-blown movements. Russia’s ‘sovereign’ or ‘guided de-
mocracy’ approach does not offer much space for social mobilisation. It 
is very likely that a sizeable food sovereignty movement would face state 
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opposition and restrictions, as is currently happening with various urban 
NGOs and emerging rural movements. Alternatively, the Russian gov-
ernment might take up the concept if food sovereignty would become 
more popular, but would likely do so in a tightly controlled manner. It 
might do so, for instance, by moulding the concept ingeniously – taking 
out the elements that challenge the status quo – as it has previously done 
with various rural and urban movements and their notions, by creating 
state embedded civil society organisations (Chapter 3). Thus, it would be 
less likely for a Russian food sovereignty movement to be close to the 
term’s global understanding (in the vein of a social movement like Via 
Campesina), and more likely for it is something of a state-captured ‘Via 
Kremlina’. 
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Notes 
 
1 This applies also to urban food movements. 
2 For varying definitions, see e.g. Desmarais (2007), Edelman (2014), Nyéléni 
(2007), Peoples’ Food Sovereignty Network (2002). 
3 An exception is DeMaster (2013). 
4 Alternatively, some argue more recently that food sovereignty is becoming too 
locally focused (Iles and Montenegro 2013). 
5 Furthermore, though they mostly continued offering some support to house-
hold plots, LFEs gradually reduced the range of goods and/or beneficiaries (Ni-
kulin 2003, 2009, Visser 2009). 
6 See: Subsidiary farming – a relic of the past or the reality of the Russian coun-
tryside? http://altapress.ru/story/80477. 
7 Some of the state support to LFEs may ‘leak’ to the plots through the symbiosis 
between the two; but this would be a small percentage, especially as the monitor-
ing of large farm property became more strict from the late 1990s onwards (Vis-
ser 2009).  
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8 Interview conducted 21 October 2010, Moscow. 
9 Interview conducted 5 November 2013. 
10 There are also differences between regions and households, with the small 
group of somewhat larger, commercial household plots likely to be more positive. 
For a slightly more positive view on smallholdings, see Alekhin (2012); for nega-
tive views, see Kitching (1998), Pallot and Nefedova (2007: 205). 
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7 
What Do We Learn From This? Research 
Implications, Generalisability, 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 
 
This doctoral dissertation aimed to rethink some predominant assump-
tions in critical agrarian studies, by positioning post-Soviet post-socialist 
rural politics within the context of global agrarian debates. At the same 
time, it challenged the common understanding of contemporary trans-
formations in the post-socialist countryside by bringing fresh insights 
from the critical agrarian studies literature. It demonstrated that land 
grabbing and the development of large-scale industrial agriculture are 
often accepted by post-Soviet villagers, who – contrary to rural people in 
other parts of the world – do not necessarily resist, but rather work to be 
incorporated into large-scale agriculture. This study also shows that 
small-scale subsistence farming can coexist with large-scale agriculture, 
due to the continuation of the Soviet dual agricultural system and the 
symbiotic relations between large and small farms. The analysis of rural 
resistance and mobilisation in post-socialist post-Soviet settings reveals 
that social movements and activists are more effective when they coop-
erate with the state and employ official regulations, norms and rhetoric 
in their politics, rather than openly opposing the regime. Finally, the 
study indicates that the rights to culturally appropriate food and defining 
one’s own food system are not alien to the post-Soviet population. 
However, these ideas are not accompanied by public discourses and 
open mobilisation, thus, representing a ‘quiet’ form of what can still be 
seen as food sovereignty.  
This concluding section addresses the issue of generalisability of the 
study results and shows common features in rural politics within the 
post-socialist region. It is followed by an overview of how the research 
findings could transform the predominant discourses in critical agrarian 
studies. The discussion of the theoretical implications is followed by an 
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analysis of possible policy implications of the dissertation’s results in 
Russia and Ukraine. And finally, this chapter recognises and discusses 
some limitations of this research and indicates several ideas for future 
studies. 
7.1. Generalisability of research findings within the post-
Soviet post-socialist context 
The generalisation of qualitative research results is considered as irrele-
vant and even impossible by (neo)positivist scholars, who are committed 
to scientific methods and quantitative research (Jonassen 1991, Sobh and 
Perry 2006, Creswell 2007). They argue that qualitative studies represent 
the researcher’s subjective interpretation of the phenomenon, and that 
the same actions or circumstances have different meanings to different 
individuals. Therefore, the extension of the results of qualitative research 
to a wider population or to different contexts is considered inappropri-
ate. Constructivist scholars, on the contrary, argue that generalisation is 
possible in qualitative studies; however, it is less expressive and determi-
nistic than in quantitative research (Payne and Williams 2005, Stake 1980, 
Popay et al. 1998). Payne and Williams (2005: 296) proposed a type of 
limited generalisation in qualitative studies, so-called ‘moderatum gener-
alisations’, which constitute ‘the modest, pragmatic generalisations drawn 
from personal experience which, by bringing a semblance of order and 
consistency to social interaction, make everyday life possible’. Stake 
(1980: 69) introduced the concept of ‘naturalistic generalisation’, which is 
a ‘partially intuitive process arrived at by recognising the similarities of 
objects and issues in and out of context’. Popay et al. (1998: 348) advo-
cated in favour of logical generalisations, which allow ‘a theoretical un-
derstanding of a similar class of phenomena rather than probabilistic 
generalisations to a population’. This section presents the discussion 
about the generalisability of research findings, largely following the per-
spective of Popay et al. (1998), and reveals how similar types of phe-
nomena can be detected within and outside post-Soviet and post-
socialist settings. 
Before putting forth some generalised claims regarding the post-
socialist context, it is important to assess whether these research findings 
can be logically generalisable throughout Russia and Ukraine. In terms of 
geographical scale, this study is limited to the analysis of rural politics in 
suburban areas (the Moscow and Kiev regions), fertile agricultural re-
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gions (the Stavropol Krai and the Khmelnitsk region), and a more mar-
ginal, but still central part of Russia (the Vladimir region). Despite the 
multi-sited fieldwork, the primary data does not reflect the ethnic diver-
sity, unequal economic development, and diverse natural and climatic 
conditions of the analysed countries. Thus, by focusing on the central 
European part of Russia, this study overlooks processes in the Northern 
and Asian regions of the country, which could demonstrate different 
pathways of development. For instance, Nakhshina (2012) revealed open 
resistance and mobilisation of indigenous fishermen in the Murmansk 
region (the North-Western part of Russia) against restricted access to 
aquatic resources due to the activities of large industrial fishing compa-
nies. Zhou (2015) analysed agrarian transformations in the Russian Far 
East, caused by the inflow of Chinese migrant farming population. These 
regional differences and many other place-specific processes were not 
reflected in this dissertation. Similarly, the ethnographic study in two 
Ukrainian regions clearly does not account for all rural politics that take 
place in the country.  
However, the goal of this study was not to cover all forms of socio-
geographic diversity in Russia and Ukraine, but to investigate and reveal 
the key rural politics in detail and from various perspectives. Despite the 
geographical boundaries of primary qualitative data, this analysis is not 
limited to any particular place and time. Many other academic studies 
reflect analogous processes in different parts of Russia and Ukraine, 
which support the arguments of this dissertation. For example, Visser 
(2008) revealed a perseverance of productive symbiosis between large 
and small farms in the Pskov and Rostov regions of Russia1. Kuns (2016) 
discussed rural abilities to adapt to unfavourable conditions is his study 
of smallholders’ strategies in the Kherson region of Southern Ukraine. 
The empirical chapters of this dissertation engage with an extensive set 
of post-Soviet literature and include national statistical data and survey 
results, which confirm and compliment the qualitative research findings, 
and, therefore, allow for making more generalised claims at the country 
level.  
In order to evaluate whether the research results can be generalised to 
post-socialist settings at large, we need to return to the discussion of 
‘post-socialism’ and the comparability of different phenomena in the 
post-socialist region (initiated in Chapter 1). The term ‘post-socialism’ 
can also be applied to China, Vietnam, Laos, Cuba and several other 
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countries that share a history of socialism. However, this research fol-
lows a more narrow understanding of post-socialism, which is defined as 
a socio-economic transition from socialism to capitalism in the region of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (see Humphrey 2002a, 
Matkowski 2004, Gudeman and Hann 2015). Until recently, post-
socialism was understood as a temporary formation, which inevitably 
should come to an end when a complete transformation to capitalism 
occurs (Matkowski 2004, Stenning 2005a). Matkowski (2004) assessed 
the transformation to capitalism in 27 post-socialist countries of Europe 
and Asia, and clustered them based on macroeconomic performance and 
social welfare. The first group2 consists of the lower-middle income 
countries of Central Asia and Transcaucasia that are lagging behind in 
terms of transition to capitalism. The South-Western former Soviet Un-
ion (FSU) and South-Eastern European countries3 were referred to by 
Matkowski (2004) as the upper-middle income states, which went 
through a privatisation of former collective assets, but still experience 
significant state interventions in the economy; whereas post-socialist 
East-Central Europe4 represents a high-income group that is the most 
advanced in the privatisation process and development of market rela-
tions.  
According to Humphrey (2002a: 12), the comparison of these coun-
tries is essential for understanding the transformation processes in this 
region. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, description of different 
situations in various countries and then applying calculations does not 
make sense as ‘there is X here, but not there; there is Y here but not 
there’ (Humphrey 2002b: 12). Thus, the generalisability of this disserta-
tion’s results for post-socialist settings is discussed for every detected 
phenomenon and by using the wide field of ‘post-socialisms’ for com-
parison.  
Despite somewhat different schemes of agricultural de-
collectivisation,5 many post-socialist countries followed similar trajecto-
ries of agrarian transformation. Thus, as stated by Gudeman and Hann 
(2015: 11) in their study of Eastern European agricultural development, 
‘capitalised family farming in the Western manner still remains an excep-
tion on the post-socialist countryside. Successful entrepreneurs (often 
the old power-holders in a new guise) depend on personal links to na-
tional elites and access to EU subsidies’. This corresponds to Burawoy’s 
(2001) concept of ‘transition without transformation’, which was used in 
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Chapter 1 to discuss Russian and Ukrainian post-socialist transforma-
tions. The former socialist power structures remain largely unchanged in 
many post-socialist countries. Individuals who occupied important posi-
tions under socialism, benefited from land distribution and agriculture 
subsidies, while the majority of the rural population became dispossessed 
and highly dependent on subsistence farming on their household plots. 
In their pilot study of land grabbing in post-Soviet Eurasia, Visser and 
Spoor (2011) argued that the three largest post-Soviet agricultural pro-
ducers – Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan – experience similar patterns 
of land investments. The legacy of industrial agriculture, abandonment 
of farmland after the collapse of the FSU, and uncertain land rights of 
the rural population lead to a remarkable resemblance in the processes of 
large-scale land accumulation in these countries. This, in turn, caused 
similar responses among rural communities. Thus, this dissertation draws 
a parallel between Ukrainian and Kazakh villagers, who prefer working at 
LFEs to running a private family farm due to the socialist legacy of in-
dustrial farming, which resulted in the societal acceptance of large-scale 
land deals (Chapter 5). The socialist structures remain vital in Belarus 
and define the process of land grabbing, which proceeds through inter-
national investments into (primarily state-owned)6 former kolkhozy and 
sovkhozy (Farmlandgrab 2014). This suggests that the process of land 
and capital accumulation follows a similar trajectory in a number of post-
Soviet middle-income countries that are exposed to agrarian capitalism, 
but demonstrate strong legacies of socialist agriculture.  
Low-income Central Asian countries7 have been much slower in 
transforming former socialist farm structures. In Uzbekistan, Turkmeni-
stan and Tajikistan the state retained ownership of farmland and contin-
ues to control agricultural production (Hofman and Visser 2014, Veld-
wisch and Bock 2011). Here, ‘agrarian structures have not crystallised 
yet, in contrast to most other FSU states where agrarian structures have 
more or less stabilised after two decades of independence’ (Hofman and 
Visser 2014: 5). However, uncrystallised agrarian structures do not re-
strain, but rather facilitate land grabbing and the dispossession of the 
rural poor. Processes of land acquisitions by domestic and foreign inves-
tors were detected in a number of studies on agrarian transformation in 
Central Asia (Lerman 2012, Hofman and Ho 2012, Visser and Spoor 
2011).  
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Generalised claims can be made in terms of advocacy, rural politics 
and state-society relations in many authoritarian countries of the FSU. 
Thus, similarly to Putin’s patrimonial governance, Belorussian president 
Lukashenko’s public image of ‘bat’ka’ (father of people) and his ‘flam-
boyant autocratic style finds favour with a vast constituency of rural and 
elderly voters still nostalgic about the communist era’ (Silitski 2005: 85). 
Lukashenko’s use of the ‘tsar-deliverer’ myth for socio-political control 
in the country is very similar to what was discussed in Chapter 4 on naive 
monarchism and rural resistance in Russia. Furthermore, neopatrimonial 
power mechanisms characterise authoritarian governance in many coun-
tries of Central Asia and Transcaucasia (Paiziev 2014). Do rural dwellers 
in these countries – similar to Russians – derive benefits from their sub-
ordinate positions and employ the myths of ‘the tsar-deliverer’ and ‘of 
loyal peasants’ in their grievances? Complaint letters to higher ranked 
authorities or newspapers were a common form of peasant defiance in 
the Soviet Union (Fitzpatrick 1996) and continue being practised today. 
Thus, farmers in Tajikistan often write letters of complaint to higher au-
thorities, called ‘ariza’ (Mandler 2012). Mandler (2012: 18) argued that 
ariza ‘may do more harm than good as it provokes a response from 
lower level authorities, who are themselves integral components of the 
local elite system’, and, therefore, may ‘jeopardise village tinji [village 
peace]’. In comparison to Russian complaint letters, ariza might be less 
effective because the ‘vertical power structure’ and principals of ‘hands-
on/manual management’ (see Chapter 4) are less profound in Tajikistan.  
Some parallels can be made in regard to organised social movements 
in a politically constrained post-socialist environment. As argued in 
Chapter 3, a number of rural social movement organisations in Russia 
have emerged as an extension of the state apparatus or with the purpose 
of fulfilling the hidden goals of their creators. In a study of civil mobili-
sation and protests in Central Asia, Radnitz (2010) discovered that many 
rural protests in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were organised and led by 
domestic elites, who used rural discontent for their personal interests to 
gain power and resources. By studying Kyrgyzstan’s 2005 ‘Tulip Revolu-
tion’ from this perspective, Radnitz (2010) argued that the clientelistic 
relations between elites and local communities were the ‘weapons of the 
wealthy’. However, he overlooked the possibility that this clientelism can 
be the means to mobilise the apolitical post-Soviet rural population, what 
would challenge some of his arguments about the Tulip Revolution.  
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Studies on small-scale farming of the post-socialist population consti-
tute an entire field in post-Soviet and post-socialist studies.8 Kaneff and 
Leonard (2002) revealed that food self-provisioning is commonly 
practised in post-socialist Eastern Europe, East Asia, and the FSU. This 
small-scale food production is often discussed as a fallback option in 
times of crisis, societal transformational around food practices, and as a 
cultural identity of the post-socialist populations (see Gudeman and 
Hann 2015, Cash 2015, Smith and Jehlička 2013). The concept of ‘quiet 
food sovereignty’, proposed in Chapter 6 to study Russian people’s farm-
ing, was developed under the influence of Smith and Jehlička’s (2013)’ 
theory on ‘quiet sustainability’ in Poland and the Czech Republic. This 
dissertation argues that practices of ‘quiet food sovereignty’ can be ob-
served in many countries of the post-socialist region (and even beyond 
it) – in places where people grow healthy and culturally appropriate food, 
but without attaching great importance to this process or engaging in 
public discourses and mobilisations around these issues.  
7.2. Contributions to the critical agrarian studies debates 
Chapter 1 situated this doctoral study within the critical agrarian stud-
ies debates. It applied agrarian (and particularly, peasant) studies frame-
works to explain the contemporary rural politics in the post-socialist 
post-Soviet settings. The present section attempts to initiate a discussion 
on how the study’s results could enhance or contest some core concepts 
and theories of the agrarian studies literature. It does not make hard as-
sumptions, but rather offers avenues for rethinking rural politics and 
agrarian transformations across the world.  
Most of the literature on land grabbing concurs that the process of 
large-scale land accumulation for purposes of extracting resources in fa-
vour of external actors is not a new phenomenon. White et al. (2012: 
623) wrote about the continuity of land grabbing: ‘in many regions of the 
Global South, land was first grabbed by pre-colonial rulers in chronic 
territorial wars with each other, then by colonial governments and in-
creasingly by foreign or domestic corporations’. The history of land 
grabbing is still shaping how and where land grabbing is happening to-
day. Among the main ideas that justify and facilitate land grabs through-
out the centuries, Franco et al. (2013: 10) distinguished: ‘(1) the effi-
ciency of seizing land and securing it as exclusive “property” through 
legal means, (2) the utility of justifying which lands “can” be grabbed us-
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ing the discursive device of “vacant” or “empty” land, and, (3) the value 
of establishing an overriding legitimacy in taking over someone’s land for 
reasons of “public purpose” or “public interest”’.  
This dissertation similarly reveals that the recent land rush in the for-
mer Soviet Union is deeply shaped by past practices and historical lega-
cies. The mechanisms and ideologies that justify large-scale land accumu-
lation and its social impacts are largely influenced by the legacy of 
socialist agriculture. A contribution of this study to the land grab litera-
ture is that it applied the discussion on the longevity and path-
dependency of contemporary large-scale land acquisitions to the analysis 
of post-socialist agrarian transformation. This study demonstrated that 
the neoliberal agricultural model makes very little difference if we focus 
on class dynamics in the countryside: the socio-economic structures re-
main rather unchanged. In fact, Burawoy’s (2002) concept of ‘transition 
without transformation’ applies to these regions. The re-emergence of 
the Soviet dual agricultural system (large- versus small-scale farms and 
their productive symbiosis), albeit in a neoliberal guise, begs the ques-
tion: what are the fundamental qualities that make socialist and post-
socialist phases different enough to warrant deploying the land grabbing 
concept? The answer to this question is as follows. Land grabbing did 
not provoke significant transformations of long-established power rela-
tions in the post-Soviet countryside. Nevertheless, this process of land 
accumulation should be seen as part of a global land grabbing trend that 
emerged with the global food price crisis of 2007-2008 and the more 
general crisis of capitalist accumulation, and triggered by international 
flows of capital, goods, and ideas across borders (see Margulis et al. 2013 
on links between globalisation and land grabbing, and McMichael 2013 
for a discussion about the relation between land grabbing and the global 
agrarian crisis).9 
Land grabbing is a politically loaded concept and often reflects the au-
thor’s political position in the debate over neoliberal agriculture versus 
peasant farming. Many post-Soviet studies – especially those written in 
the FSU countries – reject the term land grabbing and employ ‘large-
scale land investments’ instead, while others refer simply to ‘land deals’. 
They arguably do so based on a high-modernist ideology, and guided by 
the fact that post-Soviet land transactions are not usually accompanied 
by the displacement of the rural poor (see the discussion about ‘land 
grabbing’ and ‘large-scale land investments’ terminology in Chapter 5). 
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By discussing the case of the post-Soviet large-scale land acquisitions 
within a land grabbing framework, this study expands the notion of land 
grabs to situations where land deals are socially accepted and even 
(sometimes) welcomed by rural communities. Contrary to mainstream 
assumptions about peasant resistance to land grabbing, this research re-
veals various forms of rural responses: from outright resistance to adap-
tation and struggles for incorporation. It follows McCarthy’s (2010) ar-
gument that peasant attitudes to land grabbing critically depend on the 
‘terms of inclusion’ of the local population in land deals. This disserta-
tion distinguishes various conditions under which the rural population is 
incorporated into industrial agricultural development. These conditions 
are largely influenced by the socialist legacy of productive symbiosis be-
tween large and small-scale farms, the existing land tenure that makes 
many rural dwellers the official owners of agricultural land, and the re-
sponse strategies by rural households. This study argues that any roman-
tic illusions about small-scale farmers should be set aside when analysing 
the impact of land grabs on rural communities. It reveals that post-soviet 
rural dwellers often act individualistically, putting their own interests 
above those of the rural communities in their reactions to industrial agri-
cultural development. Therefore, this study asks critical agrarian scholars 
to look beyond the dichotomy between ‘bad land grabs’ and ‘good peas-
ant struggles’. 
Another theoretical contribution of this study is its analysis of state-
society relations. It follows the call of Hall et al. (2015) to look beyond 
the simplistic dualistic perspective on the state as either a weak ‘target’ 
state (which cannot resist the pressures of foreign and domestic agricul-
tural businesses), or as a ‘host’ (which facilitates land accumulation by 
providing large firm enterprises with infrastructure and financial sup-
port). In particular, this study turns to the Weberian tradition to analyse 
the merger of economic elites with the state apparatus and patrimonial 
governance. It also uses class analysis to explain state politics in the 
countryside. This study argues that big business and the state are so 
strongly interwoven that the latter does not only serve capital accumula-
tion (as the classical Marxist school of thought would argue); it repre-
sents the business at its core, as the state authorities (or federal oligarchs) 
are the owners of large agricultural enterprises. This study demonstrates 
the importance of seeing the state as a mix of various actors, factions 
and interests, many of which are in direct competition for power re-
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sources (i.e. economic, bureaucratic-administrative, coercive and ideo-
logical resources).  
Furthermore, this dissertation reveals a number of historical parallels 
regarding state governance and the role of national leaders. Similar to 
Tsarist and Soviet governance schemes, patrimonial rule defines the en-
tire system of social hierarchy in contemporary Russia under Putin. In 
this context, the top governmental authorities use state resources in or-
der to secure the loyalty of lower authorities. Moreover, administrative 
personnel are only answerable to the ruler. It is, therefore, unsurprising 
that the image of the Russian president as the ‘present day tsar’ fits so 
well with the popular image of the state. This study discusses the applica-
tion of ‘naive monarchism’ in state-society relations, and thus contributes 
to the debates on boundary-spanning rural contention in less-than-
democratic regimes. It engages with O’Brien’s theories on ‘rightful resis-
tance’ and Scott’s writings on the resistance of subaltern groups. Thus, it 
argues that contemporary rural resistance is deeply rooted in historical 
forms of domination and subjugation, but at the same time includes 
modern ideas on rights and uses progressive means to address com-
plaints to the president (e.g. online petition platforms, mass media, elec-
tion campaigns). Similarly to Chinese ‘rightful resisters’, Russian rural 
activists refer to official laws and regulatory frameworks to legitimate 
their causes and demand that local authorities meet their obligations. 
However, ‘rightful resisters’ tend to use authorised channels of dispute 
resolution, and, for the most part, do not hold illusions of patronage ties 
to the head of state (O’Brien 1996). Russian villagers are rarely able to 
obtain fair dispute resolutions from appellate institutions when they face 
powerful business interests (due to the corruption of the judicial system), 
and therefore appeal to the president as a last resort. This dissertation 
furthers critical discussion on whether naïve monarchism is a sincere ru-
ral belief or a conscious strategy applied by rural activists to shield them-
selves from state repression and punish their oppressors – the ‘disloyal’ 
local elites. O’Brien (2013) also raised the question of sincere versus stra-
tegic rural behaviour in his recent work ‘Rightful Resistance Revisited’. 
Similarly, he did not have a definitive answer. Whether sincere or strate-
gic, such within-the-system rural protests provide rural dwellers with a 
means to remedy occasional local injustices in less-than-democratic re-
gimes. 
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In the same vein, this study discusses institutionalised rural social 
movements and their relationship with the state. It demonstrates that an 
alliance with the state’s discourse, norms and policies is a more effective 
and less dangerous strategy than a direct confrontation with the state. 
This falls in line with the general shift in understanding civil society – 
from viewing it as a counterforce to the state, to viewing it as a collabo-
rator. This study argues that although there are many state marionettes in 
state-controlled civil space (as is the case in Russia), civil society organi-
sations should not automatically be viewed as co-opted when they col-
laborate with the state. Instead, this dissertation argues that collaboration 
with the state provides political, economic and social resources to social 
movements, which are necessary for conducting the movements’ activi-
ties. Thus, social movement organisations are effective when they coop-
erate with the state, while at the same time being able to preserve their 
autonomy. 
Another contribution of this dissertation is that it takes the ‘food sov-
ereignty’ concept out of its comfort zone. In a sharp counterpoint to ac-
tivist dispositions on food production and consumption – which galva-
nise each other with transformative zeal – this study displays the 
concept’s more mundane, domesticated side. It explores what food sov-
ereignty looks like in an authoritarian political context, with a limited po-
litical opportunity structure and a soviet legacy of industrial agriculture –
elements that hinder the emergence of more conventional food sover-
eignty movements. It shows a form of ‘quiet food sovereignty’, drawing 
on Smith and Jehlička’s (2013) concept of ‘quiet sustainability’. It reveals 
that Russia features many hidden and ad hoc strategies, which preserve 
the autonomy of small-scale farming and protect people’s rights to 
healthy and culturally appropriate food. Therefore, this study asks schol-
ars and/or activists not to write off peasantries that do not necessarily 
see themselves as part of a social movement. It argues, instead, that the 
principles of food sovereignty are widely adaptable to a variety of politi-
cal contexts, including those where direct action, formal organising, and 
other common tactics of the food sovereignty movement may not be 
politically productive.  
Finally, this study demonstrates that the prefix ‘post-’ in post-socialist 
and post-Soviet studies should not be associated with processes of lag-
ging behind. Instead, they should be seen as an indication of alternative 
Processed on: 6-9-2016
505017-L-bw-Mamanova
 What Do We Learn From This? 241 
transformation pathways, which provide an original angle to critical 
agrarian studies debates.  
7.3. Discussion on policy implications of research findings, 
and engaged research practices 
Early studies on peasant politics and agrarian transformation were pri-
marily preoccupied with broad trends and the generation of broad theo-
ries (i.e. Lenin 1964, Chayanov 1966, Wolf 1969). In the 1980s, the focus 
of agrarian studies moved toward more micro-level research next to a 
political economy approach. Colburn (1982: 438) argued that this trans-
formation ‘offer[ed] possibilities for theory building that may help not 
only to integrate individual experiences into a body of knowledge, but 
also to assist those working in the design and implementation of devel-
opment policies and projects’. The ‘critical’ approach to agrarian studies 
has somewhat blurred the line between academic researchers, develop-
ment practitioners, and civil society activists (see Borras 2016 on land 
politics, agrarian movements and scholar-activism). Besides furthering 
academic knowledge on post-socialist rural politics, this study has aimed 
to have practical implications that can contribute to more fair rural de-
velopment in the FSU and beyond. This section presents a discussion on 
the implications of the research findings and the results of engaged re-
search practices. 
This study demonstrates that small-scale food production in the post-
Soviet context is a resource-efficient, ecological, cultural form of farm-
ing, and is as productive in terms of yield as LFEs, not to mention more 
sustainable in the long-term (Chapter 6). However, due to the general-
ised belief ‘big is beautiful’ and state capture ‘from inside’, the state pol-
icy of national food security is primarily based on unsustainable large-
scale industrial agriculture. Nation states should recognise that peoples’ 
farming is not backward and inefficient, as it has been commonly per-
ceived – but is actually resource-efficient, highly productive, and entails 
social, economic, and ecological benefits for the population as a whole. 
Therefore, it should be supported and promoted by the state. However, 
this scenario seems not only infeasible in the short and medium term, 
but might bring more disadvantages than advantages to smallholders.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, post-Soviet states respond to the interests 
of large businesses. It is unlikely that federal oligarchs and state-owned 
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LFEs would allow for the implementation of policies aimed at the devel-
opment and expansion of small-scale farming at the expense of large in-
dustrial agriculture. Such a shift in state policy seems improbable without 
a political regime transformation, resulting in the breakdown of the state-
elite marriage. It also could be the result of pressure from large-scale ru-
ral social movements and civil society. However, as this study demon-
strates, post-Soviet social movement organisations are inconsistent, dis-
persed, and lack support from the rural population. Moreover, rural 
dwellers do not attach great importance to their farming; therefore, they 
are unlikely to defend their lifestyle in an open political manner. Mean-
while, the recent Russian ‘foreign agent’ law (2012)10 constrains, in part, 
the inflow of international ideas on food sovereignty and the peasant 
way of life, which could generate discourse and recognition of the im-
portance of small-scale farming among the post-Soviet rural population 
(see Chapter 4 on rural social movement organisations). 
If, however, the Russian or Ukrainian state would decide to support 
smallholders, then how could one guarantee different results from those 
witnessed in the early post-Soviet transition period? After the collapse of 
the USSR, the newly emerged countries anticipated the development of 
commercial family farming on the ruins of collective agriculture, not tak-
ing into account the specificity of household production and symbiotic 
relations between small and large farms. This dissertation has demon-
strated that the post-Soviet rural population does not strive for inde-
pendence in its farming, but prefers a level of symbiosis and coexistence 
with LFEs.11 In order to empower smallholders, it is important to under-
stand the rules and norms that govern their food production and distri-
bution. Thus, many food practices are carried out informally through 
personal networks (see Chapter 6). Official recognition and registration 
of these practices will most likely lead to their dissolution or emergence 
of shadow/hidden practices. For example, the recent proposition of the 
Ukrainian government to register rural households engaging in market 
sales as commercial entities created discontent among the rural popula-
tion, and would possibly lead to a decrease in market sales if this policy is 
adopted (Kuns 2016).  
This study demonstrates that the peasant identity is underdeveloped, 
and Soviet nostalgia about collective farming still dominates in the post-
Soviet countryside. The majority of rural dwellers consider employment 
at LFEs to be the best solution to their problems. Therefore, the princi-
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ples and guidance for responsible investment in agriculture,12 which are 
largely based on the coexistence scenario between large and small agri-
culture, can be beneficial for Russia and Ukraine under the present cir-
cumstances. However, these principles are voluntary and have a recom-
mendatory character, which makes them less efficient in protecting the 
interests of the poor. Even if these guidelines were to be obligatory, their 
implementation is problematic in countries such as Russia and Ukraine, 
where the de facto dominates the de jure.  
However, this does not mean that nothing can be done to improve 
the situation in the analysed countries. Knowledge is a powerful weapon, 
which is often used by critical scholars and activists. Engaged research 
practices encompass different ways in which academic researchers mean-
ingfully interact with their informants and other members of the non-
academic community, which ‘generate benefits, changes and/or effects 
for all participants as they develop and share knowledge, expertise and 
skills’ (Holliman and Holti 2014: 2). This study devotes quite some atten-
tion to knowledge exchange with the analysed rural communities and 
other interested (academic and non-academic) actors. Besides publication 
of the research findings in leading academic journals, several empirical 
chapters were transformed into popular articles and published with open 
access. For example, Chapter 5 was rewritten for the volume ‘Right to 
Food and Nutrition Watch 2015’13 organised by the Food First Informa-
tion and Action Network (FIAN), and later adjusted for publication in 
the issue of ‘The Land’ magazine14 devoted to the theme of ‘Equality in 
the Countryside’. Chapter 2 became a chapter of the Russian Academy 
of Science book ‘Land accumulation in the beginning of the XXI century: global 
investors and local communities’15 – the first publication on land grabbing in 
the Russian language. Furthermore, this research project includes the 
writing of web-blog posts (http://landgrabfsu.blogspot.com/) that in-
clude discussions on intermediary research findings and share the latest 
news on land grabbing in the FSU. The study results are also published 
online at the university’s institutional repository and/or at the ERC 
webpage, according to the Open Access Guidelines for the ERC-funded 
research.  
The engaged research practices also included collaboration with rural 
activists and social movement organisations in the post-Soviet setting. In 
this regard, it is important to acknowledge various synergies and tensions 
between academic researchers and rural social movements. Edelman 
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(2009: 245) argued that ‘one of the most useful contributions of aca-
demic researchers to social movements may be reporting patterns in the 
testimony of people in the movement’s targeted constituency who are 
sympathetic to movement objectives but who feel alienated or marginal-
ised by one or another aspect of movement discourse or practice’. In-
deed, many post-Soviet rural activists were enthusiastic about participat-
ing in this research, hoping that it would spread their story and create 
public awareness about injustices in the countryside. This was especially 
important for ‘naive monarchist’ activists, who use publicity as a means 
to force authorities to meet their obligations. However, as Edelman 
(2009: 251) reminded us, the ‘activists’ expectation that academic re-
search will be immediately applicable to their struggle’ leads to a disap-
pointment, as ‘academics, unlike journalists, are socialised in the universi-
ties to write slowly’. Although much of these research findings were 
published relatively quickly and with open access, the analysis often came 
too late or in a form that is less relevant to activists’ purposes. In order 
to mitigate this shortcoming, several conferences and workshops16 were 
organised or co-organised within the research project, of which this 
study was part. These events gathered academics, rural activists, land in-
vestors and policy makers and generated a mutually productive dialogue 
between them. In addition, the Eurasian Agrofood and Land initiative 
(EURAL) was established by the ERC project that hosts this study, in 
order to exchange knowledge between academics and social actors.  
7.4. Limitations of the study and topics for future research 
Among the limitations of qualitative analysis are: its reliance on people’s 
subjective views and judgements, the involvement of a relatively small 
number of participants, and the inability to confirm its findings with 
hard numbers, which leads to a likelihood that its results will be taken 
less seriously by other academics or policy makers (Griffin 2004). Al-
though this study integrates a wealth of quantitative data into its analysis, 
it remains primarily qualitative. Meanwhile, the combination of ‘soft’ and 
‘hard’ techniques would make many of this dissertation’s arguments 
stronger. For example, the concept of ‘quiet food sovereignty’, which is 
largely developed based on interviews with small-scale food producers, 
would also benefit from quantitative data and the use of environmental 
science tools. Laboratory tests (such as chemical soil testing and plant 
analysis) could provide further insights on the environmental sustainabil-
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ity of small-scale food production, while input-output calculations for 
different households would help to develop the argument about the eco-
nomic self-sufficiency of smallholders. Furthermore, large-scale survey 
data might reveal undetected trends and relations, and would challenge, 
confirm, or expand the research findings. For example, it could be inter-
esting to conduct a factor analysis to determine which factors have sig-
nificant impacts on different rural response strategies. Survey data can 
also reveal how differences in legal frameworks (such as a moratorium 
on farmland sales in Ukraine versus a relatively free land market in Rus-
sia) influence the LFEs-smallholder symbiosis. Another interesting phe-
nomenon to investigate is the correlation between the national identity, 
patriotism, and ‘quiet food sovereignty’, which might lead to compelling 
results, especially in the case of Ukraine, where strong nationalistic 
movements are currently taking place. 
Although this study was designed to analyse rural politics in various 
geographical and socio-economic areas, the impact of place-specific fac-
tors – such as the environment, local political configurations, path-
dependency, location, ethnicity and ‘culture’ – was not clearly identified. 
For example, further research should be done to reveal whether ‘naive 
monarchism’ described in Chapter 4 is equally developed across regions 
and, if not, which factors influence its uneven development. Another 
query would be: how does product specialisation of large farm enter-
prises affect the symbiosis between large and small farms (described in 
Chapter 6)? Similarly, how does it affect rural dwellers’ attitudes towards 
land investors and state policy? This dissertation tends to treat space as a 
stage upon which macro-level processes are played out. The specifics of 
a particular place are not given an active role in shaping the trajectory of 
the considered region. Very different paths are being carved out in rural 
Russia, each in a different relationship with the country’s centre, other 
regions, and other countries. Further research should reveal what distin-
guishes the experiences of the particular places considered in this study 
from what the existing literature can tell us about other regions not in-
cluded in the dissertation. 
While focusing on small-scale food production in the countryside, 
this dissertation does not give sufficient attention to the farming activi-
ties of urban dwellers at their dacha (second country home) plots. Ac-
cording to different estimations, between 40 and 80% of the post-Soviet 
urban population are engaged in dacha-based food practices (Treivish 
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2014, Nefedova 2013). Dacha gardening is the focus of the so-called ‘da-
cha studies’, which investigate these activities in relation to Soviet nostal-
gia and memories of hardship, a source of food security, or a societal 
countermovement to capitalism (Zavisca 2003, Caldwell 2011). Chapter 
6 offers an original glance at post-Soviet urban gardening, by analysing it 
within the concept of ‘quiet food sovereignty’. Dacha gardening is also 
briefly mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3 as a trigger for land grabbing. 
However, this phenomenon offers much more for critical agrarian stud-
ies. Dacha-driven land grabbing deserves special attention due to its ac-
celerating rates and severe impact on rural communities and landscapes 
in suburbia. During the last decade, the number of dachas has doubled, 
occupying five times as much land (Mamonova and Sutherland 2015). 
Some 85% of newly built dachas are constructed on former agricultural 
land (Agureyeva 2010). In some rural settlements, the number of dachniks 
(dacha owners) exceeds the amount of traditional rural inhabitants, 
which leads to drastic socio-economic transformations (Nefedova 2011). 
Furthermore, as was also revealed in Chapters 2 and 3, the dacha-driven 
land use change is accompanied by deprivation of the land rights of 
many villagers and triggers rural resistance and mobilisation. Further re-
search should be done to reveal mechanisms, trajectories, and socio-
economic consequences of contemporary dacha-driven rural (and also 
suburban) development. The dacha phenomenon is not only a post-
Soviet characteristic. Trevish (2014) observed similar processes in many 
countries of Europe and North America that have a tradition of second 
homes. The analysis of dacha-related processes within a broader agrarian 
studies framework will be an important contribution to understanding 
rural transformations worldwide.  
This study does not address gender and generational dynamics, while 
these are important dimensions of rural politics. This omission is the re-
sult of the overall purpose of this study that has to do with general 
trends of agrarian transformation and the insufficiently explored field of 
rural politics in the FSU. That required a number of questions to be ad-
dressed before exploring the impact of gender and generations on the 
processes analysed in this study. This is also a limitation of many pre-
sent-day agrarian studies – which, despite the explicit calls from different 
research societies and academics for gender and generation-sensitive 
studies – often remain silent about these dynamics (see Hall et al. 2015). 
Only a few works deal with gender and generational issues related to 
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agrarian capitalism and rural politics (see for example Doss et al. 2014, 
Julia and White 2012, White et al. 2014, White and Park 2015). Hall et al. 
(2015: 482) revealed that ‘women and men respond, both individually 
and collectively, in diverse ways to the promises and threats of land 
deals’. Therefore, in order to understand rural politics, gender issues 
should be addressed.  
Although ‘zhenskiy vopros’ (the question of women) is routinely raised 
in post-soviet studies, it is often reduced to an analysis of folklore or 
gender inequality in education and other social services, in regard to the 
discussion on gendered roles in the countryside (Olson and Adonyeva 
2013, Silova and Magno 2004). Meanwhile, different roles of men and 
women in agrarian transformation go largely unnoticed (with some nota-
ble exceptions such as Wegren et al. 2010, Wegren at al. 2015, who stud-
ied workplace gender inequality during the post-soviet transition period). 
Gender analysis is important for a better understanding of everyday rural 
politics, as women have ‘informal power’ in everyday life and decision-
making processes at the household level and in rural communities 
(Denisova 2010). Women are also the main actors in ‘quiet food sover-
eignty’ practises, as their desire for high-quality organic food for them-
selves and their families, means they are more likely to engage in food 
self-provisioning (Rogozin 2013). Furthermore, the image of an active 
‘Soviet woman’17 is still present in the post-Soviet countryside, and mani-
fests itself in advocacy rural politics – whose participants are predomi-
nantly women. These facts point towards a need for a gender-sensitive 
analysis, which will help to increase the understanding of underlying 
drivers of post-soviet post-socialist rural politics.  
The fieldwork for this research was carried out before the Ukrainian 
Euromaidan revolution and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The empiri-
cal chapters of this dissertation were updated based on interviews with 
Russian and Ukrainian experts and post-fieldwork correspondence with 
informants. However, the current crisis brought a number of changes in 
official politics in Russia and Ukraine, which is a call for future research. 
For example, the embargo imposed by Russia on European food im-
ports in retaliation for Western sanctions against Russia over the crisis in 
Ukraine, should, according to the Russian government, stimulate domes-
tic food production. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev asserted that 
blocking imports, protecting domestic markets, and providing state sup-
port to agriculture would lead to the emergence of new commercial fam-
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ily farms and encourage rural entrepreneurship (Interfax 2014). How-
ever, the number of private farmers increased only by 2.6% during 2014-
2015 (Vedomosti 2015). Meanwhile, the 20% increase in domestic agri-
cultural production during 2014-2015 was achieved due to colossal state 
subsidies given to LFEs. Moreover, despite the current economic crisis 
and food sanctions, the Ministry of Agriculture has proposed new legis-
lation aimed at limiting the amount of poultry and livestock in rural 
households (Kretsul 2015). This legislation was proclaimed to make a 
clear distinction between commercial family farmers (which have to be 
registered and pay taxes) and personal subsidiary farming. In reality, it 
will jeopardise the subsistence of many rural households. Will these 
amendments become an incentive for rural resistance and mobilisation 
around rights to food and to farming? Further research should be carried 
out to investigate the impacts of the geopolitical crisis and the food im-
port ban on agrarian transformation in Russia, and to study how rural 
dwellers respond to the new challenges brought upon them by the eco-
nomic crisis and their own government. It is important to understand 
whether a shift from state policy oriented towards large-scale farming – 
yet which tolerates (or ignores) small-scale farms – to a policy actively 
curtailing small-scale farms would generate more rural resistance. 
The recent political change in Ukraine did not bring many changes in 
the rural politics of the state. Yanukovich's government fell during the 
Euromaidan revolution in 2014, followed by a civil war and confronta-
tions with Russia. However, the state agricultural policy continued in its 
orientation towards large-scale agricultural development. The new gov-
ernment of Poroshenko, although proclaiming its support for small- and 
medium-scale farmers, did nothing, in fact, to support them (Kuns 
2016). Land grabbing by state-affiliated oligarchs has continued. The Eu-
romaidan revolution did not change the state system: the oligarchic clan 
of Yanukovich – the so-called ‘family’ – was replaced by the oligarchic 
clan of Poroshenko, while the principles of a state-oligarch merger re-
main unchanged (Müller 2014).  
The new Ukrainian government declared integration with the Euro-
pean Union as the main goal of its domestic and foreign policies18. The 
vexed question of liberalisation of the Ukrainian land market was raised 
again – and this time, the moratorium on farmland sales will most likely 
be lifted. International observers have advised the Ukrainian government 
to cancel the moratorium ‘in a phased manner’ with the application of 
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the ‘Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of 
Land, Fisheries and Forests’ (Tonchovska and Egiashvili 2014). How-
ever, even if the moratorium’s cancellation is carried out in accordance 
with international standards, ‘due to the economic crisis and the civil war 
in the country, the majority of Ukrainians have no money to purchase 
the relatively cheap land’, which would lead to land accumulation by 
state-affiliated oligarchs and large agricultural companies – including for-
eign investors (Plank 2015: 76). However, this will not cause a drastic 
change in land use, as LFEs and oligarchs already control the majority of 
Ukrainian farmland. The moratorium cancellation will mainly ensure 
land property rights of current land users. However, this legislative 
change might break down the symbiosis between LFEs and rural house-
holds. Future research should be conducted to study the impact of land 
sales on the productive symbiosis and coexistence between large and 
small-scale farming.  
Furthermore, post-fieldwork correspondence with Ukrainian infor-
mants indicated an increase in the dependence of the population on the 
small-scale subsistence farming on household and dacha plots in order to 
cope with the economic crisis and political uncertainty. Meanwhile, offi-
cial statistics demonstrate an unchanged picture: in 2014, households 
produced as many crops as they did a year ago before the revolution and 
civil war started, and even decreased their livestock production by 5% 
(Ukrstat 2016). Imprecise official statistics or exclusion of Crimea from 
calculations could be among the explanations for this unpredicted trend. 
Further research should investigate the survival strategies of rural house-
holds during the current economic crisis in Ukraine. It will be critical to 
engage with the post-war, post-conflict studies literature to understand 
socio-economic transformations in contemporary rural Ukraine. In addi-
tion, it will provide important insights in the (temporal) dynamics and 
resilience of post-socialist small-scale farming. 
This study demonstrates the importance of the post-socialist region 
for critical agrarian studies debates. It reveals the diversity and dynamic 
nature of rural politics in Russia and Ukraine, and demonstrates how the 
analysis of post-socialist rural processes can support, complement, and at 
times contest mainstream assumptions about contemporary agrarian 
transformation. This brings us one step closer to a better understanding 
of what is occurring in rural areas, in particular, when land deals hit the 
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ground, and how, in general, neoliberal agricultural development changes 
the lives of rural people. 
Notes
 
1 The Pskov region is located at the Western border of Russia, while the Rostov 
region is in the Southern region of Russia. 
2 Matkowski (2004) included in this group: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Kyr-
gyzstan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. He also included Moldova, however, it is not 
located in Central Asia or Transcaucasia. 
3 These include Albania, Ukraine, Romania, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Kazakhstan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Russia, Belarus, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Croatia (Matkowski 2004). 
4 These include Poland, Estonia, Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, 
according to Matkowski (2004). 
5 In the Baltic and some countries of central and Eastern Europe, de-
collectivisation of agriculture was carried out through land restitution to the 
original owners of the land (see Chapter 2); whereas in many countries of Central 
Asia and Transcaucasia state remain the major farmland owner. 
6 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Belarussian government imple-
mented a course of land reforms aimed at privatization of kolkhozy and sovk-
hozy’ land and assets, however, this reform was later curtailed. Currently 80% of 
agricultural enterprises are owned by the state (Fritz 2007). 
7 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. 
8 Humprey 2002b, Gudeman and Hann 2015, Cash 2015, Smith and Jehlička 
2013, Visser 2008, Pallot and Nefedova 2007 among others. 
9 In Ukraine, the influence of global investors is much larger than in Russia, but 
even among domestic Russian investors, the distance between the investment 
headquarters and the farm sites invested in, became larger. 
10 The Russian ‘foreign agent’ law is officially law № 102766-6 “On Amendments 
to Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation regarding the Regulation of the Ac-
tivities of Non-profit Organisations Performing the Functions of a Foreign 
Agent,” adopted in 2012. 
11 These findings are supported by the household survey results of Nefedova 
(2008), conducted in the Kostroma region in 2008. According to this survey, 
nearly 50% of the respondents argued that they will continue their (semi-) subsis-
tence farming at the same scale with a hypothetical increase in household in-
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comes, 25% would decrease their food production, and only 14% will expand 
their farming and, possibly, establish a commercial farm. 
12 These include: the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and 
Food Systems (RAI) of the World Bank; The Voluntary Guidelines on the Re-
sponsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context 
of National Food Security (VGGT) developed by FAO; the Principles for Re-
sponsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Re-
sources (PRAI), which was developed by the Inter-Agency Working Group 
composed of FAO, IFAD, UNCTAD and the World Bank; the Voluntary Guid-
ance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains of FAO and OECD. 
13 Mamonova, N. 2015. Quietness and adaptability: Ukrainian peasants’ responses 
to land grabbing and agribusiness expansion. In Right to Food and Nutrition Watch 
2015 ‘Peoples’ Nutrition Is Not a Business’ FIAN International. Available 
at:http://www.rtfn-watch.org/fileadmin/media/rtfn-
watch.org/ENGLISH/pdf/Watch_2015/RtFNWatch_EN_web.pdf. 
14 Mamonova, N. 2016. Co-existence in Ukraine. The Land magazine, issue 19, 
February 2016. Available at: http://www.thelandmagazine.org.uk/back-issues. 
15 Visser, O., Mamonova, N. and Spoor, M. 2012. Инвесторы, мегафермы и 
«пустующие» земли: крупные земельные сделки в России. В книге: Земельная 
аккумуляция в начале XXI века: глобальные инвесторы и локальные сообщества. М.: 
Издательский дом «Дело» РАНХиГС, 2012. 
16 The international conference ‘Land Accumulation in the FSU and beyond: 
Global investors and local communities’ (Moscow, October 2011); international 
workshop ‘Food, farmland and forests in transition: The Eurasian countryside 25 
years after’ (November 2014, Bucharest). 
17 The socialist propaganda on gender equality was aimed at creating ‘the image of 
a socially active Soviet woman, taking care of the orderly running and daily life of 
their families, neighbourhood and workplace’ (Scheide 2001: 17). 
18 This affiliation with the European Union, according to Kramer (2013), would 
protect property interests of Ukrainian oligarchs and give them access to loans 
from the International Monetary Fund. 
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 Appendices 
Appendix 1 
The questionnaire for Household Survey conducted in Ukraine in 
2012 (translated into English, originally written and conducted in 
Russian or Ukrainian) 
 
Household no: ………………….…. Date: ………………… 
Village: ……………………………………………………… 
Age of the respondent:………………………………………. 
Gender of the respondent: [ ] Male; [ ] Female  
 
Interview is administered to the household head [ ]; to a family member [ 
] 
 
A. HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS 
 
A1. Number of household members …………………… 
 
A2. 
N of 
fami-
ly 
mem
ber 
A3.  
Gender 
 
1.Male 
2.Female 
A4. 
Age cate-
gory 
 
1.Infant 
(<17) 
2.Adult 
(working 
age) 
3.Pensioner 
(>65) 
A5. 
Occupation 
 
1.Study at school/university 
2.Employed at LFE 
3.Employed in non-
agricultural sector in the 
countryside 
4.Work in urban areas  
5.Conduct household farming  
6.Commercial farmer (family 
farming) 
7.Non-agricultural self-
employment  
8.Unemployed  
9.Pensioner  
10.Other (specify) 
A6. 
Engagement 
in personal 
farming 
  
1.Full time (more 
than 8 hours per 
day) 
2.Part-time (less 
than 4 hours a 
day) 
3.Eventually dur-
ing planting 
and/or harvesting  
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1     
2     
3     
…     
A7. Has any of your family members ever lived in another place for three or 
more months at one time?  
[ ] yes, in another village  
[ ] yes, in another town/city 
[ ] no 
 
A8. Why did he/she move here? (tick as much as relevant) 
[ ] to study  
[ ] to look for job 
[ ] to get married/establish a family  
[ ] to start own entrepreneurship (including commercial farming) 
[ ] other (specify)…………………………………… 
 
A9. If he/she came back, what were the reasons? (tick as much as relevant) 
[ ] finished the study 
[ ] were unable to find a job  
[ ] were unable to support himself/herself financially  
[ ] homesick  
[ ] he/she was needed at the household/farm back home 
[ ] other (specify)…………………………………… 
 
 
A10. How would you characterise yourself: 
[ ] peasant  
[ ] rural worker 
[ ] farmer  
[ ] villager 
[ ] other (specify) …………………………………… 
 
B. FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL RESOURCES OF HOUSEHOLD  
 
B1. What are the main income sources of your family/household? (mark 1 – 
important, 2 – less important, 3 – least important, 0 – none) 
 Importance  
1. Farm income from household plot (food production for 
family consumption) 
 
2. Sales of farm products  
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3. Salaries from agricultural employment  
4. Salaries from non-agricultural employment  
5. Income from non-farm self-employment (private entrepre-
neurship) 
 
6. Social security benefits, including retirement pensions, un-
employment insurance, veterans’ benefits, etc. 
 
7. Payments of LFEs for renting your land plot (pai)  
8. Remittances from relatives  
9. Credit  
10. Other (specify)  
 
B2. Which of the following products/goods/services you… 
 1. produce yourself (within your 
household) 
2. buy at market/shop/supermarket 
3. buy from neighbours and ac-
quaintances 
4. receive as gifts from friends and 
relatives 
5. buy from LFEs or commercial 
farmers  
6. receive for free from LFEs or com-
mercial farmers 
7. receive from LFEs or commercial 
farmers as a payment for renting 
your land plot 
8. don’t use/need at all 
1. Vegetables, potatoes, eggs, green-
ery 
 
2. Fruits and berries  
3. Meat and fish  
4. Milk and milk products  
5. Grain for self-consumption (includ-
ing flour) 
 
6. Grain to feed animals  
7. Bread, bakery products, confection-
ery 
 
8. Fertilisers (and other input for farm-
ing) 
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9. Young animals  
10. Assistance with land cultivation 
(machinery)  
 
 
B3. How did you change your production during the last 10 years? 
 1. started growing/producing  
2. significantly increased 
3. increased  
4. no changes  
5. decreased  
6. stopped growing/producing  
1. Vegetables, potatoes, eggs, green-
ery 
 
2. Fruits and berries  
3. Milk and milk products  
4. Meat  
5. Grain  
6. Other (specify)  
  
B4. What were the reasons for the change? (tick as much as relevant) 
[ ] unequal competition with LFEs  
[ ] increase [ ] decrease in market demand (and market price) for this type 
of products  
[ ] increase [ ] decrease in the state support to small-scale producers (incl. 
subsidies, certification, market place) 
[ ] we have more [ ] less family members  
[ ] we can’t afford/too expensive to buy these products in shops/market  
[ ] we lost [ ] get more farmland 
[ ] increase [ ] decreased in the size of pai and other support from LFEs  
[ ] other (specify)___________________________ 
  
 B5. What is the most important for you when you decide to rent (and to 
whom) your land plot? (mark 1 – important, 2 – less important, 3 – least important, 0 – 
none) 
 Importance  
1. The size of pai (in kind and cash)  
2. Tenant’s support to my household (with ploughing, 
fertilisers, seeds, etc.) 
 
3. Tenant’s support to my village (reparation of roads, schools, 
etc.) 
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4. The type of agriculture the tenant does  
5. Environmental impact of tenant’s activities  
6. Other (specify)  
 
B6. What do you think about the moratorium on farmland sales?  
[ ] farmlands should be bought and sold as commodities – it will improve 
Ukrainian agriculture 
 [ ] cancellation of moratorium will be bad for the village (specify how)…....... 
 …………………………………………………………………………... 
 [ ] I look forward to sell my land plot, as I need money 
 [ ] I want to buy additional lands when moratorium will be lifted 
 [ ] I have no opinion about this 
 
C. CIVIL ACTIVITIES AND PROTEST 
 
C1. How do you learn about the local news? (tick as much as relevant) 
 [ ] local television channels 
 [ ] radio 
 [ ] at village meetings 
 [ ] from neighbors  
 [ ] other (specify)____________________ 
 
C2. Which injustices would motivate you to join an organised group protest 
in front of the village authority office (mark 1 – definitely join; 2 – will think about; 
3 – not join; 0 – it is useless to protest about such issues) 
 Response 
1. Closure of rural hospital  
2. Appointment of a new head of village authority, which I 
don’t like 
 
3. Non-payment (or underpayment) of pai by LFEs  
4. Ecological problems  
5. Other (specify)  
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Appendix 2 
Example of an information sheet, which was distributed to all 
participants of the research (translated into English, originally 
distributed in Russian or Ukrainian) 
 
INFORMATION SHEET: 
 
Dear Sir, Dear Madam, 
You are invited to participate in a research project by the International Insti-
tute of Social Studies (ISS) in the Hague. This project is carried out in col-
laboration with the Institute of Geography [this central institute in Moscow 
and/or a regional institute with we cooperate will be mentioned here]. It is 
funded by the EU (projectnr. 313871). 
This research project investigates global investments in land and agriculture 
in Russia, and the consequences for and reactions by local communities. It 
aims to study the motivations and nature for such investments as well as 
effects and responses. 
For your participation in this research, the following points are important: 
1. Participation in this research occurs on the basis of informed consent. It 
is voluntary and can be refused.  
2. Withdrawal from the research is possible at any time, without further no-
tice.  
3. In order to protect your privacy, research data will be dealt with confi-
dentially. Which means that statements made by you will be transcribed us-
ing synonyms, to make sure you are not identifiable. You can also indicate 
that you have no objection to the untranscribed use of your identity. 
4. At your request recorded material in which you figure can be made avail-
able to you. 
5. The data will be securely stored under the responsibility of the principal 
investigator. After the end of the 5-year project, the most sensitive data will 
be destroyed, the rest will be securely stored at the ISS, The Hague. The raw 
data will only be used for academic purposes. Access to the data by aca-
demic researchers, beyond the research team is dependent on a strict evalua-
tion by the ethical committee of the ISS in which confidentiality is key. No 
other persons or institutions will have access to the data. 
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6. Results of the research will be published in academic publications, and on 
the blog of the research project. All publications and dissemination will oc-
cur with strict adherence to the above-mentioned privacy procedures.  
For more information on this research you can contact / turn to: 
Locally: Natalia Mamonova, Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of Social Stud-
ies, Russian phone number: + 7905-757-25-19, e-mail: mannova@iss.nl  
The project’s Principal Investigator, Dr Oane Visser, in the Netherlands at 
the Institute of Social Studies, P.O. Box 29776, 2502 LT The Hague, tel. 
+31 (0)70-104-081-164, visser@iss.nl 
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Appendix 3 
Fieldwork photos 
 
Above: Mykolay was formerly a tractor driver, and Maria a veterinarian, as part of the kolkhoz in 
the village of Rusanivtsi. Today, they are self-sufficient subsistence farmers, keeping two cows, 
geese, and chickens. In the photo, they are shown returning home with hay, which they had 
mown from abandoned farmlands (Letichiv district, Khmelnytsk region, Ukraine. Photo by S. 
Donati). Below: Ludmila with her two grandsons, who stay with her during the summer school 
holiday (Pereyaslav-Khmelnytskyi district, Kyiv region, Ukraine. Photo by S. Donati). 
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Above: Petro and Nadezhda at their rural house, where they live most of the year (they only live 
in their city apartment for a few months in the winter). They cultivate nearly the entire household 
plot of 0.2 ha and follow the rural lifestyle. Below: Nadezhda is preparing breakfast for herself, 
her husband, and unexpected but warmly received guests (Trebukhovka village, Khmelnitsk re-
gion, Ukraine. Photos by N. Mamonova (above), and S. Donati (below)). 
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Above: Larisa has gathered some apples to treat the research team. The apples, as well as other 
self-grown food, are used for self-consumption, given away to friends and family, sold on local 
markets, and preserved for the winter. Below: The remaining preserves from the previous year 
(Bar village on the border between the Khmelnitsk and Vinnytsia regions, Ukraine. Photos by S. 
Donati (above) and N. Mamonova (below)). 
 
Processed on: 6-9-2016
505017-L-bw-Mamanova
262 APPENDICES 
 
 
Above: An official food market in Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi, where rural dwellers sell their prod-
ucts. They have to pay for a spot and, if necessary, for veterinary-sanitary tests (Kiev region, 
Ukraine. Photo by S. Donati). Below: An ‘impromptu’ (unofficial) market on the side of the road 
(Khmelnitsk region, Ukraine. Photo by N. Mamonova).  
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Above: Commercial family farmer Mykolay with his daughters and sons-in-law. Formerly, Myko-
lay was an agronomist at a collective poultry farm. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, he was 
one of the few who managed to withdraw land shares for private farming. Currently, his family 
cultivates 250 ha (the majority of which they rent from fellow villagers) and produces wheat and 
buckwheat. Below: Lyudmila (odnoosibnik) with one of her 6 cows. She runs her household 
together with her husband, youngest son and daughter-in-law. She travels to Kiev once a week to 
sell their milk products at a farmers’ market (Hreblya village, Kyiv region, Ukraine. Photos by S. 
Donati).  
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Above: Note-taking during the interview with Ivan, a former kolkhoz tractor driver, who is now 
one of the two men living in the Rusanivtsi village. He tells that only 6 of the village’s 30 houses 
are inhabited, primarily by elderly widowed women (Khmelnytsk region, Ukraine. Photo by S. 
Donati). Below: The first day of official visits in the Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi district. In the 
photo: researcher with received gifts, local rural authorities, and representatives of the district 
government (Kiev region, Ukraine. Photo by S. Donati). 
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Above and Below: An abandoned cowshed from a former kolkhoz in the Letychiv district. 
Livestock production has collapsed after the fall of Soviet Union, and until now remains less 
attractive to large-scale investors. Most animal products are produced in households (Khmelnitsk 
region, Ukraine. Photo by S. Donati).  
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Above: A modern grain elevator close to the Bar village. The locals mentioned that it was built 
by a foreign investor, although the elevator’s management did not confirm this information. Be-
low: Workers at a former kolkhoz in the Letichiv district, which is currently the subsidiary of a 
large American agroholding. The farm enterprise preserved its Soviet name, structure, and many 
of its former employees (Khmelnitsk region, Ukraine. Photos by S. Donati). 
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Above: Combine harvesters on the field of a former kolkhoz, which is now the subsidiary of a 
large American agroholding. In the Soviet times, this kolkhoz cultivated 4,000 ha, ran 2,000 head 
of cattle and 50,000 of poultry, and employed 240 people. With the new investor, the farm be-
came specialised in monocrop wheat production and expanded its landholding to 16,000 ha. It 
currently provides 120 permanent and 15 seasonal jobs in the district. 60% of its employees are 
former kolkhoz workers. Below: one of the guards monitors harvesting (Khmelnitsk region, 
Ukraine. Photos by S. Donati). 
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Above: A bust of Lenin at the entrance of the JSC kolkhoz ‘Named after Lenin’, in the village of 
Arzgir. Although this kolkhoz was transformed into a joint stock company after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, it preserved its old name and symbols. The diversity of its agricultural produc-
tion, however, has declined; the enterprise became largely specialised in monocrop wheat produc-
tion. Below: Svetlana, chairwoman of the kolkhoz’s trade union, proudly shows the rich history 
of the kolkhoz ‘Named after Lenin’ in the kolkhoz’s museum (village of Arzgir, Stavropol Krai, 
Russia. Photos by N. Mamonova).  
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Above: Andrey is a combine harvester driver at the JSC kolkhoz ‘Named after Lenin’ in the vil-
lage of Arzgir. Both of his parents used to work at this kolkhoz; he sees no other way of life than 
continuing in his parents’ footsteps. Although Arzgir is a large village, there are few employment 
opportunities beyond those provided by kolkhoz. He does not have the resources to start a pri-
vate family farm, but neither does he want to take a risk in that direction, as he has recently be-
come a father. Below: One of the modern combine harvesters at the JSC kolkhoz ‘Named after 
Lenin’. In total, the kolkhoz has 48,000 ha, including 24,000 ha of arable land and 14,000 ha of 
grassland. It employs 370 people (village of Arzgir, Stavropol Krai, Russia. Photos by N. Ma-
monova). 
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Above: Mikhail is a tractor driver at the JSC kolkhoz ‘Named after Lenin’. He used to work at 
the same kolkhoz before the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, when the kolkhoz 
experienced severe difficulties, he was dismissed on grounds of redundancy. After that, he was 
jobless for a while, and then worked as a long-distance truck driver. He was happy to be hired 
again at the kolkhoz in the early 2000s. Below: Preparing lunch for the workers at the cafeteria of 
the kolkhoz ‘Named after Lenin’ (village of Arzgir, Stavropol Krai, Russia. Photos by N. Ma-
monova).
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Above: Beef cattle breeding at the JSC kolkhoz ‘Named after Lenin’. This kolkhoz is one of the 
few large-scale meat produces in Stavropol Krai. However, the meat production is unprofitable, 
and only maintained to keep up employment. In the near future, the kolkhoz will consider termi-
nating this activity. Below: One of the cowsheds of the JSC kolkhoz ‘Named after Lenin’ (village 
of Arzgir, Stavropol Krai, Russia. Photos by N. Mamonova). 
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Above: An abandoned greenhouse from a former kolkhoz close to the village of Krasnoye. The 
kolkhoz no longer exists. Some of its greenhouses are used by Chinese farmers to grow vegeta-
bles. Below: Ludmila, a retired teacher of Russian language and literature at a rural school in the 
village of Krasnoye. She was a gatekeeper for the fieldwork conducted in the village of Krasnoye 
(Grachyovsk district, Stavropol Krai, Russia. Photo by N. Mamonova). 
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Above: Olga is watching her 5 cows returning home after grazing. 17 households in the Kras-
noye village keep livestock (approx. 2-4 cows per household, 66 cows in total). They jointly 
organise the grazing: based on a rotation principle, every household provides a herder with a 
horse for a week to take the herd to pasture. Below: Alik is leading the village herd back from 
the pasture. Villagers have to graze their cows in areas unsuitable for grazing (roadsides or rocky 
terrain), because the new investor, which acquired a bankrupted kolkhoz, turned all the grassland 
into arable land (village of Krasnoye, Grachyovsk district, Stavropol Krai, Russia. Photos by 
N.Mamonova). 
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Olga and Michail are self-sufficient small-scale food producers. They keep 3 cows, a dozen pigs, 
chicken, geese, and cultivate the entire 0.34 ha household plot. Several years ago, they wanted to 
withdraw their land shares from the local large farm enterprise to start a commercial family farm. 
However, the enterprise’s management denied their multiple requests, and only agreed to give 
them their land shares after they applied to a local court. Their land parcel was allocated at some 
distance from the village, and in a rocky desert area, which was inappropriate for agriculture. 
Olga and Michail did not accept the plot, and left their land shares under the local farm’s admini-
stration (village of Krasnoye, Grachyovsk district, Stavropol Krai, Russia. Photos by N. Ma-
monova). 
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Above: Maria is watching her pigs, which she will have to slaughter when the new law for limit-
ing the livestock of rural households comes into force. Maria, her husband, and mother-in-law 
cultivate 3 household plots. They financially support their three sons, who live and study in the 
city (village of Rasshevatskaya, Novoalexandrovsk district, Stavropol Krai, Russia). Below: 
Commercial farmer Alexander and his son at their watermelon field. Alexander worked as a chief 
secretary for the village Communist Party. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, he was one of 
3 people in the village who managed to withdraw land shares and establish farms. Today he is the 
only farmer in the village; the other two went bankrupt (village of Krasnoye, Stavropol Krai, 
Russia. Photos by N. Mamonova).  
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Above: Nadezda moved with her husband and daughter from a city to a village 10 years ago, 
when her husband’s carpentry business was bankrupted by the local mafia’s extortions. Since 
then, they follow the rural lifestyle. They kept livestock for some time, but had to slaughter them 
when her husband became ill (village of Davydovskoe, Kolchugino district, Vladimir region, 
Russia). Below: A view from a rural house on the household and field. Many rural houses are 
used by urban dwellers as dachas – i.e. summer country houses (village of Prokudino, Kolchu-
gino district, Vladimir region, Russia. Photos by N. Mamonova). 
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Above: I am helping my father to dig the vegetable plot close to our dacha. My family, like many 
other Russian families, has a dacha plot of 0.06 ha for recreational activities and for cultivating 
fruits and vegetable for family consumption. Below: My father being proud of his cucumbers. 
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Above and Below: Protest of deprived land shareholders of the sovkhoz ‘Serp i Molot’. 180 
former sovkhoz workers lost their land shares due to the illegal acquisition and deliberate bank-
ruptcy of the sovkhoz. They are members of the rural social movement ‘Krestyansky Front’ and 
have been protesting for more than 10 years. The texts on their posters say: ‘Privatisation in rural 
areas only benefits tricksters, what about the peasants?’ and ‘LJSC “Serp i Molot”, give us our 
land back!’ (village of Purschevo, Balashikha district, Moscow region, Russia. Photos by N. Ma-
monova). 
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Above: Protest of deprived land shareholders of the sovkhoz ‘Leninskiy Luch’. This sovkhoz 
used to supply Moscow with milk products; it was illegally acquired and bankrupted, and its farm-
land was used for the construction of prestigious houses for the new Russian elite. The protesters 
are dissatisfied with the offered compensation of 10,000 USD per share (the market price of one 
land share of 4 ha is about 800,000 USD). Below: A meeting between civil activists and a repre-
sentative of the Moscow regional government (Krasnogorsk, Moscow region, Russia. Photos by 
N. Mamonova). 
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Above: A petition letter to the Russian President from the Deulino villagers, who complain 
about the unlawful acquisition and bankruptcy of their sovkhoz, and the construction of country 
houses on its land (village of Deulino, Sergiev-Posad district, Moscow region, Russia). Below: A 
newly built dacha settlement for middle-class urbanites; the crossed out graffiti on the fence 
reads: ‘the land of Radonezh is grabbed’. The illegal acquisition of the Radonezh land sparked a 
huge public scandal due to this area’s religious and historical heritage, and the fact that this con-
flict was used in political campaigns by several regional politicians (village of Antipino, Sergiev-
Posad district, Moscow region, Russia. Photos by N. Mamonova).  
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